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Debates about multi-level governance have led to a profound restructuring of  
regional and local government. The second level of  local government is under 
review in most European countries, with the aim to strengthen the institutional 
capacity of  municipalities or to develop appropriate institutional structures for 
governing fragmented urban areas.
This book provides a thematic and cross-national analysis of  the key actors in 
local government that form the crucial components of  effective and democratic 
policy making. Focussing on the second tier of  local government, it examines new 
empirical data on councillors from this level of  government in 15 European coun-
tries and integrates important variables such as party politics, notions of  democ-
racy, finance, multi-level settings. Divided into five parts, it addresses:
• Attitudes of  county/provincial councillors towards administrative and territo-
rial reforms.
• Their role perception and role behaviour.
• Their political orientation.
• Actor constellations and governance arrangements.
• Political socialization and recruitment, professionalization and career patterns 
of  county/provincial councillors.
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1 Introduction
Xavier Bertrana, Björn Egner and Hubert Heinelt
Aims, origin and main questions of  the book
Instead of  focusing on national sovereignty and government-centred governance, 
increasing interest is dedicated in political and scholarly debate since the 1990s 
on multi-level governance, which stresses the importance of  the spatial dimension 
in public policy and governance in general as well as collective self-determination. 
In this context the effectiveness and the democratic quality of  policy making in 
multi-level systems have occupied a prominent position on the political agenda 
and led in most European countries to a profound restructuring of  regional and 
local government (for recent publications on this topic see Loughlin et al. 2011; 
Baldersheim and Rose 2010).
One of  the main focuses of  these reform processes is the second tier of  local 
government, which has become the weakest link in the chain of  the multi-level 
government systems in European countries. It is frequently squeezed between the 
powers of  upper levels of  governments and the municipalities. While in some 
European countries this level of  local self-government, based on a multipurpose 
jurisdiction, has being upscaled or even abolished in the context of  wider region-
alisation processes, in others it has been completely revised either to become an 
proper institutional structure for governing fragmented urban areas by upscaling 
municipal powers or decentralising tasks of  upper levels of  government tasks (see, 
for example, OECD 2015). In fact, exceptions to this multi-level reform processes 
can be found in most of  the Eastern European countries included in this book, 
where decentralisation took place quite recently and the second tier of  local gov-
ernment has only experienced minor institutional changes. Nevertheless, where 
reforms took place in Eastern European countries the second tier of  local govern-
ment has played an important role in establishing democratic political structures 
at the subnational level and strengthening local autonomy. For that reason, reform 
processes at county level have affected the central state administration (or, in other 
words, the deconcentrated state administration) either to give the second tier more 
autonomy in relation to the central state (as happened in Croatia in 2001) or simply 
to abolish central state administration offices at county level (Czech Republic).
Northern European countries like Denmark, Sweden or the United Kingdom 
share a long tradition of  continuous structural reforms of  local government, which 
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continued during the last decade (for a historical overview, see the different country 
chapters in Baldersheim and Rose 2010 or Heinelt and Bertrana 2011). For exam-
ple, in 2007 Denmark abolished counties, shifting most of  its tasks to municipalities 
(which were amalgamated) and creating new government structures at the regional 
level responsible for health services (see Mouritzen 2011). In Sweden, there is an 
ongoing review of  the second tier of  local government towards amalgamation 
which should be complemented by the allocation of  more functions of  the decon-
centrated central state administration at this level of  government (see Bäck 2011). 
Finally, in England there is a continuous process towards the creation of  the so-
called unitary authorities merging former counties and districts.
Due to coercive top-down approach employed, these kinds of  reforms in Nordic 
and North-middle European countries have been termed the ‘North European 
Strategy’ (Wollmann 2010). By contrast, the ‘South European Strategy’ has 
retained not only the historical small-size format of  the municipalities by creating 
different kinds of  intermunicipal bodies, but also created a highly stable second tier 
of  local government (Bertrana and Heinelt 2013).
From this perspective, one of  the most striking features of  the reform processes 
on the local government system during the last decade in Southern European 
countries like France, Italy or Spain is their impact in the second tier of  local gov-
ernment. In almost all of  these cases the economic and financial crisis played a 
crucial role in the reforms deviating from the South European Strategy (see 
Bertrana and Heinelt 2013).
In France, the départements and the regions will be completely renewed if  the 
Socialist government’s plans for reform succeed. The different levels of  local gov-
ernment are experimenting in such an ambitious reform that it is difficult to syn-
thesize it in a few lines. While municipalities will still be considered as the basic 
level of  local government, sub-national levels of  government above the municipali-
ties are experiencing a significant reform of  their electoral system, their powers 
and competences (with a probable abolishment of  the general clause of  compe-
tence) and their territorial structure. In January 2015, for example, different 
métropoles were created with both municipal and departmental competences. This 
applied to cities like Rennes, Bordeaux or Strasbourg. In January 2016 the metrop-
olis of  Paris and Marseille will be created and the former 22 regions will be replaced 
by 13 new regional units (see Gouvernement de la République Française 2015).
In Italy the Law on the Metropolitan Cities, Provinces, and Unions and Munici-
pal Amalgamations transformed different provinces into 10 ‘metropolitan cities’ 
on 1 January 2015. They will also combine the competences of  the former munici-
pal and provincial levels of  government. These ‘metropolitan cities’ are lead by a 
‘metropolitan mayor’ who is the mayor of  the biggest city and a council consisting 
of  ‘metropolitan councillors’ elected amongst and by the municipal councillors and 
mayors. Furthermore, a transitory regime for the remaining provinces is planned 
before they are abolished after a Constitutional reform.
In Spain, the ‘Law on the Rationality and Sustainability of  Local Administration’ 
has focused on the rescaling of  municipal services to the provincial level to overcome 
the weaknesses of  the fragmentation of  the municipal level. However, at the same 
time, the actual implementation of  this law is questionable if  we take the weak 
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democratic legitimacy of  provincial councils and the contested role of  the Spanish 
provinces in the context of  the Estado de las Autonomías into account (i.e. the particular 
political system of  Spain with its strong ‘autonomous communities’/regional 
governments).
The planned reform of  the Dutch provinces continues to be uncertain because 
the plans of  the Dutch cabinet to reduce the number of  provinces through mergers 
have failed – as in the recent case of  the planned amalgamation of  Utrecht, Flevo-
land and North Holland. Nevertheless, ideas about the abolition of  city-regions, the 
amalgamation of  municipalities (with a mixed approach between voluntary mergers 
and intermunicipal cooperation) and the development of  new cooperative arrange-
ments between municipalities and provinces in an experimental way are still defining 
an ongoing process of  reform, which is altering the multi-level system of  government 
in the Netherlands (for a general overview see OECD 2014 and 2015: 66–67).
Finally, since the regionalisation of  the competences regarding the organisation 
of  local government in Belgium (in 2001), the reform plans are divergent in the two 
main regions of  the country. The implementation of  the planned reforms is depen-
dant on the strength of  the different political parties (and their different views on 
the state structure) in both regions. After the 2014 regional elections, the Walloon 
government consolidated the provinces. That government remains important at the 
intermediate government level to support municipalities in partnership with the 
regional government. The Flemish government that came into power in 2014 plans 
a far-reaching functional reform to alter the multi-level system of  government and 
the role of  the provinces. From 2017 onwards Flemish provinces will be responsible 
for territory-related competences only (and no longer for person-related compe-
tences) while excluding all their supralocal initiatives in cities with more than 
100,000 inhabitants and their partnership in intermunicipal cooperation.
These examples show not only that the democratic quality and the effectiveness 
of  the second tier of  local government is increasingly contested in the ongoing 
rescaling of  statehood, but also that reform processes are taking place even in 
countries where until now this level of  local government has showed a high capac-
ity to resist any attempt to impose far-reaching structural reforms.
How this rescaling of  statehood has affected the second tier of  local government 
in European countries has been shown in detail in Heinelt and Bertrana (2011; see 
also Bertrana and Heinelt 2013). However, gaps remain in knowledge about what 
is happening in daily practice at this level of  government, how policy making is 
done and how the rescaling of  statehood is perceived by those actors involved in 
policy making at the second tier of  local government.
To close this gap of  knowledge, a group of  scholars from a number of  Euro-
pean countries carried out a survey among councillors, political executives (i.e. 
presidents of  provinces, Landräte etc.) and leading bureaucrats (executive offi-
cers/CEOs), i.e. the highest ranking appointed and not elected civil servant or 
employee at the second level of  local government (provinces, counties, départements, 
Landkreise, etc.) in the years 2012 and 2013.1 Results of  this survey are published in 
this book. We have to admit that due to the small number of  responses of  political 
executives and leading bureaucrats at the second level of  local government (see 
Table 1.1) most chapters of  this book are focused on councillors.
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Introduction 5
The main (interrelated) research questions addressed in this book in a compara-
tive way are:
• What are the attitudes of  councillors, political executives and leading bureau-
crats at the second level of  local government towards recent administrative 
and territorial reforms?
• What is their role perception, and what is their actual role behaviour?
• What is their notion of  democracy and how does it affect their role percep-
tion, role behaviour and attitudes towards administrative and territorial 
reforms?
• What is the political orientation of  key actors involved in policy making at 
this level of  government? Do party politics (or party politicisation) play a role?
• How do key actors respond to newly emerging governance arrangements? 
More specifically: How do councillors, political executives and leading 
bureaucrats at the second level of  local government interact among each 
other? And how do they interact with societal actors and actors from upper 
levels of  government?
• What sorts of  people become a councillor at the second level of  local gov-
ernment? (What is their social background, political career and level of  
professionalization?)
The book edited by Heinelt and Bertrana (2011) provided the background for 
this survey (as the editors of  this book as well as a number of  authors who contrib-
uted country studies to it were part of  the research group).
The following countries are covered by this survey (carried out by the partners 
listed): Belgium (Tony Valcke, Kristof  Steyvers, Herwig Reynaert and Tom 
 Verhelst), Croatia (Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović and Sunčana Slijepčević), Czech 
Republic (Dan Ryšavý and Daniel Čermák), England (David Sweeting, Colin 
Copus, and Thom Oliver), France (Eric Kerrouche), Germany (Hubert Heinelt, 
Björn Egner and Max-Christopher Krapp), Greece (Nikos Hlepas), Hungary 
(Ilona Pálné and László Kákai), Italy (Carlo Baccetti and Annick Magnier),  Norway 
(Jacob Aars, Bjarte Folkestad and Lawrence E. Rose), Poland (Pawel Swianiewicz), 
Romania (Cristina Sta�nuş and Daniel Pop), Spain (Jaume Magre, Carmen Navarro, 
Joan Manel Sánchez and Xavier Bertrana) and Sweden (Anders Lidström, Kata-
rina Roos and Linn Antonsson).2
Content of  the book
According to the aforementioned questions tackled by individual chapters the book 
is arranged in the following way.
The first part of  the book is focused on counties in multi-level systems and atti-
tudes of  actors at this level of  local government towards administrative and territo-
rial reforms.
In Chapter 2, ‘County councils in a multi-level position: formal powers and 
assumed autonomy’ are reflected by Anders Lidström and Katarina Roos. 
8329-0042-PI-001.indd   5 7/10/2015   1:27:43 PM
6 X. Bertrana, B. Egner and H. Heinelt
The Heinelt and Bertrana (2011) book made a first attempt to develop a specific 
analysis of  the position of  the second-tier local authority in a comparative per-
spective. However, a limitation in the analysis is that it is only based on ‘objective’ 
criteria. There is no room for the decision makers themselves to express their 
views about their county’s position. This chapter fills this gap of  knowledge with 
an actor-centred analysis of  the vertical position of  the second-tier local authori-
ties vis-à-vis other levels of  government. A key question is to what extent objective 
criteria and subjective assessment correspond. One of  the main findings is that 
the assumed relationships vis-à-vis the municipalities on the one hand and vis-à-vis 
upper levels of  government on the other are uncorrelated. This suggests that 
downwards and upwards relationships reflect different logics. The link to the 
municipalities is more a governance-oriented exchange between equal partners 
whereas the relationship upwards is of  a hierarchical type, where county councils 
are clearly understood to be subordinate authorities with little scope for making 
a difference. Aside from formally identified differences in the institutional setting 
of  the second tier, councillors emphasise the existence of  different modes of  gov-
ernance regarding downwards and upwards relationships. There is support for 
both the theory of  limited rationality and the notion that the formal position and 
the assumptions of  autonomy are two different phenomena. For this reason, as 
Lidström and Roos show, whenever possible formal measures should be comple-
mented with subjective assessments in order to obtain a fuller picture of  a unit’s 
vertical autonomy.
‘Perceptions of  New Public Management reforms’ are addressed by Hubert 
Heinelt and Max-Christopher Krapp in Chapter 3. New Public Management 
(NPM) has been the major paradigm of  administrative reforms since the 1980s. 
However, it is quite unclear what local government actors really think about the 
need for administrative reforms and the reform perspectives offered by NPM. 
Heinelt and Krapp try to give answers to this question in this chapter. Furthermore, 
they refer not only to results of  the survey carried out in 2012 and 2013 with sec-
ond-tier councillors but also to surveys with local government actors carried out 
over the last 20 years. This is done to tackle the question if  changes in the percep-
tion of  local government actors regarding the need for administrative reforms and 
NPM related reform perspectives can be identified. Finally, this leads to the ques-
tion if  the heydays of  NPM have passed and what could be possibly expected 
‘beyond NPM’.
In Chapter 4, Dubravka Jurlina Alibegovic and Suncana Slijepcevic look at 
‘County councils: between revenue shortfalls and growing responsibilities’. In the 
last decades the process of  decentralization has been present in most European 
countries. This chapter starts with a review about the scholarly and political debate 
about decentralisation and particularly the relevance of  decentralisation for 
regional and local economic development. Based on this, the authors explore the 
role of  the second tier of  local government and attitudes of  second-tier councillors 
towards a decentralisation process and their perception in fostering local economic 
development, keeping in mind that there is a gap between revenue shortfalls and 
growing responsibilities that has been further deepened by the global financial 
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crisis. The authors conclude that in the last few decades many European countries 
have been faced with the same situation that the share of  the second level of  local 
government revenue in terms of  GDP stayed at relatively low levels. Central gov-
ernment keeps under its control main revenue sources. Transferred responsibilities 
to the second tier of  local government in the countries analysed are different but 
generally, the responsibility of  the second tier of  local government for coordinating 
local development policy remains low. Because of  limited financial resources for 
current responsibilities, the attitudes of  county councillors towards new tasks and 
responsibilities are not homogenous across the countries analysed. Most county 
councillors across Europe think that their role in the coordination of  local eco-
nomic development should be more important. Therefore, additional attention is 
given to the analysis of  county councillors’ attitudes towards territorial reforms and 
the division of  responsibilities for providing basic public services/goods between 
the private and the public sector in different European countries. The emphasis is 
on an advocacy role of  county councillors in the promotion of  regional develop-
ment and overall well-being of  the local community.
The second part of  the book deals with the role perception and role behaviour 
of  actors at the second tier of  local government (particularly with councillors).
Cristina Sta�nuş approaches ‘The political representation focuses of  second-tier 
councillors in Europe’ in Chapter 5. The main aim is to describe and explain the 
mix of  representational focuses characteristic of  elected officials at the second tier 
of  local government in Europe. More precisely, the chapter sets out to answer three 
questions: (1) How does the notion of  overlapping focuses of  representation mani-
fest itself  at the second tier of  local government in Europe? (2) To what extent is 
territorial representation being replaced/complemented by more flexible forms of  
political representation? And (3) what are the factors that account for variation 
(if  any) in territorial representation focuses of  second-tier elected officials in 
Europe? First, the analysis shows that territorial and functional representation 
coexist and complement each other at the second tier of  local government. The 
main reason is that territorial representation tends towards more localised forms, 
but at the same time this trend is stronger in local government systems where 
councillors play important roles in policy making and, consequently, find them-
selves more integrated in local policy networks involving higher levels of  functional 
representation. Second, the analysis partially explains variation in terms of  territo-
rial representation focuses across Europe by examining at a set of  aggregate and 
individual level variables. At the cross-national level, the type of  territorial repre-
sentation is acquired by county councillors in Europe seems to depend significantly 
on the electoral formula and the type of  local government system. Third, at the 
individual level, the future career plans of  a councillor as well as whether he or she 
is a full-time politician (which is at least partially institutionally determined) or, to 
a lesser degree, his or her affiliation with a political party, help to shed some light 
on the acquisition of  representational focuses. However, these elements provide 
only a partial explanation, since characteristics of  national and local politics 
explained above seem to be more relevant to influence the role perception of  
elected officials at the second tier of  local government.
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Chapter 6, ‘Representational styles among regional and local councillors’ (by 
Jacob Aars, Bjarte Folkestad and Lawrence E. Rose) takes as its departure two 
potentially opposing demands on elected officials famously expressed by Edmund 
Burke. On one hand, elected representatives are expected to consult with their 
voters in order to express the views of  their constituency. On the other, they are 
expected to formulate their own policy initiatives, independently of  their voters’ 
opinions. The two demands entail different representational roles: whereas the 
first primarily implies a delegate role, the second implies a trustee role. At the 
time when Burke made his speech, however, political parties in the form that we 
know today did not exist. Representatives are now typically nominated by politi-
cal parties and stand for election on the basis of  a party platform. This chapter 
focuses on the party mandate as a form of  role orientation. The authors pay 
special attention to the significance of  contextual variation in representational 
styles associated with role orientations among elected representatives at two dif-
ferent levels in the political-administrative systems of  12 countries. It is suggested 
that county councillors operate in a context where they are less close to their 
constituents than are municipal councillors, and hence a party mandate role 
orientation is likely to be more prevalent among regional representatives. The 
authors find some support for this ‘levels effect’ proposition, but they also find 
differences in what are termed representational role profiles between the countries 
investigated, and that the representational role profiles for county and municipal 
councillors have noteworthy similarity. This suggests that there are also ‘system 
effects’ that influence the role orientations of  councillors at both levels of  local 
government of  the political system in the twelve countries. It would seem, in 
short, that certain features within a country, whether these be structural, cultural 
or otherwise, generate similar representational styles across different levels of  
government.
Chapter 7, ‘Patterns of  gender representation in councils at the second tier of  
local government: assessing the gender gap in an unexplored institutional setting’, 
by Carmen Navarro and Lluís Medir, starts with a straightforward review of  the 
literature on political representation in general and of  the representation of  women 
in representative bodies in particular. Based on this review, the authors examine 
the composition of  councils at the second tier of  local government as well as the 
personal characteristics of  female members of  these councils and their distinctive 
attitudes and values. In this way they explore whether the main hypotheses and 
findings to be found in the literature on women’s political representation can be 
confirmed for second-tier local assemblies. The main findings are that differences 
in the share of  women in councils at the second tier of  local government can be 
explained by institutional together with cultural and socioeconomic variables. The 
most favourable context for women to become a county councillor can be charac-
terised by proportional representation with closed party lists, large districts, gener-
ous welfare systems, high proportions of  women in the labour force and a culture 
of  gender equality. Furthermore, a practice of  applying candidate quotas makes a 
difference. Finally, leftist parties tend more to nominate women to safe places on 
their lists.
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Finally, in Chapter 8, ‘Notions of  democracy of  councillors at the municipal and second 
tier of  local government – and their role perception and behaviour’, Hubert Heinelt starts with 
an analysis of  responses of  second-tier councillors that can be related to either a 
representative or a broader participatory understanding of  democracy. In a second 
step the author tries to explain the pattern detected, which indicates different 
notions of  democracy. As it turned out in a previous analysis of  municipal council-
lors, formal horizontal power relations between councillors, the mayor and the 
leading bureaucrats of  the municipal administration determined by different local 
government systems do not affect the councillors’ notion of  democracy. Instead, 
their notions of  democracy can be related to personal characteristics only. It will 
be shown that this does not hold true for councillors at the second tier of  local 
government: in addition to personal characteristics, their notion of  democracy is 
also related to the institutional power relations they have to act in. The chapter 
follows an analysis of  the role perception and role behaviour of  councillors from 
both tiers of  local government as well as their attitudes towards reforms at the local 
level to see whether or not councillors’ notions of  democracy can be related to their 
role perception, role behaviour and attitudes towards reforms as dependent vari-
ables. It has to be emphasised that the responses of  councillors from both levels of  
local government to these topics are compared to see whether differences between 
municipal and second-tier councillors can be detected which could indicate that 
the greater spatial distance of  second-tier councillors from lay people/citizens 
 matters – and in this respect the geographical size of  political units.
The third part of  the book includes reflections on the political orientations of  
key actors, political parties and actor constellations at the second level of  local 
government and political parties.
Chapter 9, on ‘The importance of  political parties in county government’ (by 
Colin Copus, David Sweeting and Thom Oliver) examines the attitudes of  council-
lors towards their political party. The authors set their contribution in the broader 
context of  the decline of  party in different countries in different ways in this study, 
such as declining membership and a lack of  trust in parties and party politics. 
Using a party significance index and other variables the authors explore the impor-
tance of  the councillors’ own political party in this study. They find that party 
remains for many councillors of  overriding concern, and party loyalty is a deeply 
ingrained custom across the sample. Moreover, national parties exert considerable 
control over local party groups. Therefore, while a decline in the importance of  
the councillors’ own political party might be a feature of  broader societal processes, 
parties retain a strong grip on their activities.
Chapter 10, ‘Parties and ideology: how parties shape their manifestos to obtain 
votes’ (by Björn Egner), addresses the debate in political science of  how to measure 
ideological party positions. A large number of  empirical analyses use ideology 
scores for parties as independent variables, e.g. for policy choice, fiscal perfor-
mance, electoral campaign strategies. One possibility is rarely used by political 
scientists, hence it suggests enhanced validity and reliability: The measurement of  
party positions according to the self-assessment of  party members. The survey on 
which the chapters of  this book are based provides us with a self-assessment of  
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politicians of  the second tier of  local government, which are in touch with the ‘real’ 
problems of  the local level, but are also potential career politicians for upper levels. 
Therefore, the assessment of  the people who are taking part in politics at the sec-
ond level of  local government level is representative of  what the ‘party infantry’ 
thinks where ‘their’ party is located on the traditional left-right dimension. The 
chapter discusses the assessment of  party members about their party, their ideologi-
cal self-assessment and links the survey data to the scores of  the comparative mani-
festo project.
In Chapter 11, ‘Actors’ influence and horizontal power relations at the second 
tier of  local government’, Panagiotis Getimis and Nikos Hlepas analyse empirical 
findings reflecting patterns of  different horizontal power relations at the second 
tier, as they have been systematized by Mouritzen and Svara (2002) for the 
municipal level and then adapted for the second tier of  local government by 
Heinelt and Bertrana (2011). Discrete positions in horizontal power relations are 
reflected in deviating perceptions of  councillors, county presidents and CEOs 
concerning the influence of  various actors at the second tier of  local government. 
Executive leaders (administrative CEOs and county presidents) perform distinc-
tive roles and focus more on specific actors. Nonetheless, the primacy of  politics 
and governmental actors over county activities has been confirmed by all groups 
of  respondents in all European countries. Business interests seem to be less influ-
ential at the county level than governance theories would anticipate. The authors 
also conduct an analysis of  the frequency of  contacts that the respondents declare 
to have to different actors, which has clearly shown that elected politicians with 
executive functions (presidents and CEOs) have more frequent contacts to wider 
sets of  actors than ordinary councillors. The analysis reveals bonds of  elected 
politicians to different actors. Empirical findings show a relationship between 
electoral support to politicians and frequency of  their contacts in most cases. 
Finally, in some countries, a ‘circle of  power reproduction’ is confirmed, starting 
with a high electoral support that begets a relatively high frequency of  contacts, 
which leads to a perceived strong influence of  some civic actors over county 
activities.
The final part of  the book deals with political socialization and recruitment, 
professionalization and career pattern.
Chapter 12, ‘The political career of  county councillors in Europe: examining 
the internal logic of  professionalization and comparative country patterns’ (by 
Xavier Bertrana, Jaume Magre, Joan Manel Sánchez, Kristof  Steyvers, Tony 
Valcke and Tom Verhelst), examines the political career of  second-tier councillors. 
Using a theoretical framework that structures the empirical scrutiny of  council-
lors’ careers in four different analytical dimensions (career focus, scope, locus and 
sequence) and operationalises them by applying specific items of  the question-
naire to substantiate the ideal-typical features of  the layman–professional con-
tinuum in each dimension, the authors explain the logic of  professionalization in 
the councillor career both at the individual level and at the cross-national level. 
The analysis reveals clear signs of  a professional career scope regarding seniority 
and future ambitions. In terms of  career focus however, most councillors still 
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correspond to the typical layperson image of  the citizen-politician. Furthermore, 
while the combined results from career locus and sequence seem to point to sub-
stantial degrees of  professionalization as well, a closer look showed a largely sepa-
rate local career system in which councillors often gain external experience at the 
municipal level before entering the county council. However, the expectation that 
the different indicators of  professionalization within and between the four dimen-
sions would reinforce one another at the individual level has only been confirmed 
to a very limited extent. There is only scarce evidence pointing towards a strong 
internal logic of  professionalization in the political career development of  second-
tier councillors in Europe. However, systematic differences in vertical power rela-
tions of  counties in various country settings seem to affect the degree of  county 
councillor professionalization to a higher extent. A refined grouping of  countries 
defined on the basis of  Bertrana and Heinelt (2011) shows that in countries where 
the levels of  municipal recruitment amongst the county councillors are higher also 
show a clearer tendency towards recruitment from the political executive of  the 
municipalities or even the mayoralty, and hence to political professionalization. 
This pattern reinforces the idea of  the second-tier level offering fertile ground for 
a career path in its own right in the context of  an autonomous local political 
sphere where the different levels of  local government interact as a relevant feature 
of  political localism in some countries like France, Spain or the Czech Republic. 
By contrast, the decoupling of  both levels of  government in relation to the politi-
cal career of  these political elites seems to characterise the rest of  Southern and 
Eastern European countries. Finally, the degree of  integration of  local govern-
ment in the overall structures of  the political systems of  Belgium and Germany 
on the one hand, and Norway and Sweden on the other (in the sense of  Bertrana 
and Heinelt 2011 or Sellers and Lidström 2007: 611–612) could explain the exis-
tence of  career paths that are closely linked to the multi-level government system 
of  these countries.
Chapter 13, ‘Political professionalization of  county councillors in Europe’ (by 
Dan Ryšavý and Daniel Čermák), also deals with the degree of  political profes-
sionalization of  county councillors. The analysis is carried out in three main steps: 
(1) The authors develop a typology of  county councillors’ professionalization by 
using both responses to time invested into county affairs and full-time status. 
(2) They study whether the degree of  political professionalization is related to 
differences between countries depending on their location (Eastern-Western 
Europe), type of  political system (more or less decentralised) and the size of  coun-
cil or size of  county. (3) Finally, they consider the relationship between the degrees 
of  political professionalization and attitudinal variables. Ryšavý and Čermák 
identify four types of  county councillors: laymen, time investors (those who spend a 
lot of  time on county affairs without full-time status), outward oriented full-time coun-
cillors (those politicians with full-time status who spend a lot of  time on political 
affairs that are not county related) and full-time county councillors. Then they develop 
different hypothesis to explain their distribution across countries by taking into 
account different variables at the national level and also how they are interrelated 
with the degree of  professionalization at the individual level. For example, they 
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show that the chance of  becoming a full-time county councillor grows not only 
with the increasing number of  inhabitants, but also with the increasing number 
of  municipalities in the counties. Conversely, they explain that the presence of  a 
regional or state level of  government increases the chances of  county councillors 
remaining laymen. Finally, they show that countries where both councillors and 
the public perceive local government as increasingly threatened by fraud and cor-
ruption are those with higher numbers of  time investors and a clear pattern of  
hidden professionalization. As can be observed, there are many factors behind the 
degree of  political professionalization of  second-tier councillors and some rele-
vant differences between the countries included in the book. However, in most of  
them, if  politics at the second tier of  local government is a profession, it is a 
precarious one (Borchert 2003).
It is widely acknowledged that elected representatives have often benefited 
from a variety of  stepping stones in their passage to power. Chapter 14, ‘Family, 
ambition, local rootedness and party: a study of  the activation and apprentice-
ships of  the county councillor in Europe’ (by Eric Kerrouche and Corentin 
Poyet) reflects comparatively on such stepping stones amongst second-tier coun-
cillors in Europe following previous research on municipal councillors (Verhelst 
and Kerrouche 2012). More specifically, it takes into account that family ties, 
ambition, the entrenchment in the locality and the political party are elements 
of  activation and apprenticeship in the process of  political recruitment. The 
chapter investigates whether some assets, such as the inclusion in the local com-
munity and the enrolment in a political party, are essential for entering a politi-
cal career, while others are not but nevertheless quite helpful (e.g. family, 
motivations, social background, municipal size, ideology and function) or 
dependent upon the institutional provisions in place (e.g. quota, electoral sys-
tem). Some of  the main conclusions of  the chapter are that (1) a successful 
political career is mainly determined by factors related to the social life of  the 
politician (i.e. social networking capabilities either through the political parties 
or local organisations); (2) socialisation in a political life through familial ties is 
important but not a requirement; (3) the size of  the county constitutes a good 
predictor to explain differences in activation and apprenticeship; and (4) indi-
vidual factors also matter. Leftist councillors benefit more of  their engagement 
in politics and trade unions. On the contrary, the socialisation of  right-wing 
councillors appear to take place independently of  the political scene and mainly 
in the economic sector.
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Notes
1 Similar surveys of  municipal councillors (see Egner, Sweeting and Klok, 2013; 
Heinelt 2014), mayors (see Bäck et al 2006) and municipal chief  executive officers 
(see Mouritzen/Svara 2002 and Klausen/Magnier 1998) have been carried out by 
some of  the same partners involved in the survey of  councillors, the political execu-
tives and leading bureaucrats at the second level of  local government. See for more 
details about these surveys Section 3.1 in the chapter written by Heinelt and Krapp 
in this book.
2 We are particularly grateful for the resources invested by those partners mentioned who 
could not (for whatever reason) contribute a chapter to this book.
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Introduction
In most large and medium sized European countries, local government functions 
are divided between a municipal and a second tier (Heinelt and Bertrana 2011).1 
Among the European Union member states such units are currently present in 19 
of  28 states (Loughlin et al. 2011). The largest state without a second tier is Bul-
garia, with 7.6 million inhabitants. Croatia, with 4.3 million inhabitants, is the 
smallest member state with two tiers of  local government. This suggests that one 
of  the reasons for establishing such units is that the different local self-governing 
functions require different territorial scales in order to be carried out in an optimal 
way. Indeed, common functions of  the second tier include responsibility for sec-
ondary education, health care and specialised social services which typically require 
larger populations. In addition, the second tier may also have supervising and 
coordinating functions vis-à-vis municipalities and other actors (Heinelt and 
 Bertrana 2011; Lidström 2011).
The second tier of  local government is located somewhere in the middle in 
modern systems of  multi-level governance, and therefore is at the centre of  inter-
connections between levels of  government – as well as networks involving both 
public and private interests (Pierre and Peters 2000). Gary Marks, one of  the 
founders of  the concept of  multi-level governance, defined it as ‘a system of  con-
tinuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’ (Marks 
1993: 392) and emphasised that ‘supranational, national, regional, and local gov-
ernments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks’ (Marks 1993: 
402 f.). Second-tier local authorities are ideal cases for exploring the complexity of  
multi-level governance. They have relationships upwards towards the region (in 
certain countries), the state and the European Union; downwards towards munici-
palities, and sideways towards other public authorities at county level, private firms 
and the civil society. Indeed, the complexity of  their position may provide both 
limits and opportunities as regards to the amount of  self-government that they may 
have in practical terms. The focus of  this chapter is on the autonomy of  second-tier 
authorities in relation to other levels of  government. Are they squeezed between 
demanding municipalities and scrutinising upper levels of  government or do they 
have a real space for action? And how does this vary among countries in a Euro-
pean context?
County councils in a  
multi-level position
Formal powers and assumed autonomy
Anders Lidström and Katarina Roos
2
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There are many previous attempts to map and comparatively analyse the degree 
of  self-government among local governments in different countries. These include 
more general studies of  local government systems (Sellers and Lidström 2007) and 
decentralisation (Schneider 2003; Stegarescu 2005; Bolleyer and Thorlakson 2012) 
but there are also a few studies that specifically concern the position of  the second 
tier (Hooghe et al. 2010; Heinelt and Bertrana 2011). Comparisons of  self-government 
may concern the tasks, competences and capacities of  a unit and the extent to 
which it is circumscribed by controls and supervision by other levels of  govern-
ment. Although often very ambitious and highly sophisticated, these studies suffer 
from mapping the formal divisions of  powers and access to resources only and have 
not taken the experiences and views of  the decision makers of  these units into 
account. This is potentially a serious limitation as it may make these objective 
measures less appropriate as predictors of  the policy choices made by these 
governments.
A consequence of  this lack of  previous research is that there is practically no 
knowledge available about to what extent the formal powers of  a unit correspond 
to the assessments made by the leading actors. There might be a high degree of  
correspondence, which would suggest that the leading actors have good knowledge 
about the formal prerequisites, in a comparative sense, too. However, correspon-
dence may instead be low, or even non-existent, which could indicate that subjec-
tive and objective measures capture different aspects of  power and autonomy. 
Independently of  the results of  the analysis, the findings will be crucial for further 
research on local government autonomy.
This chapter aims to shed light on these matters by answering the following 
questions:
• How do elected second-tier councillors perceive the vertical autonomy of  their 
own unit of  government in relation to other levels of  self-government?
• To what extent does this correspond to measurements of  the formal position 
of  these units?
• How can differences and similarities be accounted for?
These questions will be addressed first in an overview of  relevant theories and 
later through an empirical analysis, based on a survey of  county councillors and 
other types of  data from 14 European countries.
Theoretical perspective
The starting point of  this chapter is institutional theory that emphasises the impor-
tance of  formal and informal norms for human behaviour (March and Olsen 1989; 
Scott 1995; Peters 2012; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). The perspective draws on 
normative institutionalism, stressing the logic of  appropriateness as a guiding prin-
ciple but also on sociological institutionalism with its emphasis on the cognitive 
basis of  institutions and their role in creating meaning. Actors in institutions are 
expected to adjust their behaviour to comply with existing norms, sometimes 
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contrary to what would have been most rational for themselves. A logic of  appro-
priateness is applied when new situations emerge. Although norms set limits, they 
do not determine behaviour. There is always room for actors to make their own 
interpretations and choices and it is always up to the actors themselves to decide 
whether they want to follow the norm or not.
Our institutional theory has a social constructivism trait in the sense that the 
norms exist as perceptions of  actors and are not given from the outside. Instead, 
they are constructed and reconstructed in a social setting (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
In the short term, norms provide the limits to what is seen as appropriate behaviour 
in a given situation; but in the long run they may be renegotiated and modified, 
although there is a tendency towards path-dependency, i.e. that the already domi-
nant norm has precedence over alternative norms. An important notion is also that 
norms reflect power struggles.
In the institutional perspective, a multi-level governance system should be 
regarded as a social construction that in the short run is seen as given and taken 
for granted, hence clarifying for the actors the range of  appropriate actions that 
are available. Many aspects of  the system are regulated by laws, some of  which 
some may even have a constitutional status. These require a formal process in order 
to be changed. Other aspects may be more informal and rest on explicit or tacit 
agreements among the actors. An important aspect is also that the system provides 
a set of  roles which are defined within social settings. Some of  these may be for-
mally regulated but all roles are accompanied by informal expectations that set 
limits on how they can be used.
This chapter has a focus on the position of  the county council in a multi-level 
system, and in particular the extent of  its vertical autonomy. Horizontal autonomy 
concerns the scope for action in relation to other units of  the same kind, or the 
outside society, whereas vertical autonomy is about how other levels of  government 
in the multi-level system limit or facilitate each other’s actions (Clark 1984; King 
and Pierre 1990). The analysis also has a comparative perspective. It is assumed 
that assumptions about vertical autonomy may vary between different institutional 
settings. The major formal differences with regard to the position of  the county 
council are between countries, but powers and functions may also be different 
within a particular country. In addition, it has to be taken into account that actors 
in the same institutional context can make different assessments.
Given this type of  institutional theory, there may be different alternative rela-
tionships between the actors’ assumptions of  the vertical autonomy of  a unit and 
its formal powers.
A first alternative is that there is high and almost complete correspondence 
between the formal position of  a unit and how vertical autonomy is perceived. This 
may be the situation when the key actors, who make the assessments, are well 
informed not only about the formal prerequisites for their own decision-making 
unit, but they are also able to position this in relation to similar units in other 
countries. Indeed rationalist theories of  decision making take for granted that 
actors have access to extensive and relevant knowledge so that they can make well-
informed decisions. A consequence of  this alternative is that it would be sufficient 
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to map the formal positions and the actors’ assumptions about autonomy would 
then add little to the picture.
The second alternative would expect a certain but limited amount of  correspon-
dence between formal and assumed position. This may be the case when the deci-
sion makers are reasonably well informed about the formal conditions but then 
also use additional information in order to make their final assessments. This com-
plies more with the notion of  limited information in normative and sociological 
institutionalism (March and Olsen 1989). Contrary to what is sometimes assumed 
by rational choice theories, these versions of  new institutionalism accept that 
human beings have a limited capacity to comprehensively analyse all the details on 
matters upon which they are acting. In particular sociological institutionalism, that 
emphasises cognitive frames and sense making, and it has a theory of  action that 
recognises that actors follow routines, rules of  thumb, automated schemas and 
scripts rather than an exact understanding of  the various detailed aspects that may 
be relevant for their actions (Simon 1947; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Weick 1995; 
Scott 1995).
We will expect actors to rely on overall assessments, rather than on a systematic 
evaluation of  different aspects of  the relationships with other levels. Actors will be 
expected to have a general picture of  their own unit’s strengths or weaknesses vis-
à-vis other units. This way of  understanding how actors make sense of  their world 
assumes that the formal position is just one of  several aspects that are being taken 
into account when the actors make their assessments of  the vertical autonomy of  
their unit.
Finally, a third position would be that there is no link between formal posi-
tion and assumed autonomy, or even that the direction may be the opposite of  
what is expected, i.e. despite a unit having a strong formal position, the actors 
would regard it to be weak, or vice versa. This would suggest that there is no 
rational connection between formal position and assumed autonomy, but 
rather that they represent two different and incompatible understandings of  
the position of  a unit. The formal position and the assumptions are simply just 
different things that need to be understood on their own terms in order to 
obtain a more complete picture of  the autonomy of  a unit. This would require 
that the formal position and the actors’ assessments are being taken into 
account separately.
These positions may be regarded as alternative hypotheses about the relation-
ship between formal powers and assumed autonomy. The empirical analysis will 
be able to illuminate the extent to which each of  these explanations are valid.
Independently of  the results, it must also be emphasised that assumption of  
vertical autonomy is an individual trait, and therefore is also likely to vary between 
people. Previous research has shown that strong personal resources enhance an 
individual’s sense of  efficacy (Verba et al. 1995). Those with more individual 
resources could be expected to make a more positive assessment of  the position of  
their county council. Such resources have traditionally included male gender, 
medium age and high level of  education. However, they may also refer to one’s 
political position, such as being an experienced politician, having a senior position 
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or exerting considerable influence over policy making. In the subsequent analysis, 
these individual traits will be taken into account.
Method, material and operationalisation
The main set of  variables used in the analysis are measures of  the formal powers 
of  the county council on the one hand and actors’ assessments of  county council 
vertical autonomy in a multi-level setting on the other.
During the last few years two different measurements of  formal powers of  
county councils have been developed, but on the basis of  different principles. The 
first is a set of  indicators developed by Heinelt and Bertrana (2011) specifically 
concerning second-tier local government. They borrow the dimensions of  capacity 
and supervision from Sellers and Lidström’s (2007) general comparative analyses 
of  local self-government but adjust these to the specific conditions of  the second 
tier of  local government. Particularly relevant for our analysis, they set up separate 
criteria for the relationship vis-à-vis the municipal level and the upper levels of  
government. Therefore, they end up with four different indices – on capacity and 
supervision vis-à-vis the municipal level and on capacity and supervision vis-à-vis 
national government.2
The other measure of  formal position is Hooghe et al.’s (2010) Regional Author-
ity (RA) index which has indicators of  the region’s influence over their own citizens 
(self-rule) and their position in the national system (shared rule).3 Their data set 
consists of  42 countries and covers the time period from 1950 to 2006. Hence, they 
are able to capture the main regionalisation changes of  the last few decades. Apart 
from covering the state level in federations and regions in strongly regionalised 
states such as Spain, they also provide separate data on the position of  the second 
tier of  local government in each country. The data on shared rule captures federal 
arrangements, therefore our analysis will be confined to their measure of  self-rule. 
This is directly relevant as a measurement of  county council self-government.
It could have been expected that the RA index and the four Heinelt and Ber-
trana (HB) indices, despite measuring formal powers of  county councils in different 
ways, would end up with similar pictures of  how formal powers vary between the 
different countries. However, a correlation analysis indicates that the RA index is 
positively correlated to one of  the HB indices, negatively correlated to another and 
non-related to the remaining two. This suggests that there is not just one single 
uncontested measure of  the formal powers. However, with several measurements 
we will be able to assess the extent to which each of  them corresponds to the actors’ 
assumptions of  county council autonomy.
The measurement of  assumed autonomy is generated from the survey on sec-
ond-tier councillors. The elected councillors, rather than any other representative 
for the county council, were selected as respondents. They have an overarching 
responsibility for county council matters and make the final decisions in all key 
issues. A set of  questions was included in the questionnaire aiming at capturing the 
councillors’ perceptions of  the relationship between the county council on the one 
hand and the municipalities, regional government (where present), the national 
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government and the European Union on the other. For each relationship, two 
statements were posed, one about the influence of  the county councils over the 
other level, and another about the influence of  the other level over the county 
council. For example, in relation to the municipalities, the statements were:
• ‘My county has much influence on the municipal level.’
• ‘Municipalities have much influence on my county.’
There were five alternative answers to each statement: strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. Alternatively, the respon-
dents could indicate that the question was not relevant. Rather than providing 
details of  the relationship between the county council and other levels of  govern-
ment, the respondents were expected to provide a general assessment of  their own 
unit’s strength vis-à-vis other levels of  government.
Each question was coded from −2 to +2, the positive value indicating that the 
respondent thought that the county council had a strong position vis-à-vis the other 
level of  government. How the responses were dispersed on each question is pre-
sented in Table 2.1.
The results displayed in Table 2.1 correspond to what may be expected in 
terms of  how the different levels of  government are hierarchically related to each 
other. The county council is seen as subordinate in relation to all upper levels of  
government, whereas the relationship with the municipalities is seen as more 
reciprocal. A closer analysis of  the relationship between the different measures 
suggests that the views on the relationship with higher levels of  government are 
highly intercorrelated. Therefore, and in order to simplify the analysis, it will be 
limited to two sets of  relationships – the county council vis-à-vis the national 
Table 2.1  Survey questions about the relationship between the county council and other 
levels of  government
Disagree Neither disagree 
nor agree
Agree n
My county has much influence on . . .
the municipal level 16 30 54 5,025
the regional government 52 33 16 3,019
the national government 69 24 7 4,745
EU decision making 81 15 4 4,653
[Level of  government] have/has much influence on my county
Municipalities 24 33 44 5,021
Regional government 20 40 40 2,946
National government 19 40 41 4,967
EU decision making has 20 41 39 4,930
Source: Second Tier Survey
Note: n = number of  observations. ‘Disagree’ = categories ‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly disagree’, ‘Agree’ = 
categories ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly agree’.
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government and vis-à-vis the municipalities. This also facilitates comparisons 
with the HB index, which distinguishes between the relationship with upper 
levels and the municipalities.
The pair of  questions for each level of  government is added to an index – one 
for the relationship to the municipalities and another for the relationship to national 
government.
Each index varies from −2 to +2. Summarised versions of  the indices, distinguish-
ing those with negative, neutral and positive values, are presented in Table 2.2.
The table clearly illustrates the mixed picture with regard to county council 
autonomy in relation to the municipalities. Although most councillors are indiffer-
ent, there is a significant proportion that sees it as either strong or weak. It is also 
obvious that the main variation in relation to the national level concerns whether 
the county councils are seen as weak in relation to the state, which is claimed by 
almost two-thirds, or if  the councillors are indifferent.4
There are considerable differences between countries. Figure 2.1 summarises 
the views among the councillors on county council autonomy vis-à-vis the munici-
pal level for each country. The autonomy of  the county councils is seen as strongest 
in Croatia and Greece and weakest in Poland and Spain. However, the differences 
do not follow any particular pattern with regard to geographical position, state type 
or type of  local government system (Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Loughlin et al 2011).
As indicated in Table 2.2, the main variation in assumed autonomy in relation 
to the national level is between those that regard it to be weak and those that are 
indifferent. Very few see the position of  the county council as strong in relation to 
national government. However, whether councillors regard the autonomy to be 
weak or are just indifferent varies considerably between countries, which is sum-
marised in Figure 2.2. The position is seen to be weakest in Hungary and Sweden 
Table 2.2  Indices of  county council assumed autonomy in relation to the 
municipal and national levels
Assumed autonomy of  county 
council in relation to . . .
 Valid per cent n
the municipal level strong 29 1,449
neither weak nor strong 60 3,042
weak 11 552
total 100 5,043
missing 445
the national level strong 3 164
neither weak nor strong 33 1,637
weak 64 3,219
total 100 5,020
missing 468
Source: Second Tier Survey
Note: Strong represents the values between +1 and +2; neither weak nor strong, the 
values between −0.5 and +0.5; weak, the values between −2 and −1.
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Figure 2.1 Assumed autonomy of  the county council in relation to the municipal level
Source: Second Tier Survey
Note: Percentage of  councillors in each country who regard the council to have strong autonomy, weak 
autonomy and who are indifferent in relation to the municipal level
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Figure 2.2 Assumed autonomy of  the county council in relation to the national level
Source: Second Tier Survey
Note: Percentage of  councillors in each country who regard the council to have strong autonomy, weak 
autonomy and who are indifferent in relation to the municipal level
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and least weak in Greece and Belgium. In the same way as for autonomy vis-à-vis 
the municipal level, there is no obvious pattern in terms of  geography, state type 
or type of  local government system.
Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 2.3, the rank order of  the national averages 
of  the two subjective measures are interrelated. In countries where councillors 
regard their councils as having limited autonomy vis-à-vis the municipalities, they 
are also particularly pessimistic about the autonomy in relation to national govern-
ment. The overall assumed autonomy of  the county councils is weakest in Hungary 
and Sweden and strongest in Croatia and Romania.
Formal powers and assumed autonomy
After having discussed the main features of  the measuring and operationalisation 
of  formal powers and assumed autonomy, we will now turn to the main task of  
the chapter: the analysis of  the relationship between them. With regard to the 
municipal level, this will be done on the basis of  multi-level regression analysis, 
in which a set of  individual level characteristics such as sex, age, level of  educa-
tion and experience as a politician, are controlled for, but the variation at country 
and county level is also being taken into account. Unfortunately, this is not pro-
ductive with regard to assumed autonomy in relation to the national level. The 
variable that measures this relationship is severely skewed, which means that the 
generated results are not robust. As we have seen, there are very few councillors 
who agree that the county council has strong autonomy vis-à-vis the national 
level.
Figure 2.3  Assumed autonomy of  the county council (CC) in relation to the national and 
municipal levels (country averages)
Source: Second Tier Survey
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The findings from the multi-level regression models with assumed autonomy of  
county councils in relation to municipalities as the dependent variable are sum-
marised in Table 2.3. As previously mentioned, the dependent variable is an index 
that ranges from −2 to +2. A positive value means that the respondent thinks that 
Table 2.3  Multi-level regression models with assumed autonomy of  the county council in 
relation to the municipal level as dependent variable (three-level model; Iterative 
Generalized Least Squares estimates)
Fixed effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.242 0.130 0.079 0.126
Individual-level predictors
Female (vs. male) 0.003 −0.003 0.009
Age
19–29 (Ref.) 0.177** 0.148 0.169**
30–49 0.222*** 0.250*** 0.214***
50–69 0.220*** 0.314*** 0.215**
70–
Education
Elementary/secondary 
school (Ref.)
University/college or 
equivalent
−0.032 −0.026 −0.036
Full-time councillor −0.060** −0.033 −0.061**
Number of  years as councillor
1–2 (Ref.) −0.011 −0.017 −0.010
3–9
10–
−0.014 −0.014 −0.010
Self-assessed influence −0.010 −0.007 −0.011
Higher-level predictors     
HB second tier capacities vs municipalities −0.161**
HB second tier supervision over municipalities 0.235***
RA index second tier self-rule   0.058***
Randomised effects
Ωe 0.487*** 0.462*** 0.453*** 0.462***
Ωµ 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.006 0.012**
Ωv 0.010* 0.007 0.002 0.003
ICC Level 1 0.944 0.960 0.983 0.969
ICC Level 2 0.037 0.025 0.013 0.025
ICC Level 3 0.019 0.015 0.004 0.006
Model fit
Deviance 10,822.411 6,387.753 4,865.023 6,282.198
Number of  observations
ni 5,034 3,057 2,362 3,057
nj 583 339 288 339
nk 14 13 9 13
Note: *. significance at the 90% level, **. significance at the 95% level, ***. significance at the 99% level. 
Ωe = Variance Level 1 (individuals), Ωµ = Variance Level 2 (county councils), Ωv = Variance Level 3 
(countries). ICC = Intra Class Correlation Statistic.
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the autonomy of  the county council is strong in relation to the municipal level, and 
a negative value represents the opposite. In between are those who do not take a 
clear position and who are indifferent.
Model 1 is an empty model, with no predictors included. The grand mean, 
which is the overall average across counties and countries is 0.242 on the index. 
The variation between different countries as well as between counties is signifi-
cant. The Intra Class Correlation Statistic (ICC) gives a measure of  the propor-
tion of  the total variation in assumed autonomy, which adheres to the different 
level of  analysis. Most of  the total variation, about 94 per cent, is found between 
different groups of  individuals. The rest of  the variation is divided between the 
county level (about 3.7 per cent) and the country level (1.9 per cent). The varia-
tion in assumed autonomy in relation to the municipal level is significant on all 
three levels of  analysis, even though the variation between countries is significant 
only at the 90 per cent level. Thus, if  we seek to explain the variation in assumed 
autonomy, we need to be prepared to explore explanations at all three levels of  
analysis.
Comparing the different models is really not appropriate as these have been 
generated from analyses with varying numbers of  observations. However, the 
reduction in the Deviance statistic (−2 × loglikelihood) that is used as an overall 
model fit, is substantial, as predictors on the level of  the individual are included in 
Model 2 as compared to the empty model. The tendency to make positive state-
ments about the autonomy of  the county council in relation to the municipal level 
increases with ascending age. It seems that experience and engagement, measured 
as the time that councillors in general devote to their political work, have the oppo-
site effect on assumed autonomy. Councillors who are engaged full-time are less 
optimistic about the autonomy of  the council than those that combine their role 
as politician with other tasks. Another predictor which is not included in Model 2, 
but which has been evaluated, is number of  hours per week which the councillor 
devotes to work associated with the council.5 The more hours that the councillors 
in general spend on such tasks, the more pessimistic they are about the possibility 
of  the council exerting influence over municipalities. Number of  years in office 
does not have any significant effect, partly because it is correlated to full-time 
engagement. Efficacy is another potentially interesting variable. It is measured as 
the subjective assessment of  the ability of  the individual councillor to affect deci-
sion making in the council. This predictor does, however, not have a significant 
effect on the outcome. The regular control variables such as sex and education are 
not significantly related to perceptions of  autonomy in relation to the municipal 
level.
The main purpose of  the analysis is to investigate whether the formal position 
of  the county council matters as an explanation for assumed autonomy. As previ-
ously discussed, two different measures of  formal position are included in the 
analyses: Heinelt and Bertrana (2011) indices, labelled HB capacity and HB supervi-
sion and Hooghe et al.’s (2010) RA index on the second tier. They cannot all be 
included in the same model as HB capacity and RA index are too strongly corre-
lated. Hence, the predictors are analysed in two separate models   Model 3 with 
8329-0042-PI-002.indd   27 7/15/2015   2:24:36 PM
28 A. Lidström and K. Roos
HB capacity and HB supervision, and Model 4 with the self-rule measure of  the 
RA index.
In the theory section, three hypotheses about alternative outcomes of  the 
relationship between formal position and assumed autonomy were identified. 
The first predicted that they would be positively and almost fully corresponding, 
the second that there would be a positive but limited connection and the third 
that they would be non-related or even negatively related. The regression analy-
ses presented in Models 3 and 4 provide mixed results. The HB index represent-
ing supervision over municipalities and the RA index are both positively related, 
but not to the extent predicted by the first hypothesis. Rather, it would lend 
support to the second hypothesis, expecting a positive but weak relationship 
between formal position and assumed autonomy. However, the other HB index 
representing the formal capacities of  the county councils is negatively related 
to assumptions of  autonomy. Indeed, a closer look at the measure of  formal 
capacities indicates that councillors representing county councils with constitu-
tional protection, strong democratic legitimacy, considerable resources and a 
strong power of  taxation power regard the county council to have less autonomy 
than those representing county councils with weaker capacity. At first sight, this 
does not make sense, but it would support our third hypothesis that formal pow-
ers and assumed autonomy are two very different phenomena. Clearly, the 
results are very mixed.
The variation between councillors in different countries, which was observed in 
the empty model, is reduced towards zero when the individual level predictors are 
controlled for in Model 1. However, the variation between individuals from differ-
ent councils remains positive and significant. When the HB indices are included in 
Model 3, the only variation that remains significant is between groups of  individu-
als. Formal position thus reduces the variation between councils in a substantial 
manner so that it is no longer significant. In the model where the RA index is 
included, there still remains a significant variation between counties. Hence, it 
seems the HB indices are better predictors.
As previously mentioned, we cannot make the corresponding analysis of  the 
relationship with the national level, as the number of  councillors who regard the 
county council to have strong autonomy vis-à-vis this level is very small. An 
empty model was fitted (but not presented here): although the variation between 
the different levels is significant, the measure is too skewed to produce robust 
results. As an alternative, we will examine the bivariate relationships between 
country averages of  the formal and assumption-based measurements. Figures 2.4 
and 2.5 illustrate these relationships with regard to one of  the HB indices and 
the RA index.
Both figures provide fairly scattered pictures and it seems difficult to identify any 
distinctive linear relationship between the two variables. One reason is that there 
is very limited variation between countries in assumed autonomy in relation to the 
national government. This would support our third hypothesis, emphasising that 
formal powers and assumptions about autonomy are different and unrelated 
phenomena.
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Figure 2.4  Assumed autonomy of  the county council in relation to the national level (country 
averages for strong autonomy) and HB capacity
Source: Second Tier Survey
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Figure 2.5  Assumed autonomy of  the county council in relation to the national level (country 
averages for strong autonomy) and RA index
Source: Second Tier Survey
Conclusions
Second-tier councillors are located in the middle of  their systems of  multi-level 
governance and have relations both downwards to the municipalities and upwards 
toward national government – and, where relevant, to the regional tier and the 
European Union. Hence, they are ideally positioned for an exploration of  how key 
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political decision makers assess the amount of  autonomy they have when making 
decisions. The purpose of  this chapter has been to map the assumptions of  second-
tier councillors about the vertical autonomy of  their own unit of  government in 
relation to other levels of  self-government in a number of  European countries, and 
to introduce and test theoretical assumptions about the extent to which this cor-
responds to measures of  formal powers.
A first conclusion is that the assumed relationships vis-à-vis the municipalities 
on the one hand and vis-à-vis upper levels of  government on the other are uncor-
related. This suggests that downwards and upwards relationships reflect different 
logics. The link to the municipalities is more a governance-oriented exchange 
between equal partners, whereas the relationship upwards is of  a hierarchical type 
wherein county councils are clearly understood to be subordinate authorities with 
little scope for making a difference.
In the theory section, three alternative hypotheses were identified. The first 
predicted a near full correspondence between formal position and assumptions, 
based on expectations of  decision making rationality. The second, which was 
informed by normative and sociological institutionalism, expected a certain degree 
of  correspondence but also that the actors took other complementary information 
into account when making their assessments. The third hypothesis predicted that 
there would be no or even a negative relationship between formal position and 
assumptions, as these measures would be based on different logics.
The results from the analysis provide a mixed picture. With regard to the three 
hypotheses, there is clearly no support for the rationalist expectations of  the first 
hypothesis. Actors’ assumptions are not mere reflections of  the formal position of  
the county councils. However, the more limited type of  rationality, expressed in the 
second hypothesis, has empirical support but only in relation to the municipalities. 
Two different measures of  the formal position – HB supervision and the RA index 
both correspond to the assumptions of  the actors. However, the negative significant 
relationship between HB capacities and the councillors’ assumptions is disturbing 
and makes the conclusion less clear-cut.
Although based on bivariate analyses only, the relationship with the national 
government seems to be more in line with the third hypothesis. There is no rela-
tionship between variation in formal powers and the assumptions of  the councillors 
about the position of  the county councils vis-à-vis national government. This 
would suggest that there are different logics underlying the formal measures and 
the actors’ assumptions. Independently of  formally identified differences, the coun-
cillors emphasise that their councils are strongly subordinate to national 
government.
To summarise, there is support for both the theory of  limited rationality and the 
notion that the formal position and the assumptions of  autonomy are two different 
phenomena. The rationalist position that the assumptions are just reflections of  
the formal powers of  a unit has been rejected. This has important implications for 
further research on local self-government and autonomy. Whenever possible, for-
mal measures should be complemented with subjective assessments in order to 
obtain a fuller picture of  a unit’s vertical autonomy.
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Notes
1 Second-tier local authorities and county councils will be used as generic labels for directly elected 
units of  self-government above the municipal level, but within a state.
2 The capacities of  the second tier of  local government in relation to municipalities (high 
values = strong position of  second tier) are measured by (a) the constitutional protection 
of  the second tier of  local government, (b) the democratic legitimacy of  the second tier 
in comparison to municipalities, (c) the expenditure of  the second tier as a percentage of  
local expenditure and (d) locally raised tax revenue by the second tier as a percentage of  
the total of  locally raised tax revenue, and the supervision of  municipalities by the second tier 
of  local government (high values = strong position of  the second tier) by (a) the compe-
tence of  the second tier of  local government to coordinate municipalities hierarchically 
(b) the dependency of  municipalities on the resources of  the second tier of  local govern-
ment and (c) the forms of  supervision and control over the municipalities.
  The capacities of  the second tier of  local government in relation to upper levels of  govern-
ment (high values = strong position of  the second tier) is measured by (a) the constitu-
tional protection of  the second tier of  local government, (b) its expenditure as per 
centage of  public expenditure and (c) locally raised tax as a per centage of  the total 
revenue of  the second tier of  local government, and the supervision of  the second tier 
of  local government by upper levels of  government (high values = weak position of  the 
second tier) by (a) the appointment of  the second tier executive as well as of  (b) the high 
ranking officers at the second tier by upper levels of  government, (c) earmarked grants 
as per centage of  the revenue of  the second tier, (d) tax autonomy of  the second tier, 
(e) fiscal supervision of  and control and (f) forms of  supervision and control over the 
second tier.
3 Hooghe et al.’s Regional Authority index (specifically concerning second-tier local govern-
ment refers to (a) self-rule, i.e. the authority exercised by a second tier of  local government 
over those who live in the region in respect of  institutional depth (autonomy), policy scope 
(range of  functions), fiscal autonomy (independent taxation of  population) and representation 
(independent legislature and executive); and (b) shared rule, i.e. the authority exercised by 
a second tier of  local government or its representatives in the country as a whole (i.e. 
federal arrangements) with respect to law making, executive control, fiscal control and constitu-
tional reform.
4 It needs to be stressed that the index, which measures the councillors’ perceptions of  
autonomy for the county council in relation to the national level, is skewed. Thus, the 
results should be interpreted with great caution. This is even more so in the case of  the 
aggregated values presented for each country.
5 The variable was discarded from the model because of  the large number of  missing 
values.
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3 Perceptions of New Public 
Management reforms
Hubert Heinelt and Max-Christopher Krapp
Introduction
Perceptions of  New Public Management (NPM) reforms by local government 
actors will be analysed in this article to address two questions: How much support 
or rejection does NPM receive so that it is reasonable to talk about a Post-NPM 
era? And what could be possibly expected ‘beyond NPM’ (see for this debate for 
instance Christensen and Lægreid 2011b; 2012: 581–583)? Because NPM reforms 
differ from country to country,1 the authors will also look for particular patterns 
of  perceptions on NPM reforms between countries. Based on the literature of  
NPM reform profiles, England is the only case of  the ‘NPM front runners’ (Chris-
tensen and Lægreid 2012: 578) in our sample. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert’s 
(2011: 117) distinction between different NPM reforms and NPM reformers, Eng-
land is a clear case of  what they call the ‘marketizers’, which ‘see a large role for 
private sector forms and techniques in the process of  restructuring the public 
sector’.2 Norway and Sweden as Scandinavian countries are usually also seen as 
NPM front-runners (Hansen 2011). However, they ‘share a more positive attitude 
towards the state and a less positive attitude towards private sector models’ (Chris-
tensen and Lægreid 2012: 580). Therefore, NPM ideas have been taken up to 
focus more ‘on citizens’ needs, citizens’ participation, performance and results and 
professionalization of  public services’ (ibid.). This is the reason why Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2011: 117) classified the Scandinavian countries as ‘modernizers’ 
among the NPM reformers. In contrast Germany is not seen as a ‘NPM front 
runner’ (Kickert 2011: 101–104), but rather as fitting to Continental European 
countries. For their part:
Continental European countries that have a consensual political system [. . .] 
and corporatist state-society relations [. . .] the public management reforms 
were less ideological and more pragmatic. Reform there was not about ideol-
ogy and belief, but about effectiveness, efficiency and modern management 
techniques. [Like in] Continental European countries with a predominant 
legalistic “Rechtsstaat” tradition [. . .] the public management reforms hardly 
succeeded to break through the monopoly of  legalistic thinking.
(Kickert 2011: 97)
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And one can add: a positive attitude towards the state (like in the Scandinavian 
countries; see earlier). Belgium and France share with Germany on the one hand 
a predominant legalistic Rechtsstaat tradition together with a positive attitude 
towards the state; on the other hand, both countries have a lot in common with 
Southern European countries, like Greece, Italy and Spain. ‘In Southern European 
countries with a legalistic and formalistic administration, and above all with a 
highly politicised administration [. . .] public management reforms also had a hard 
time to break through (Ongaro 2009)’ (Kickert 2011: 97). The Eastern European 
countries in our sample – Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania – have been shaped by dramatic political overthrows in the 1990s, which 
are expressed by new configurations of  the state. At that time a reformulation of  
the scope of  the public sector was necessary, which became ‘especially complicated 
[. . .] in state socialism where the public sector is “everything”, and the public-
private dichotomy hardly exists at all’ (Ásh 2003: 537). In this context, beside 
democratisation, the effectiveness and efficiency of  public administration belong 
to the main reform goals. It was (mostly) a controversial question as to which ser-
vices should be privatised and how services could be provided in the most efficient 
way while still being offered in a public form.
It is necessary to point out that there might be ‘discrepancies between the 
world of  ideas [i.e. preferred reform perspectives] and the world of  practice’ (Chris-
tensen and Lægreid 2012: 577; italics added). In our survey councillors were 
clearly asked about their preferences. The question of  how much support the 
NPM reform perspectives still achieve and what could be possibly expected 
‘beyond NPM’ will be analysed based on the perceptions of  NPM reforms by 
councillors from the second tier of  local government in all the countries 
included in the survey (Section 2). Furthermore these findings will be tackled 
by putting them in the context with findings of  previous surveys, having been 
carried out over the last two decades. Although these surveys were focused on 
different local government actors – namely municipal chief  executive officers 
(CEOs), mayors and municipal councillors – such a longer time frame will 
allow reflections on possible changes in the perceptions of  administrative 
reforms at the local level.
Perceptions of  NPM reforms by councillors from  
the second tier of  local government
To identify current perceptions of  NPM reforms by councillors from the second 
tier of  local government, councillors were asked if, based on experiences in their 
county, a further outsourcing and privatisation or a direct provision of  formerly outsourced or 
privatised services are endorsed. Furthermore, they were asked about the reasons for 
these different routes of  changes. Finally, they were asked which form of  service delivery 
(either public, private, or a public-private partnership) is most preferable in respect to 
different tasks – namely public transport, maintenance of  school buildings, waste 
management, energy supply, water supply and sewage, hospitals as well as care 
homes for the elderly.3
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Further outsourcing and privatisation and/or a direct  
provision of  formerly outsourced or privatised services  
by the second tier of  local government
The responses to the question ‘Based on the situation in your county, do you 
endorse further outsourcing and privatisation?’ and to the question ‘Based on the 
situation in your county, do you endorse the county providing directly formerly 
outsourced or privatised services’ based on experiences in their county either further 
outsourcing and privatisation or a direct provision of  formerly outsourced or privatised services are 
endorsed are shown in Table 3.1. While about 64 per cent of  the European council-
lors at the second tier of  local government were not in favour of  further outsourc-
ing and privatisation, about half  of  them declared that they do not support a direct 
provision of  formerly outsourced services by their counties. These findings indicate 
that in general there is no dominant trend of  a reform preference either in the 
direction of  further outsourcing and privatisation or in the one of  directly provid-
ing formerly outsourced or privatised services. At the same time, it is remarkable 
that the rejection of  further privatisation is high. This reveals a stronger mistrust 
in this reform strategy. Therefore it seems to be reasonable to carefully agree to 
Wollmann and Marcou’s (2010: 256) assessment that an ‘international trend 
towards reversing the privatization wave of  the 1990s appears to be gaining 
momentum’.
Table 3.1  Responses of  second tier councillors to the question ‘Based on the 
situation in your county, do you endorse . . .’ by countries (in per cent)
Country . . . further outsourcing 
and privatisation?
. . . the county providing 
directly formerly outsourced or 
privatised services?
No Yes No Yes
England 50.4 49.6 40.4 59.6
Norway 61.8 38.2 65.0 35.0
Sweden 52.9 47.1 59.9 40.1
Germany 74.8 25.2 54.5 45.5
Belgium 69.3 30.7 53.6 46.4
France 72.3 27.7 30.5 69.5
Italy 70.8 29.2 47.3 52.7
Greece 44.9 55.1 41.8 58.2
Spain 53.0 47.0 52.8 47.2
Czech Republic 63.9 36.1 58.3 41.7
Poland 44.5 55.5 53.8 46.2
Croatia 58.1 41.9 31.5 68.5
Romania 36.2 63.8 38.9 61.1
Hungary 85.4 14.6 39.2 60.8
Total* 63.8 36.2 50.5 49.5
Source: Second Tier Survey
* Average based on weighted country data
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However, there are differences between countries. In England and Sweden, the 
‘NPM front runners’ in our sample, the percentage of  councillors in support of  
further outsourcing and privatisation was considerably higher than the European 
average. This indicates that for these ‘NPM front runners’ outsourcing and priva-
tisation are still relevant topics. Nevertheless the absolute support within these 
countries is under 50 per cent, so we have to assume that the privatisation strategy 
enjoys only limited acceptance – even though it is stronger than in other countries. 
In Germany, Belgium, France and Italy, which can be either labelled as ‘modern-
izers’ or as ‘maintainers’ (in contrast to ‘marketizers’), councillors are clearly less 
in favour of  further outsourcing and privatisation. According to the statements of  
the councillors, Greece and to a lesser extent also Spain are different cases because 
outsourcing and privatisation seems to be more supported strategies there. This 
might be explainable by the reforms pushed forward by the fiscal crises in these 
two countries. Finally, the Eastern European countries show quite diverse patterns 
which are hard to explain. Especially in Hungary further privatisation was strongly 
neglected, while in Poland and Romania this strategy was positively evaluated by 
the majority. This indicates that in these countries quite different reform debates 
have been developed, so that the Eastern European countries do not comprise a 
common group.
However, responses of  councillors from the second tier of  local government to 
the question if  they endorse a direct provision of  ‘formerly outsourced or privatised ser-
vices’ show an interesting picture. Councillors from France, Italy and Greece (as 
well as from Croatia and Romania) declared that they support this approach. 
Remarkably, also county councillors from England were quite positive towards 
more ‘insourcing’. This indicates that in England as one of  the ‘NPM front run-
ners’ not only a critical perspective on outsourcing and privatisation has been 
developed, but also a reform perspective of  direct provision of  services gained 
importance. That the direct provision of  formerly outsourced or privatised services 
by the second tier of  local government is – according to the majority of  responses 
of  the councillors – not an attractive reform approach in Norway, Sweden, Ger-
many and Belgium can be explained by the fact that in these countries outsourcing 
and privatisation have been limited in the past, at least in comparison to the ‘mar-
ketizers’ among the NPM reformers (e.g. England). However, one should not 
ignore political struggles in these countries about ‘remunicipalisation’, like the ones 
in Germany particularly affecting the energy sector (see for example Sack 2014).
In the literature some core motives for ‘insourcing’ are pointed out, which focus on 
bad experience with formerly privatised services. Rising costs for citizens, missing 
control opportunities for local authorities and unsatisfactory results or quality of  
services are emphasised in political and scholarly debates (see for instance Woll-
mann and Marcou 2010: 255–256; Christensen and Lægreid 2011b: 392–394). In 
our survey we asked for the relevance of  these reasons for both strategies. Regard-
ing the advantages of  further outsourcing and privatisation, those councillors 
declaring a preference for this strategy stated that costs, flexibility and quality 
altogether would be the most important reasons for pursuing that strategy (see 
Table 3.2a). Also the combinations of  quality and costs as well as flexibility and 
costs were marked quite often. Therefore the reduction of  costs seems to be the 
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Table 3.2a Reasons for further privatization (in per cent)
Country Quality Flexibility Costs Quality and 
flexibility
Quality & 
costs
Flexibility 
and costs
Quality, flexibility 
and costs
Total
England 6.0 4.5 17.9 0.0 17.9 6.0 47.8 100
Norway 8.3 4.8 4.8 14.3 27.4 7.1 33.3 100
Sweden 5.3 4.4 1.4 16.0 6.5 2.8 63.6 100
Germany 1.5 1.8 8.4 2.7 15.6 27.5 42.5 100
Belgium 14.8 13.0 13.9 4.6 9.3 13.9 30.6 100
France 5.1 11.4 15.2 2.5 13.9 30.4 21.5 100
Italy 8.1 8.1 24.3 5.4 35.1 5.4 13.5 100
Greece 7.4 11.0 6.6 11.0 13.2 7.4 43.4 100
Spain 2.5 5.1 13.9 5.1 12.7 21.5 39.2 100
Czech Rep. 3.0 0.0 12.1 3.0 15.2 3.0 63.6 100
Poland 1.5 3.0 19.4 0.0 26.9 7.5 41.8 100
Croatia 12.8 4.1 14.5 8.1 34.3 2.9 23.3 100
Romania 14.7 3.2 6.3 3.2 24.2 3.2 45.3 100
Hungary 7.7 0.0 7.7 15.4 23.1 15.4 30.8 100
Total* 4.5 4.3 13.4 3.6 20.4 14.0 39.8 100
Source: Second Tier Survey
* Average based on weighted country data
Table 3.2b Reasons for direct provision (in per cent)
Country Quality Control Costs Quality 
and control
Quality 
and costs
Control 
and costs
Quality, control 
and costs
Total
England 14.8 6.2 12.3 6.2 12.3 1.2 46.9 100
Norway 20.8 3.9 5.2 18.2 16.9 1.3 33.8 100
Sweden 15.4 2.4 9.1 8.4 28.1 3.6 32.9 100
Germany 4.9 6.2 2.8 34.7 6.7 8.5 36.2 100
Belgium 10.3 13.5 12.7 15.1 13.5 18.3 16.7 100
France 11.5 1.4 14.4 3.6 55.4 4.3 9.4 100
Italy 17.5 1.6 12.7 1.6 50.8 1.6 14.3 100
Greece 13.0 13.0 11.0 6.2 11.0 6.8 39.0 100
Spain 19.0 2.5 15.2 6.3 31.6 7.6 17.7 100
Czech Rep. 5.4 0.0 10.8 10.8 24.3 8.1 40.5 100
Poland 17.0 5.7 15.1 11.3 17.0 9.4 24.5 100
Croatia 5.2 6.6 10.4 9.9 17.9 14.6 35.4 100
Romania 12.5 6.2 9.4 6.2 18.7 15.6 31.3 100
Hungary 11.9 11.9 26.9 1.5 19.4 4.5 23.9 100
Total* 10.9 5.2 9.4 17.6 20.7 7.2 29.1 100
Source: Second Tier Survey
* Average based on weighted country data
most important driving force for privatisation. Especially in England supporters of  
privatisation indicated a high relevance of  costs as reform motive, while councillors 
from Norway and Sweden more often quoted in favour of  combinations with the 
quality dimension, which is in line with the described NPM profiles. Notably the 
councillors from Eastern European countries who support further privatisation 
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quoted particularly for the combination of  quality and costs as main reasons, while 
in France, Germany and Spain the combination of  flexibility and cost also received 
much support.
Looking at the contrary strategy, it is remarkable that the respondents declare that 
the quality is the most relevant factor for providing directly local services (see 
Table 3.2b). Certainly, councillors supporting this strategy marked quality, control as 
well as cost, but particularly combinations with the quality dimension are indicated 
quite often. This can be understood as a rather fundamental concern of  councillors 
from the second tier of  local government in respect to private provision of  local ser-
vices. It is evident in the Scandinavian cases as well as in Germany, while in France, 
Italy and Spain especially the specific combination of  quality and costs is – from the 
perspective of  second-tier councillors – an important reason for the direct provision 
of  services. Within the Eastern European countries the dimension of  costs (in combi-
nation with others) seems to be most relevant for strategies of  ‘insourcing’.
Taken together, based on these findings the councillors of  the second tier in our 
sample show different patterns of  reform motives. What is the most crucial issue 
(quality, efficiency or democratic control) for an assessment of  reform perspectives 
is weighted differently in different reform contexts. Therefore a modernisation 
paradigm ‘beyond NPM’, which should appeal to local actors, has to be balanced 
in this respect.
Preferences for particular forms of  service delivery
In the following section the responses to the request ‘Please indicate which form 
of  service delivery is most preferable in respect to different tasks?’ will be discussed, 
which could be answered with public, private, or a public-private-partnerships and 
have been differentiated by separate fields of  local activities – namely public trans-
port, maintenance of  school buildings, waste management, energy supply, water 
supply and sewage, hospitals as well as care homes for the elderly.
The responses clearly show that a majority of  the responding councillors of  the 
second tier of  local government had a preference for a public provision of  service 
in every field addressed in the survey (see the totals in Table 3.3). The preferences 
for public forms are in general particularly strong in the field of  water supply and 
sewage as well as hospitals. This can be explained with the more sensitive character 
of  these tasks, which points to a preference for unrestricted control by the public 
sphere. Remarkably, the cooperative form of  service delivery in public–private part-
nerships (PPP) seems to be in general the second choice of  councillors – particularly 
in public transport and care homes for the elderly – while private forms receive less 
support. This may indicate that PPPs are perceived as a realistic and preferable 
alternative to more comprehensive approaches of  outsourcing like privatisation.
But there are also clear differences between countries and country groups. 
Based on the debate about differences of  NPM reforms between countries (see 
the references given in Note 1) we have ordered the countries covered by our 
survey in Table 3.3. We have started with England as the only case of  the ‘NPM 
front runners’ (Christensen and Lægreid 2012: 578) of  the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. English county councillors are still the only ones who prefer more than the 
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average European councillor at the second tier of  local government a private 
form of  service delivery in all listed sectors – except hospitals where PPP are 
highly preferred among English county councillors. The Scandinavian image 
of  NPM front runners with more positive attitudes towards the state (which was 
described in the first section in this article) is also reflected by the results for 
Norway and Sweden as the two cases in our sample for the Scandinavian coun-
tries: Scandinavian respondents supported less than their European colleagues 
on average private forms of  service delivery – with the exception of  the main-
tenance of  school buildings (and waste management in Norway. Instead, they 
strongly preferred public provision of  water supply and sewage, of  hospital 
services as well as of  care for the elderly. In addition, PPP are also preferred 
(above average) for the provision of  hospital services and care homes for the 
elderly as well as for public transport, waste management and maintenance of  
school buildings. The strong emphasis of  either public service provision or PPP 
is also expressed by the only bigger difference between Norwegian and Swedish 
councillors: while the Norwegian councillors expressed their preference for a 
public form of  energy supply, their Swedish colleagues preferred PPP in this 
sector.
The responses of  the German councillors of  the second tier reveal a strong 
preference for public forms of  service delivery in all mentioned sectors – except 
care homes for the elderly. However, in the case of  care homes for the elderly a 
specific private service fulfilment has a long-standing tradition in Germany: namely 
the provision of  services by the non-profit sector (see Evers and Wintersberger 
1988; Evers and Olk 1996; Zimmer 1999). The same applies to a certain extent 
for hospitals, with German councillors from the second tier of  local government 
preferring more than the average European councillors a private form of  service 
delivery, though this includes an involvement of  the non-profit sector (including 
Protestant and Catholic organisations).
The responses from the Southern European countries show strong preferences 
either for public or at least PPP forms of  service provision in almost all of  the 
mentioned sectors. Particularly in Spain, PPPs were relatively strongly (in compari-
son to other countries) preferred for the provision of  most of  the mentioned ser-
vices (except energy supply).
The Eastern European countries in our sample offer a quite different picture – 
both in respect to the other countries as well as between them. This again is hard 
to explain.4 Nevertheless, councillors from Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania shared preferences for public forms of  service provision in 
the maintenance of  school buildings, water supply and sewage as well as hospitals. 
This feature fits to a strategy of  ‘maintaining’ (according to the typology of  Pollitt 
and Bouckaert 2011: 115). Furthermore, Croatian, Hungarian and Polish council-
lors also declared their preference for public forms of  service delivery regarding 
public transport, waste management, energy supply and care homes for the elderly, 
while councillors from the Czech Republic and Romania reveal a more scattered 
image (with more positive attitudes towards PPP and private forms of  service 
provision).
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These differences between countries show that when it comes to concrete tasks 
there are fewer councillors with positive attitudes towards private forms of  service 
provision, which could imply that the NPM era is coming to an end. But it seems 
that the trend does not clearly revert to the opposite direction. Furthermore, the 
many different country profiles indicate a rather differentiated answer to questions 
of  service fulfilment, which seem to reflect specific national experiences and 
debates with regard to concrete services.
Has the heyday of  NPM passed? Perceptions  
of  local government actors over time
As mentioned in the introduction, these diverse findings raise the question of  what 
could be possibly expected ‘beyond NPM’. This issue will also be addressed by 
putting the findings of  the survey on councillors from the second tier of  local gov-
ernment in the context of  previous surveys with local government actors. These 
previous surveys will be briefly described in the following subsection.
Previous surveys with municipal CEOs, mayors  
and municipal councillors
For about 20 years a group of  scholars organized in the standing groups on Local 
Government and Politics (LOGOPOL) of  the European Consortium of  Political 
Science (ECPR) and/or in the European Urban Research Association (EURA) 
have carried out surveys on actors performing different roles within local 
government.
The first survey was focused on executive officers (CEOs) or the highest ranking 
appointed and non-elected civil servant or employee at the municipal level.5 As it 
was supported by UDITE (Union des dirigeants territoriaux de l’Europe) is has been 
called the UDITE survey.6 The next survey – named the POLLEADER (‘political 
leader’) survey – dealt with European mayors from municipalities with more than 
10,000 inhabitants.7 It followed a survey on councillors from municipalities with 
more than 10,000 inhabitants – called the MAELG (‘Municipal Assemblies in 
European Local Governance’) survey. It was based on a stratified sample that took 
into account the regional distribution of  the total number of  municipal councillors 
in a country.8 The latest survey, which provides the basis for the chapters in this 
book, concerns the second tier of  local government.9
For the first time, results of  all of  these surveys related to reforms of  the administra-
tion at the municipal and second level of  local government are presented together (for a 
comparative analysis of  municipal councillors and mayors, see Krapp 2013). Tak-
ing the results on administrative reforms of  all surveys or at least some of  them 
into account allows reflection on changes of  the perception of  NPM reforms over 
time because the responses of  the groups of  actors were given at different points 
in time. This applies not only to the roughly 10 years between the survey on munic-
ipal CEOs and municipal councillors but also to the more or less five years between 
the survey on mayors and municipal councillors as well as to the different years 
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between these surveys on municipal actors and those acting at the second level of  
local government. However, in reflecting on changes over time, it is also necessary 
to consider the different roles of  respondents in countries covered by the surveys.
Admittedly, there is only a limited number of  questions in all or most of  these 
surveys which can be used for an analysis of  differences in the reform perceptions 
of  local government actors and changes of  their reform perceptions. Nevertheless, 
common questions addressing administrative reforms are the following:
• A basic question asks respondents to evaluate the statement that ‘The 
need for changes and reorganisation of  the public sector has been greatly 
exaggerated.’
• At least for mayors, municipal councillors and municipal CEOs, it is possible to 
compare their agreement or disagreement with the statement that ‘There are 
few benefits from contracting out or privatising services in the municipality.’
• Furthermore, a fundamental issue of  NPM reforms – namely the separation 
of  politics and administration – is addressed by the questions of  how much 
the respondents agree or disagree with the statement that ‘Politicians should 
Table 3.4  Surveys on local government actors and the number of  respondents by countries 
and time in which they were carried out
Country Municipal CEOs 
(1995–1997)+
Mayors 
(2002–2004)
Municipal councillors 
(2007–2008)
Second-tier councillors 
(2012–2013)
Austria - 40 408 no second tier
Belgium 352 140 634 336
Croatia - - 233 331
Czech Rep. - 78 624 85
Denmark 200 108 - no second tier
Finland 324 - - no second tier
France 266 188 720 308
Germany 414 636 894 1,672
Greece - 145 235 233
Hungary - 82 - 133
Ireland 21 20 - no second tier
Italy 541 256 1,201 131
Netherlands 404 234 1,222 -
Norway 324 - 1,134 226
Poland - 229 328 120
Portugal 104 41 - no second tier
Romania - - - 177
Spain 366 155 520 188
Sweden 224 142 1,346 1,225
Switzerland - 94 1,616 no second tier
GB/England 284* 123* 700** 140*
Total 3,824 2,711 11,815 5,285
+ In Germany this survey was carried out in 1999.
* The survey covered just England.
** The survey covered GB
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only define objectives and control outputs, and never intervene into the task 
fulfilment of  local administration.’
In addition, more detailed responses of  particular local government actors on 
administrative reforms can be considered. This pertains firstly to those of  munici-
pal councillors on the statements that ‘Competition between service providers 
facilitates citizen choice in public services’ and that ‘Public–private partnerships 
are more effective in solving problems than public administration and representa-
tive bodies.’ Furthermore, responses of  municipal CEOs from the second half  of  
the 1990s (i.e. the heyday of  NPM reforms in most European countries) can be 
taken into account. These were responses to the statement that ‘The public sector 
has grown too large compared to the private sector,’ and that ‘In general, the pri-
vate sector is more efficient than the public sector.’
Has the need for changes and reorganisation of  the public 
sector been greatly exaggerated?
In all surveys one question has been asked regarding administrative reforms – 
namely if  the respondents agree or disagree with the statement that the ‘need for 
changes and reorganisation of  the public sector has been greatly exaggerated’. 
Looking at the results, a number of  general assessments can be drawn.10
A general and obvious finding is that most of  the different groups of  local gov-
ernment actors from all European countries covered by the respective surveys nei-
ther agreed nor disagreed with this statement between the second half  of  the 1990s 
and 2012/2013. This is indicated by a mean value between 2.87 for the mayors 
and 3.09 for municipal councillors (and with mean values for municipal CEOs of  
3.04 and for councillors from the second tier of  local government of  3.13).
Looking for differences between countries and the different local government 
actors, it turned out that only in a few countries do the responses of  the actors devi-
ate from the general pattern mentioned. Indeed, there are no large deviations from 
the European average among municipal councillors. However, municipal CEOs 
from Sweden tended at the end of  the 1990s to disagree with the statement that a 
need for changes and reorganisation of  the public sector has been exaggerated11 (i.e. 
they saw a need for public sector reforms at this time). The opposite applies for the 
Spanish CEOs who tended to agree with this statement. Both of  these (extreme) 
findings are in line with debates about differences in NPM between countries (see 
above). These findings confirm debates on NPM reforms in which Sweden is seen 
as an ‘NPM front runner’12 and Spain is usually classified as a ‘maintainer’ (see 2.1 
of  this article). Interestingly, mayors from England and particularly mayors from the 
Netherlands were (at the beginning of  the 2000s) more sceptical about the need for 
changes and reorganisation of  the public sector (see the mean values for mayors 
from these countries in Table 3.5). Furthermore, provincial councillors from Italy 
(with a mean value of  3.54) and particularly from Croatia (with a mean value of  
3.96) tended in the early 2010s to agree with the statement that the ‘need for changes 
and reorganisation of  the public sector has been greatly exaggerated’. That 
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provincial councillors in Italy disagreed at that time with a need for changes and 
reorganisation of  the public sector can be explained by the already started debate 
about changes affecting the provinces in this country (see Bertrana and Heinelt 
2013: 84) which were finally carried out in 2014.
Considering changes over time by looking at the responses from the different local 
government actors, no clear support can be ascertained either for the existence of  a 
sort of  heyday of  NPM or ‘that the heyday of  NPM may have passed’ (Haque 2007: 
179). Instead, a strong need for changes and reorganisation of  the public sector has 
rather been neglected by the studied actor groups in most countries over the whole 
period of  20 years where the mentioned surveys had been carried out. Especially 
Spanish municipal CEOs (between 1995 and 1997) and English and Dutch mayors 
(in the period from 2002 to 2004) and particularly Italian councillors from the second 
tier of  local government tend to support the statement that the ‘need for changes and 
reorganisation of  the public sector has been greatly exaggerated’.
Table 3.5  Mean responses (by country) to the question ‘How much do you agree or disagree 
with the following statement? The need for changes and reorganisation of  the 
public sector has been greatly exaggerated’
Country Municipal level Second-tier 
Councillors
CEOs Mayors Councillors
Austria - 2.97 3.18 no second tier
Belgium 2.91 3.07 3.12 3.12
Croatia - - 3.18 3.96
Czech Rep. - 3.22 3.07 3.36
Denmark 3.02 2.88 - no second tier
France 3.16 2.95 2.95 3.14
Germany 3.19 2.73 2.95 2.96
Greece - 3.26 3.24 3.23
Hungary - 2.29 - 3.03
Ireland 2.81 3.00 - no second tier
Italy 2.97 2.65 2.97 3.54
Netherlands 3.25 3.70 3.41 -
Norway 2.57 - 2.84 2.73
Poland - 2.83 3.47 3.36
Portugal 2.73 2.85 - no second tier
Spain 3.65 2.57 2.93 3.31
Sweden 2.44 2.54 3.15 2.86
Switzerland - 2.63 3.03 no second tier
GB/England 3.08* 3.52* 3.25** 2.77*
Total*** 3.04 2.87 3.09 3.13
Source: Second Tier Survey
The respondents could answer ‘strongly agree’ = 5; ‘agree’ = 4; ‘neither agree nor disagree’ = 3; 
‘disagree’ = 2; or ‘strongly disagree’ = 1.
* The survey covered just England.
** The survey covered GB 
*** Based on weighted country data.
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Are there benefits from contracting out or privatising  
services in the municipality?
The issue of  contracting out and privatisation already considered on the basis of  
the most recent survey on councillors from the second tier of  local government 
were also addressed in former surveys in which actors from the municipal level – 
namely mayors, councillors and CEOs – were asked if  they agree or disagree with 
the statement that ‘There are few benefits from contracting out or privatising ser-
vices in the municipality’ (actors from the second tier of  local government were not 
asked the same question).13
The results show again that in total these three groups of  municipal actors neither 
agreed nor disagreed with the statement that ‘there are few benefits from contract-
ing out or privatising services in the municipality’ (indicated by a mean value of  2.95 
for municipal CEOs, 2.86 for the mayors and 3.14 for municipal councillors; see 
Table 3.6). This finding confirms that from the previous surveys there is no clear 
indication that there was a peak of  success of  NPM which has really passed.
Table 3.6  Mean responses (by country) to the question ‘How much do you agree 
or disagree with the following statement? There are few benefits from 
contracting out or privatising services in the municipality.’
Country Municipal level
CEOs Mayors Councillors
Austria - 3.23 3.50
Belgium 2.81 2.95 3.16
Czech Rep. - 2.23 2.94
Denmark 3.09 2.87 -
France 3.53 3.17 3.40
Germany 3.03 2.99 3.32
Greece - 3.21 3.47
Ireland 2.67 2.95 -
Italy 2.86 2.50 3.16
Netherlands 2.81 3.08 2.93
Norway 2.56 - 3.12
Poland - 2.77 2.68
Portugal 2.76 2.32 -
Spain 3.04 2.75 2.93
Sweden 3.00 2.76 2.83
Switzerland - 3.40 3.44
GB/England 2.93* 2.66* 2.90**
Total*** 2.95 2.86 3.13
Source: Second Tier Survey
The respondents could answer ‘strongly agree’ = 5; ‘agree’ = 4; ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ = 3; ‘disagree’ = 2; or ‘strongly disagree’ = 1.
* The survey covered just England.
** The survey covered GB
*** Based on weighted country data.
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As in the case of  responses to the question on the perceived need for changes in 
the public sector, there are only minor deviations in the answers of  municipal 
councillors between countries (except the Polish ones), and again some deviations 
by countries among municipal CEOs and mayors can be observed. Municipal 
CEOs from France saw in the late 1990s fewer benefits from contracting out or 
privatising services than their colleagues in other European countries, and their 
counterparts from the ‘modernizer’ country Norway emphasised the strongest such 
benefits. In the case of  mayors (in the early 2000s) only the Czech and Portuguese 
mayors tend to deny the statement that ‘There are few benefits from contracting 
out or privatising services in the municipality.’ Looking for changes in the responses 
of  the actors by countries over time, the agreement with this statement increased 
particularly in Mediterranean countries like France, Greece and Italy but also in 
Germany (and the Czech Republic) between the early and the late 2000s, i.e. 
between the survey on mayors and the one on municipal councillors. This indicates 
that in the mentioned Mediterranean countries the time for public management 
reforms became even harder during the 2000s, and that in Germany, as a late-
comer among the ‘modernizers’, benefits from contracting out or privatising ser-
vices were questioned more and more.
The separation between politics and administration
A basic idea of  NPM reforms is to separate the tasks and responsibilities of  politics 
and administration. The crucial argument behind this idea is that only by such a 
clear separation can accountability be achieved (Hood 1991: 4). This applies par-
ticularly to politicians who should concentrate on determining policy objectives 
and on controlling the actually achieved outcomes as well as to bureaucrats who 
should be free to choose the appropriate way for implementing policy programmes 
and to effectively and efficiently realise the policy objectives defined by politicians. 
However, it remains an open question as to whether or not this idea has been 
comprehended as well as accepted and taken over by the concerned actors – or if  
it has been rejected because it has not been compatible with either their particular 
role perception or their role behaviour.14
It might not be astonishing that municipal CEOs as leading bureaucrats tend to 
agree or even strongly agree that ‘It is the politicians’ duty to decide only on major 
principle issues and not on routine matters’ However, it is remarkable that, in total, 
mayors (with a mean value of  3.56) as well as councillors from both levels of  local 
government (with mean values of  3.26 and 3.20 respectively) tend to restrict their 
role in this way. This finding is especially noteworthy as it may indicate that mayors 
and councillors have taken over ideas which happen to fit with a role model advo-
cated by NPM.
Nevertheless, in total the slightly decreasing mean values for mayors, municipal 
and county councillors may indicate that the acceptance of  this role model for 
politicians is shrinking over time (because the surveys were carried out – as men-
tioned in 3.1 of  this article – at different times). Looking for change between these 
groups of  local government actors and in this way also over time in countries, the 
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declining acceptance of  this role model is remarkable mainly in Sweden and Great 
Britain respectively England as ‘NPM front runners’ as well as Germany as a late-
comer among the ‘modernizers’. This may show that this core idea of  NPM has 
been increasingly questioned in these countries.
Further results from the survey on municipal councillors and 
municipal CEOs
From the findings presented so far it seems that NPM ideas and reforms have never 
been enthusiastically supported among the studied local government actors since 
the late 1990s. Quite the contrary, there are a number of  results pointing to 
decreasing support.
Table 3.7  Mean responses (by country) to the question ‘How much do you agree or disagree 
with the following statement? Politicians should only define objectives and control 
outputs, and never intervene into the task fulfilment of  local administration.’
Country Municipal level Second-tier 
councillors
CEOs* Mayors Councillors
Austria - 3.30 3.43 no second tier
Belgium 4.06 2.94 3.10 3.12
Croatia - - 3.58 3.20
Czech Rep. - 3.12 3.34 3.46
Denmark 4.71 2.48 - no second tier
France 4.36 2.82 2.86 2.65
Germany 4.61 3.97 3.25 3.21
Greece - 3.60 3.86 3.94
Hungary - 4.23 - 3.72
Ireland 4.81 2.85 - no second tier
Italy 4.63 3.69 3.46 3.49
Netherlands 4.26 3.94 3.58 -
Norway 4.83 - 2.96 3.03
Poland - 4.28 3.90 -
Portugal 4.35 3.20 - no second tier
Spain 3.92 3.14 3.21 3.12
Sweden 4.47 3.91 3.70 3.43
Switzerland - 3.43 3.16 no second tier
GB/England 4.25* 3.10* 2.91** 2.73*
Total** 4.41 3.56 3.31 3.26
Source: Second Tier Survey
The respondents could answer ‘strongly agree’ = 5; ‘agree’ = 4; ‘neither agree nor disagree’ = 3; 
‘disagree’ = 2; or ‘strongly disagree’ = 1.
* CEOs responded to a statement which was slightly different: ‘It is the politicians’ duty to decide only 
on major principle issues and not on routine matters.’
** The survey covered just England.
*** The survey covered GB.
**** Average based on weighted country data.
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That municipal councillors were more undecided in the second half  of  the 2000s 
than enthusiastic about basic ideas of  the NPM reform movement is also demon-
strated by their responses to the statement that ‘public-private partnerships are more 
effective in solving problems than public administration and representative bodies’ 
(see Table 3.8). With limited deviations (from the average mean value of  3.18) 
between countries, municipal councillors tend to ‘neither agree nor disagree’.
The findings are different regarding the responses to the statement that ‘compe-
tition between service providers facilitates citizen choice in public services’. In this 
case the whole group of  municipal councillors were (with an average mean value 
of  3.51) a bit more than halfway between ‘neither agree nor disagree’ and ‘agree’, 
thus an overall slight tendency toward agreement. However, this finding is explain-
able by the strong support of  this statement by municipal councillors from some 
Eastern European (Poland, Croatia and the Czech Republic) and some Mediter-
ranean countries (Greece and Italy) where at that time obviously some hope for the 
positive effects of  ‘consumer choices’ played a role.
Table 3.8  Mean responses (by country) of  municipal councillors to the questions 
‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Competition between service providers facilitates citizen choice in public 
services’ and ‘Public-private partnerships are more effective in solving 
problems than public administration and representative bodies’
Country ‘Competition between 
service providers 
facilitates citizen choice 
in public services’
‘Public-private partnerships 
are more effective in 
solving problems than 
public administration and 
representative bodies’
Austria 3.46 2.94
Belgium 3.06 3.07
Croatia 3.99 3.61
Czech Rep. 3.98 3.16
France 3.40 3.18
Germany 3.46 2.84
Greece 3.74 3.48
Italy 3.78 3.22
Netherlands 3.11 3.36
Norway 3.36 3.29
Poland 4.49 4.18
Spain 3.42 3.15
Sweden 3.58 3.47
Switzerland 3.30 2.90
Great Britain 3.28 2.95
Total* 3.51 3.18
Source: Second Tier Survey
The respondents could answer ‘strongly agree’ = 5; ‘agree’ = 4; ‘neither agree nor disagree’ = 3; 
‘disagree’ = 2; or ‘strongly disagree’ = 1.
* Average based on weighted country data.
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Looking at results of  the survey on municipal CEOs, which was carried out in 
the second half  of  the 1990s, it turns out that already at this time (which is usu-
ally seen as the heyday of  NPM) these leading bureaucrats from some ‘NPM 
front runners’ were sceptical toward critical arguments about the public sector. 
The opposite was the case for some Mediterranean countries (see Table 3.9). 
While municipal CEOs from Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Nor-
way disagreed or tended to disagree with the statement that ‘in general, the 
private sector is more efficient than the public sector’, municipal CEOs from 
Portugal, Spain and Italy clearly agreed with it. Irish and British municipal 
CEOs also disagreed with the statement that ‘the public sector has grown too 
large compared to the private sector’ while it was most strongly supported by 
their Spanish colleagues.
Conclusion
As ‘[v]ariations in reform practice from one country to another are the rule rather 
than the exception’ and as countries ‘have different starting points, are at different 
stages of  reforms and face different external and internal constraints’ (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2011a: 10; see also Christensen and Lægreid 2002a: 20–23 and 2012: 
578–580) it is thus unsurprising that the picture of  support and refusal of  NPM 
ideas in Europe is quite differentiated.
Table 3.9  Municipal CEOs and their response to the statements ‘The public sector 
has grown too large compared to the private sector’ and ‘In general, the 
private sector is more efficient than the public sector’ (means)
Country ‘The public sector has 
grown too large compared 
to the private sector’
‘In general, the private 
sector is more efficient 
than the public sector’
Portugal 2.79 3.87
Spain 3.85 3.57
Italy 3.02 3.57
Belgium 2.88 3.31
Germany 3.07 3.12
Netherlands 2.81 3.06
France 2.55 2.53
Norway 3.33 2.39
Sweden 2.67 2.08
Denmark 3.13 1.89
England 2.08 1.81
Ireland 2.33 1.71
Total* 2.95 2.90
Source: Second Tier Survey
The respondents could answer ‘strongly agree’ = 5; ‘agree’ = 4; ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ = 3; ‘disagree’ = 2; or ‘strongly disagree’ = 1.
* Average based on weighted country data
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Accordingly, it is hardly possible to make any certain generalisations about a 
post-NPM perspective or to predict what will come ‘beyond NPM’. Furthermore, 
we have to be aware that there are ‘certain “families” of  NPM-related reforms 
(devolution, contracts, privatisation, market- und consumer-oriented reforms, etc.)’ 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2002b: 301–302), which have never been implemented 
all together in the same way, but rather selectively and with more or less emphasis 
on some of  these ‘families’ of  NPM-related reforms. In view of  the sources of  this 
approach, such diversity is in the end likewise ‘arising from the hybrid character 
of  NPM, which combines economic organization theory and management theory’ 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2012: 578). This leads inevitably to tensions in political 
and administrative practice: ‘They result from the contradiction between the cen-
tralizing tendencies inherent in contractualism and the devolutionary tendencies 
of  managerialism’ (ibid.).
Against the background of  the findings presented in this chapter, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that a strong and widespread belief  of  the majority of  
the studied local government actors in a straightforward reform path according 
to NPM ideas has not been taken, nor has it ever existed. In other words, it 
seems that these actors have already realised in the past that NPM ‘was driven 
by lofty ideas, ideals and principles rather than by practical experiences’ 
(Brunsson 2011: 66). If  something like a belief  in a straightforward reform path 
according to NPM ideas has existed at all at some point in time, it has been more 
and more replaced by pragmatic searches for a better – and this means mainly 
a more context related – way to change administrative practise. For sure, such 
searches for more context-related solutions will lead to a diversity of  post-NPM 
reforms.
Notes
1 For differences of  NPM reforms between countries see Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; 
Christensen and Lægreid 2002a: 26–30; 2002b: 302–305; 2012: 578–580; Sahlin-
Andersson 2002: 48–50; Bevir et al. 2003; Halligan 2011; Kickert 2011; Hansen 2011.
2 For another distinction between NPM reformers see Halligan 2002: 75. He distinguishes 
‘hesitant reformers’, ‘specialist reformers’, ‘ambivalent reformers’ and ‘comprehensive 
reformers’. These ‘types of  reform’ (as Halligan 2002: 74–76) cannot only be applied 
to countries or groups of  countries but may also capture differences within countries.
3 For a detailed reflection on the provision of  long-term care, health care, electricity, water 
and waste management in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom see Woll-
mann and Marcou 2010.
4 Explanations are also missing in the literature mentioned in Note 1.
5 This survey covered not only European countries but also Australia and the United 
States.
6 Results of  this survey were published by Klausen and Magnier (1998), Dahler-Larsen 
(2000) as well as Mourtizen and Svara (2002; see also Heinelt and Haus 2002 for the 
results of  the survey in Germany).
7 Comparative results of  the POLLEADER survey were published in Bäck et al. (2006) 
whereas results for single countries or on particular issues were published separately (see 
Egner 2007 for Germany or Egner and Heinelt 2008 for mayors’ perception of  the role 
of  municipal councils).
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8 Comparative results of  the MAELG survey were published in a special issue of  Lex 
Localis (2012, Vol. 10, No. 1) and a special issue of  Local Government Studies (2013, Vol. 39, 
No. 5) as well as in Egner et al. (2013b) and Heinelt (2014). For a comparison of  attitudes 
to administrative reforms between countries cp. especially Krapp et al. (2013). In addi-
tion, partners involved in the survey published national results (like Egner et al. 2013a).
9 A new survey on European mayors is currently under preparation in close cooperation 
with the COST project (see ‘Local Public Sector Reforms – an International Compari-
son’ in LocRef, www.uni-potsdam.de/cost-locref/). It will be carried out in 2015 and a 
publication of  its comparative results can be expected in 2016 or 2017.
10 In the following discussion those countries have not been considered which were just 
included in one of  the surveys, i.e. where we do not have the opportunity to observe 
changes over time. This applies for Finland, which was included only in the survey on 
municipal CEOs, and for Romania, which was covered just by the Second Tier 
Survey.
11 This is indicated by a mean value of  2.44, i.e. a value tending slightly to a disagreement 
that such a need is exaggerated than to ‘neither nor’.
12 The mean value for Norwegian municipal CEOs is with 2.57 just slightly higher than 
the one for the Swedish municipal CEOs. This indicates that Norwegian municipal 
CEOs had at that time perceptions of  a need for public sector reforms similar to their 
Swedish colleagues which is in line with debates about NPM reforms in Scandinavia 
(Hansen 2011).
13 Again those countries have not been considered in the following which were only 
included in one of  the surveys. This applies for Finland, which was included only in the 
survey on municipal CEOs; Hungary, which was included only on the survey in mayors; 
and Croatia which was covered only by the survey on municipal councillors.
14 For the debate on this issue in general terms, see Christensen and Lægreid (2002a: 25); 
for Germany, Bogumil et al. (2007); and for Italy, Ongaro (2009).
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4 County councillors
Between revenue shortfalls and growing 
responsibilities
Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović and Sunčana Slijepčević
Introduction
European regional development policy has the goal to create an environment in 
which sub-national government can strengthen its own development potentials, 
which will then contribute to economic growth and development according to 
sustainable development principles. The body of  literature stresses the fundamen-
tal role of  sub-national tiers of  government in implementing sustainable develop-
ment policies, based on the goals set in the sub-national development strategies. 
Also, regional development policy should create conditions that will raise the com-
petitiveness of  sub-national government within the country. According to the 
Council of  Europe Resolution (2012), the second tier of  local government has a 
role in most European countries in increasing the efficiency of  public service provi-
sion and delivering services which may not be possible for municipalities to engage 
in. Such a statement of  the importance of  decentralisation for local economic 
development is based on the theoretical literature concerning decentralisation, 
with foundations in the research of  Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972), which state 
that a decentralisation process leads to a higher efficiency of  public services provi-
sion. However, Oates (1972) also stresses that decentralisation of  public activities 
is very expensive and that the state must have adequate resources to provide a 
decentralised supply of  public goods and services.
These theoretical reflections are underpinned by a number of  empirical studies. 
A positive correlation of  fiscal decentralisation and growth is indicated in theory, 
and promotion of  decentralisation is happening in countries containing heteroge-
neous developmental characteristics of  regions. In this case, it is important that 
limited resources are used effectively and contribute to economic growth of  regions. 
Fiscal decentralisation has been associated with efficient fulfilment of  local devel-
opment goals, greater competitiveness among the sub-national levels of  govern-
ment in providing public services and with boosting economic growth (Bahl and 
Linn 1992; Bird and Wallich 1994). Decentralisation could increase growth by 
raising the ability of  a decentralised system to encourage the implementation of  
reforms (Dillinger 1994; Yilmaz 2000; Iimi 2005). A relatively small number of  
publications contain the empirical research of  a decentralisation-growth nexus. 
Davoodi and Zou (1998) conducted empirical research using panel data from 
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46 countries in the period 1970–1989, in order to investigate a fiscal decentralisa-
tion-economic growth relationship and found that it is negative in developing coun-
tries. In their empirical research, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) presented 
the negative effect of  fiscal decentralisation on economic growth in developed 
countries which, in contrast, is positive in developing countries.
Nevertheless, the body of  literature is not clear about the direction of  the 
relationship between decentralisation and economic growth. Bahl and Linn 
(1992) and Bailey (1999; 2002; 2004) suggest that decentralisation comes with a 
higher level of  development. Ezcurra and Rodriguez-Pose (2013) and Rodriguez-
Pose and Ezcurra (2010) demonstrated the negative effect of  fiscal decentralisa-
tion on economic growth for 21 OECD countries. Gemmell et al. (2013) pointed 
out that spending decentralisation decreases growth, but revenue decentralisa-
tion increases it.
The literature dealing with the link between decentralisation and local and 
regional economic development is rare. Jurlina Alibegović (2013) determined a 
positive relationship between the level of  fiscal decentralisation and economic 
development at the second tier of  local government in Croatia. Furthermore, Sien-
kiewicz (2014) stresses that economic development, besides activities of  the busi-
ness sector, depends on the economic development policy carried out by all 
sub-national levels of  public authorities. According to Swiburn et al. (2006: 1), local 
economic development has the purpose to ‘build up the economic capacity of  a 
local area to improve its economic future and the quality of  life for all. It is a process 
by which public, business and non-governmental sector partners work collectively 
to create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation’. The 
Council of  European Municipalities and Regions (2008) emphasises the impor-
tance of  decentralisation and territorial reforms for fostering local economic devel-
opment, but also stress the importance of  capabilities and capacities of  sub-national 
government units, as well as cooperation of  different levels of  sub-national govern-
ment units, in providing public functions.
In the last several years, decentralisation tendencies were visible in a large num-
ber of  European countries. Decentralisation is a process which involves the transfer 
of  powers, competences and resources from central government to elected sub-
national governments. It entails political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation 
(European Commission 2009). As noted by the European Commission (2009: 1) 
‘the decentralisation process and its perspectives are relevant in assessing the coun-
try situation, the government development agenda and the sustainability of  the 
development strategies’. By obtaining increased responsibilities and resources, the 
role, power and actual influence of  county councillors changed. However, already 
in 1998 the International Monetary Fund (IMF), noted that in some countries the 
transfer of  responsibilities was not followed by adequate fiscal decentralisation; this 
has remained an issue until today (IMF, 1998). The recession that began in 2007 
in the United States and then spread to the rest of  the world has a large impact on 
the second tier of  local government revenues and their effectiveness in meeting 
fiscal responsibilities (IMF, 1998). The body of  literature shows that the financial 
crisis negatively affected the fiscal position of  sub-national government more in 
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those countries which are less decentralised (Roitman 2009). It is expected that 
central government finances rebound quicker than sub-national finances, which 
will feel the consequences of  reduced revenues, grants from central to sub-national 
government and decrease of  property values for longer periods (Gordon 2012; 
Slijepčević 2014).
Drawing on these issues, this chapter explores the attitudes of  second-tier coun-
cillors towards a decentralisation process and their perception in fostering local 
economic development. It is important to explore these attitudes because of  the 
role assigned to sub-national level of  government in promoting sustainable eco-
nomic growth. County councillors have legislative powers. Their role in promoting 
local economic development will be observed, keeping in mind that there is a gap 
between revenue shortfalls and growing responsibilities that has been further deep-
ened by the global financial crisis. Therefore, additional attention will be given to 
the analysis of  county councillors’ attitudes towards territorial reforms and the 
division of  responsibilities for providing basic public services/goods between the 
private and the public sector in different European countries. The emphasis is on 
an advocacy role of  county councillors in the promotion of  regional development 
and overall well-being of  the local community.
The structure of  this chapter is as follows. Decentralisation trends and the fiscal 
autonomy of  sub-national government in different countries are described in the 
second part of  this chapter. Survey results of  councillors’ attitudes towards decen-
tralisation and reforms are analysed in the third part of  this chapter. The chapter 
ends with some conclusions.
Decentralisation trends in different countries
Fiscal federalism theory and empirical research suggests that less-developed coun-
tries are more centralised than developed countries (Gadenne and Singhal 2013). 
Reforms in European countries covered by the survey go in different directions 
(Table 4.1). In the last decade, administrative decentralisation reforms have been 
conducted in France, Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic and Croatia. In con-
trast, Greece and Spain are examples of  countries where centralisation processes 
occur. The last wave of  centralisation tendencies started five to six years ago with 
Table 4.1  Ongoing tendencies of  administrative decentralisation/centralisation by 
countries
Decentralisation/centralisation reforms Countries
Predominantly decentralisation processes France, Germany, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Croatia
Predominantly centralisation processes Greece, Spain
Reforms toward centralisation and 
decentralisation
Belgium, Sweden
Source: Authors’ systematisation
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the beginning of  the last economic and financial crisis. According to Hlepas (2014), 
more than a hundred tasks were transferred from the second tier of  local govern-
ment to central government in Greece during 2010–2011, while decentralisation 
of  additional tasks to the second tier of  local government was cancelled. The divi-
sion of  competences among different tiers of  government is currently under discus-
sion in Spain (Council of  European Municipalities and Regions 2013), which could 
result in increasing competences of  second-tier government. There is an obvious 
tendency for several and new patterns of  control by the central level of  govern-
ment, especially concerning financial management and fiscal stabilisation of  sub-
national governments.
It is difficult to classify Sweden into a group. In Sweden there are tendencies in 
both directions. Re-centralisation has emerged in the debate during recent years. 
For example, there are several proposals to centralise responsibility for schools and 
for the health-care system. However, no such changes have been supported by the 
political majority. Also, in Belgium the role of  sub-national government has been 
changed. After several waves of  reform, the 2013 decentralisation round was com-
prised of  a number of  re-centralisation measures, which were considered to be the 
first re-centralisation process in the Belgian history of  fiscal federalism (Jennes 
2014). The tendency toward centralisation at the regional level has occurred in 
Belgium, with the consequence that the regions started acting as the new centres. 
Also, a decentralisation process in Croatia started in 2001, with the assignment of  
additional responsibilities to local government. Although there is continuous 
debate about further decentralisation and territorial reforms of  the country, the 
decentralisation process has not continued over the last few years.
The World Bank (2015) noted that in unitary countries sub-national government 
is not constitutionally empowered to make decisions over public functions, while 
the Council of  Europe (2012) stressed that administrative decentralisation should 
be followed with adequate fiscal decentralisation. General differences between 
European countries are that sub-national governments in federal states are consti-
tutionally protected and have decision-making power. The second tier of  local 
government is in most European countries responsible for environment, economic 
development, transport and education. In order to fulfil these tasks it should have 
sufficient fiscal autonomy. Since 2008, in France, Greece, Hungary, Belgium. Italy, 
Spain, Sweden, Norway and Czech Republic there has been a tendency towards 
fiscal decentralisation, measured as the share of  consolidated sub-national revenues 
in GDP. Table 4.2 gives an overview of  the powers and competences of  the second 
tier of  local government in European countries.
As can be seen from Table 4.2, the distribution of  public functions among levels 
of  government is different and responsibilities for public functions are allocated to 
various levels of  government. This is also confirmed by Bertrana and Heinelt 
(2013). Total sub-national government expenses by functional classification of  bud-
get (COFOG functions)1 presented in Table 4.3 show that sub-national govern-
ment (which includes second-tier government and local government) spends most 
of  the financial resources for general public services in Italy, health in Sweden, 
education in Sweden, Norway, Poland and Czech Republic and social protection 
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in Sweden and Norway. The second tier is mostly responsible for education and 
social welfare (expenses for the construction of  buildings and for other capital 
investments), but also for other public service provision.
The share of  revenues and expenses of  sub-central government in general gov-
ernment revenues and expenses, as well as the share of  these revenues and expenses 
in GDP, indicates the level of  fiscal decentralisation in the country. The share of  
sub-central government revenues as percentage of  GDP amounts from 3.9 per cent 
(Greece) to 25.2 per cent (Sweden). The degree of  decentralisation in analysed 
countries varies greatly (Table 4.4). Even larger differences can be seen in the share 
of  the second tier of  local government in the total local government revenue. 
Hungary is an example of  a country where the second tier of  local government 
has the least participation in total local government revenues (6.8 per cent). In 
contrast, the second tier in the Czech Republic accounts for 39.5 per cent of  the 
total local government revenue.
The previously presented data show that the second tier of  local government 
has in general a broad range of  competences, but its decision-making power and 
share of  public expenses is quite different between countries. Also, the fiscal auton-
omy of  second tier of  local government varies between countries.
In most of  the European Union member states a number of  important functions 
are entrusted to the second tier of  local government, such as those relating to the 
environment, economic development, transport and education. For these functions 
this level of  government has resources of  its own. In compliance with the principle 
of  fiscal autonomy, those authorities benefit from fiscal resources (Council of  
Europe 2012). Figures in Table 4.4 show that, despite growing responsibilities of  
the second tier of  local government, the fiscal autonomy of  sub-national 
Table 4.4 Structure of  second tier and local government revenues by countries
Countries Sub-central 
government revenue 
as percentage of  
GDP
Own tax revenues 
as percentage of  
total sub-national 
government revenue
Tax shares + general 
grant as percentage 
of  total sub-national 
government revenue
Revenue of  the second 
tier as percentage of  total 
sub-national government 
revenue
Belgium 6.9 45.0 42.0 9.5
Croatia 12.3 5.0 61.0 15.4
Czech Rep. 10.2 3.0 71.0 39.5
France 11.5 57.0 23.0 31.0
Germany 7.8 18.0 51.0 28.0
Greece 3.9 31.0 42.0 15.0
Hungary 10.0 34.0 60.0 6.8
Italy 14.8 24.0 61.0 n.a.
Norway - 43.0 36.0 n.a.
Poland 13.0 33.5 66.5 n.a.
Romania 9.3 8.0 55.0 n.a.
Spain 6.3 27.0 55.0 9.4
Sweden 25.2 57.0 13.0 34.0
Source: Eurostat (2015) and national statistics
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government is still quite low. The Council of  Europe (2012) stresses that economic 
and financial crises engender (de)centralisation reforms, but also territorial reforms 
which have been mostly focused on the position of  the second tier of  local govern-
ment. The crises that affected the majority of  European countries could speed up 
the process of  amalgamations at both levels of  local government.
Local development policy cannot be effectively conducted without a greater 
reliance on sub-national government’s own financial and human resources. The 
importance of  own resources is, for instance, confirmed in the analysis by Eyraud 
and Moreno Badia (2013) of  EU15 countries over the period 1995–2011. They 
showed that a decentralisation of  expense, financed through transfers or borrowing 
as it was mostly performed in the EU15 countries, leads to weaker fiscal outcomes. 
Also, they state that a number of  studies showed that sub-national government 
propensity to spend intergovernmental transfers is significantly larger than the 
propensity to spend own resources.
Survey results
Depending on different levels of  decentralisation and fiscal autonomy in the ana-
lysed countries, county councillors’ actual influence can significantly differ from 
their perception. The analysis of  the survey data starts with an analysis of  the 
county councillors’ attitude towards the importance of  the coordination of  local 
economic development in different European countries. In the next stage of  the 
analysis county councillors’ attitudes towards different reforms and diffusion of  
responsibilities for providing basic public services between private and public sec-
tors are analysed.
Insight into overall councillors’ attitudes toward their own involvement in the 
coordination of  local economic development shows that 74.9 per cent of  them find 
that it is fairly or very important that the coordination of  local economic develop-
ment is one of  their main tasks. This task is considered not important at all or of  
very little importance by only 6.4 per cent of  European county councillors. An 
analysis by countries shows that more than 10 per cent of  county councillors in 
Belgium, Greece and England find it is of  very little importance that they coordi-
nate economic activities. Both Belgium and Greece have a lower share of  sub-
national government revenues in GDP than most of  the analysed countries, which 
could be the explanation for county councillors’ attitudes in these countries. 
Although there is no straightforward link between the level of  fiscal decentralisa-
tion and the county councillors’ attitudes toward their role in fostering local eco-
nomic development, most of  the countries with a lower level of  fiscal decentralisation 
rate the importance of  this task lower than those with a higher level of  decentralisa-
tion. County councillors from European countries with a larger share of  sub-
national revenues in GDP evaluated the importance to be involved in the 
coordination of  local economic development as more significant. Examples of  
these countries are Italy and Hungary, where more than 85 per cent of  the respon-
dents find that it is fairly or very important to be involved in the coordination of  
local economic development. A significant change in the level of  fiscal 
8329-0042-PI-004.indd   61 7/15/2015   2:32:21 PM
62 D. J. Alibegović and S. Slijepčević
decentralisation measured by the share of  sub-national budget revenues and 
expenses in the consolidated general government budget or by the share of  sub-
national government revenues and expenses in GDP gives greater power to the 
sub-national level of  government. In this case, county councillors could have 
greater influence on local development policies. It is also noteworthy that there are 
countries in which there is no correlation between the level of  fiscal decentralisa-
tion and the county councillors’ attitudes toward this issue; these are Romania and 
Spain. Both of  these countries have low levels of  fiscal decentralisation, but the 
county councillors are aware that they could influence local economic 
development.
In the more decentralised countries, the second tier of  local government exer-
cises greater influence on decisions, which have a positive or negative influence on 
the local development. Therefore, the second group of  analysed questions is related 
to the county councillors’ views about decentralisation of  tasks to different local 
government levels, regardless of  the fact of  whether or not such a reform has 
already been conducted in the country. We analyse the data on the attitudes of  
county councillors toward decentralisation of  tasks to the county as well as decen-
tralisation of  tasks to the municipalities.
0% 
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BE HR CZ FR DE GR HU IT NO PL RO ES SE Engl. 
Not important at all or of very little importance Fairly and very important 
Figure 4.1  Overview of  attitudes toward own involvement in the coordination of  local eco-
nomic development by country
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the survey.
Notes: Percentages are sums of  not important and of  very little importance or of  fairly and very impor-
tant on a five-point scale. Where county councillors did not answer these questions, data were omitted 
from the analysis.
BE – Belgium, HR – Croatia, CZ- Czech Republic, FR – France, DE – Germany, GR – Greece, HU – 
Hungary, IT – Italy, NO – Norway, PL – Poland, RO – Romania, ES – Spain, SE – Sweden, 
Engl. – England.
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Table 4.5 shows responses to the survey from county councillors in all countries 
analysed. The summary results for all analysed countries show that slightly more 
than half  of  the respondents support the decentralisation of  tasks to a lower level 
of  government. On average, 58.1 per cent of  county councillors find that the 
decentralisation of  tasks to counties or municipalities is desirable or highly desir-
able reform. Also 59.9 per cent of  the county councillors agree or strongly agree 
with the statement that decentralisation of  tasks to local government is a good way 
of  involving citizens in public affairs.
However, there are large differences between countries. The percentage of  
county councillors that find decentralisation of  tasks to counties desirable, vary 
from 37.0 per cent in Poland to 83.6 per cent in Italy, while the percentage of  those 
who support decentralisation of  tasks to municipalities vary from 29.3 per cent in 
Hungary to 77.4 per cent in Croatia. More than half  of  the respondents support 
decentralisation of  tasks, both to municipalities and to counties in Croatia, 
 Germany, Greece, Norway, Romania, Spain and Sweden. The results of  the 
deeper analysis of  county councillors’ attitudes towards a decentralisation process 
in Croatia, which are presented in Jurlina Alibegović et al. (2014), show that county 
councillors are more concerned with fiscal than with administrative decentralisa-
tion. Jurlina Alibegović et al. (2014) stated that improving the quality of  public 
services and obtaining financial autonomy are the two most important goals of  
decentralisation.
Table 4.5 County councillors’ attitudes toward decentralisation of  tasks
Countries Decentralisation of  tasks to the county Decentralisation of  tasks to the 
municipalities
Mean Standard 
deviation
Desirable or highly 
desirable (per cent)
Mean Standard 
deviation
Desirable or highly 
desirable (per cent)
Belgium 3.3 1.157 51.4 3.2 1.189 43.3
Croatia 3.9 0.811 77.3 3.9 0.802 77.4
Czech Rep. 3.7 1.005 63.4 - - -
England 3.8 0.959 73.3 3.3 1.054 49.6
France 3.4 1.056 55.4 - - -
Germany 3.4 1.007 55.2 3.4 1.017 51.4
Greece 4.1 1.076 77.7 3.7 1.125 65.7
Hungary 4.1 0.987 77.7 2.9 1.212 29.3
Italy 4.2 0.950 83.6 - - -
Norway 3.6 1.158 66.3 3.7 1.121 64.6
Poland 3.1 1.095 37.0 3.1 1.129 38.1
Romania 4.1 0.978 80.0 3.9 1.010 70.3
Spain 3.6 1.166 62.4 3.7 1.072 63.6
Sweden 3.7 0.997 58.7 3.5 0.960 50.0
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the survey
Notes: Mean values on a five-point scale or percentages, calculated as the sum of  desirable and highly 
desirable. Where county councillors did not answer these questions, data were omitted from analysis.
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Poland is the only clear example of  a lack of  trust in the decentralisation process. 
Only in Poland, the number of  county councillors who found that the decentralisa-
tion of  tasks to counties or municipalities is undesirable or highly undesirable is 
almost equal to the number of  councillors who found that these reforms are desir-
able or highly desirable. These results are fully in line with the results of  the 
research carried out by Brusis (2013). He explored connection among electoral 
competition, ideological divides and territory-based divisions in the creation of  
regions and regional self-governments (started in1999), local electoral reform 
(introduced in 2002), rules of  adopting regional development projects (adopted in 
2006) and the creation of  metropolitan regions (created in 2008). His study pro-
vides evidence that a national conservative opposition to the process of  decentrali-
sation arose in Poland (see also Rincker and Battle 2011).
Thirty-eight per cent of  all councillors surveyed find that decentralisation of  
tasks is desirable or highly desirable, both for municipalities and for counties. How-
ever, 16 per cent of  county councillors did not have clear opinions about these 
issues, stating that decentralisation of  tasks to some of  the lower levels of  govern-
ment is neither desirable nor undesirable. In addition, only 9 per cent of  all county 
councillors found that decentralisation of  tasks to a lower level of  government is 
not desirable. This confirms that, on average, most of  the county councillors sup-
port administrative decentralisation reforms, regardless of  their previous experi-
ences with fiscal decentralisation and limited revenues for financing their tasks.
County councillors were also asked which services should be provided either in 
a public, a private form or by a public-private partnership (PPP).
The PPP, as a separate form of  providing tasks, has been included in the analysis 
due to the fact that the literature demonstrates that this form of  providing public 
services can encourage local development in European countries (see for example, 
Boxmeer and Bechoven 2005). Yescombe (2007) also stresses that PPP has become 
a popular form for obtaining and maintaining public sector infrastructures in many 
sectors, such as transportation and social infrastructure, but also in providing public 
services. Besides an inadequate structure of  sub-national budgetary revenues and 
expenses, the reasons for private sector involvement in infrastructure development 
are increased local and regional needs, the size of  local and regional projects, high 
costs of  project preparation and construction as well as borrowing restrictions at 
the central and regional levels. Metaxas and Preza (2012) stress the role of  PPPs 
during and after last financial crises, when the need for collaboration between the 
private and the public sector increased due to the lack of  necessary financial 
resources for delivering public services.
County councillors were asked to choose between three different forms of  ser-
vice delivery for seven different public functions (see also Heinelt and Krapp, 
Chapter 3 in this book). Those public functions are public transport, maintenance 
of  school buildings, waste management, energy supply, water supply and sewage, 
hospitals and care homes for the elderly.
Analyses of  county councillors’ opinions do not bring us to a straightforward 
conclusion. Differences in county councillors’ opinions are especially evident when 
they were asked whether or not private or public sectors should be responsible for 
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certain public services. More than half  of  the European county councillors found 
that the maintenance of  school buildings, water supply, sewage and hospitals 
should be the responsibility of  the public sector.
Regarding the delivery of  services in the form of  PPP, opinions were different, 
depending on the country and the specific public service. More than 30 per cent 
of  all county councillors found that only three public services should be developed 
in this form: public transport, waste management and care homes for the elderly. 
Almost one-third of  all analysed county councillors (32 per cent) found that public 
Table 4.6  County councillors’ attitudes about which form of  service delivery is most prefer-
able with respect to different tasks
Service Form of  
service 
delivery
Countries with between 30 and 
50 per cent of  county councillors 
who have chosen a form of  service 
delivery
Countries with more than 50 
per cent of  county councillors 
who have chosen a form of  
service delivery
Public transport PPP CZ, FR, GR, IT, NO, RO, 
ES, SE
-
private PL, ENGL. -
public HR, FR, GR, IT, NO, PL, 
ES, SE, ENGL.
BE, DE, HU
Maintenance of  
school buildings
PPP NO, SE, ENGL. -
private BE, ENGL. -
public BE, GR, NO HR, CZ, FR, DE, HU, 
IT, PL, RO, ES
Waste management PPP BE, CZ, GR, IT, RO, SE, 
ES
-
private CZ, NO, PT, RO -
public BR, FR, GR, IT, NO, PL, 
ES, SE, ENGL.
HR, DE, HU
Energy supply PPP BE, GR, IT, RO, SE, ES -
private DE, ES CZ, ENGL.
public BE, CZ, FR, GR, IT, RO, 
SE
HR, DE, HU, NO, PL
Water supply and 
sewage
PPP CZ, IT, RO, ENGL. ES
private - ENGL.
public CZ, RO, SE BE, HR, FR, DE, GR, 
HU, IT, NO, PL, SE
Hospitals PPP BE, RO, SE ENGL.
private - -
public BE, RO, ENGL. HR, CZ, FR, DE, GR, 
HU, NO, PL, SE, ES
Care homes for the 
elderly
PPP BE, HR, CZ, FR, GR, HU, 
NO, ES, SE
RO
private - DE
public BE, HR, GR, HU, SE, 
ENGL.
CZ, FR, NO, PL, ES
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the survey
Note: where county councillors did not answer these questions, data were omitted from analysis.
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transport should be offered through a PPP, while almost half  of  the respondents 
(48 per cent) found that it should still be the responsibility of  the public sector. The 
distribution of  answers is similar when respondents were asked about waste man-
agement and care homes for the elderly. One-third of  county councillors (34 per 
cent) found that care homes for the elderly should be developed in the form of  PPP, 
while 41 per cent found that it should be the responsibility of  the public sector. 
Similarly, 30 per cent of  respondents found that waste management should be 
conducted in the form of  PPP, while 45 per cent of  them find that the public sector 
should stay responsible for this public service.
Based on the previous analyses, we assume that councillors prefer a specific form 
of  public services provision, regardless the sector. This is explored by testing the 
correlation between different sectors (Table 4.7) using phi and Cramer’s V correla-
tions. Moderately strong to strong correlations between county councillors’ atti-
tudes towards different forms of  public service provision show that those councillors 
who prefer PPP as the form of  public delivery in one sector, would choose the same 
form in other sectors as well. The results are the same for public and private-public 
services provision.
The second channel recognised in the large number of  European countries, 
through which public services could be improved and local development encour-
aged, is territorial reform. The fiscal federalism literature suggests that a modified 
territorial structure of  a country should be a result of  implemented fiscal auton-
omy principles for sub-national government units, in order to achieve an efficient 
public service provision. The territorial division of  the country should be con-
ducted, taking into account different criteria such as population size, fiscal capac-
ity, economic structure and other specific factors (e.g. historical factors). There are 
many other different criteria that should be implemented in order to strengthen 
the administrative capacity of  sub-national authorities. All of  them have the same 
goal: strengthening of  the political profile of  sub-national government and the 
political and administrative accountability of  sub-national actors aiming to 
achieve an increase in the well-being of  a local community. In their research, 
Wollmann (2004, 2011) and Wollmann and Bouckaert (2006) systematised the 
experience of  developed countries (Germany, France) in the implementation of  
territorial reform. The process of  territorial reform happens in almost all Eastern 
European countries. The general conclusion provided by Kuhlmann and Woll-
mann (2011) is that territorial reorganisation of  local governments can rely on 
voluntary or imposed mergers of  general-purpose local units or on creating func-
tionally oriented inter-municipal bodies. There are examples of  countries that 
have been preparing a proposal of  a new administrative-territorial division of  the 
country which would, by reducing the number of  local government units and 
public spending, providing optimal performance of  public tasks and responsibili-
ties at sub-national level.
The results of  the survey conducted among county councillors show large dif-
ferences in their opinions regarding territorial reforms, irrespective of  the fact of  
whether or not such reforms were conducted in the country. Overall, the analysis 
of  all responses shows that
8329-0042-PI-004.indd   66 7/15/2015   2:32:21 PM
Ta
bl
e 4
.7
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
at
tit
ud
es
 a
bo
ut
 w
hi
ch
 fo
rm
 o
f 
se
rv
ic
e 
de
liv
er
y 
is
 m
os
t p
re
fe
ra
bl
e 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 ta
sk
s
 
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f 
sc
ho
ol
 b
ui
ld
in
gs
W
as
te 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
E
ne
rg
y 
su
pp
ly
W
at
er
 su
pp
ly
 
an
d 
se
w
ag
e
H
os
pi
ta
ls
C
ar
e H
om
es
 fo
r 
th
e E
ld
erl
y
Pu
bl
ic
 tr
an
sp
or
t
Ph
i
C
ra
m
er
’s 
V
0.
39
7*
*
0.
28
1*
*
0.
49
4*
*
0.
35
0*
*
0.
45
3*
*
0.
32
1*
*
0.
41
1*
*
0.
29
1*
*
0.
40
2*
*
0.
28
4*
*
0.
44
2*
*
0.
31
3*
*
N
4,
84
7
4,
78
2
4,
84
6
4,
86
7
4,
59
5
4,
54
3
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f 
sc
ho
ol
 b
ui
ld
in
gs
Ph
i
C
ra
m
er
’s 
V
0.
49
3*
*
0.
34
9*
*
0.
36
6*
*
0.
25
9*
*
0.
34
3*
*
0.
24
3*
*
0.
34
0*
*
0.
24
0*
*
0.
33
2*
*
0.
23
5*
*
N
4,
85
8
4,
83
7
4,
85
2
4,
58
4
4,
52
7
W
as
te
 m
an
ag
em
en
t
Ph
i
C
ra
m
er
’s 
V
0.
65
1*
*
0.
46
0*
*
0.
60
6*
*
0.
42
8*
*
0.
40
2*
*
0.
28
4*
*
0.
41
6*
*
0.
29
4*
*
N
4,
87
0
4,
88
7
4,
60
0
4,
54
9
E
ne
rg
y 
su
pp
ly
Ph
i
C
ra
m
er
’s 
V
0.
74
2*
*
0.
52
5*
*
0.
43
6*
*
0.
30
8*
*
0.
41
7*
*
0.
29
5*
*
N
4,
87
4
4,
58
9
4,
53
4
W
at
er
 s
up
pl
y 
an
d 
se
w
ag
e
Ph
i
C
ra
m
er
’s 
V
0.
43
4*
*
0.
30
7*
*
0.
36
0*
*
0.
25
4*
*
N
4,
60
8
4,
55
2
H
os
pi
ta
ls
Ph
i
C
ra
m
er
’s 
V
0.
78
9*
*
0.
55
8*
*
N
4,
55
8
So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
rs
’ o
w
n 
w
or
k.
N
ot
e:
 F
or
 P
hi
 a
nd
 C
ra
m
er
’s 
V,
 *
* 
p<
0.
01
.
8329-0042-PI-004.indd   67 7/15/2015   2:32:21 PM
68 D. J. Alibegović and S. Slijepčević
• 44.0 per cent of  county councillors found that merging municipalities is a 
desirable or a highly desirable reform, while 33.5 per cent of  county coun-
cillors found it a highly undesirable or an undesirable reform;
• 33.3 per cent of  county councillors found that merging counties is a desir-
able or a highly desirable reform, while 46.6 per cent of  county councillors 
found it a highly undesirable or an undesirable reform;
• 6.9 per cent of  county councillors found that splitting up counties is a desir-
able or a highly desirable reform, while 75.9 per cent of  county councillors 
found it a highly undesirable or an undesirable territorial reform.
The results of  the survey show that more than 50 per cent of  county councillors 
who answered the questionnaire in Croatia, France, Hungary, Italy and Norway 
consider that merging municipalities would be a good idea. Norway is the example 
of  a country which conducted territorial and decentralisation reforms in 2010, 
introducing new competences, but also introducing additional financial resources 
to counties. Municipalities obtained the new competences in the areas of  health 
and social affairs (Council of  European Municipalities and Regions 2013). This 
implies that county councillors in those countries believe that too many small 
municipalities are a barrier to faster local development in those countries. 
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BE HR CZ FR DE GR HU IT NO PL RO ES SE Engl. 
Highly undesirable or undesirable Desirable or highly desirable 
Figure 4.2 County councillors’ attitudes towards merging municipalities within the county
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the survey
Note: Percentages are sums of  highly undesirable and undesirable or desirable and highly desirable on 
a five-point scale. Where county councillors did not answer these questions, data were omitted from 
analysis.
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Generally, federalised states have a larger level of  decentralisation with stronger 
decision-making power at the second level of  local government. In those countries, 
on average, the majority of  county councillors support the merging of  municipali-
ties. Until 1993, Belgium conducted reforms to transform a unitary into a federal 
state, but the overlapping territories and competences still remain the problem 
(Ismeri Europa and Applica 2010).
In Spain, however, more than 50 per cent of  respondents find that this is a highly 
undesirable or an undesirable territorial reform. However, countries in which ter-
ritorial reform failed or where reforms were conducted with only minor modifica-
tions, are those which try to support inter-municipal cooperation. The examples 
are Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, France and the United Kingdom (Council 
of  European Municipalities and Regions 2013).
As could be expected, when talking about merging counties, more county coun-
cillors in the analysed countries considered that this is an undesirable rather than 
a desirable territorial reform. The situation is different in only two countries. On 
one hand, more than 50 per cent of  county councillors from Norway and Sweden 
find that merging counties is a desirable reform. On the other, less than 10 per cent 
of  county councillors from Belgium, Spain and England find that merging counties 
should be conducted.
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Figure 4.3 County councillors’ attitudes towards merging counties
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the survey
Note: Percentages are sums of  highly undesirable and undesirable or desirable and highly desirable on 
a five-point scale. Where county councillors did not answer these questions, data were omitted from 
analysis.
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However, county councillors have similar opinions about splitting up counties. 
Most of  the county councillors found that this reform should not be conducted, 
revealing their attitudes, that the number of  local government units is large enough. 
Such attitudes could be especially strong during financial crises, when most of  the 
local government units are faced with the lack of  financial resources and have to 
cut expenses. Indeed, most of  them found such a reform extremely undesirable. 
Such an opinion is mostly pronounced in Hungary, where 79.2 per cent of  county 
councillors found that splitting up counties is a highly undesirable reform and an 
additional 10.6 per cent consider it to be an undesirable reform.
Although the survey discovered large differences between county councillors, 
which are a consequence of  many different factors, including historical back-
ground, successfulness on conducting territorial reforms so far, etc., the division of  
competences is determined mostly only under ordinary legislation, and there is no 
constitutional division of  competences between different levels of  government 
(Ismeri Europa and Applica 2010). The conducted decentralisation process was 
mostly only administrative, while the level of  fiscal autonomy remained very low. 
Hence, the county councillors felt the gap between the revenues and expenses 
needed to conduct local economic development. Such a fiscal imbalance, especially 
during and after the financial crises, is more pronounced in also influencing the 
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Figure 4.4 County councillors’ attitudes towards splitting up counties
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the survey
Note: Percentages are sums of  highly undesirable and undesirable or desirable and highly desirable on 
a five-point scale. Where county councillors did not answer these questions, data were omitted from 
analysis.
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county councillors’ attitudes toward territorial reforms. Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that almost all county councillors found that merging municipalities and/or 
counties would not be a preferable reform.
Conclusions
In the last few decades, the role of  the second tier of  local government has changed 
in many countries, depending on the constitution of  the country, whether it is a 
unitary or a federal country. Also, the role of  second-tier local government depends 
on the direction of  conducted reforms. The special problem is that the share of  
the second tier of  local government in GDP stayed at relatively low levels in most 
of  the European countries. The long (and in some countries still ongoing) financial 
crisis further widens the financial gap between revenues and expenses of  sub-
national governments. The central government keeps under its control almost all 
revenue sources. Transferred responsibilities to the second tier of  local government 
in the analysed countries are different, but mostly cover education, health and 
social welfare. In generally, the responsibility of  the second tier of  local government 
for coordinating local development policy remained low.
The attitudes of  county councillors towards new tasks and responsibilities are 
not homogenous across the analysed countries. This is partly a consequence of  the 
fact that the second tier of  local government has limited financial resources for 
current responsibilities. In spite of  that, most of  the county councillors across 
Europe find that their role in the coordination of  local economic development 
should be more important.
Overall, more than one-third of  all analysed county councillors in Europe con-
sidered that territorial reforms, which would lead to a decreased number of  munic-
ipalities and/or counties, are desirable. A somewhat smaller share of  county 
councillors with those attitudes could be noticed in countries which have already 
conducted such reforms. Such territorial reforms would have an impact on a more 
efficient provision of  public services.
County councillors do not neglect the possibility of  larger participation by the 
private sector in providing public functions in the form of  privatisation or PPP. 
Water supply, sewage, hospitals, and care homes for the elderly are public functions 
which most of  the county councillors would like to remain in the sphere of  the 
public sector. For deeper analysis of  county councillors’ attitudes, additional research 
would be necessary, with the goal of  gaining insight into their opinions about local 
economic development goals in different countries and an acceptable division of  
responsibilities between government levels from county councillors’ perspectives.
Note
1 International Monetary Fund (2001) international guidelines for statistical methodology 
of  compiling public finance statistics is harmonised with the System of  National Accounts 
1993 (SNA 1993). The methodology brought some changes in fiscal statistics with the 
goal of  improving transparency. Therefore, classification of  revenues and expenses 
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changed and now includes the following classification of  public functions: 01 General 
public services, 02 Defence, 03 Public order and safety, 04 Economic affairs, 05 Environ-
mental protection, 06 Housing and community amenities, 07 Health, 08 Recreation, 
culture and religion, 09 Education and 10 Social protection.
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5 The political representation 
focuses of second-tier  
councillors in Europe
Cristina Stănuş
Introduction
The alliance between democracy and political representation has always been an 
uneasy one, though participatory democratic politics at the local level made this a 
workable relationship (Pitkin 2004). This uneasiness is significantly greater in a 
context defined by the introduction of  governance-oriented reforms on all levels 
of  government. With governance and collaborative-governance mechanisms 
comes a challenge to the traditional views on political representation, which goes 
as far as requiring elected officials to reinvent their roles in relation to citizens and 
other relevant actors in governmental structures (Hansen 2001; Saward 2005; Bru-
gué and Vallés 2005). In political representation research, the emphasis falls upon 
representational role orientations and the gap between normative expectations and 
role behaviours. An inherently normative component of  representational role ori-
entation, yet with practical reverberation, is linked with the question of  whom 
elected officials claim to represent. This is a particularly valid question in the con-
text provided by the second tier of  local government. Normatively speaking, elec-
toral mechanisms compel an elected official to represent his or her territorial 
constituency. Yet, in a governance context, constituencies become fluid and depart 
significantly from the Burkean notion of  national/local territorial focus of  repre-
sentation of  elected officials (Saward 2005: 182). Consequently, in the case of  a 
single elected official we may speak of  multiple constituencies (some territorially 
defined and some not) which overlap. It is thus important to explore the space 
carved out for territorially oriented political representation in the new governance 
configuration.1
In this direction, the chapter sets out to answer three questions: (1) How does 
the notion of  overlapping focuses of  representation manifest itself  at the second 
tier of  local government in Europe? (2) To what extent is territorial representation 
being replaced/complemented by more flexible forms of  political representation? 
And (3) what are the factors that account for variation (if  any) in territorial repre-
sentation focuses of  second-tier elected officials in Europe? Based upon empirical 
research on the representational styles and focuses assumed by members of  national 
and European legislative bodies and officials in the first tier of  local government, 
a set of  empirical expectations regarding the representational focuses of  county 
councillors in Europe is formulated and tested in a comparative context.
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In the following section the chapter reviews findings concerning political repre-
sentation, with an emphasis on the focus of  representation (for representational 
styles see Aars et al., Chapter 6 in this volume). Next, it describes the overlapping 
focuses of  territorial representation of  elected officials at the second tier of  local 
government in Europe. Afterwards, it explores the linkages between territorial and 
functional (interest-based) political representation. Later on, the chapter attempts 
to explain the variation in terms of  the focus of  representation taking into account 
institutional, party-related and personal variables.
The focus of  representation
At the heart of  representative democracy, political representation defines the rela-
tionship between elected officials and voters. The simplest definition available 
emphasises that representation is about making citizens present (Pitkin 1967). It is 
concerned not with what decisions should be made, but with how decisions are to 
be made by elected officials (Eulau et al. 1959: 745). Hence, there is a strong empha-
sis on who the representatives are, how they see their role, and how they behave in 
their elected positions. Only more recently (see for example Saward 2005), the 
emphasis has shifted towards the represented (the citizens), as well as towards non-
electoral forms of  political representation. Much of  the research on political rep-
resentation has unavoidably focused on members of  national parliaments. It was 
in this context that role theories of  legislative behaviour were developed. Research-
ers shifting the focus to other levels of  government or other types of  elected officials 
have generally tried to test and expand existing propositions and concepts 
(for example de Groot et al. 2010; Rao 1998; Verhelst et al. 2014).
Among a legislator’s key roles the representational role is singled out (Katz 
1997). It comprises norms and expectations concerning decision-making processes 
and, consequently, the relationship between officials and citizens (pressure groups, 
other citizens), as well as between officials and other officials, deriving from their 
administrative role and the leadership positions they occupy, as well as from their 
expertise on certain subject-matters (Wahlke et al. 1962: 14). Conflicting role defini-
tions are possible, which is why investigations of  the topic emphasise the role orienta-
tion, which is defined as a translation of  expectations related to the rights, duties 
and obligations connected with the position of  representative (Wessels/Giebler 
2011). A key difference in the literature, stemming from a different theoretical 
tradition, is whether the self-perceptions and self-definitions (see for example Sear-
ing 1991) or strategic plans for action (Strøm 1997) are seen as key elements of  a 
representative’s role.
The role orientation of  elected officials at all levels of  government is defined by 
two main dimensions, the style and focus of  political representation (Wahlke et al. 
1962; Saalfeld and Müller 1997; Eulau et al. 1959; Eulau and Karps 1977). The 
question of  whom the representative claims/aims to represent addresses what is 
known as the focus of  representation (Weßels 2007). The focus of  representation is 
multidimensional, with three main categories identified in the literature: (1) geo-
graphical (nation, state, district or other territorial level); (2) group (religious, ethnic, 
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economic and ideological/party groups); and (3) individual (focused on the repre-
sentation of  individuals) (Weßels 2007: 839). These are analytical categories; in 
practice we find a mix and overlap of  representational focuses of  given politicians 
(Eulau et al. 1959).
Political parties play an important role in building representational linkages 
in most European countries (according to the ‘responsible party’ model, see 
Bengtsson/Wass 2011; Thomassen 1991; Wessels and Giebler 2011), in contrast 
to the more individualist approach used in studies made on the American con-
tinent. When looking at national legislatures, in many European political sys-
tems the focus of  representation seems to be biased towards the party, with 
territorial and functional representation thought to be less important (Weßels 
2007: 839). It can also be argued that, given the importance of  the political 
parties in representational linkages, they have moved beyond being a focus of  
representation. Parties thus became part of  the institutional settings which 
incentivise individual representatives in choosing a specific role. Most certainly, 
favouring one approach over the other would result in missing some of  the 
aspects of  the representative process (Thomassen and Andeweg 2004; Thomas-
sen and Esaiasson 2006; Brack et al. 2012).
Institutional settings shape the acquisition of  legislator’s representative focus and 
style (Weßels 2007; Saalfeld and Müller 1997; Kuklinski and Elling 1977). Varia-
tion between the countries is explained by systemic features, such as electoral rules 
and candidate selection procedures (Weßels 2007: 839). Research on representa-
tional role behaviour has especially focused on the amount of  constituency work 
representatives choose to do and its relationship with the electoral formula in use 
(Studlar and McAllister 1996 on MPs in New Zealand; Bowler and Farrell 1993 
on MEPs). This debate has surpassed the limits of  the academic world, being 
frequently invoked whenever a democratic country discussed electoral reform. The 
focus of  representation seems to depend also on individual-level characteristics 
(Itzkovitch-Malka 2014; Russo 2011). The importance of  individual-level charac-
teristics is highlighted by the focus on constituency representation in the case of  
officials elected using closed-list proportional representation.
From a focus of  representation point of  view, the second tier of  local govern-
ment is particularly interesting since it encompasses several first-tier governments. 
Available literature actually describes a struggle between representing the entire 
constituency or just the locality or area where the representative lives (Bengtsson 
and Wass 2011). There is a reasonable expectation that the territorial aspect of  
representation is a key issue in the case of  elected officials at the second tier of  local 
government. Consequently, this chapter focuses on territorial representation, while 
briefly exploring other dimensions of  political representation focuses.
Within the second tier of  local government, the chapter will focus strictly on the 
county councillors. The existence of  a mediating assembly of  some kind between 
the citizenry and political decision making is the key feature of  political representa-
tion (Brennan and Hamlin 1999; de Groot et al. 2010), while research on mayors 
(Kjaer 2013) has suggested a completely different conceptualisation applies to the 
representational role orientations of  occupants of  one-of-a-kind positions. In the 
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following section of  the chapter I proceed to describe the representational focuses 
of  second-tier councillors in Europe.
A description of  the representational focuses 
of  second-tier councillors
How do councillors at the second tier of  local government define their focus of  
representation? The search for an answer to this question is guided by two theo-
retically reasonable expectations. The first expectation is that county councillors 
in Europe are similar to other officials elected in representative assemblies in the 
sense that they mix several focuses of  representation. The second expectation is 
that, given the institutional variation at second tier of  local government in Europe 
and the importance of  the institutional settings in shaping role orientations, we 
can expect some institutionally induced variation between councillors. Therefore, 
throughout this chapter we will seek to showcase differences between the main 
types of  local government systems: the strong political leader, committee leader, 
collective leader and council-manager forms (Mouritzen and Svara 2002; Heinelt 
and Bertrana 2011; Bertrana and Heinelt 2013). The horizontal power relations 
at the heart of  this typology are particularly relevant to our topic due to the fact 
that they prescribe different policy-making roles for councillors, which incentivise 
councillors to take on the representation of  certain groups (or not). Countries were 
classified based on Heinelt and Bertrana (2011) and information from the national 
research teams involved in the Second Tier Survey (see the ‘Method and issues’ 
section).
In order to find out how second-tier councillors define their focus of  representa-
tion, councillors at the second tier of  local government in Europe were asked to 
respond to the following question: ‘As a county councillor, do you speak on behalf  
of  the following groups or interests?’ Respondents were asked to position them-
selves in terms of  territorial representation (entire county, part of  the county), 
socially defined groups (the elderly, youth, ethnic minorities, the middle class, less-
resourceful citizens, the unemployed, religious groups), and economically defined 
interests (different economic sectors, public servants, workers, particular public 
services).
The geographical or territorial element of  political representation is rarely dis-
cussed when approaching members of  parliament, given the nationalisation of  
major political issues and controversies in all contemporary democracies (Thomas-
sen and Andeweg 2004). However, not even in extreme cases such as the Dutch 
parliament is the notion of  territorial representation missing from how MPs build 
and perform their representational roles (Thomassen and Andeweg 2004). Second-
tier councillors investigated in this chapter fit this picture, as they dominantly 
declare some type of  territorial representational focus (see Table 5.1). Only one 
county councillor in 20 declares that he or she does not have a territorial focus of  
representation. A second aspect stems from the fact that the largest group of  coun-
cillors declares to represent at the same time both the entire county and a part of  
it, which was labelled dual territorial representation. The latter aspect very probably 
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reflects the broader notion of  political representation, which goes beyond electoral 
mechanisms, associated with local governance. This view on territorially oriented 
political representation is universalist and localist at the same time, a reflection of  
the complex set of  cues and incentives a representative has to deal with.
The next step in this analysis looks at the extent to which this pattern persists 
within different types of  local government systems. As shown in Table 5.1, there 
are significant differences between the categories. In the case of  the collective form 
of  second-tier local government, where elected councillors play important roles in 
policy making, dual territorial representation is the dominant category. In the case 
of  the strong political leader and committee leader forms of  second-tier local 
government, the largest category is that of  councillors declaring to represent the 
entire county. This could probably be linked to the need of  the councillors to 
legitimize their position in relation with the political leadership of  the county. In 
the case of  the council-manager form, where much of  the role of  the councillor is 
defined in relation to the professionalised county manager, the same applies. This, 
however, needs to be approached with caution as only one country included in this 
sample (Norway) classifies as a council-manager form of  second-tier local govern-
ment. The same is also true for Sweden, the only country classified under the 
committee-leader form of  local government system.
Taking this to the country level, Table 5.2 shows significant variation in terms of  
how county councillors in Europe define their territorial focus of  representation. A 
few countries (France, Hungary, Norway, and Poland) stand out as different. France 
has a significant number of  second-tier councillors declaring they have no territorial 
focus of  representation, which could be linked to the position of  county councillors 
as political notables with high political weight, allowed to cumulate multiple man-
dates in a political system in which there is even a legal requirement that MPs do 
not mention their constituency and plea for local interests (see Négrier and Nicolas 
2011; Brouard et al. 2013). In the Hungarian case almost all county councillors 
declare the same, which is quite unusual. This might be explained by the strong 
standing of  national political parties in county councils in Hungary, reinforced by 
Table 5.1  The territorial focus of  representation of  councillors in different second-tier local 
government systems
Type of  local government 
system
No territorial 
representation
Representing a 
part of  the county
Representing the 
entire county
Dual territorial 
representation
Number 
of  cases
Strong-leader form* 8.0% 17.6% 40.3% 33.8% 2,508
Committee-leader 
form*
3.7% 7.5% 51.0% 37.7% 1,147
Collective form* 1.5% 16.4% 14.2% 67.75% 668
Council-manager form 60.1% 39.8% 216
All countries* 5.8% 16.5% 34.0% 43.5% 4,539
Source: Second Tier Survey
*  Significant at 0.000.
  Weighted data.
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legal provisions such as those forbidding independent candidates and requiring vot-
ers to cast their vote for a political party based on a partial list of  candidates (Soós 
2011). In this institutional and political context it is quite likely that councillors 
might feel themselves to be representatives of  the political parties. Poland has a very 
large number of  councillors declaring dual territorial representation, which could 
be explained by looking at the intersection of  formal rules which prescribe the elec-
tion of  county councillors in wards with the particular non-partisan nature of  local 
politics (see Gendźwiłł and Żółtak 2014; Swianiewicz 2011).
The large numbers of  councillors declaring dual territorial representation, and thus 
seemingly applying a broad notion of  political representation, suggests it could also 
be relevant to explore linkages with functional political representation. Functional 
representation (i.e. the representation of  interest not primarily related to a particular 
territorial unit) is seen as an indicator of  a representative’s willingness to build for 
himself  or herself  an individual role. It is considered to characterise the behaviour of  
individual representatives even in countries with strong political parties (Thomassen 
and Andeweg 2004). In this respect, the literature distinguishes between administra-
tive, pressure group and party-related focuses of  representation (Rao 1998). I focus 
this analysis on the administrative and interest group-related focuses of  representation, 
as these reflect underlying changes to representational role orientations in the context 
of  local governance. An administrative focus of  representation reflects the extent to 
which elected officials in local government see it as their role to be involved in day-to-
day administration (which is a departure from a councillor’s prescribed role of  non-
involvement in local governance contexts, see Hansen 2001). Taking interest in 
practical and implementation issues unavoidably leads to elected officials keeping close 
contact with public servants or particular public services and speaking on their behalf. 
Table 5.2 The territorial focus of  representation of  councillor by country
Country No territorial 
representation
Representing a 
part of  the county
Representing the 
entire county
Dual territorial 
representation
Number 
of  cases
Belgium* 1.9% 39.0% 27.0% 31.8% 251
Croatia* 6.1% 18.8% 35.5% 39.4% 276
Czech Rep.* 4.5% 37.8% 18.1% 39.3% 66
England* 3.1% 32.5% 3.1% 61.1% 126
France* 39.0% 24.4% 17.7% 18.7% 192
Germany* 3.4% 16.0% 46.8% 33.6% 1,498
Greece* 1.1% 15.0% 39.8% 43.9% 173
Hungary* 92.6% 2.1% 4.2% 1.0% 95
Italy* 1.0% 19.7% 38.5% 40.6% 98
Norway – – 60.1% 39.8% 216
Poland* – 7.4% 8.4% 84.1% 98
Romania* 3.5% 33.5% 34.2% 28.6% 143
Spain* – 6.5% 27.4% 66.0% 153
Sweden* 3.7% 7.5% 51.0% 37.7% 1,147
Source: Second Tier Survey
* Significant at 0.000.
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At the same time, it is reasonable to expect that functional representation might also 
be linked to the division of  labour practised by political parties (asking certain council-
lors to focus on certain policy issues), as well as to the particular professional back-
ground of  the individual councillor (the councillor might choose to focus on a policy 
field which is linked to his or her occupation outside politics).
I employ univariate analysis and exploratory principal axis factoring to describe 
functional representation among second-tier councillors in Europe (see Linz 1981). 
The analysis shows councillors are less inclined to declare they speak on behalf  of  
administrative interests, the only groups even less favoured by councillors being those 
defined in religious terms. Functional representation at the second tier of  local govern-
ment in Europe seems to have two main components. The first, which can be labelled 
representation of  social interest groups, sees councillors declaring they speak on behalf  of  
the elderly or ethnically defined groups. The second sees them declaring to speak on 
behalf  of  business groups from various economic sectors. The two dimensions are 
relatively strong. While several variables load both dimensions, in all but two cases 
there is a significant difference in favour of  one of  the two dimensions. The social 
dimension of  functional representation seems oriented towards groups perceived as 
being worse off  from different points of  view, which would explain why the middle 
class loads this component slightly less than most other groups. The church and/or 
religious groups are included in both the social and economic dimension of  represen-
tation, with a slight tendency towards the economic dimension, which is reflective of  
Table 5.3 Dimensions of  functional representation, county councillors in Europe
Do you speak on behalf  of  . . .? Yes Social  
interests
Economic 
interests
Elderly people/ pensioners/retired 66.4% 0.78
Youth 77.5% 0.79 0.42
Ethnic minorities 45.0% 0.76
Public Servants 41.2% 0.77
Workers 61.8% 0.78 0.48
The middle class 68.9% 0.70 0.53
Less-resourceful citizens 73.9% 0.75
Unemployed 67.3% 0.82 0.43
Private business employees 52.8% 0.52 0.71
Primary sector (farming, fishing, etc.) 67.9% 0.81
Secondary sector (industry) 58.8% 0.87
Construction/real estate sector 52.6% 0.43 0.84
Trade sector 56.1% 0.87
Tourism sector 61.7% 0.83
The Church/religious groups 34.2% 0.49 0.57
Particular public service(s) 42.4% 0.54 0.54
Explained 0.43 0.42
Source: Second Tier Survey
PAF of  correlation matrix, varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization.
Explained variance Rho = 0.85, KMO = 0.71, N = 2153.
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the historical role of  the church in some Western European societies in articulating 
social and economic interests (see Linz 1981). The only variable which loads similarly 
both components of  functional representation concerns whether councillors declare 
to speak on behalf  of  particular public services. This reflects the dual nature of  these 
services, deriving from whether they are outsourced or not: outsourced public services 
may be perceived as economic interests, while non-outsourced services are part of  the 
administrative sphere to which a councillor should pay attention.
The same analysis was conducted for each type of  local government system to 
see whether there are departures from this pattern. The broad pattern (two com-
ponents, one focusing on the representation of  social problems and the other one 
focusing on the representation of  business interests) holds, with slight variations in 
terms of  loading, for councillors in strong leader, committee leader and collective 
leader forms of  second-tier local government. In the case of  the council-manager 
type of  local government systems the analysis revealed a single dimension, corre-
sponding to the social representation dimension. The latter case has to be viewed 
with caution, due to the fact that it is based on a small number of  cases from a 
single country. The next step in this analysis focuses on exploring the connections 
between territorial and functional representation.
A theoretically reasonable expectation concerning the linkages between territo-
rial and functional focuses of  representation is that it is more likely that councillors 
who declare to represent both the entire county and a part of  it at the same time 
will also declare more interest in representing social or economic groups. In order 
to test this I conducted point-biserial correlation (Anderson 1994) analyses between 
a series of  dummy variables reflecting the four different categories of  territorial 
representation and the factorial scores corresponding to the two dimensions of  
functional representation. Data concerning second-tier councillors supports this 
(see Table 5.4). Thus, when moving from other categories to the councillors declar-
ing a dual territorial representation focus we find a significant increase in the coun-
cillor’s interest in speaking on behalf  of  social groups and, to a lesser extent, 
economic groups. In the opposite direction, when moving from any other category 
to councillors declaring to represent the entire county, we have a significant 
Table 5.4  Linkages between territorial and functional representation, county councillors in 
Europe
Economic  
representation
Social  
representation
No territorial focus of  representation 0.03 –0.12*
Representing a part of  the county –0.03 0.04**
Representing the entire county –0.05**** –0.13*
Dual territorial representation 0.06*** 0.17*
Source: Second Tier Survey
Point bi-serial correlation: * significant at 0.001; ** significant at 0.02; *** significant at 0.002; **** 
significant at 0.007. N = 2,074.
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decrease in social representation. When moving into the category of  councillors 
declaring to have no territorial focus of  representation, we have a significant 
decrease in terms of  social representation and a very small but statistically insig-
nificant decrease in economic representation.
The next step in this analysis involved exploring this pattern across the various 
types of  local government systems. As shown in Table 5.5, the positive relationship 
between dual territorial representation and functional representation seems to hold 
across different types of  local government systems. Within strong-leader local gov-
ernment systems it seems that there is an increase in social representation as we 
move towards the category of  councillors declaring to represent the entire county 
and a significant decrease in economic representation as we move into the category 
of  councillors declaring to represent a part of  the county. Within the committee 
leader systems there seems to be an increase in social representation as we move 
towards the category of  councillors declaring to represent a part of  the county. In 
collective leader systems, when we move into the category of  councillors declaring 
to represent the entire county, economic representation increases and social repre-
sentation decreases. No relationship could be detected in the case of  the council-
manager form of  second-tier local government, which suggests different patterns 
apply in the one country included in this category (Norway).
These differences possibly suggest that, in different local government systems, 
the institutional cues concerning the councillor’s role might emphasise as accept-
able different combinations (overlaps) of  representational focuses. The impact of  
Table 5.5  Linkages between territorial and functional representation by forms of  local gov-
ernment system
Strong political leader 
form
Committee-leader form Collective leader form Council-manager 
form
Econ. repr. Social 
repr.
Econ. 
repr.
Social repr. Econ. 
repr.
Social repr. Econ. 
repr.
Social 
repr.
No territorial 
focus of  
representation
–0.02 –0.25* –0.02 –0.01 –0.07 –0.16*** – –
Representing a 
part of  the 
county
–0.10**** –0.008 0.006 0.08***** –0.21* 0.04 – –
Representing the 
entire county
0.04 –0.001 –0.002 –0.19* 0.03 –0.17** –0.07 –0.08
Dual territorial 
representation
0.05 0.21* 0.01 0.16* 0.20* 0.14***** 0.07 0.08
Number of  cases 709 901 346 118
Source: Second Tier Survey
Point bi-serial correlation: * significant at 0.000; ** significant at 0.001; *** significant at 0.002; **** 
significant at 0.006; ***** significant at 0.007. N = 2,074.
Econ. repr. = economic representation; Social repr. = social representation
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the type of  local government system, as well as of  other institutional, party-related 
and personal level variables, on the choice of  territorial focuses of  representation 
is further explored in what follows.
Factors shaping a representative’s role orientation
An explanation of  differences in territorial representation can reasonably start with 
factors or categories of  factors in line with the conventional wisdom in the field of  
political representation research. Thus, two assumptions guided the search for poten-
tial explanatory factors. First, given the unavoidable linkage between the style and 
focus of  representation, we can reasonably assume that factors linked to the style of  
representation might help shed some light on the choice of  focus of  representation. 
Second, we assume that second-tier legislatures are, at least to some extent, mini-
parliaments where patterns of  building representational roles similar to those of  MPs 
apply. Applying this double perspective, three categories of  potential explanatory 
variables can be identified: institutional, party-related and personal characteristics.
Institutional settings play an important role in how elected officials see territori-
ally defined political representation. Among the more powerful elements of  the 
institutional settings are the type of  local government system, as power relations 
provide very powerful cues for councillors regarding of  what is expected of  them, 
the electoral system and the size of  the county council.
The type of  local government system influences the choice of  representational 
role due to the extent to which horizontal power relations get councillors to experi-
ence the pressure of  effective decision-making. In the committee leader and the 
collective form of  local government system, councillors are somewhat constrained 
in taking effectiveness more into account. Consequently, we would expect them to 
show more restraint towards representing sectoral interests or adopting a localist 
view on territorial representation.
Research on MPs has suggested that representational role perception and the 
amount and type of  constituency work depend on the electoral rules, with MPs 
elected in single-member districts doing broadly more constituency work than 
those elected on party lists (Bradbury and Mitchell 2007; Gallagher and Holliday 
2003; Bowler and Farrell 1993). We can reasonably expect that councillors elected 
in single member districts to be more focused on the respective districts, which are 
in fact geographical parts of  the counties. Linked to the choice of  electoral system 
and a potential key element in how a councillor defines his or her territorial rep-
resentation focus is whether he or she is elected in a constituency which covers the 
entire territory of  the county or just a part of  it.
Linking to the practical and theoretical discussions concerning the size of  the 
assemblies, an interesting aspect is the extent to which a political system favours 
representativeness or efficiency. Favouring representativeness will give small groups 
and parties the opportunity to make their voice heard, or might even give a local 
elected official from a larger political party an incentive to speak on behalf  of  small 
groups in need of  a voice. The best reflection of  the option for representativeness 
is given by the assembly size; for example, the larger the assembly size in a propor-
tional representation system, the greater the chances for smaller political parties 
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and lists to be represented (Kjaer and Elklit 2014). To some extent this also holds 
for majority systems, as larger assembly sizes mean smaller constituencies and bet-
ter chances for smaller political actors. I hypothesise that the larger the county 
council, the more likely it is to have individual representatives adopting a more 
localist or interest-based view on political representation.
The category of  party-related predictors includes the type of  political party. The 
literature suggests that belonging to the governing party or coalition helps explain 
some of  the variation in terms of  attitudes toward political representation (de Groot 
et al. 2010). In the realm of  local politics equal importance might be given to the dis-
tinction between local parties or lists and the national political parties, with the former 
more likely to reject universalist views on political representation. However, it was also 
suggested that a greater territorialisation of  representation can cause national parties 
to allow greater internal diversity within the organisation, even if  it does not produce 
the expected territorialisation in terms of  political recruitment (Montero 2007).
In the category of  individual-level variables we find the ideological orientation 
of  the councillor, his or her seniority, future career plans and whether the council-
lor is a full-time politician or not. In connection to party-related variables, the ideo-
logical orientation is often mentioned as influencing the choice of  representational 
style and focus (Verhelst et al. 2014; Itzkovitch-Malka 2014; Méndez-Lago and 
Martínez 2002). Data concerning the direction of  the relationship is inconclusive. 
Data from Spain supports the idea that right-leaning parties encourage a more 
national approach to the focus of  representation, while an analysis of  French MPs 
is inconclusive (Méndez-Lago and Martínez 2002; Brouard et al. 2013).
Of  particular importance is the issue of  seniority, as previous studies suggest 
there might be a difference in terms of  style and focus of  representation between 
newly elected officials and the more experienced ones (de Groot et al. 2010; Itzko-
vitch-Malka 2014). More experienced councillors are expected to be more likely 
to embrace a more traditional universalist view on territorial representation.
At the same time it is important to take into account the future career plans of  
the councillor, as previous research has suggested that MPs choose the role that 
maximises their chances to achieve their career prospects (Strøm 1997; Gallagher 
and Holliday 2003; Blidook and Kerby 2011). Career plans were shown to be a 
significant predictor of  the representational focus of  MPs (Itzkovitch-Malka 2014; 
Brouard et al. 2013). In the case of  county councillors it thus becomes relevant 
whether they plan to quit politics, remain councillors or become mayors, ministers 
or MPs. Politicians intending to promote from local to national politics are more 
inclined to focus on policy making and national issues to prove their credentials. 
They are probably also keener to get some support from local party activists and 
organisations during the selection process and the subsequent electoral race – this 
could direct them to focus on representing a part of  the territory.
The previous section of  the chapter pointed out there seems to be a connection 
between the territorial focus of  representation on a part of  the county and func-
tional representation. Among the two dimensions of  functional representation, the 
social one seems to be more strongly correlated with territorial representation. 
Consequently, it can reasonably be included in the category of  potential predictors 
of  territorial representation.
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Method and issues
In order to test the influence of  these factors over the county councillor’s choice of  
representational focus I use a multinomial logistic regression model. The depen-
dent variable is the territorial focus of  representation. The analysis contrasts the 
‘normal’ situation – councillors declaring they represent the entire county – to 
other situations: for example, councillors declaring no territorial focus of  represen-
tation, those declaring to represent just a part of  the county and those declaring a 
dual focus of  territorial representation. The analysis excludes Norway, and thus 
the council-manager form of  local government system, due to the distribution of  
the Norwegian councillors on the dependent variable. Due to missing data, coun-
cillors from Germany, Hungary, Poland and England were also excluded at this 
step of  the analysis. Although alone in the committee-leader category, Sweden 
provides sufficient cases and significant variation on the dependent variable and is 
included in the analysis.
The analysis tests for the influence of  eight independent variables grouped 
alongside the three dimensions and uses four control variables. Two of  the vari-
ables (proportional representation2, type of  local government system3) represent 
contextual data built based on information provided by national research teams 
and Heinelt and Bertrana (2011). A third variable, the size of  the council, is a 
contextual variable also provided by national research teams.
The analysis of  the influence of  ideological orientations takes the individual 
self-placement on the (11-point) left-right scale into account. The characteristics 
of  the data available do not allow for an analysis which also discriminates between 
local and national political parties. Consequently, we will only distinguish between 
independents and party members.4
I control for the effects of  whether a councillor is a full-time politician or not, 
since what a councillor does or thinks he or she can do obviously depends on the 
time available. To a large extent, this is linked to the institutional/systemic factors. 
Whether a county councillor is a full-time politician depends on how this position 
is regulated in the national legal framework.
On the personal characteristics level I also take into account the age, gender 
and education of  the councillors. Gender and age are key variables, given the 
tendency of  local elected officials to be male and older (see for example Rao 1998 
on England) and, consequently, more likely to have been exposed throughout 
their lives and careers5 to the traditional electoral-based view on political repre-
sentation. The next section of  this chapter presents the multinomial logistic 
regression model.
A multivariate explanation of  the variations 
in territorial representation
The model in Table 5.6 suggests that at the intersection between institutional, party 
and individual characteristics we can build a potential explanation of  how council-
lors define their territorial representation focuses.
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The institutional variables seem to significantly influence the territorial focus of  
representation acquired by the county councillors (the strongest dummy predictors 
in the model). Proportional representation is shown to favour the more traditional 
emphasis on strictly representing the entire county and to significantly discourage 
councillors from not having a territorial focus of  representation and from declaring 
to represent just a part of  the county. This fits our expectation that councillors in 
proportional representation systems are more likely to have a universalistic take on 
territorial representation.
Horizontal power relations, reflected in the type of  local government system, 
are also a significant predictor. Councillors in committee leader forms are more 
likely to choose no territorial representation over representing the entire county 
and less likely to choose forms of  territorial representation which involve repre-
senting a part of  the county. Councillors in collective leader forms seem more 
likely to choose any other form of  territorial representation than strictly resuming 
themselves to representing the entire county, with the important observation that 
they too are more inclined towards not having a focus of  territorial representation. 
Our expectations are thus confirmed only in the case of  councillors in committee 
leader forms. A separate analysis indicated that councillors in strong leader forms 
are slightly more inclined to choose dual territorial representation over represent-
ing the entire county, and quite unlikely to choose the other possible stances.
The size of  the county council has minimum impact. However, it is important 
that a bigger size of  the assembly slightly increases the odds in favour of  represent-
ing a part of  the county or having a dual focus of  territorial representation. This 
supports our expectation that in systems where representativeness in encouraged 
via larger assembly size the chances increase that councillors will focus on specific 
groups or areas.
The affiliation of  a county councillor to a political party decreases the odds that the 
councillor acquires a focus of  representation which does not have a territorial compo-
nent. This suggests that the socialization of  councillors into their roles in a partisan 
context includes among the socially desirable elements the fact that the councillors 
should have a positive territorial focus of  representation. I was unable to test our expec-
tations concerning a difference between local parties or lists and national parties.
Moving to the ideological orientation, as we move towards the right of  the politi-
cal spectrum odds increase that councillors declare to focus on a part of  the county 
or a dual focus as opposed to the entire county. This suggests a localist orientation, 
which fits the more individualist internal logic of  the political right.
If  councillors see themselves as representatives of  social groups, the odds 
decrease that they declare to have no territorial representation focus. As expected 
and suggested by bivariate analysis, they are more strongly inclined towards a dual 
focus of  territorial representation. This is consistent with the notion that, in a 
governance context, elected officials deal at the same time with representing tradi-
tional territorially defined constituencies and constituencies which are more fluidly 
or informally defined.
The goal of  continuing as a councillor translates into less openness of  county 
councillors towards other forms of  territorial representation. Consistent with 
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theoretical expectations and results obtained in other contexts, councillors aim-
ing for a higher political position are more likely inclined towards a dual focus 
of  representation, which suggests deliberate efforts to widen one’s base of  sup-
port in view of  future candidate selection and electoral processes. The expecta-
tion that more experienced councillors will be less likely to depart from 
representing the entire county does not seem to find enough support in the data. 
Full-time politicians are more likely to depart from the focus on the entire county, 
with the strongest effect in favour of  focusing on a part of  the county. This sug-
gests specialisation and division of  labour tend to happen when the councillor 
gets the opportunity (or the obligation, depending on the national legal frame-
work) of  working full time.
Age does not seem to help explaining the acquisition by county councillors of  a 
certain focus of  representation. Gender seems more relevant in the case of  focusing 
on a part of  the county or dual focus: males are overall more likely to depart from 
the strict focus on the entire county. Education is less relevant in explaining the 
choice of  a dual focus, while generally speaking the better educated the councillors 
are the more likely it is to depart from the strict focus on the entire county.
Conclusions
This chapter has set out to tentatively answer three questions: (1) How does the 
notion of  overlapping focuses of  representation manifest itself  at the second tier 
of  local government in Europe? (2) To what extent is territorial representation 
being replaced/complemented by more flexible forms of  political representation? 
And (3) what are the factors that account for variation (if  any) in territorial repre-
sentation focuses of  second tier elected officials in Europe?
The analysis shows that territorial and functional representation coexist and 
complement each other at the second tier of  local government. Territorial repre-
sentation seems to tend towards more localised forms. More and more councillors 
declare to represent a part of  the county, though most of  the councillors in this 
category also declare allegiance to the entire county (a dual focus of  territorial rep-
resentation). Bivariate analysis suggests this trend is stronger in local government 
systems where councillors play important roles in policy making and, consequently, 
find themselves more involved in local policy networks. This led to the exploration 
of  functional representation. Functional representation at the second tier of  local 
government in Europe seems to have two main components: social representation, 
seemingly oriented dominantly towards worse-off  groups in society; and economic 
representation, oriented towards business interests. While there is some correlation 
between territorial and functional representation, the relationship is not particularly 
strong. It is, however, clear that as we move from other categories towards council-
lors declaring a dual focus of  territorial representation we find an increased interest 
of  county councillors in Europe to speak on behalf  of  social groups.
The next step of  the analysis partially and limitedly explains variation in terms 
of  territorial representation focuses across Europe by looking at a set of  institu-
tional, party-related and individual-level variables. The type of  territorial 
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representation that is acquired by county councillors in Europe seems to depend 
significantly on institutional level variables, namely the electoral formula and the 
type of  local government system. The latter aspect must be regarded with caution, 
as this model could not be tested for the council-manager form of  local govern-
ment system and only one country is subsumed under the committee-leader form. 
At individual level, the future career plans of  a councillor as well as whether he or 
she is a full-time politician (which is at least partially institutionally determined) 
help shed some light on the acquisition of  representational focuses. The influence 
of  a councillor’s career plans supports the idea that role perception are linked to a 
councillor strategic behaviour towards advancing his or her political career. The 
affiliation of  a councillor with a political party also seems to have some influence 
in terms of  how he or she defines a territorial representational focus. However, the 
influence of  party membership seems reduced as compared to the institutional and 
some of  the individual-level variables. These elements only provide a partial expla-
nation, since characteristics of  national and local politics also influence the role 
perception of  elected officials at the second tier of  local government.
Notes
1 This chapter was developed as part of  the project ‘Local democracy and political rep-
resentation: an in-depth analysis of  the second tier of  local government in Romania’ 
supported by the CNCS-UEFISCDI through grant no. PN-II-RU-PD-2012–3–0512.
2 The variable on proportional representation is dichotomic: 0 = plurality/majority electoral 
formula; 1 = proportional representation electoral formula. France and the United King-
dom are subsumed under the plurality/majority electoral formula. The other countries 
included in the analysis are subsumed under the proportional representation formula.
3 The variable on forms of  local government system is categorical: 0 = strong leader form; 
1 = committee leader form; 2 = collective leader form. Croatia, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Romania and Spain are subsumed under the strong leader form; Sweden under the 
committee leader form; and Belgium, Czech Republic, England and Poland under the 
collective leader form. Cases from Germany were labelled as follows: councillors in  Hessen 
are included in the collective leader form category, while other councillors in  Germany 
are subsumed under the strong leader form.
4 Independent councillors are coded with 0, and councillors affiliated to local or national 
political party with 1.
5 The variable on future career plans is categorical: 0 = quit politics; 1 = continue as 
councillor; 2 = promote to a higher political office.
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county and municipal councillors
Jacob Aars, Bjarte Folkestad and Lawrence E. Rose
Introduction
As Edmund Burke’s well-known speech to the electors of  Bristol in 1774 served to 
highlight, elected representatives face potentially conflicting normative demands 
(Burke 1774). On one hand, they are expected to consult with and be attentive to 
their voters in order to express the views of  their constituency. On the other hand, 
they may be expected to formulate their own policy initiatives, independently of  their 
constituents’ opinions. These two demands entail different representational perspec-
tives or role orientations: whereas the first primarily implies what Burke termed a 
delegate role, the second implies what Burke termed a trustee role.
At the time when Burke made his speech, however, political parties in the form 
that we know today did not exist. Elected representatives were able to decide upon 
their role orientations more or less unfettered by party organisations. The introduc-
tion of  political parties as a linkage mechanism operating between voters and 
elected officials fundamentally altered the context of  role formation. Representa-
tives are now typically nominated by political parties and stand for election on the 
basis of  a party platform. Elected representatives are expected to pay heed to the 
political party or grouping with which they are affiliated. In modern democracies, 
in short, parties commonly have a strong hold on representatives; they serve as both 
linkages and buffers between representatives and their electorates. Indeed, political 
parties may have the ability to ‘lock’ the system, contributing to a party-mandate 
role orientation that overrides the other two role orientations identified by Burke.
What is in fact the case in contemporary democracies? What is the relative 
prominence of  alternative role orientations among county and municipal council-
lors? Are role orientations at these two levels similar or do they differ? In the course 
of  time research on the roles and behaviour of  elected representatives has expanded 
in many directions, both substantively and geographically, and has provided insight 
across a broad range of  topics. Despite this growth there is to date relatively little 
systematic research devoted to how representational styles may vary among elected 
representatives according to the specific contexts in which they are elected and 
operate (Bengtsson and Karlsen 2013 constitute a noteworthy exception in this 
regard). This applies in particular to possible similarities or differences in represen-
tational styles across different political-administrative units and levels found within 
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any given country. The intention here is to help fill this lacuna. The chapter begins 
with a discussion of  representation and the representational role concept. We then 
elaborate our general theoretical argument and expectations before turning to the 
empirical question of  whether representational styles vary according to (a) different 
national political systems, and (b) different levels of  government within each politi-
cal system. The chapter concludes with a brief  discussion of  the findings. Data 
about both county and municipal level councillors are used in order to examine 
the empirical questions raised.
Representation and representational roles:  
a conceptual discussion
Representation has been generally defined as ‘the making present of  something 
which is nevertheless not literally present’ (Pitkin 1967: 144), or to be acting on 
behalf  of  the represented ‘as they would have acted, had they been able to partici-
pate themselves’ (Friedrich 1948: 127). In this sense representation implies a degree 
of  identification with the represented by the representative. Still, performing the 
task of  political representation allows for a variety of  orientations. The representa-
tives’ perception of  their task has in this regard been conceptualised as a set of  
roles. The concept of  role suggests that there are a number of  demands or expecta-
tions with which an elected official must deal, and that in performing the task of  
representation the representative may choose between or weight various consider-
ations differently. Burke’s speech serves as a classical reference in this regard.
In an important contribution to the literature discussing representational roles, 
Eulau et al. (1959: 744) differentiate between representational focus on one hand, 
and representational style on the other. Focus refers to the particular constituency 
or segment of  the electorate to whom the representative is primarily oriented (see 
also Cristina Stănuş, Chapter 5 in this book). Style, by comparison, denotes the 
predominant kind of  relationship which may exist between a representative and 
her or his constituents. Our concern in this chapter is with the latter – i.e. how 
representatives perceive that their actions while in office may be constrained by a 
mandate or instructions from their constituents or their political parties. This is the 
so-called mandate-independence controversy discussed among others by Miller 
and Stokes (1963) and Pitkin (1967).
In its purest form, the term mandate-independence suggests a continuum where at 
one end representatives are instructed by their constituents whereas at the other 
end they are completely unconstrained by the constituents’ concerns. But as has 
been pointed out by Pitkin (1967: 127), neither of  the two terminal points can 
actually be classified as representation in the sense of  acting for others. She argues 
that representation rather involves some kind of  sensitivity to the perspective of  
the ones for whom the representative is acting (Pitkin 1967: 142). Such consider-
ations of  the other’s viewpoint are absent from the pure, extreme ends of  the 
mandate-independence continuum. Research on styles of  representation has none-
theless been dominated by the pair of  conceptual terms used by Burke which are 
commonly seen as corresponding to opposite ends of  a continuum. In practical 
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empirical terms, however, use of  these role concepts must be interpreted as leaning 
towards one or the other of  the two roles. Someone who leans toward the delegate 
role acts on the basis of  a fairly close instruction given by her or his constituents. 
Conversely, someone who leans toward the trustee role considers herself  or himself  
relatively free to use their own independent judgment and act on the basis of  what 
they consider to be in the true interest of  their constituents.1
Yet as we have already noted, the original delegate and trustee role concepts 
were shaped in an era prior to the introduction of  mass political parties. When 
parties gradually evolved into member organisations and party systems became 
fundamental institutions in most Western political systems (cf. Dalton 1985: 269; 
Sartori 1976: 22), the role of  elected representatives also changed. Candidates were 
elected on a party ticket. Through party programmes voters were given a tool for 
ex ante screening of  candidates and ex post facto holding them accountable for 
their performance. Whereas prior to party politicisation attention had mainly been 
on the linkage between voters and individual candidates, more recently greater 
emphasis has been placed on the importance of  party organizations. Consequently, 
acting as a ‘party loyalist’ (Katz 1997: 212) has appeared as a viable third alterna-
tive to the delegate and trustee role orientations. In this case the primary emphasis 
is on representing the party and acting according to a ‘party mandate’. Such an 
orientation does not preclude the representative from giving consideration to the 
constituency and acting either as a delegate or trustee on behalf  of  her or his 
constituents. All the same the presence of  political parties does serve to shift the 
reference point for what may be termed ‘the representational map’. Representa-
tives may orient themselves to their political party every bit as much or perhaps 
more than their constituencies.2 Important in this respect is the fact that political 
parties have also penetrated both levels of  local government in most countries 
(for an overview see Loughlin et al. 2011).
Representation style: what is the significance  
of  system and level?
As this brief  discussion of  party politicisation suggests, representation is likely to 
have different meanings in different situations and contexts. This state of  affairs 
lies at the heart of  the concept of  ‘politico’ introduced by Eulau and his associates 
(1959: 749). The basic observation which underlies the politico concept is that the 
choice of  role orientations depends on the particular decision to be made. By 
introducing a concept designed to combine the two initial notions of  delegate and 
trustee, Eulau and his associates explicitly acknowledge that in practical decision 
making there is not a choice between only two options but rather a combination 
of  the two (or perhaps more), and that a more sequential logic exists where the 
mixture of  orientations depends on the specific policy decision and context in 
question. Political systems as well as electoral systems differ, impinging directly or 
indirectly on the role of  elected representatives. The socio-demographic and politi-
cal composition of  constituencies may also affect the linkage between voters and 
representatives. Birch (1971: 87–88) as well as Prewitt and Eulau (1971: 300–301), 
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for example, present arguments in favour of  an understanding of  representation 
that is sensitive to social context. Birch contends that a high level of  social conflict 
within a constituency raises the level of  pressure on elected officials, while Prewitt 
and Eulau suggest that heterogeneous contexts may enhance the independence of  
representatives since they are offered more discretion in choosing between alterna-
tive policy options.
In the present chapter we pursue this line of  reasoning and seek to assess the 
significance of  differences to be observed when comparing representation style 
orientations among elected representatives at different political-administrative 
levels within any given country. The fundamental question posed, in short, is to 
what extent is there evidence suggesting that there are similarities or differences 
in representative role orientations among county and municipal councillors within 
a number of  European countries. Arguably there are two potential patterns of  
systematic variation – one based on what may be termed country or system effects, 
the other based on what may be termed within country or political-administrative 
level effects.
A ‘system effect’ presumes that certain features are common across different 
levels of  government within any given country. The thesis about nationalisation 
of  party systems, for instance, postulates that the national party system will grad-
ually penetrate the county and municipal level (Kjær and Elklit 2010; Rokkan 
1966). Hence, in the course of  time local and regional party systems are expected 
to grow more similar to the party system at the national level. The prevalence of  
a broadly shared national political culture or specific electoral arrangements 
could be expected to have a comparable effect. Insofar as this is true – and we 
presume that the degree of  party nationalisation, cultural consensus, electoral 
arrangement or other national factors will affect the manner in which elected 
officials at all sub-national levels of  government perceive their representational 
roles – then a first hypothesis is that role perception will be highly consistent across dif-
ferent levels of  government within each country. Thus, if  local councillors in a country 
tend to identify with the party mandate role orientation more than a trustee or 
delegate orientation, we would expect to find a similar pattern among councillors 
at the second tier of  local government. Conversely, if  we find relatively weak 
support for a party mandate orientation among municipal councillors, we would 
expect to find a correspondingly weak orientation toward a party mandate ori-
entation at the county level.3
It should be emphasised here that this hypothesis does not presume that such a 
‘national representational profile’, if  we can use this phrase, will be the same or 
quite identical across different countries. Cross-national similarities in representa-
tional profiles might well occur as a result of, for example, internationalisation and 
forces of  convergence which such processes entail, but this is another matter. It is 
not the gist of  our first working hypothesis, nor do we have access to appropriate 
diachronic data that would permit inquiry into such a dynamic process of  conver-
gence. At the present we would instead expect national representational profiles to 
vary, although just how much, and why, is another matter which is not a primary 
focal point here.
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The idea of  a ‘level effect’ is based on a different line of  thinking. Party system 
penetration, national political cultures and electoral arrangements or other factors 
may contribute to similarities in role orientations among representatives at different 
political-administrative levels. But the ‘level effect is based on a supposition that 
differences in conditions existing at different levels of  government will lead to dif-
ferences in the emphasis representatives place on their respective role orientations. 
The assumption, in other words, is that the level of  government will have an impact 
on elected officials’ role perception, and that predominant role orientations will vary across 
different levels of  government within any given country. Thus, we can expect differences in 
role perception across representatives serving at the municipal and second tier of  
local government respectively.
This second hypothesis rests on a central tenet – namely that whereas munici-
pal and county levels of  government may not be expected to have a great deal 
of  explanatory power in their own right, the two levels may be associated with 
at least three more general contextual properties, all of  which point in the same 
direction. The first of  these properties is that municipal councillors typically 
function in closer geographical proximity to their constituents than do their 
county counterparts (on this topic, see also Heinelt, Chapter 8 in this book). For 
this reason we expect municipal councillors are likely to exhibit a stronger con-
stituency orientation – either delegate or trustee – in their representational role 
preferences than will county councillors. If  so, we would take this as evidence 
of  a level effect within any given country. Second, and in line with the first point, 
since we presume county councillors are likely to be less closely linked to the 
individual voters, we expect county politics to be more closely structured by 
party divisions than municipal politics. Accordingly, we would expect party 
loyalty to be a stronger role orientation among county councillors than among 
municipal councillors. Third, it has been observed that county elections are 
often perceived as less important than both national and municipal elections by 
voters (see discussions found in Dandoy and Schakel 2013). In Norway, for 
example, only about 10 per cent of  the voters report that county council elec-
tions are important, whereas the corresponding figure for municipal elections is 
29 per cent (cf. Rose and Hansen 2013: 212). If  municipal elections are second 
order to national elections, this would suggest that county elections may in many 
instances have a status as third-order elections. If  so we suppose that county 
councillors might be expected to have less of  an incentive to serve as delegates 
for the voters than do municipal level councillors and will rather emphasise their 
party loyalties.
In sum, by highlighting the peculiarity of  each level of  government this second 
level effect hypothesis stands in contrast to the first system effect hypothesis. We do 
not anticipate that role preference profiles of  elected representatives at the munici-
pal and county levels respectively will be identical in order to support the system 
effect hypothesis, but merely that the profiles would display a relatively high degree 
of  similarity. Under the level effect hypothesis, by comparison, we expect greater 
differences in role perception across the two levels of  local government. With this 
we can turn to our empirical evidence.
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Empirical evidence
Analyses presented here are based on a relatively simple and straightforward 
comparison of  data from two primary sources: surveys conducted among elected 
councillors at the municipal and county levels respectively in connection with 
two comparative research projects (for these surveys see Heinelt and Krapp, 
Chapter 3 in this book).4 These two data sets contain relevant responses from 
councillors at both levels of  local government in 12 countries that constitute our 
empirical base. Although the two data sets were collected at different points in 
time using different data collection procedures, the two surveys contain many 
questions which are comparable, and no clear effects of  different data collection 
procedures have been detected. Moreover, conditions surrounding the election 
and operation of  municipal and county councils within these countries have not 
changed in any dramatic fashion during the period in question. There are there-
fore no immediate grounds to question the reliability and comparability of  the 
survey data.
The dependent variables for the analyses reported – general representational 
role orientation or style – have been created based on three different response 
alternatives used in connection with the following question: ‘If  there should be a 
conflict between a member’s own opinion, the opinion of  the party group in the 
council or the opinion of  the voters, how should, in your opinion, a member of  
the council vote?’
Before looking more closely at the distribution of  responses for each of  the 12 coun-
tries it is appropriate to consider the broader picture. Results presented in Table 6.1 
provide an initial perspective in this regard. This table contains the average distri-
bution of  role orientations across all 12 countries. Two features stand out in this 
table. Most evident is the apparent predominance of  a trustee role orientation at 
both levels of  local government. On the average, over half  of  all respondents 
within each of  the 12 countries indicate this role as most relevant in determining 
voting behaviour in cases where there may be a conflict between a member’s own 
opinion, the opinion of  the party group in the council and the opinion of  the 
Table 6.1  Distribution of  representational role orientations 
among municipal and county councillors in 12 coun-
tries. Average percentages*
Role preference Municipal councillors County councillors
Party mandate 29 35
Trustee 54 53
Delegate 16 11
Total 100 100
Sources: Second Tier Survey and MAELG (Municipal Assemblies in 
European Local Governance) Survey
* Averages are calculated on the basis of  unweighted distributions for 
each of  the 12 countries.
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voters. Across the board, in other words, councillors seem to emphasise the ability 
to exercise independent judgement in deciding what is best for their constituents, 
and the percentages indicating this preference are roughly equal for municipal and 
county level councillors (54 and 53 per cent respectively). In this respect there is 
little evidence of  a level effect.5
Looking beyond this, we see that a party mandate orientation is the second most 
common role orientation, whereas a delegate role orientation obtains on the aver-
age the least support. However the average percentages for these latter two role 
orientations vary from municipal to county level. In particular we observe that a 
party mandate role orientation is more common among second-tier councillors 
than it is among municipal councillors (35 versus 29 per cent), and the opposite is 
true regarding a delegate role orientation (11 versus 16 per cent). These differences, 
while not large, are in keeping with arguments suggesting a level effect: municipal 
councillors operate in closer contact with their constituents and appear therefore 
more likely to endorse a delegate role whereas second-tier councillors, operating 
in a ‘third-order vacuum’ with greater distance to their constituents, are more likely 
to favour a party mandate orientation when confronting conflictual decision-
making situations.
Does the level of  local government matter?
Caution must be exercised in considering and interpreting these results. Average 
values may conceal as much as they reveal. Such is the case in this instance since 
there is much variation in what we can term the role orientation profiles of  municipal 
and second-tier councillors in the 12 countries. This is evident in Table 6.2. If  one 
ignores the countries involved, we see that there is a very substantial spread in the 
degree to which different role orientations are identified as being most appropriate 
in conflictual decision-making situations. The range of  differences is around 
50 percentage points for both party mandate and trustee role orientations, and 
around 25 percentage points for a delegate role orientation. These differences 
apply at both the municipal and county levels.
These differences do not attest to a uniform European representation style 
among municipal and second-tier councillors across the 12 countries – rather just 
Table 6.2  Distributional statistics for representational role orientations among municipal 
and county councillors in 12 countries. Minimum, maximum and percentage 
difference
Role preference Municipal councillors County councillors
Minimum Maximum Difference Minimum Maximum Difference
Party mandate 31 75 44 28 78 50
Trustee 7 56 49 13 67 54
Delegate 7 31 24 4 29 25
Sources: Second Tier Survey and MAELG Survey
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the opposite. Whereas 75 per cent of  municipal-level councillors in France empha-
size a trustee role, only 31 per cent of  the councillors at the same level in Spain do 
the same. In Spain 56 per cent of  municipal level councillors indicate a party 
mandate role orientation as most appropriate, but only 7 per cent of  Polish repre-
sentatives at the municipal level do the same. As for a delegate role orientation, this 
is endorsed most frequently in Poland (31 per cent) while only 7 per cent do the 
same among German local level representatives. Similar differences in role orienta-
tion profiles are to be observed among second-tier councillors in various 
countries.
Against this backdrop a closer look at the role orientations found in each country 
is in order. In doing so we choose to present Figure 6.1, which facilitates consider-
ation of  the theoretical expectations and hypotheses introduced previously. This 
figure contains a comparison of  the distributions of  role orientations among 
municipal and county councillors in each of  the 12 countries. In presenting the 
figure in this fashion it is the within country similarity or difference in role orientations 
at the two separate levels of  local government that is the principal object of  inter-
est, not the similarity or differences that may exist across national political systems. As 
noted previously, our primary attention and commentary here is not focused on 
explaining specific country findings; we are rather most interested in the patterns 
of  role orientations found within each country.
The figure is organised according to the share of  party mandate orientations 
found on the county level, ranging from the lowest to highest per cent as one 
moves from top to bottom. In examining the figure, several aspects are worthy 
of  note. To begin with the figure confirms what has already been shown in 
Table 6.1 – namely that with the exception of  four countries (Spain, Belgium, 
Sweden and Norway), a party mandate role orientation is not typically of  
foremost importance among representatives in the countries considered. In the 
four countries mentioned roughly half  or more of  the councillors do endorse 
this representational style, whereas in all of  the other countries this style is 
preferred by only about 30 per cent or less. This applies at both county and 
municipal levels.
More interesting and of  greater relevance in light of  the hypotheses advanced 
earlier, however, is the degree of  similarity or difference to be observed with respect 
to support for a party mandate orientation at the municipal and county levels 
respectively within each country. Except for three instances – Germany, England 
and Greece – we see that a party mandate role orientation is more frequently 
endorsed by county-level councillors than it is by municipal-level councillors. The 
greatest disparities are found in Italy, Sweden and Norway (roughly 15 per cent in 
each case) whereas in the Czech Republic there is no significant difference (less 
than 1 per cent). Overall this pattern of  findings fits quite well with the level effect 
argument set forth earlier. Geographic and thus perhaps substantive insight and 
nearness is greater for local-level councillors than it is for second-tier councillors, 
and hence they are more likely to see a trustee or delegate role orientation as being 
a preferred representational style.
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This logic receives further support when viewing the distribution of  trustee and 
delegate role orientations. For one thing we see that the results for the delegate role 
tend to constitute a mirror image of  the findings related to party mandate. In 10 out 
of  12 countries the delegate role is stronger among municipal councillors than it is 
among their counterparts at the second tier of  local government. The only excep-
tions are found in England, where the pattern is reversed, and in Spain, where there 
is no difference between local and county councillors’ preference for the delegate 
role. This observation serves to reinforce the claim that politics at the municipal level 
is characterised by stronger proximity to the voters and that politics at the second tier 
of  local government is more strongly structured by political parties.
Figure 6.1  Prevalence of  different representational role orientations among councillors at 
the municipality and county levels in 12 countries, shown in percentages
Sources: Second Tier Survey and MAELG Survey
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System versus level effects – a closer look
Overall, the respective country role profiles displayed in Figure 6.1 support a level 
effect hypothesis. Yet before accepting this conclusion and rejecting the system 
effect hypothesis, the data merit a closer look. As already indicated, a system effect 
hypothesis predicts small or at least no significant differences in the proportion of  
councillors at the two different levels of  local government within each country 
which express support for each of  the three role orientations. In its purest form the 
same proportion of  second-tier councillors should advocate a party mandate rep-
resentational style as do municipal councillors, and the same with respect to both 
trustee and delegate role orientations. This criterion applies to all countries. As 
soon as any differences appear, the system effect hypothesis is weakened and the 
level effect hypothesis becomes more plausible. But the prospect of  totally identical 
representational role orientation profiles at the two levels for all 12 countries is 
highly unlikely. Some ‘random noise’ may be anticipated.
The question therefore is how much variation should be required to set aside the 
system effect hypothesis in lieu of  the level effect hypothesis? There is no standard 
answer to this question. One approach is to consider the magnitude of  the absolute 
differences in role orientation profiles found among municipal and second-tier coun-
cillors in each of  the 12 countries considered. In theory mean differences between 
the three role orientation distributions at the municipal and county levels can vary 
between zero and 66.7 per cent. This is because there are three possible role ori-
entations and two levels of  local government which are compared. In the hypo-
thetical case where there are no differences in the distributions of  role orientations 
between the two levels of  government, the mean is zero. If, for example, the role 
preferences are 33.3 per cent for each orientation at both levels, then the mean 
absolute difference would be zero. At the other hypothetical extreme, in the very 
unlikely situation where 100 per cent of  the councillors prefer one role orientation 
at the county level and 100 per cent of  the councillors at the municipal level prefer 
another role orientation, then the mean absolute difference would be 66.7 – that 
is, (100 + 100) / 2 = 66.7. In interpreting means calculated in this fashion, the basic 
logic is quite straightforward: the greater the absolute mean values deviate from 
zero, the stronger is the indication of  level effects.
Taking first the absolute differences for each of  the three role orientations sepa-
rately and calculating average values across all 12 countries, we obtain the follow-
ing values: party mandate, 7.3; trustee, 5.7; and delegate, 6.0 respectively. The 
magnitude of  these deviations from zero is not great, but they do attest to some 
moderate level effects with respect to representational role orientations when look-
ing across all 12 countries. While the effects are most evident with respect to party 
mandate orientations reported by municipal and second-tier councillors, they are 
also observed with respect to the two other role orientations.
These effects need not be uniformly distributed either geographically across 
different countries or across the three representational orientations. Rather, as we 
have seen in Figure 6.1, the effects are more pronounced with respect to the three 
alternatives in some countries than they are in others, and the degree to which a 
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level effect is observed within any given country varies. In order to get a better 
impression of  where the level effects are most pronounced, we can look at the aver-
age absolute differences found in each country when all three role orientations are taken 
into consideration. These values may be considered a cumulative or summary 
indicator of  a level effect found in any given country. The results are displayed in 
Figure 6.2 wherein countries are ranked according to the size of  the mean differ-
ences between municipal and county levels.
As can be seen in Figure 6.2, there is substantial geographic variation in the rela-
tive magnitude of  level effects to be observed in the 12 countries considered. Spain, 
England and Germany are countries where representational role orientations are 
quite similarly distributed between the levels and hence the overall level effect is 
quite modest. Even so this does not mean that the representational profiles for these 
countries are similar on a cross-national basis. In Spain a party mandate role orienta-
tion is predominant at both levels (60 and 56 per cent respectively) while a delegate 
role orientation is nearly identical, being endorsed by 12 and 13 per cent respec-
tively. In England, by comparison, the proportion of  councillors at the county and 
the municipal level that support a party mandate role orientation is likewise nearly 
identical, but much below that found in Spain (24 and 25 per cent respectively). A 
delegate role orientation, however, is slightly more prevalent among second-tier 
councillors than it is among municipal councillors (22 versus 17 per cent).
Italy and Norway constitute examples found at the other end of  the scale dis-
played in Figure 6.2. Both countries have values reflecting substantially greater 
Figure 6.2  Mean differences between local and regional level representational role orienta-
tions by country (all representations styles combined)
Sources: Second Tier Survey and MAELG Survey
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average absolute differences in the representations profiles found among county 
and municipal councillors. These values, however, derive from different segments 
of  the national representational profiles – especially from differences relating to 
trustee and delegate role orientations at the two levels of  local government. Still, 
it is important not to exaggerate these percentage differences. Even in the four 
countries where level effects are most evident, the differences are less than one-fifth 
of  the maximum potential variation.
Another way of  assessing the degree of  relative similarity of  role orientations 
among representatives across levels within each country is to calculate pairwise 
correlation coefficients within the same representational style but across different 
levels. Is there, for instance, a tendency that – within each of  the 12 countries – the 
proportion of  second-tier councillors indicating a party mandate role orientation 
is correlated with the proportion of  municipal councillors indicating a party man-
date orientation? With such an approach the higher the value of  the correlation 
coefficient the greater is the relative consistency of  specific role orientations across 
levels of  local government in the 12 countries. Correlation coefficients approaching 
a value of  1.0 indicate that representational styles are highly consistent across dif-
ferent levels of  local government within each country (independent of  the specific 
representational orientation profile for the country), and thus indicative of  a strong 
system effect. Lower correlation coefficients are indicative of  more pronounced 
level effects among the 12 countries.
Pairwise correlation coefficients comparing the distributions within national rep-
resentational role profiles at municipal and county levels have been calculated and 
are displayed in Table 6.3. The findings are striking. Even though we have detected 
some level effects in our previous analyses, when all 12 countries are considered, 
the correlation coefficients found in Table 6.3 document a strong correspondence 
between role preferences across political-administrative levels within each country. 
With respect to both the party mandate and trustee role orientations the coeffi-
cients approach a value of  1.0. The correlation coefficient for the delegate role is 
somewhat lower yet still indicates a high degree of  accordance between role orien-
tation styles for municipal and county councillors. Thus, in countries where the 
party mandate is comparatively important to municipal councillors, the same can 
Table 6.3  Pairwise correlation coefficients between role 
preferences of  county and municipal council-
lors in 12 countries (Pearson’s r)
Role preference County/municipality coefficient
Party mandate 0.952***
Trustee 0.946***
Delegate 0.802**
Sources: Second Tier Survey and MAELG Survey
***=sig > 0.001
**=sig > 0.05
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be said about county councillors. This is most evident in Spain. The same holds 
where a party mandate role orientation is less prominent. England and the Czech 
Republic offer clear examples of  this. And even when there are differences in the 
distribution of  representational role orientations between municipal and county 
councillors (as seen, for example, in Norway), they are, when considered in a cross-
national perspective, relatively modest.
To sum up, a level effect is first and foremost evident insofar as certain role ori-
entations are more or less evident at particular levels in many countries – e.g. the 
party mandate receives greater support at county level than at municipal level in 
most countries (nine out of  12) whereas the delegate role receives greater support 
at municipal level in most countries (10 out of  12). But even if  there are traces of  
a level effect, a system effect cannot be discarded. Despite the differences observed 
between county and municipal councillors, and the differences between countries, 
there is substantial correspondence in representational role orientations found 
across the levels of  local government within each country.
Discussion and conclusion
This chapter has investigated representational role orientations among county 
and municipal councillors in 12 European countries. In addition to the classic 
distinction introduced by Edmund Burke in the late 1700s between being a trustee 
versus a delegate in representing one’s constituents, the role of  representing a party 
mandate has also been used in the analysis. Findings demonstrate that representa-
tional styles vary between both countries and electoral levels. Differences in 
national representational role profiles do not tend to be great, but they are none-
theless noteworthy in several respects. Somewhat surprising in light of  the party 
politicisation literature is the fact that the party mandate role orientation is not 
more predominant among municipal and second-tier councillors in the countries 
investigated. In part this may be due to the countries considered – especially those 
of  Central and Eastern Europe where party systems have been in flux following 
the re-emergence of  democratic local government. Yet even aside from these 
countries, in only four countries (Norway, Sweden, Belgium and Spain) do roughly 
half  or more of  the councillors at both levels of  local government indicate that a 
party mandate representational style is most appropriate in situations when there 
may be a conflict between a member’s own opinion, the opinion of  the party 
group in the council and the opinion of  the voters. Elsewhere a party mandate 
role orientation is weaker.
As for our tests of  the two respective hypotheses (system and level effects), the 
evidence is somewhat mixed. Some support of  a level effect is found for all 12 coun-
tries in our study, although the magnitude of  these effects varies with respect to the 
different role orientations and from one country to another. In most instances in 
which we find evidence for such level effects, however, the differences are consistent 
with theoretical arguments advanced at the outset concerning the nature of  such 
effects. In particular the delegate role orientation tends to be more prevalent 
among municipal councillors, something we would anticipate on the grounds of  
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nearness and possible contact between representatives and their constituents, 
whereas a party mandate role orientation tends to be more common among sec-
ond-tier councillors where constituents are not as close at hand and political parties 
may exercise a stronger point of  reference.
But there is also clear evidence of  a system effect in the 12 countries we have 
considered. For whatever representational role distribution is found at the county 
level in a given system, the representational role distribution at the municipal level 
tends to be quite similar. This is indicated by strong correlation coefficients between 
municipal and county councillors’ role orientations within each country. Accord-
ingly, it would seem that certain features within a country, whether these are struc-
tural, cultural or otherwise, generate similar representational styles across different 
levels of  government.
At the end of  the day one can discuss whether the differences observed are 
significant – either statistically or substantially – and whether some of  the results 
may be methodological artefacts based on the analytical approach we have 
employed. This will have to remain an open question at this juncture. With the 
approach employed it is nonetheless undisputable that a great deal of  variety 
exists in how councillors from the various countries perceive their representa-
tional roles. What accounts for this is not readily apparent. Closer inspection 
reveals different sources of  variation from one country to another. The respective 
country profiles and summary values displayed in Figure 6.1 do not allow for a 
grouping of  the 12 countries according to some of  the common typologies of  
sub-national political systems found in the literature – for example those of  Page 
and Goldsmith (1987), Hesse and Scharpe (1991) and more recently Loughlin 
and Peters (1997) and Heinelt and Hlepas (2006). Neither is there any clear 
relationship between national representational style profiles and indicators of  
other systemic characteristics such as relative authority of  municipal and county 
councils, types of  local electoral systems or extent of  electoral control.6 National 
representational role profiles and the scores to which they give rise must remain 
a matter for further research.
Notes
1 For a critical discussion of  representation in terms of  the delegate and trustee role distinc-
tion, see among others Rehfeld (2009).
2 This suggestion is consistent with the work of  Converse and Pierce (1986: 664–696) who 
use the term loyal partisan with respect to representatives who see the party as much as 
their constituents as the focus of  their role orientations.
3 The logic extends to elected representatives at the national level as well, but at this point 
we do not have comparable data to investigate this hypothesis empirically.
4 Results from the same surveys have also been used in the chapter from Heinelt in this 
book.
5 The predominance of  a trustee role orientation is noteworthy in light of  a trend reported 
by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005: 509) suggesting that the trustee role had been gradu-
ally losing ground in a 30-year period from 1972 to 2001, at least among Dutch MPs. If  
a similar trend has existed at the sub-national level, this would suggest an even greater 
predominance of  a trustee role orientation among municipal and second-tier councillors 
previously.
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6 See, for example, regional authority index scores found at Arjan H. Schakel’s website 
(www.arjanschakel.nl) and information on local electoral systems found in van der Kolk 
(2007).
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7 Patterns of gender representation 
in councils at the second tier of 
local government
Assessing the gender gap in an unexplored 
institutional setting
Carmen Navarro and Lluís Medir
Introduction
The political representation of  women in parliaments is, by far, the most studied 
subject within the research field of  gender and politics. It has been extensively 
analysed with reference to national legislatures, both through large-n comparative 
surveys testing the impact of  specific factors – such as the electoral system, parties 
recruitment, quotas, culture and socioeconomic development – on the numbers 
and behaviour of  women in politics (see e.g. Paxton and Hughes 2013, Rosenbluth 
et al. 2006; Dalherup 2006; Franceschet 2013), and through case studies that have 
explored the specificities of  decision-making processes using more in-depth strate-
gies (see e.g. Celis 2006; Weikart et al. 2006).
Yet, there are relatively few studies focused on the sub-national level of  govern-
ment (Vengroff  el al, 2003; Smith et al. 2012). Not many analyses have addressed 
the topic of  women in local politics, and there is arguably a significant lacuna to 
fill. This is remarkable because (a) local governments have become increasingly 
important in policy areas (education, welfare, etc.) of  particular concern to women, 
(b) local spaces may also serve as a key recruiting ground for women candidates to 
higher-level offices and (c) local politics is generally seen as more woman-friendly 
because of  its proximity to work and home. More generally, politics and policy 
outcomes cannot be fully understood if  national parliaments are the sole institu-
tions analysed: decision-making processes increasingly take place in multi-level 
networks, and local governments constitute a compelling arena for research for all 
who aim to understand how societies are organised and governed.
Data from the survey on councillors from the second tier of  local government 
enables us to explore the numbers, attributes and visions of  female council repre-
sentatives, thereby adding to the still limited body of  research on gender and local 
government. This chapter will analyse the patterns of  representation of  women in 
local government. Is there a gendered path to local political power? What are the 
attributes of  women councillors in the second tier of  local government? Do they 
have distinctive visions of  their roles as representatives?
In the following sections, we first review the main theories explaining women’s 
political representation articulated around its two main dimensions: descriptive 
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representation and substantive representation. Building upon this literature and 
the specific hypotheses derived from it, we then analyse and discuss the data gath-
ered by the survey. In the concluding part, we try to assess the findings and explore 
whether or not and for what type of  research, local assemblies are promising insti-
tutional sites for testing theories on women’s political representation. Finally, we 
discuss potential avenues for a future research agenda.
Descriptive and substantive representation of  women 
in legislatures: ‘still few but responsive’
Questions regarding when and where women have come to hold political office, as 
well as questions regarding the characteristics of  those women who have been 
motivated to seek political office possess, have driven much scholarly work in recent 
decades (Kenny 2013). Characterising the distinctiveness of  women’s attitudes and 
behaviour when engaged in politics has inspired a great number of  researchers as 
well. These two poles of  attraction correspond with two dimensions of  political 
representation: (1) descriptive (or quantifiable) representation, which looks at how 
many women are elected and what their basic characteristics are; and (2) substan-
tive representation, which focuses on whether or not women representatives have 
distinctive values, priorities and policy preferences and to what extent they manage 
to advance them in policy agendas.
Referring to descriptive representation, whether based on pragmatic (electoral gains), 
substantive (women make a difference) or justice (democratic legitimacy) arguments, 
the agreement on the belief  that women should be equally present in politics is 
nowadays widely shared. Parties’ strategies, policy choices (e.g. gender quotas) and 
voters’ behaviour provide ample evidence of  this: the share of  women in assemblies 
has increased over the last decades throughout the world, and is no longer a phe-
nomenon confined to the Western world (Franceschet et al. 2013). In correspon-
dence with this circumstance, and due to the fact that there are still fewer women 
in politics than men, research efforts have focused on identifying, at the macro level, 
the factors that explain country variation in the percentages of  women in legisla-
tures and, at the micro level, the particular features distinguishing recruitment pro-
cesses for political offices from each other, as well as the correlations (negative and 
positive) between those features and the successful recruitment of  women.
In following the pace at which women have entered parliaments, empirical stud-
ies have devoted attention to cross-national variations. This growing body of  litera-
ture has identified three categories of  factors that explain cross-country differences 
in percentages of  female elected legislators: institutional, such as electoral rules or 
how parties organise candidate selection; socioeconomic, such as the proportion of  
women in the workforce and the strength of  the welfare state; and cultural, such as 
modernisation trends, beliefs about equality, and the social acceptance of  women 
for representational and leadership roles.
In the first place, studies acknowledge that electoral institutions shape the emer-
gence of  candidates, the outcomes of  elections and the dynamics of  democratic 
politics. Women’s presence in politics is not an exception in this respect. Already 
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in the 1950s, the earliest work on electoral institutions identified the benefits of  
proportional representation (PR) systems for the emergence of  women candidates 
(Duverger 1955): the fewer the number of  contested political offices there were in 
any particular system, the more difficult it would be for women in that system to 
run and to win. In PR systems, as distinct from plurality/majoritarian systems, 
open places are available for newcomers without displacing incumbents or other 
candidates preferred by political parties. District size also impacts women’s chances: 
the incentive for parties to balance their candidate lists, and to allow room for 
women without displacing male candidates, is greater in larger districts (Kittilson 
2006). Finally, a ballot structure of  closed lists can benefit female candidates in 
more traditional societies, in which cultural views regarding women in politics can 
diminish women candidates’ chances (Wangnerud 2009).
Social and economic factors are key to increased women’s representation as well. 
Overall, levels of  development and women’s position in the labour market and in 
the educational system have transformed gender roles and have promoted higher 
political representation (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008). The welfare state, based 
on a dual-earner model, has been built on family policy choices that have strongly 
impacted the gendered distribution of  private and public work. This has, in turn, 
encouraged women’s equal participation in politics (Rosenbluth et al. 2006).
Cultural factors such as religion and general attitudes toward gender equality have a 
significant effect on women’s presence in politics as well. More egalitarian cultures, 
greater secularization and early women’s enfranchisement are positively correlated 
with higher numbers of  women representatives (Dalherup and Leyennard 2013). The 
link between culture and women’s equality in political institutions has been explored 
largely and fruitfully, normally based on the work of  Inglehart and Norris (2003) and 
their proposal of  a scale to measure gender equality culture around the world. Their 
gender equality scale – based on citizens’ attitudes regarding women as political lead-
ers/professionals or filling a traditional mother role – is strongly connected with 
women’s opportunities for upward mobility and for political recruitment.
Important though they are, the three dimensions mentioned earlier do not 
encompass all the variables. Significantly: (a) they do not take into account the 
recent fast-track advances in some countries, due to the implementation of  legis-
lated candidate quotas that regulate the gender composition of  candidate lists; and 
(b) the variety of  results among countries with similar institutions, socioeconomic 
levels, culture and quotas have opened new perspectives of  research. Internal pro-
cesses through which candidates are selected are being examined, with a greater 
focus on political parties as the main actors in recruitment processes and candidate 
selection. These approaches acknowledge that parties do not always adhere to 
formal rules (which are considered more favourable for women), and that informal 
institutions that often reward attributes more commonly found among men – e.g., 
service to the party, previous office holding or time available – exist as well. In 
analysing recruitment processes, it is crucial to explore the dynamics of  nomination 
of  party candidates. Studies have consistently shown that more formal rules, as well 
as greater centralisation of  leadership in the recruitment system, favour women 
candidates (Kenny 2013).
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Elegantly conceived and executed, Norris and Lovenduski’s supply and demand 
model of  political recruitment (1995) looks at parties and argues that the outcome of  
their selection processes can be understood as an interaction between the supply of  
candidates wishing to stand for political office and the demands of  gatekeepers 
(parties) who select the candidates. Supply factors are inherent to the individual char-
acteristics of  aspirants, and demand factors refer to the preferences of  the parties’ 
electorate. The elements that shape the supply of  candidates are their personal 
resources (education, time, experience), motivation, ambition and interest in politics 
(Krook and Schwindt-Bayer, 2013). Demand factors connote the processes the parties 
engage in in the candidates’ recruiting process, and their perceptions of  their qualifica-
tions and skills. In these processes, there is evidence that – in mechanisms such as 
electoral laws, parties’ rules like primaries, group membership, spheres of  recruitment 
or dedication to the party – women aspiring to political office do not have all of  the 
same opportunities as men (Kitilson 2013). Studies using the supply and demand 
framework have argued that the personal resource ‘time to devote to politics’ is scarcer 
for women due to the unequal share of  household and family tasks, operating as a 
barrier (in the ‘supply’ category) to their equal presence. Some analyses have also 
pointed to the fact that women’s weaker political networks place them in a disadvan-
taged position to attain seniority and to compete (Krook and Schwindt-Bayer, 2013).
In contrast to studies on descriptive representation, substantive representation is a 
less developed line of  research in gender studies. This is due both to its being a less 
straightforward ground to explore, and to the challenge of  measuring change in 
the context of  the relatively recent arrival of  women in legislatures. Unlike ‘count-
ing women’, measuring the difference women make requires researchers to define 
what they are looking for: whether or not women are bringing in different perspec-
tives and shaping legislative procedures, outcomes, style, and the quality of  democ-
racy (Wangnerud 2009). A further challenge consists in the circumstance whereby 
the best strategy for capturing the difference women are said to make involves using 
longitudinal research designs in long lag-time frameworks that can capture changes 
in processes that are slow in showing effects. The difficulty, however, is that empiri-
cal material required for longitudinal studies is available in a only handful of  cases 
(mainly the Scandinavian countries) where the presence of  women in legislatures 
has had a long trajectory.
Interest in substantive representation grew after Anne Phillips’s The Politics of  
Presence (1995). From a normative perspective, Phillips provided arguments to sup-
port the claim that women should be present in elected political institutions in 
order to advance women’s issues. Her work suggested a link between descriptive 
and substantive representation, as it claimed that female politicians are best 
equipped to represent the interests of  women and that, therefore, democratic 
political systems must not exclude them. The theory is based on the premise that 
distinctive experiences characterising women’s lives (childbearing, occupation, 
unequal positions in paid and unpaid work, etc.) result in preferences that are best 
represented by those who have shared those experiences, or, at the very least, by 
institutions that are not dominated by men. Although that premise is contested 
(Young 2000), two decades of  empirical research have shown that female 
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politicians come to institutions with distinctive attitudes and values and that they 
have contributed (to a greater or lesser extent) to improving women’s positions in 
society through their work in parliaments and executive offices (Lovenduski and 
Norris 2003; Mateo-Diaz 2005; Thomas and Wilcox 2005; Dodson 2006).
If  women express different values, attitudes and public priorities, or if  they 
behave with a different political style,1 this means that they make a difference. First, 
women’s decision-making style has been identified as more inclusive, seeking 
broader participation, stressing cooperation rather than conflict, and consulting 
more sources to define the problem and to explore the solutions, in contrast with 
a more command-and-control masculine style (Weikart et al. 2006). Further, schol-
ars have detected distinct attitudes and policy priorities among male and female 
legislators (Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Mateo-Diaz 2005; Thomas and Wilcox 
2005; Dodson 2006). Showing the outcomes of  these differences is not straightfor-
ward: the introduction of  new attitudes and priorities does not always suffice in 
order for policy changes to occur. With respect to the proportion of  women 
elected,2 factors such as party discipline and other contextual variables (e.g. being 
in the opposition) can obstruct the translation of  values and priorities into outputs 
(Lovenduski and Norris 2003). But overall, the evidence does appear to support 
the theory that having a greater percentage of  women in elected office helps to 
make women’s position in society stronger. Relevant work has mapped distinctive 
political attitudes of  women in office and has shown that female elected officials 
tend to prioritise issues such as social policy, gender equality and family policy 
(Dodson 2006). Specifically focussing on local government, several empirical stud-
ies in the Nordic countries have reported an increase in women’s interest in social 
policy agendas, followed by outcomes that have been beneficial for women in their 
daily lives (Bratton and Ray 2002; Wangnerud and Sundell, 2012).
Women’s political representation and the unknown 
world of  the second tier of  local government
Based on the literature presented, we will now look at: (a) the composition of  
councils at the second tier of  local government, (b) the personal characteristics of  
female councillors and (c) their distinctive attitudes and values. In this way we will 
explore whether the main hypotheses and findings on women’s political representa-
tion can be confirmed for second-tier local assemblies as well. Councillors at this 
level of  government enter politics, follow specific recruitment patterns, compete in 
elections, work in assemblies, hold specific visions about their role and their con-
stituencies, and take part in decision-making processes (Heinelt and Bertrana 
2011). Every dimension of  political representation analysed in national parlia-
ments can be found in local arenas as well. Regarding descriptive representation, 
institutions – together with cultural and socioeconomic variables – can potentially 
explain differences in the share of  women in councils. Analysing quota implemen-
tation, as well as supply and demand factors in political recruitment, can aid us in 
understanding cross-country and gender differences. From female councillors’ 
responses to questions regarding their role as councillors, their views on democracy 
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and decision making, and their vision of  public services, we can learn more about 
certain aspects of  their substantive representation. Although we are confronted 
with some limitations (the questionnaire was not designed in order to test gender 
differences) exploring gender representation in councils at the second tier of  local 
government is worthwhile, feasible and, to our knowledge, original.
Methodological approach
The databases created for analysing councillors, political executives and leading 
bureaucrats in local government covers a wide range of  features and variables, 
including the gender of  the respondent. In most of  these cross-country surveys, the 
‘gender variable’ is often placed as a fundamental control variable used to illustrate 
the side effects of  gender in other substantive research. In contrast, for the present 
study, gender is our main dependent variable. Starting from it, we will develop a 
wide range of  basic bivariate analyses to test some of  the aforementioned funda-
mentals in the gender and politics literature in a hitherto unexplored political 
institutional setting.
The dichotomous variable in the questionnaire, ‘gender’, enables us to distin-
guish between two independent groups based on the natural attribute of  gender. 
In this sense, the analysis made in this chapter states that ‘gender’ is an indepen-
dent attribute of  our objects of  analysis (councillors), which has an impact on their 
role, perceptions and visions. Our main analyses focus on differences between 
groups (men versus women), rather than cross-country comparisons. The null 
hypothesis operates under the theoretical assumption that these groups are two 
different samples from the same population. Thus, the test reflects the likelihood 
that their values are equal.
To test the basic assumption that no differences based on gender for a same 
population should exist, we mainly use the independent means t-test for continuous 
variables and Pearson’s chi-square test for categorical variables. The independent-
samples t-test compares the means of  two sets of  values from one continuous vari-
able, while the Pearson’s Chi-square tests the idea of  comparing the frequencies 
observed in certain categories to the frequencies one might expect to get in those 
categories by chance. When using this latter technique, we often recode the original 
variables in the database into a dichotomous one to create 2×2 matrices that easily 
capture the most important information for each indicator.3
The t-test states that the observed differences between groups, if  they exist, are 
not due to chance, while Pearson’s chi-square test examines whether there is an 
association between two categorical variables, and tests whether the two variables 
are independent. If  the significance value is small enough, then we reject the 
hypothesis that the variables are independent and gain confidence in the hypothesis 
that they are in some way related. Moreover, to better capture the magnitude of  
the effect for our categorical data, we are offering the odds ratio as well. We also 
show the results of  Fisher’s exact test for our contingency tables, as a robustness 
check for the probability of  the chi-square statistic to be accurate, though all of  
our tables have sufficiently large values for n. Utilising both techniques enables us 
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both to test the likelihood that ‘gender’ is not a ‘natural attribute’ for individuals 
involved in politics, and to show that the fact that being a man or a woman also 
has an impact on the political activities of  politicians in local government.
Descriptive representation
Women are underrepresented in legislative bodies around the world. That is the 
case not only in national legislatures (Interparliamentary Union 2014), but also in 
municipal assemblies (Sundström 2013), despite the common perception that 
women have greater access to local elected office than to national elected office 
(Vengroff  et al, 2003). Equal representation in local politics has definitely not been 
achieved in the countries included in this study and, in second-tier councils, women 
are underrepresented as well (see Figure 7.1). However, differences among coun-
tries are great and the share of  women in elected office does approach real balance 
in some of  them, such as Sweden (47.3 per cent) and Norway (43.5 per cent.) To 
understand the great cross-country variation, we first have to take a look at the 
institutional, socioeconomic and cultural factors that an extensive body of  research 
suggests are the main explanatory variables. After numerous empirical studies, we 
can assume that: (1) proportional representation electoral systems with (2) closed 
party lists, (3) large district sizes, in countries with (4) generous welfare states, 
(5) high proportions of  women in the labour force and a (6) culture of  gender 
equality, are the most favourable contexts for women to compete and win seats in 
representative institutions (see e.g. Krook and Schwindt-Bayer 2013; Wangnerud 
2009; Rosembluth et al. 2006). In addition, the implementation of  legislated can-
didate quotas makes a difference and, other things being equal, leftist parties have 
traditionally been more likely to nominate women to safe places on their lists, 
although party ideology does not matter as much nowadays as it did in the past 
(Kittilson 2013). In the same degree that these traits affect the composition of  
national parliaments, we expect them to have an incidence in local councils.
Figure 7.1 shows the percentages of  women in national parliaments, second-tier 
councils and municipal assemblies for the countries included in the study, classified 
by descending order of  the percentage of  women in municipal assemblies. Some of  
the percentages are fairly consistent with the existing research, although some others 
will require further exploration and cannot all be addressed in depth here. Overall, 
as expected, countries ranking highly in socioeconomic variables, with strong wel-
fare states and cultures that value gender equality – such as Sweden and Norway – 
are at the top of  the list in terms of  the percentage of  women in all legislatures. Even 
though we cannot compare the national figures for each one of  these variables in 
detail, we can surmise that the countries’ positions illustrate the strong effect of  
structural factors, with the exception of  Spain, whose second place is explained only 
by the effectiveness of  compulsory gender quotas, and Hungary, which is in a rela-
tively high position only with respect to the female share in municipal assemblies.
Just focusing on provincial councils, some interesting features arise. First, as 
expected, the electoral system seems to produce effects in terms of  the election of  
women to local assemblies (see Table 7.1). The general proposition is that, other 
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things being equal, councils elected according to a proportional representation rule 
will, in principle, have more women, while plurality/majoritarian systems will have 
a negative impact on the percentage of  female councillors. District magnitude and 
ballot structure (closed or open lists) are held to influence proportions of  female 
elected officials as well, although we lack the detailed information on these two 
aspects that would be required in order to assess their effects.
The relatively low presence of  women in county councils in the United  Kingdom – 
as compared with figures in the similar (with respect to culture, modernization, 
women’s status and the absence of  quotas) Scandinavian and Middle European 
countries – can be explained in these terms looking at its plurality electoral system, 
as it has been extensively referred in the literature about the House of  Commons 
(see e.g. Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Although local politics seems to be a friend-
lier arena for women than Westminster, important barriers still exist. It is the same 
phenomenon we find in French département councils, elected under majoritarian 
rules, which shows the effect of  different electoral systems within a country, with 
significantly larger numbers of  female councillors in French municipalities, whose 
assemblies are elected under the proportional representation system. The corre-
sponding Spanish percentages at provincial and municipal levels can also be 
explained by looking at the election system. Interestingly, in Spain members of  
provincial councils are indirectly elected by and among the municipal councillors, 
according to the electoral results and following political parties’ orders. The output 
of  this system is a much lower representation of  women (25 per cent) in provincial 
councils compared to municipal assemblies (40 per cent). There are a number of  
possible explanations for this, the main one being that when parties are not bound 
by quota legislation in Spain, candidate selection processes favour males. Belgium 
is another case deserving closer attention, as the same electoral system produces 
different results by territory for provincial elections only. Although it is not shown 
in Figure 7.1, according to our data the Flemish region has a significantly higher 
share of  women (41.6 per cent) compared to the Walloon region (only 32.7 per 
cent) – with no apparent explanation if  one considers that both territories have 
comparable percentages in municipal councils. Poland will be an interesting case 
to follow from the next municipal elections onwards, once the 2014 reform that 
implements a majoritarian system for municipalities (differing from the PR system 
in counties) is enforced.
In addition to electoral rules, gender quotas have proven to be an effective tool 
for increasing women’s representation in elected bodies of  government in com-
parative perspective (Dahlerup 2006; Franceschet et al. 2013; IDEA 2013), although 
they have not always resulted in uniform increases. Quotas regulate – with specific 
targets – the gender composition of  candidates’ lists and can be either mandatory 
for all political forces running in elections (legislated candidate quotas) or voluntary 
(party quotas) adopted by individual parties for their own candidate lists, following 
their internal statutes or regulations. Quotas started being voluntarily implemented 
in the early 1970s by social democratic parties in Western Europe, and they have 
had the greatest impact on proportional representation systems with party lists. 
The Scandinavian democracies have never adopted legal compulsory quotas, yet 
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balanced lists are a common practice among most of  the political parties. The 
strong influence of  women’s groups on society, parties and politics, combined with 
solid social democratic welfare states have led to this result (Dalherup and Leye-
naard 2013). In the rest of  Europe, compulsory candidate quotas are the rule in a 
large range of  national legislatures4, but not all of  the countries in question have 
implemented them for local elections. Among the countries surveyed, only Bel-
gium, Italy, Greece and recently Poland have quotas for council elections at the 
second tier of  local government, although they have not always brought about 
the expected results. Except for Belgium, none of  these countries rank high on the 
chart. On the contrary, Italy and Greece in particular seem to struggle with wom-
en’s descriptive representation. This confirms previous studies’ findings that quotas’ 
effectiveness is constrained by parties’ discriminatory practices such as the gen-
dered allocation of  safe positions (Verge and Troupel 2011) or by the specific details 
of  individual measures, such as the disincentive effects of  sanctions or the ambition 
of  the specific targets to attain power (Franceschet 2013).
An additional solid finding in the field is that women do better in left-wing par-
ties (see e.g. Dahlerup and Leyenaard 2013; Wangnerud 2009). The explanation 
for this involves a variety of  factors. First, there are party platforms: parties on the 
left embrace progressive and egalitarian ideals and therefore tend to put forward 
more female candidates (Paxton and Hughes, 2013). But there are also important 
agency factors to take into account, such as women’s activism. Leftist parties have 
traditionally been more likely to have strong women’s sections in their ranks that 
have lobbied party leaders to implement voluntary quotas and to recruit more 
female candidates (Kittilson 2006; Dalherup and Leyenaard 2013). Whatever the 
explanation, the fact is that this pattern is weaker nowadays than it was 20 years 
ago. Substantial increases are found in most party families in Western democra-
cies due either to quota implementation or to a contagion effect, with the possible 
exception of  religious and ultra-right parties. Green parties have had more women 
elected, possibly because of  their agendas of  promoting environmental sustain-
ability over economic growth (Paxton and Hughes 2013). Irrespective of  whether 
the party is from right, entre or left, research on this topic suggests that centralised 
leadership in recruitment processes tends to favour women’s chances to become 
candidates (Kittilson 2013). In more centrally and hierarchically organised par-
ties, top leaders have better chances to enforce organisational guidelines with 
respect to balanced lists, even in cases of  local branch revolts. Ultimately, there-
fore, left-wing parties and national parties would seem to offer a friendlier atmo-
sphere for women.
Our data for the councils at the second tier of  local government are consistent 
with these patterns. The variable in the questionnaire asking for the partisan 
affiliation of  the respondents, and the later recodification according to Andersson 
et al.’s work (2014), allows us to differentiate between Left-wing parties and Right 
wing parties.5 According to the theoretical statements made earlier, we should 
expect to find a significant proportion of  women in left-wing parties. Table 7.2 
summarises the results of  the Chi-square test based on the ideological affiliation 
to a party.
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According to our data, there is a significant association between party family (the 
ideological cleavage) and gender (χ2 = 22.452, p < 0.000). In particular, the results 
show that the odds for women to enrol in left-wing parties are 1.38 times higher 
than they are for men. In other words, gender is a relevant factor in explaining 
enrolment in left-wing or right-wing political parties; this finding supports previous 
theoretical statements.
A final aspect of  descriptive representation we want to address is the distinctive 
personal characteristics of  female councillors. Women in legislatures are not only 
fewer in number, but they are also slightly different from men in some personal 
attributes. In other surveys of  local leaders, it has been detected that, for instance, 
women legislators tend to be younger and better educated (MAELG database).6 
Analysing patterns of  female representation inevitably points to the concepts of  
supply and demand in recruitment processes, and to the connected Norris and 
Lovenduski framework (1995) referred to earlier. As was mentioned, supply-side 
factors determine who presents him- or herself  as a potential candidate, and 
demand-side factors determine who, among candidates that have come forward, 
is favoured by the political elites. The fact that specific traits are overrepresented 
in legislatures (following the 3M mantra of  political recruitment: typically men, 
middle-class, middle age; see Steyvers and Reynaert 2006) could be the result either 
of  there being more aspirants coming from that group, or of  political recruiters 
preferring those characteristics. Lack of  time, as well as lower levels of  political 
ambition and confidence purportedly detected in women – as a consequence of  
gender role socialization – have been identified as gendered supply-side explana-
tions for women’s weaker presence in politics, while the biased recruitment prac-
tices of  political elites that tend to overlook available women count as gendered 
demand-side variables (Fox and Lawless 2010). Analysing which variable is weighti-
est, or whether the outcome of  the recruitment process is a product of  both, would 
go beyond the scope of  the present chapter, but the questions implicated are worthy 
of  investigation in their own right.
We might expect female councillors to be older than their male counterparts, 
and to enter politics only after the child-rearing period (from the age of  25 to 
40 years), considering that women are in general more likely to take more respon-
sibility for raising families. If  lack of  ambition or of  self-efficacy were common 
characteristics of  women, they would probably show this gendered socialisation 
effect once they were in office as well, in ways that would be reflected in their 
Table 7.2 Affiliation to left-wing parties (Chi-square test)
Women left-wing parties (per cent) 62.5
Men left-wing parties (per cent) 54.4
χ2 22.452
p-value 0.000
Fisher’s exact test 0.000
Odds ratio 1.38
Source: Second Tier Survey
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decisions regarding whether to pursue political careers (ambition) or in how much 
influence they would report having in council decisions (self-efficacy). Some of  the 
variables in the questionnaire enable us to gauge these effects.
Our data for councillors at the second level of  local government show that 
women councillors are (slightly but statistically significantly) younger and better 
educated than, and as ambitious as, their male colleagues, although their perceived 
levels of  self-efficacy are lower. To analyse differences in age and years in county 
politics, in Table 7.3 we present the results of  the independent t-test, while to anal-
yse differences in political ambition, education and their perception of  self-efficacy, 
we show the results of  the Chi-square test in Table 7.4.
Regarding age, although the difference is quite small (54.4 years for men; 
52.7 years for women) it is significant from a statistical perspective. We assume 
equal variances for data (Levene’s test is non-significant), but a significant differ-
ence on age based on gender. The results for years in office also show small, but sig-
nificant, differences by gender. A man in the sample has spent an average of  8.7 years 
as a council member at the second level of  local government, while a woman has 
spent 7.6 years. In this case we cannot assume equal variances on data (Levene’s 
test is significant), but a small statistically significant difference in means, caused by 
gender. In both cases the effect size (R2) is quite modest.
The data displayed in Table 7.4 present divergent results: for education and 
self-efficacy we find differences related to gender, while for political ambition there 
do not appear to be significant differences.
There is a significant association between level of  educational attainment (higher 
education versus medium or basic education are considered) and gender (χ2 = 
8.599, p < 0.003). The results show that the odds of  women councillors having 
attained higher education are 1.22 times higher than is the case for their male col-
leagues; gender is thus a relevant factor in understanding differences in levels of  
educational attainment among second-tier councillors. Regarding self-efficacy 
(measuring how much influence respondents exercise on county activities), we find 
that again a significant association with gender exists (χ2 = 7.803, p < .005). When 
high versus low or moderate self-efficacy is considered, the odds for women to 
consider themselves with high self-efficacy is 0.80, which is to say that men are 
20 per cent more likely to consider themselves highly effective when performing 
Table 7.3 Councillors by age and years as a county politician (independent means t-test)
Age Years in office
men’s age (mean) 54.4 men’s years in office (mean) 8.7
women’s age (mean) 52.7 women’s years in office (mean) 7.6
Levene’s test (p-value) 0.298 Levene’s test ( p-value) 0.000
t-test 4.864 t-test 5.487
Difference in means 1.752 Difference in means 1.16
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000
R2 0.060 R2 0.098
Source: Second Tier Survey
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Table 7.4  Councillors by education, self-efficacy and political 
ambitions (independent means t-test)
Education
Women with higher education (per cent) 71.3
Men with higher education (per cent) 67.1
χ2 8.599
p-value .003
Fisher’s exact test .003
Odds ratio 1.22
Self-efficacy
Women with high self-efficacy (per cent) 17.5
Men with high self-efficacy (per cent) 21.1
χ2 7.803
p-value .005
Fisher’s exact test .005
Odds ratio 0,8
Political ambition
Women willing to continue in politics (per cent) 83.6
Men willing to continue in politics (per cent) 83.1
χ2 0.198
p-value .656
Fisher’s exact test .691
Odds ratio (1.04)
Source: Second Tier Survey
their political tasks. By contrast, our results on political ambition do not show any 
pattern of  difference linked to gender (χ2 = 0.198, p > .05, odds = 1.04), suggesting 
similar levels of  expectations for professional advancement, once in office, for both 
genders.
In summary, these findings offer a mixed picture. First, female elected officials 
tend to be younger than their male colleagues; this suggests that women of  child-
rearing age are, on average, better represented among elected officials than is 
generally the case in other occupations. This fact could have different explanations. 
From a supply-side perspective, it could be the effect of  fewer time barriers than 
those identified in the literature because of: (a) changing patterns in family respon-
sibilities that have freed women to devote time to political involvement, (b) the fact 
that local politics might be less time-consuming compared to other arenas or 
(c) the higher representation of  young women without family responsibilities. The 
first and second explanations point to optimistic scenarios, and probably indicate 
that participation of  women in local political institutions will grow. The third expla-
nation, on the contrary, points to a reality where women confront a trade-off  
between pursuing a political career and having a family, being forced to choose 
between them. Second, higher levels of  education probably point to barriers that 
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still exist for women wishing to gain spaces on party lists, which are only overcome 
when they are better prepared (in this case, in the sense of  having higher educa-
tional qualifications). In this context, education seems to be a vital resource for 
women (Paxton and Hughes 2013). Third, the equivalent political ambition of  
male and female councillors seems to indicate that this supply-side factor plays a 
role only in the process of  becoming an aspirant and seeking elective office, but 
that once women enter into politics, ambition is similar. Sadly, it does not seem to 
be the case for self-perception of  personal efficacy as – other things being equal – 
women councillors see themselves as having less influence than their male coun-
terparts over county activities.
In conducting this analysis, we have also detected that women have lower levels 
of  seniority as councillors. Again, this can lead to an optimistic and a pessimistic 
explanation. If  fewer years serving as councillors is the consequence of  a cohort 
effect, due to the relatively recent arrival of  women to politics, it can be expected 
that the gap will narrow over time and that women will soon acquire the seniority 
and experience men already have, which are required in order to pursue influen-
tial positions and an equal presence in executive positions. But it might also be 
the effect of  higher rates of  turnover in women, a state of  affairs identified in 
multiple studies (see e.g. Verge and Troupel 2011). If  the latter is the case – i.e. if  
female politicians are less likely to be re-elected either because they give up or 
because parties replace them in higher numbers – the forecast is pessimistic and 
the chances for women to accumulate political experience and advance in sub-
stantive representation diminish.
Substantive representation
As developed at the beginning of  this chapter, substantive representation asks 
whether women seek to promote ‘women’s issues’ once they are elected to political 
office, and whether they are able to do so. Much less mature as a field of  research, 
and much more elusive as an object of  inquiry (Wangnerud 2009), substantive 
representation’s main concern is to determine whether women behave differently, 
whether they pursue different objectives and, as a further step, whether they man-
age to promote their purportedly distinctive issues once they are elected to political 
office. Knowing whether women have made a substantial change since they were 
first elected to representative bodies exceeds the scope of  this chapter. Pursuing 
that question would require longitudinal studies gauging outcomes over time and 
their connection to the increased presence of  women in each particular assembly, 
in line with what Bratton and Ray (2002) did when they analysed whether policy 
outputs have been altered in Norwegian local governments over 15 years, and with 
Wangnerud’s and Sundell’s research on Swedish local assemblies (2012). But even 
if  studies like those conclude that a great change has not been introduced, that 
would not necessarily mean that representation of  women is not substantially dif-
ferent. Other elements of  the political system, such as party discipline and eco-
nomic cycles, can impede women from expressing their values and priorities in 
policy decisions.
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The variables included in the questionnaire do not suffice if  we wish to conduct 
a thorough analysis or to test the main hypotheses in the field, but they do offer 
some information which is potentially of  great value if  we wish to gauge substan-
tive representation issues. They enable, for instance, the mapping of  women in 
executive positions, which is a precondition for their making a difference in deci-
sions, and they illuminate several relevant aspects of  women’s role as councillors, 
their interactions with other political actors and with their constituents, and their 
visions of  democracy.
As an example, exploring the issue of  horizontal substantive representation (in 
other words, whether or not women are concentrated in some commissions or 
committees) would require knowing more about the respondents’ responsibilities 
within the councils, the hypothesis being that women are better represented in 
some commissions (education, social issues) and have limited access to a range of  
others (finance, infrastructure). Absent such information, what can be gauged is 
whether women are equally represented in leading political positions. After decades 
of  reforms towards the reinforcement of  political leadership (Haus et al. 2005), 
councillors’ transformed roles have come to resemble the roles played by back-
bench MPs in national parliaments, and holding executive positions has become 
a way for them to gain influence and power, thus guaranteeing substantive 
representation.
To analyse this, we use the variables originally designed for assessing political 
careers. We combine the variables covering different possible executive positions 
and, separately, the variables covering non-executive positions, and then we cross 
them by gender. The information we obtain is the percentage of  men and women 
holding ‘at least’ one executive position versus the percentage who did not have ‘at 
least’ one non-executive position. The results show that a significant association 
with gender exists (χ2 = 18.487, p < 0.000). That is to say: the odds of  a woman 
councillor having at least one executive position in her career are 0.82, meaning 
that men have 18 per cent greater likelihood of  occupying at least one executive 
position. The findings here are in line with other studies that have identified an 
unequal gendered distribution in political hierarchies (Dalherup and Leyernaard 
2013).
We can also explore some aspects concerning a gendered path to political 
office. From the different possibilities suggested by the variables used to assess the 
political career, we have selected those with large n in responses, and those having 
Table 7.5 Executive positions in political career (Chi-square test)
Women with at least one executive position (per cent) 34.1
Men with at least one executive position (per cent) 38.2
χ2 18.487
p-value 0.000
Fisher’s exact test 0.003
Odds ratio 0.82
Source: Second Tier Survey
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an impact on political positions (such as mayor). Moreover, we have recoded 
some of  them to specifically capture the respondents’ entry in politics. In other 
words, for each individual respondent, we separate his or her entry in politics 
from the other positions he or she has held. By doing this, we can have both the 
information regarding each first political position, and the impact of  gender on 
that position.
Our results show that there are no differences based on gender for beginning 
the political career as a municipal executive or as a municipal councillor. How-
ever, we find significant association between gender and beginning one’s politi-
cal career as a mayor (χ2 = 5.402, p < 0.020), confirming that men have 45 per 
cent greater likelihood to begin as mayors than women (odds ratio = 0.55). 
However, women are more likely to debut in politics by entering directly at the 
second tier of  local government. The percentage of  women beginning as county 
Table 7.6 First appointment or election in the political career (Chi-square test)
Begin as a mayor Begin as a county councillor  
Women beginning as 
a mayor (per cent)
20.2 Women beginning as a 
county councillor (per cent)
46.1
Men beginning as a  
mayor (per cent)
31.3 Men beginning as a county 
councillor (per cent)
36
χ2 5.402 χ2 38.670
p-value 0.020 p-value 0.000
Fisher’s exact test 0.022 Fisher’s exact test 0.000
Odds ratio 0.55 Odds ratio 1.51
Begin as a municipal councillor Begin as a county executive
Women beginning as  
a municipal 
councillor (per cent)
87.4 Women beginning as a 
county executive (per cent)
20
Men beginning 
as a municipal 
councillor (per cent)
89.3 Men beginning as a county 
executive (per cent)
11.4
χ2 2.315 χ2 17.058
p-value 0.128 p-value 0.000
Fisher’s exact test 0.132 Fisher’s exact test 0.000
Odds ratio (0.88) Odds ratio 2.08
Begin as a municipal executive
Women beginning as  
a municipal executive  
(per cent)
34.4 p-value 0.134
Men beginning as a 
municipal executive  
(per cent)
30.5 Fisher’s exact test 0.145
χ2 2.245 Odds ratio (1.2)
Source: Second Tier Survey
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councillors is statistically significant and different from the percentage among 
men (χ2 = 38.670, p < 0.000). The results show that for women the odds of  
beginning in politics as county councillors are 1.51 times higher than is the case 
for men. Moreover, women are 2.08 times more likely than men to debut in 
politics as county executives. Thus, gender is a relevant factor explaining the 
debut in politics, especially if  we look at the second tier of  local government, 
where women are substantially more likely than men to begin their political 
careers serving as councillors.
The assumption that women have certain interests in common is another com-
monly shared premise in studies on women in representative bodies and on the 
bases of  substantive representation. Following the literature reviewed at the 
beginning of  this article, we expect that women will tend, compared to men, to 
show different values and attitudes as a group and to share common interests and 
policy priorities. Female political representatives tend, more than their male col-
leagues do, to view women as a group of  special constituents. In Weikart et al.’s 
study (2006), when directly asked whether they thought female legislators were 
better able to represent women’s special concerns, almost 80 per cent of  female 
political representatives said ‘yes’, whereas only 30 per cent of  men did so. 
Women in councils at the second level of  local government are not an exception 
in this sense.
Table 7.7 reflects the Chi-square test for the degree of  importance given to the 
promotion of  views and interests of  women. The percentage of  women consider-
ing the promotion of  such views and interests of  high or very high importance is 
76 per cent, while the percentage among men is 54.4 per cent. Thus, there is a 
clear relation between gender and the highest concern about the task of  promoting 
views or interests of  women. Chi-square tests are significant for representing wom-
en’s interests (χ2 = 198.523, p < 0.000), and the odds of  a woman councillor 
considering the promotion of  women’s views and interests to be of  utmost impor-
tance is 2.66 higher than is the case with male councillors.
Finally, acknowledging the importance of  the role of  parties in recruitment, we 
have explored the relationship between women and parties. We have identified 
significant gender differences here as well. Since centralised recruitment processes 
tend to favour women, we expected to find more female representatives in national 
parties compared to local or independent candidatures. We have explored whether 
there are distinctive patterns of  party loyalty as well.
Table 7.7 Interest representation of  women (Chi-square test)
Considered by women of  high importance (per cent) 76
Considered by men of  high importance (per cent) 54.4
χ2 198.523
p-value 0.000
Fisher’s exact test 0.000
Odds ratio 2.66
Source: Second Tier Survey
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The results linking partisanship and partisan alignment when voting in county 
decisions are shown in Table 7.8. They express a significant association for both 
variables with gender. In this scenario, 90.6 per cent of  women were elected as 
candidates of  national parties, as compared with 86.4 per cent of  men, and 
52.6 per cent of  women would usually vote according to their party’s position – 
even against their personal position – as compared with 42 per cent of  men. These 
results offer a significant association (χ2 = 15.750, p < 0.000, for national party 
affiliation; χ2 = 33.801, p < 0.000, for voting following party’s indications), fol-
lowed by a significant odds ratio. Women are 1.52 times more enrolled in national 
parties than men, and the odds of  women voting in line with the positions of  the 
parties with which they are affiliated (as distinct from voting on the basis of  their 
personal opinions) are 1.53 times greater than is the case for men.
Conclusion
Taking as its starting point the recognition that gender balance in political institu-
tions is far from achieved even in European countries (and in the allegedly friend-
lier local arenas), this chapter has analysed the representation of  women in local 
government councils, focusing not only on differences between women and men 
in numbers and characteristics (descriptive representation) but also on the distinc-
tive attitudes and priorities women express (substantive representation). Using 
original data, we have tested some of  the main hypotheses in the field – mainly 
with reference to national legislatures – and have provided evidence in support of  
the theory that gendered paths to local political office do not differ substantially 
from the gendered paths to national political office, although some singularities 
exist. Throughout the analysis, great cross-country differences have been identified; 
they are a relevant aspect of  the landscape that ought not to be neglected.
Women councillors tend to be younger and better educated than, and as ambi-
tious as, their male counterparts, which gives hope for advances in their descriptive 
and substantive representation. They are more likely than men to debut in politics 
as county executives. They are committed to women’s interests and better coordi-
nated with their parties, and this ‘party soldier’ spirit could open a window in the 
Table 7.8 Party recruitment and party alignment in voting (Chi-square test)
Party recruitment Party alignment in voting
Women elected as national 
party candidate (per cent)
90.6 Women voting following their party 
rather than personal opinion (per cent)
52.6
Men elected as national 
party candidate (per cent)
86.4 Men voting following their party rather 
than personal opinion (per cent)
42
χ2 15.750 χ2 33.801
p-value .000 p-value 0.000
Fisher’s exact test .000 Fisher’s exact test 0.000
Odds ratio 1.52 Odds ratio 1.53
Source: Second Tier Survey
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future for change from within. But they continue to be fewer in number than their 
male counterparts – worrisomely so in many countries, even after decades during 
which gender equality issues have been discussed in public fora, and despite the 
implementation of  quota mechanisms (either compulsory or party voluntary). Fur-
thermore, they express lower perceived levels of  self-efficacy when it comes to 
assessing their influence on council decisions.
The limited scope of  the information available – due both to the lack of  detailed 
knowledge on some national institutional and socioeconomic indicators, and to the 
absence of  some key variables to test gender differences – has left many open ques-
tions. But many important issues have been addressed. Being able to look at wom-
en’s political representation in large numbers, from a comparative perspective and 
with reference to a hitherto unexplored institutional setting is valuable in itself, and, 
from the authors’ perspective, adds to the literature in the field. Looking forward, 
gaining a deeper understanding of  recruitment processes and attempting longitu-
dinal studies that can measure the desired change should be a priority.
Notes
1 This distinctiveness is considered to be more probabilistic than deterministic (Dodson 2006).
2 The proportion of  women elected could be measured in the accomplishment of  a mini-
mum share or ‘critical mass’ (Lovenduski and Norris 2003). According to Kanter’s theory 
of  critical mass, the size of  a group matters because the minority adapts to the surround-
ing, confirming the predominant rules of  the game. Once the group reaches a certain 
size, the available strategies change; the minority starts to assert itself  and transform the 
institutional culture, norms and values (Kanter 1977).
3 For reasons of  space, we are not offering in this chapter all of  the cross tables done, 
neither are we providing details of  each recodification. Instead we are offering light tables 
with summarized information. In any case, both the complete cross tabs and the recodi-
fications criteria are available upon request to the authors.
4 Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
FYR of  Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain. 
5 The recodification process was based on the categorization made by Andersson et al. for 
classifying political parties, and followed four different steps. First, we analyse in the 
survey how respondents state their current party affiliation, where three possible answers 
were useful for our purposes (no/yes local party; no/yes national party). Second, those 
who answered ‘yes’, were also asked to precise the name of  their party. Third, a recodi-
fication made by the editors according to Andersson et al. (v.2802_ERD-Party_Family), 
gave up to 13 different party families (electoral alliance, Liberal, Conservative, Special 
issue, Social democracy, Regional, no family, Communist/Socialist, Ethnic, Green/
Ecologist, Christian democracy, Agrarian, Right-Wing). Finally, in order to differentiate 
between left-wing and right-wing, we assume to be stable across countries their general 
positions regarding the role of  women in political life, from a more open vision to a more 
traditional approach to gender. So, we assign the following parties to the left-wing group: 
Liberal, Social Democracy, Communist/Socialist, Green/Ecologist; and the following to 
the right-wing: Conservative, Ethnic, Christian Democracy, Agrarian and Right-Wing. 
We exclude from the classification for not being general enough Regional, electoral alli-
ance, Special Issue and no family.
6 MAELG is the acronym for Municipal Assemblies in European Local Governance, an 
international research project surveying councillors in European cities (see Egner, B. et al., 
2013 and Heinelt and Krapp, Chapter 3 in this book).
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8 Notions of democracy of 
councillors at the municipal  
and second tier of local 
government – and their role  
perception and behaviour
Hubert Heinelt
Introduction
Councils of  the municipal as well as of  the second level of  local government have 
traditionally been seen as representative bodies, i.e. a core institution of  a particu-
lar understanding of  democracy – namely representative or ‘liberal’ democracy. 
This model of  democracy stresses (a) the individual’s right to participate in general 
elections and by this, the aggregation of  individual preferences to form policy 
guidelines for those in representative bodies or in government and (b) the option 
to make the latter accountable to the individual citizen through general elections. 
However, it is an open question whether or not councillors have an understanding 
of  democracy according to this model – or one which goes beyond this model by 
considering the relationship between broader forms of  participation (beyond par-
ticipating in elections) and democracy.1
In previous publications (Heinelt 2013a, 2013b, 2014) I have shown that municipal 
councillors clearly have an understanding of  democracy either in line with the rep-
resentative or a broader participatory model. Furthermore, I have also shown that 
the municipal councillor’s role perception and behaviour as well as their attitudes 
towards reforms depend on their notion of  democracy. It will be show in this paper 
if  this holds true also for councillors of  the second tier of  local government.
The theoretical explanation for the findings on municipal councillors’ notion of  
democracy has been that their understanding of  democracy is not only an expression 
of  their basic beliefs about appropriate behaviour and subjective norms (see Heinelt 
2013c: 633 ff. with reference to Fishbein and Ajzen 1975 as well as Ajzen and Fish-
bein 1980), but also reflecting their views of  human nature. According to reflections 
in the literature on political theory2 and especially by Benjamin Barber (1984), ‘lib-
eral’ democracy implies a ‘thin democracy’ because its view ‘of  human nature is 
founded on a radical premise no less startling for its familiarity: man is alone’ (Barber 
1984: 68). ‘Liberal democratic politics is thus the logic of  a certain form of  radical 
individualism written out to its last political conclusion. It is atomism wearing a social 
mask. That mask gives to liberal democracy its characteristic dependency on interest 
theory and rational-choice models and insulates it from more social understandings 
of  human nature in the political setting’ (ibid.). This ‘psychological frame’ of  the 
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liberal model of  democracy (as Barber 1984: 67 ff. phrased it) is complemented by 
a particular ‘preconceptual’ or ‘inertial frame’, that means something ‘[o]ne cannot 
“get behind”’ (Barber 1984: 27). The inertial frame of  liberal democracy is based on 
one axiom. This ‘axiom sets up materialismus. [It] posits that humans are material 
beings in all they are and in all they do’ (Barber 1984: 32).
Following Barber, the alternative to the ‘thin’ liberal democracy is ‘strong democ-
racy’. It ‘is a distinctively modern form of  participatory democracy’ (Barber 1984: 
117). ‘[L]iterally, it is self-government by citizens rather than representative govern-
ment in the name of  citizens. Active citizens govern themselves directly here, not 
necessarily at every level and in every instance, but frequently enough and in par-
ticular when basic policies are being decided’ (Barber 1984: 151). From the perspec-
tive of  this understanding of  democracy ‘human beings [are seen] with variable but 
malleable natures and with competing but overlapping interests [who] can contrive 
to live together communally not only to their mutual advantage but also to the 
advantage of  their mutuality’ (Barber 1984: 118). In this way, ‘the social nature of  
human beings’ (Barber 1984: 215) is highlighted by this understanding of  democ-
racy. Moreover, the social nature of  human beings can be seen as the ‘psychological’ 
and ‘inertial frame’ of  this understanding of  democracy. To see humans as social 
beings implies that they are not simply interacting with each other, but that they are 
also able ‘to create a public language that will help reformulate private interests in 
terms susceptible to public accommodation’ (Barber 1984: 119) thereby transform-
ing self-centred interests through political interaction.
Seen in this way, the two notions of  democracy are distinct due to their totally 
different axiomatic ideas of  human nature. However, it can be argued (see for 
instance Heinelt 2010: 22–27; Heinelt 2011) that in practice both concepts of  
democracy can complement each other to the benefit of  collective self-determina-
tion. A vibrant and broader involvement of  citizens and public deliberation in some 
phases of  the policy process (such as the phases of  problem definition and agenda 
setting as well as implementation) can be seen as compatible with the exclusive power 
of  elected representatives to take final decisions of  common interest. Furthermore, 
it can be argued that it is crucial that fora for public deliberation are designed through 
and protected by the decisions of  representative bodies. The same can be argued for 
entitlement to and enforcement of  broad citizen participation. Yet it has to be tested 
whether also the second-tier councillors’ understanding of  democracy does reflect 
different axiomatic concepts – like in the case of  municipal councillors.
Differences in the understanding of  democracy between municipal and second-
tier councillors as well as differences in the factors effecting different notions of  
democracy among councillors from the two layers of  local government may indicate 
the relevance of  Dahl and Tufte’s (1973) reflections on ‘size and democracy’. Early 
reflections by Dahl summarised as follows: ‘for most citizens, participation in very 
large units becomes minimal and in very small units it becomes trivial. At the 
extremes, citizens may participate in a vast range of  complex and crucial decisions 
by the single act of  casting a ballot; or else they have almost unlimited opportunities 
to participate in decisions over matters of  no importance. At the one extreme, then, 
the people vote but they do not rule; at the other, they rule – but they have nothing 
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to rule over’ (Dahl 1971: 97). Against this background it could be argued that coun-
cillors at the second tier of  local government see only limited opportunities for citi-
zens to participate in decisions over matters of  importance at the upper level of  local 
government. At the extremes, this could lead either to focus (a) on elections and 
contacts around party politics and political representation in the machinery of  the 
second tier of  local government or (b) on direct interest intermediation also beyond 
elections between citizens and local government through frequent contacts with the 
political head of  a province, county etc. and the administration – at least more than 
their colleagues from the municipal level where citizens have more opportunities to 
participate in decisions over matters of  importance.
This article starts with an analysis of  the responses of  second-tier councillors 
which can be linked either to a representative or to a broader participatory under-
standing of  democracy. In this section, like in the following ones, the results of  the 
analysis of  second-tier councillors will be compared with those of  the analysis of  
municipal councillors. In the following section the findings on the understanding 
of  democracy are linked to personal characteristics which can be related to basic 
beliefs and subjective norms of  a person. Furthermore, this section also considers 
whether second-tier councillors’ understanding of  democracy is linked to the for-
mal horizontal power relations between councillors, the political and executive 
head (president) and the leading bureaucrats of  the administration of  the respec-
tive second level unit of  local government determined by different local govern-
ment systems. The analysis of  municipal councillors’ understanding of  democracy 
has shown that it is not determined by different institutional conditions which offer 
councillors options to perform a specific role according to their understanding of  
democracy(see Heinelt 2013a: 646–648; 2013b: 91–93). Finally, in the last section 
role perception, role behaviour and attitudes towards reforms at the local level of  
councillors are identified and analysed to see whether or not councillors’ notions 
of  democracy can be related to their role perception, role behaviour and attitudes 
towards reforms as dependent variables.
Councillor’s understanding of  democracy
How do councillors at the second tier of  local government understand democracy? 
To answer this question, councillors at the second level of  local government were 
asked to respond to the following statements:3
• ‘Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence 
local government policies.’
• ‘Political representatives should make what they think are the right decisions, 
independent of  the current views of  local people.’
• ‘The results of  local elections should be the most important factor in deter-
mining municipal policies.’
Where councillors highlight these ideas about how local democracy should func-
tion, it can be argued that they are oriented to the model of  representative democracy 
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or liberal democracy because these statements capture basis meanings of  this notion 
of  democracy.
To identify a contrasting understanding of  democracy, the agreement by coun-
cillors to the following statements was analysed:
• ‘Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local 
decisions.’
• ‘Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before 
important local decisions are made by elected representatives.’
• ‘Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be 
negotiated together with the concerned local actors.’
• ‘Local referenda lead to high quality of  public debate.’
• ‘Decisions should be made by reasoning and discussion aiming at reaching 
consensus rather than by majority voting.’
• ‘Before an important decision is taken reasons for and against the options 
to be decided on should be discussed in public.’4
These statements do not focus on representative democracy. Instead, emphasis 
is given to a broader participatory understanding of  democracy for which the 
individual’s right to participate in general elections alone is not enough for demo-
cratic self-determination. Instead, for democratic self-determination it is seen as 
crucial to agree through public reasoning on the coordination of  actions in a soci-
etally binding way. This implies also the definition of  problems as well as the ways 
these problems should be solved in a way perceived collectively as appropriate 
through ‘problem-solving discourses [. . .] inside the framework of  organized pub-
lic spheres’ (Habermas 1996a: 367).
Thus, analysis of  the agreement or disagreement on the part of  councillors with 
the statements listed allows us to answer the question whether or not councillors 
have an understanding of  democracy according to the model of  representative democ-
racy or ‘liberal democracy’ – or an understanding which is situated beyond this model 
by considering the relationship between broader forms of  participation (beyond 
participating in elections) and democracy. Such an extended notion of  democracy 
is related to participatory governance (Heinelt 2010) or democracy beyond the core of  
governmental structures at the local level. It is focused on enhancing the realm of  
democracy, that is by ‘bringing citizens back in’, and emphasises (as suggested by 
Papadopoulos and Warin 2007) that the democratic quality of  governance arrange-
ments should be assessed according to their openness and accessibility, the quality 
of  deliberation taking place within them and their links to the public sphere.
To test whether or not councillors at the second tier of  local government have 
an understanding of  democracy according to these models, a factor analysis was 
conducted for the whole data set (i.e., for all countries) to look for joint dimensions 
behind the groups of  statements mentioned above. Furthermore, the results are 
compared with those from the survey on municipal councillors.
As shown in Table 8.1, a clear pattern between the variables connected with 
either a representative or a broader participatory understanding of  democracy can 
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be detected for second-tier councillors.5 This means that there is one group of  
councillors who clearly emphasise representative democracy, whereas another 
group is more in favour of  participatory democracy. The only remarkable differ-
ence between councillors at the second tier of  local government and municipal 
councillors is that the factor ‘The results of  local elections should be the most 
important factor’ is loading rather low in the case of  those councillors at the second 
tier of  local government emphasising representative democracy.6
Since factor analysis with orthogonal rotation always produces factors which do 
not correlate by definition, it could be argued that this is an artificial treatment of  
the items. When using oblique (non-orthogonal rotation), the factors produced are 
allowed to correlate and show a better representation of  the underlying data. How-
ever, as in the municipal councillor survey, both oblique factors only correlate with 
r = −0.15, which is quite low. Thus, it can be argued that even without the assump-
tion of  non-correlating factors, the latent variables are virtually independent from 
each other.
Finally, the same factor analysis has been conducted country-by-country to look 
for countries without the detected general pattern or with different background 
dimensions which may reflect distinct country-specific characteristics. This has 
been done to test if  the same results as found in the case of  municipal councillors 
could be detected where a country-by-country factor analysis has shown that the 
general pattern detected for the whole group of  municipal councillors appears in 
almost all countries (although with slight variations in some; see Heinelt 2013a: 
644 ff.). All countries covered by the Second Tier Survey show with slight variations 
the same general pattern detected for the whole group of  second-tier councillors – 
except one, Norway.
In Norway there is no distinct separation of  councillors with a representative or 
a much broader understanding of  democracy. At the second tier of  local govern-
ment in Norway no councillors are clearly in favour of  representative democracy. 
Instead there are two other groups of  councillors: One shows an understanding of  
democracy clearly in line with deliberative democracy because they are not only 
underlining that ‘Political decisions should not only be taken by representative 
bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors.’ They further-
more emphasise that ‘Decisions should be made by reasoning and discussion aim-
ing at reaching consensus rather than by majority voting’ and that ‘Local referenda 
lead to high quality of  public debate.’ The second group shows a less deliberative 
but a participatory understanding of  democracy by giving emphasis to opportunity 
for residents ‘to make their views known before important local decisions are made 
by elected representatives’ as well as to an active and direct participation of  resi-
dents ‘in making important local decisions’. At the same time the second group is 
strongly against an understanding that ‘Apart from voting, citizens should not be 
given the opportunity to influence local government policies.’
Because the Norwegian second-tier councillors do not show the clear distinction 
between the two contrasting notions of  democracy detected for the other countries, 
they will not be considered in the following analysis, which is on the one hand 
focused on the explanation of  these contrasting notions of  democracy and on the 
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other on their relevance for explaining the councillors’ role perception, role behav-
iour and attitudes towards reforms at the local level.
How to explain the different notions  
of  democracy among councillors?
As already mentioned, it has been shown by the analysis of  municipal councillors 
that their notion of  democracy does not depend on country-specific institutional 
structure in which councillors have to act – particularly on the competence of  the 
council and its influence in the local power relationship between it and the mayor 
and the municipal administration (see Heinelt 2013a: 646–648; 2013b: 91–93). 
Instead, it could be shown that municipal councillors’ understanding of  democracy 
depends on personal characteristics. Does this holds true also for second-tier 
councillors?
Do personal characteristics of  second-tier  
councillors matter?
Do personal characteristics of  the councillors affect their ideas about democracy – 
and which personal characteristics might be relevant? As has been shown by the 
study of  municipal councillors the following personal characteristics could 
matter.
Drawing on Karl Mannheim’s reflections on ‘generations’ (1964), age can mat-
ter insofar as specific age-groups have not only had particular experiences in historic-
social contexts but have also interpreted these experiences collectively and 
developed a particular world outlook (including a particular view on human 
nature). These interpretations can have lasting effects when they are reproduced 
through communication within an age-group and in interaction with other age-
groups which had other experiences, leading to a different world outlook. Such a 
perspective on age (or age-groups) can be especially relevant when notions of  
democracy are considered as an expression of  basic beliefs about appropriate 
behaviour and subjective norms.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to consider political orientation as a relevant 
personal characteristic for having different understandings of  democracy when it 
is related to particular views of  human nature (‘psychological frame’) comple-
mented by a particular ‘preconceptual’ or ‘inertial frame’ – as outlined by Barber 
(1984) for the liberal model of  democracy and the form of  participatory 
democracy.
Thus it can also be argued that second-tier councillors’ notions of  democracy 
differ according to their membership in particular political parties, the latter being an 
expression of  their political orientation.
Finally, based on the work of  Barnes et al. (1979) on ‘conventional’ and ‘uncon-
ventional political participation’ it seems reasonable to test if  the gender of  second-
tier councillors matters, because differences of  ‘political action’ between men and 
women were detected by them (see Kaase and Marsh 1979: 173 ff.): Women were 
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overrepresented among the ‘inactives’. However, this was mainly a result of  the 
fact that they were not strongly involved in ‘conventional political participation’ as 
they were overrepresented in ‘unconventional’ political actions which characterised 
the protest movements of  the late 1960 and 1970 in Western democracies.
Testing the personal characteristics of  age, gender and political orientation7 as 
well as membership in particular parties, 8 we find the following tendencies, which 
confirm that there are in general no difference between municipal and second-tier 
councillors.
• The older councillors are, the more they tend to have an understanding of  
democracy in line with the representative model.
• The more councillors tend to the right in the ideology dimension, the more 
they tend to support the idea of  representative democracy; the more they 
tend to the left, the more they are in favour of  participatory democracy.
In the case of  municipal councillors their party membership was considered 
according to the MANIFESTO categories (see Klingemann et al. 2006) and it 
turned out that their self-perception on a political left-right scale corresponds at 
least for members of  conservative parties and of  some left political parties, 
including members of  ecology and (former) communist parties, with a particular 
understanding of  democracy. The latter are more in favour of  participatory 
democracy and do not follow the idea of  liberal democracy, while the opposite 
applies to members of  conservative parties. More or less the same pattern can 
be detected in the case of  second-tier councillors whose party membership has 
been comparatively considered according to the party families distinguished by 
Andersson et al. (2014).While representative democracy is clearly more favoured 
among conservative and Christian democratic second-tier councillors, participa-
tory democracy finds more support among second-tier councillors who are mem-
bers of  green or ecological, special issue as well as (former) communist and 
socialist parties.
Furthermore, it turned out that in line with the findings of  the study carried out 
by Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979 on ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional political 
Table 8.2 Notions of  democracy among councillors by age and political orientation
Notions of  democracy Age Left–right dimension
Municipal 
councillors 
(N = 10,560)
Second-tier 
councillors 
(N = 4,203)
Municipal 
councillors 
(N = 10,664)
Second-tier  
councillors 
(N = 4,187)
Participatory democracy 0.010 −0.074** −0.126** −0.112**
Representative democracy 0.123** 0.065** 0.146** 0.140**
Source: Second Tier Survey
Left–right dimension between 0 = left and 10 = right.
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participation’ and like in the case of  municipal councillors (see Table 8.3 and 
Heinelt 2013a: 650–651; Heinelt 2013b: 93–94):
• female second-tier councillors are slightly more in favour of  participatory 
democracy than their male colleagues;
• male second-tier councillors are more in favour of  representative democracy 
than are female.
Taking a closer look at different age-groups of  municipal councillors (see 
Table 8.4), we see the following: the strongest support for representative democ-
racy can be identified among councillors older than 60 years. By way of  contrast, 
the lowest support for this form of  democracy comes from the younger councillors 
(i.e. those 18–29 and 30–39 years). This finding confirms the relevance of  ‘genera-
tions’ (following Mannheim), and it seems reasonable to argue that the ‘Culture 
Shift in Advanced Industrial Society’ (Inglehart 1990) linked to the social and 
political changes since the late 1960s has had an impact on councillors’ notion of  
democracy – at least in relation to support for representative democracy among 
different age-groups.
Scrutinising support of  the different models of  democracy by different age-
groups of  female and male second-tier councillors (see Table 8.4), it becomes clear 
that there are differences between the age-groups of  both sexes with respect to 
participatory democracy: While the older as well as the youngest male councillors 
(i.e. those older than 60 and younger than 30 years) do not favour this understand-
ing of  democracy, it is particularly supported by female councillors of  the age-
groups 30–39 and 40–49. In relation to representative democracy, there are 
differences between the age-groups of  female and male councillors – except those 
older than 60 years: both female and male councillors older than 60 years are the 
strongest supporters of  representative democracy. This indicates that the social and 
political changes since the late 1960s have had in particular an impact on the 
younger female municipal councillors’ notion of  democracy. These general find-
ings on the support of  the different models of  democracy by different age-groups 
Table 8.3  Notions of  democracy among second-tier councillors by the 
gender of  councillors
Notions of  democracy Gender Mean Standard 
deviation
N
Participatory democracy Male −0.028 1.016 3,411
Female 0.089 0.927 833
Total −0.005 1.000 4,244
Representative democracy Male 0.048 1.000 3,411
Female −0.193 0.974 833
Total 0.000 0.999 4,244
Source: Second Tier Survey
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of  female and male second-tier councillors are the same like those for municipal 
councillors – although some findings for single age-groups of  female and male 
councillors differ (see Heinelt 2013a: 650; Heinelt 2013b: 93–94).
To sum up, there are good reasons to argue that in the case of  councillors at the 
second tier of  local government, as well as of  municipal councillors, their notion 
of  democracy – as an expression of  their basic beliefs about appropriate behaviour 
and their subjective norms – is affected by personal characteristics, namely age, 
political orientation and gender.
Do horizontal power relations between the council, the 
president and the leading bureaucrats matter?
It has been shown that local government systems do not have an impact on munici-
pal councillors’ understanding of  democracy (see (Heinelt 2013a: 446–449, 2013b: 
91–93). It will be test if  this applies also to councillors at the second tier of  local 
government. To control such possible impacts the typology developed by Mourit-
zen and Svara (2002) is brought into play, as it was in the case of  municipal 
councillors.
This typology has been chosen because it specifically focusses on the institution-
ally determined horizontal power relations between councillors, the political leader 
Table 8.4  Notions of  democracy among second-tier councillors 
by age-groups and  gender of  councillors (means)
Gender Age-groups  
(years)
Representative 
democracy
Participatory 
democracy
Male 18–29 −0.028 −0.174
30–39 −0.033 0.119
40–49 −0.005 0.046
50–59 0.025 0.010
60 and older 0.123 −0.108
Total 0.049 −0.021
Female 18–29 −0.145 0.099
30–39 −0.350 0.222
40–49 −0.168 0.247
50–59 −0.254 0.038
60 and older −0.079 0.029
Total −0.196 0.096
Total 18–29 −0.065 −0.101
30–39 −0.093 0.139
40–49 −0.039 0.087
50–59 −0.039 0.023
60 and older 0.093 −0.088
Total 0.001 0.004
Source: Second Tier Survey
8329-0042-PII-008.indd   142 7/10/2015   1:24:55 PM
Notions of  democracy of  councillors 143
(the mayor at the municipal level and the president – or Landrat etc. – at the second 
level of  local government) and the leading bureaucrats of  the local administration, 
and therefore on different options of  councillors to perform a particular role 
according to their understanding of  democracy.9
Mouritzen and Svara start from the following hypothesis: ‘The structural fea-
tures of  municipal government in any specific country reflect a balance or com-
promise among [. . .] three organizing principles: layman rule, political leadership, 
and professionalism’ (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 50–51). Whereas ‘the layman rule 
means that citizens elected for political office should be involved effectively and 
intensively in the making of  decisions’ (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 51; italics by 
the authors), the notion of  political leadership implies the concept of  politicians ‘pro-
moting value choices and feeding energy and passion into policy systems’ (Mourit-
zen and Svara 2002: 52). Finally, professionalism rests on the following crucial 
distinction: ‘As politicians respond to demands, professionals respond to and seek 
to address needs’ (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 53). Based on these considerations, 
Mouritzen and Svara distinguish four types of  local government systems in respect 
to the horizontal power relations between councillors and the other local key 
actors:
• the ‘strong mayor form’
• the ‘committee-leader form’
• the ‘collective form’
• the ‘council-manager form’.
Regarding the second tier of  local government, horizontal power relations can 
be characterised (according to Heinelt and Bertrana 2011: 319–322 and my own 
classification based on information of  the national teams involved in the survey) as 
follows:
• in Croatia, France, most parts of  Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania 
and Spain by a strong political leader form;
• in Sweden by the committee leader form;
• in Belgium, the Czech Republic, England, the German federal state of  
Hesse, and Poland by the collective form;
• in Norway by the council-manager form.
It can be assumed that councillors acting in a committee-leader form, i.e. in the 
Swedish landstings, are in favour of  representative democracy: elected politicians 
play an important role in this form of  local government system, as the ‘political 
leader may have responsibility for some executive functions but others will rest with 
collegiate bodies, that is, standing committees composed of  elected politicians, and 
with the CEO [chief  executive officer; H.H.]’ (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 56).10
The same can be expected for the collective form, to be found in Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, England, the German federal state of  Hesse, and Poland, since 
in this kind of  local government system the ‘decision centre is one collegiate body, 
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the executive committee that is responsible for all executive functions. The execu-
tive committee consists of  locally elected politicians and the mayor, who presides’ 
(Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 56). Those councillors who are not members of  the 
executive committee may be or feel excluded from some decisions. However, not 
only the elected members of  the executive committee but also the other council-
lors play an important role in this form of  local government as they are affiliated 
with the members of  the executive committee through their parties or political 
groups, and it can be assumed that they agree with the concept of  representative 
democracy.
In contrast, in an institutional setting characterised by a strong political leader 
form, i.e. in a local government system where an elected political leader ‘controls 
the majority of  the city council and is legally and in actuality in full charge of  all 
executive functions’ (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 55), the influence of  (ordinary) 
councillors is limited, and one can assume that they do not focus on a role deter-
mined by the concept of  representative democracy. Instead, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that they support the idea of  enhancing the realm of  democracy 
beyond the core of  the local governmental structures through emphasising par-
ticipatory democracy; this could increase their limited power in relation to the 
elected political leader, who controls the council as well as the administration. 
This applies to the rest of  the councillors in the countries studied – except 
Norway.
Norway is the only country in the sample with the council-manager form where all 
‘executive functions are in the hands of  a professional administrator [. . .] who is 
appointed by the [. . .] council, which has general authority over policy but is 
restricted from involvement in administrative matters’ (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 
56). As the position of  the council as a representative body is in the council-manager 
form (the strongest among the four types of  local government systems distinguished 
by Mouritzen and Svara), it can be assumed that councillors acting in this kind of  
system are strongly oriented towards an understanding of  democracy in line with 
the ‘liberal model’. However, as has been shown in the last section, Norwegian 
second-tier councillors do not clearly favour this model of  democracy but perceive 
democracy in a way not compatible with the two distinct notions to be found in 
the rest of  the countries (which is the reason why Norwegian second-tier council-
lors are not considered in this chapter).
The findings for municipal councillors (see Table 8.5 and Heinelt 2013a: 646–
649; Heinelt 2013b: 91–93) indicate that at this level of  local government, the 
institutionally determined power relations between councillors, the mayor and 
the leading bureaucrats of  the municipal administration do not have an impact 
on the distribution of  a particular understanding of  democracy among council-
lors: there are no clear differences between the two undoubtedly divergent types 
of  local government systems (namely the strong mayor and the council-manager 
form). Furthermore, there are divergent patterns between the committee-leader 
and the collective form which can hardly be explained by the institutionally 
determined function of  the council in terms of  horizontal power relations since 
they are rather similar.
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The results are different for the second tier of  local government. They are meet-
ing more the hypotheses formulated before on the notion of  democracy among 
councillors acting in the different local government systems. This applies on the 
one hand to second-tier councillors acting in a local government system character-
ised by the strong political leader form. In this case second-tier councillors are not 
only favouring participatory democracy more than representative democracy; they 
are clearly less in favour of  representative democracy, which can be related to the 
relatively week institutional role of  the council in this form of  local government 
system. On the other hand, second-tier councillors acting in an institutional setting 
determined by the committee-leader form – which gives them much more influ-
ence – are clearly favouring representative democracy and opposing a stronger 
participatory involvement of  citizens. This is not the case for councillors who are 
acting in a collective form of  government at the second tier of  local government. 
This form of  local government may give them influence as members of  a repre-
sentative body as they are usually affiliated with the members of  the executive 
committee through their parties or political group’s second-tier councillors. How-
ever, second-tier councillors from parts of  Europe with a collective form of  govern-
ment are more in favour of  participatory governance and more or less indifferent 
regarding representative democracy (shown by a mean value of  −0.001). This may 
indicate that they feel – like their colleagues from countries with a strong leader 
form – somehow detached from the executive committee, consisting of  some 
locally elected politicians, which is clearly the power centre in this form of  local 
government system.
Table 8.5  Notions of  democracy among second-tier councillors by local government systems 
according to the typology of  Mouritzen and Svara
Forms of  local government 
systems
Participatory 
governance
Representative 
democracy
Strong political leader form Means 0.018 −0.045
N 2,849
Standard deviation 1.027 1.010
Committee-leader form Means −0.327 0.618
N 211
Standard deviation 1.029 0.965
Collective form Means 0.014 −0.001
N 1,284
Standard deviation 0.923 0.950
Total Means 0.000
N 4,345
Standard deviation 1.000
Source: Second Tier Survey
The values for ‘participatory democracy’ and ‘representative democracy’ are the seven factor scores from 
the factor analysis.
8329-0042-PII-008.indd   145 7/15/2015   2:36:22 PM
146 H. Heinelt
To sum up, in contrast to municipal councillors where no relation could be 
detected between their notion of  democracy and the horizontal power relation at 
the municipal level of  local government, such a relation can be shown in case of  
councillors acting at the second tier of  local government:
• Those councillors acting in a council with limited power due to the institu-
tionally determined strong role of  a political leader (the president or Landrat) 
are not in favour of  representative democracy and emphasise (although to 
a low degree) a more participatory form of  democracy;
• The same applies to a limited degree also to the collective form in which the 
executive committee consisting of  some locally elected politicians is clearly 
the power centre;
• Councillors acting under the institutional setting of  the committee-leader in 
which the council as a representative body is a much stronger organ are 
clearly strong in favour of  representative democracy. In this case councillors 
also oppose a participatory involvement of  citizens in politics.
How to explain these findings? Can they be related to the perception of  council-
lors that policy making in councils at the second tier of  local government is more 
spatially detached from citizenry than at the municipal level where citizens have 
more opportunities to participate directly in decisions and where councillors can 
act more effectively together with citizens to achieve a particular goal? How to 
prove such an explanation? We will see if  the attitudes and behaviour of  councillors 
considered in the following section give evidence for such an explanation.
Attitudes and behaviour of  councillors at the 
second tier of  local government in relation to their 
understanding of  democracy as an expression of   
basic beliefs and subjective norms
Role orientation
To identify the role orientation of  second-tier councillors the following question was 
asked: ‘How important do you believe the following tasks are for a councillor to 
perform?’11 The possible answers (see Table 8.6) where chosen to see whether the 
councillors have a more inward-looking role orientation focussing on items such as moni-
toring the achievement of  county strategic policies and defining the main goals of  
county activity, or a more outward-looking role orientation related to items like mediating 
conflicts in the local society, promoting the views and interests of  particular groups 
in the local society, publicising debate on local issues before decisions are taken and 
interacting with local people by explaining council decisions to the citizens.
It was assumed that councillors with an inward-looking role orientation are not only 
focussed on activities taking place within the organisational setting of  the second 
level of  local government, but are also more favourable to the concept of  repre-
sentative democracy. By contrast, councillors with an outward-looking role orientation 
can be seen as councillors focussed not primarily on activities taking place within 
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Table 8.6 Role orientation of  municipal councillors
Municipal councillors Second-tier councillors
Outward-
looking role 
orientation
Inward-
looking role 
orientation
Outward-
looking role 
orientation
Inward-
looking role 
orientation
Controlling the 
municipal activity
0.802 Taking part in 
monitoring the 
achievement of  county 
strategic policies
0.844
Defining the main 
goals of  the 
municipal activity
0.780 Taking part in defining 
the main goals of  
county activity
0.839
Mediating conflicts in 
the local society
0.667 Mediating conflicts in 
the local society
0.698
Promoting the views 
and interests of  
women in the local 
society
0.815 Promoting the views 
and interests of  
women
0.670
Promoting the views and 
interests of  minorities 
in the local society
0.820 Promoting the views 
and interests of  
minorities
0.654
Creating consensus for 
implementing council 
decisions
0.652
Reinforcing the 
executive
Supporting the 
executive
0.534
Publicising the debate 
on local issues before 
decisions are taken
Publicising debate 
on local issues before 
decisions are taken
0.518
Representing the 
requests and issues 
emerging from the 
local society
0.507 Representing the 
requests and issues 
emerging from local 
society
0.509
Explaining decisions 
of  the council to 
the citizens
0.523 Explaining decisions 
of  the council to the 
citizens
Taking part in 
implementing policies 
and projects of  the 
county
Taking part in 
controlling the executive
Taking part in 
coordinating economic 
development
Implementing the 
programme of  my 
political party/
movement
Taking part in 
implementing the 
program of  the political 
party/ movement
Source: Second Tier Survey
Varimax with Kaiser normalisation. Converged after three iterations.
KMO = 0.814 for municipal councillors and = 0.839 for second-tier councillors
8329-0042-PII-008.indd   147 7/10/2015   1:24:56 PM
148 H. Heinelt
the organisational setting of  the second level of  local government, but on an inter-
action with and involvement in local society, which is associated with the concept 
of  participatory democracy.
By factor analysis, two components can be identified which indicate the exis-
tence of  councillors with either an inward or outward looking role orientation (see 
Table 8.6). Other tasks (based on answers to the questionnaire) – namely, explain-
ing decisions of  the council to the citizens, implementing the programme of  their 
political party – are not loading on the two detected factors identified, which means 
that they are not clearly linked to councillors with either an inwards or outward 
looking role orientation. Table 8.6 shows also that these results are more or less the 
same as a similar analysis of  the responses of  municipal councillors (although the 
questions were slightly different), except for two tasks: interaction with citizens by 
explaining decisions of  the council formed a part of  the outward-looking role 
orientation of  municipal councillors whereas this shows a factor load below the 
threshold of  < 0.5 for second-tier councillors. Furthermore, representing requests 
and issues emerging from the local society played a role for an inward-looking 
orientation of  municipal councillors; this factor loaded positively with respect to 
an outward-looking role orientation of  second-tier councillors. However, it has 
to be emphasised that in both of  these exceptions the factor loads are rather low 
so that they are not considered as crucial.
In seeking correlations between these groups of  second-tier councillors and their 
notion of  democracy (see Table 8.7), only low correlations can be observed between 
a representative understanding of  democracy and both role orientations, but there 
is a significant correlation (0.357) between a broad participatory notion of  democ-
racy and an outward-looking role orientation. This is consistent with the assumption 
that councillors with this kind of  understanding of  democracy emphasise interac-
tion with the local society. Accordingly, they are less oriented towards the organisa-
tional setting of  the second level of  local government (as indicated by a correlation 
coefficient of  −0.005). In general, these results are similar to those of  municipal 
councillors. However, there is one minor exception (indicated by a correlation coef-
ficient of  0.097): For municipal councillors with a more participatory understanding 
of  democracy also an orientation to the city hall is of  some relevance.
Table 8.7  Correlations between the role orientation of  councillors and their notion of  
democracy
Outward-looking 
roleorientation
Inward-looking 
roleorientation
Participatory democracy Municipal councillors 0.288** 0.097**
Second-tier councillors 0.357** 0.005
Representative democracy Municipal councillors 0.046** 0.026*
Second-tier councillors −0.028** −0.032*
Source: Second Tier Survey
* Pearson’s r; p < 0.05. N = 10,312 for municipal councillors and N = 4,006 for second-tier councillors.
** Pearson’s r; p < 0.01. N = 10,312 for municipal councillors and N = 4,006 for second-tier councillors.
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Role behaviour
Similar issues have been listed as possible answers to a question by which the role 
behaviour can be detected – namely: ‘In your experience as a councillor, how would 
you rate your influence regarding the following tasks?’12 Councillors were asked to 
define their own contribution regarding these tasks in particular – and not just to 
consider how important these tasks are for a councillor.
A factor analysis shows two background components behind the responses of  
the second-tier councillors (see Table 8.8).
Table 8.8 Role behaviour of  councillors
Municipal councillors Second-tier councillors
Outward-
looking role 
behaviour
Inward-
looking role 
behaviour
Outward-
looking role 
behaviour
Inward-
looking role 
behaviour
Defining the main goals 
of  the municipal 
activity
0.815 Defining the main goals 
of  county activity
0.817
Monitoring the 
achievement of  county 
strategic policies
0.799
Controlling the 
municipal activity
0.762 Controlling the 
executive
0.707
Reinforcing the 
executive
0.666 Supporting the 
executive
0.677
Publicising the debate 
on local issues before 
decisions are taken
0.547 Publicising the debate 
on local issues before 
decisions are taken
0.815
Explaining decisions 
of  the council to the 
citizens
0.567 Explaining decisions 
of  the council to 
citizens
0.789
Representing requests 
and issues emerging 
from the local society
0.581 Representing requests 
and issues emerging 
from local society
0.622
Implementing the 
program of  my 
political party/
movement
Implementing the 
program of  my 
political party/
movement
0.544
Promoting the views and 
interests of  minorities 
in the local society
0.869
Promoting the views and 
interests of  women in 
the local society
0.840
In mediating conflicts 
in the local society
0.558
Source: Second Tier Survey
Varimax with Kaiser normalisation. Converged after three iterations. KMO = 0.859 for municipal 
councillors and 0.855 for county councillors.
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Accordingly, an inward-looking role behaviour of  second-tier councillors is not 
only characterised by defining the main goals of  county activity and monitoring 
the achievement of  county strategic policies (as emphasised by second-tier council-
lors in respect to role orientation (see the last section) but also by controlling and 
supporting the executive. An outward-looking role behaviour of  second-tier coun-
cillors is expressed by emphasising particularly publicising the debate on local 
issues before decisions are taken, explaining council decisions to citizens, and rep-
resenting requests and issues emerging from local society. Here differences can be 
detected in comparison to municipal councillors: for them, all of  these tasks (fac-
tors) loaded positively in respect to an inward-looking role behaviour. However, for 
an interpretation of  this finding it is important to recognise that municipal council-
lors could respond to quite different statements (see Table 8.8). Furthermore, it has 
to be mentioned that the task (factors) implementing the program of  her or his 
political party or movement loads positively in respect to an outward-looking role 
behaviour of  second-tier councillors, which was not the case for municipal council-
lors. Yet, this finding should not be taken too seriously because the factor load is 
quite low.
Looking at correlations between the role orientation and role behaviour of  sec-
ond-tier councillors, it becomes clear that a stated inward-looking role orientation 
is consistent with an inward-looking role behaviour. This applies also to an out-
ward-looking role orientation and behaviour for which the correlation coefficient 
is rather high (0.360). Nevertheless, also the correlation coefficient for an outward-
looking role orientation and an inward-looking role behaviour is quite high (0.173) 
which indicates that also second-tier councillors with such a role orientation do not 
neglect the tasks related to an inward-looking role behaviour.
These findings for the relation of  role orientation and role behaviour of  second-
tier councillors are similar to those of  municipal councillors, although in their case 
the correlations between either an outward or an inward looking role orientation 
and an a respective role behaviour is stronger. This may indicate that second-tier 
councillors with an outward-looking role orientation in particular find it more dif-
ficult than municipal councillors with the same role orientation to give more 
emphasis to interactions with citizens or actors outside the county house, which 
can be seen as a result of  the larger distance of  the second tier of  local government 
Table 8.9 Correlations between the role orientation and role behaviour of  councillors
Inward-looking 
role behaviour
Outward-looking 
role behaviour
Outward looking role orientation Municipal councillors 0.069** 0.582**
Second-tier councillors 0.173** 0.360**
Inward looking role orientation Municipal councillors 0.288** −0.016
Second-tier councillors 0.151** −0.008
Source: Second Tier Survey
** Pearson’s r; p < 0.01. N = 10,527 for municipal councillors and N = 4,053 for second-tier councillors
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to the ‘life world’ (Habermas 1987) of  laypeople. This gives some evidence to the 
explanation that the formal role of  the council determined by local government 
systems matters more for the questions answered by second tier councillors than 
by municipal councillors. As argued, second-tier councillors may perceive that 
policy making in councils at the second tier of  local government is more spatially 
detached from citizenry than at the municipal level, where citizens have more 
opportunities to participate directly in decisions and where councillors can act 
more effectively together with citizens to achieve a particular goal.
This is confirmed by the fact that the correlation between the role behaviour 
of  municipal councillors and their notion of  democracy is much clearer than the 
correlation between their notion of  democracy and their role orientation (see 
Table 8.10). In respect to their role behaviour, there is not only a significant cor-
relation (r = 0.279) between a broad participatory notion of  democracy and an 
interaction with local society, but also a significant (although relatively low) cor-
relation (r = 0.195) between a representative understanding of  democracy and 
behaviour focussed on city hall. This is different in the case of  second-tier council-
lors. Both the correlation between second-tier councillors emphasising participa-
tory democracy and an outward-looking role behaviour and councillors favouring 
representative democracy and stating an inward-looking role behaviour are lower. 
Nevertheless, the significant correlation coefficients in both cases (0.181 and 
0.143) point in the expected direction.
To test if  the role behaviour of  councillors is consistent with their contacts with 
particular local actors – namely on the one hand with actors acting in city hall or 
the county house and on the other with actors located outside – the frequency of  
contacts with actors listed in Table 8.11 has been considered. Factor analysis lead-
ing to two background components again indicates differences between councillors 
(although the actors listed in the questionnaire for municipal and second-tier coun-
cillors differed slightly). However, these differences are not the same in the case of  
municipal and second-tier councillors. Municipal councillors clearly show a dif-
ferentiation between inward- and outward-oriented councillors – namely those 
who have either frequent contact with (a) the mayor, members of  the executive 
board, committee leaders, the president of  the council, the chief  executive officer 
Table 8.10  Correlations between the role behaviour of  councillors and their notion of  
democracy
Outward-looking 
role behaviour
Inward-looking 
role behaviour
Participatory democracy Municipal councillors 0.279** 0.015
Second-tier councillors 0.181** −0.071**
Representative democracy Municipal councillors 0.053** 0.195**
Second-tier councillors 0.024 0.143**
Source: Second Tier Survey
** Pearson’s r; p < 0.01. N = 10,402 for municipal councillors and N = 3,711 for second-tier councillors
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as well as civil servants of  the municipality or with (b) local associations, initiatives 
and social movements as well as representatives of  local union, business organisa-
tions and journalists.
The frequency of  contacts with members of  their own as well as other party 
groups and the leaders of  their own local party organisation do not load on either 
of  the two components, which indicates that they play a similar role for both groups 
of  municipal councillors. Such a clear differentiation between inward- and out-
ward-oriented councillors cannot be detected for second-tier councillors. Neverthe-
less, there is also among second-tier councillors a group who has quite frequent 
contact with the business community and other local associations, groups or move-
ments as well as with the Church and religious groups which indicate that they are 
outward oriented. However, they have – in contrast to outward oriented municipal 
councillors – at the same time frequent contact with civil servants and the chief  
executive officer of  the county administration as well as with the county president 
and the president of  the council. This finding indicates that the group of  outward-
oriented second-tier councillors try to bring in interests of  societal actors and to 
mediate between them and the mentioned administrative and political key actors 
at the second tier of  local government. There is also a group of  second-tier council-
lors who are inward-oriented insofar as their contacts are centred around party 
politics and political representation in the machinery of  the second tier of  local 
government – namely the committees of  the council and (where existing) the exec-
utive board. For this group of  second-tier councillors, outward-oriented contacts 
are (with a relatively low factor load) show only with representatives of  trade unions 
which may indicate a traditional local neo-corporatist style of  policy making.13
In particular, the differences between outward-oriented municipal and second-
tier councillors indicate that it is easier for municipal councillors than for second-
tier councillors to concentrate on frequent contacts with organisations of  minorities 
and women as well as voluntary associations (see also the relatively high factor loads 
for these kinds of  actors) and looking at the same time for good (frequent) contacts 
with people acting in local government. The latter have not only much more fre-
quent contact with actors from the business sector than municipal councillors but 
also with people within the county administration and political key actors at the 
second level. This points to their role as interest intermediators. Such a role could 
be more necessary for societal actors in respect to the upper level of  local govern-
ment because it may be not so easy for them to get access to this level of  local 
government due to the larger spatial distance to this level than to the municipal 
level.
High correlations between the role behaviour of  municipal councillors and the 
frequency of  their contacts to the listed actors demonstrate that their stated role 
behaviour is consistent with their contacts with particular local actors (see 
Table 8.12): those municipal councillors who have an outward-looking role behav-
iour also have frequent outward-oriented contacts (r = 0.408), and those with an 
inward-looking role behaviour also have frequent inward-oriented contacts 
(r = 0.416). In the case of  second-tier councillors such a correlation cannot be 
shown. As those second-tier councillors with frequent contact to actors from 
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outside the county house have also frequent contacts with administrative and politi-
cal key actors at the second tier of  local government, it is not surprising that the 
correlation coefficient for a stated outward-looking role behaviour and frequent 
inward-oriented contacts is even higher (r = 0.182) than those for a stated outward-
looking role behaviour and frequent outward-oriented contacts (r = 0.106).14
Attitudes of  councillors towards reforms at the local level
The attitudes of  councillors towards political reforms at the local level can be 
determined by looking at their answers to the question of  how desirable or undesir-
able some of  the reforms are that have been introduced in local government in 
different European countries – irrespective of  whether such reforms have or have 
not been introduced in their country (see Table 8.13).
In the case of  municipal as well as of  second-tier councillors there are some who 
favour those reforms at the local level, through which wider participation of  citizens 
can be achieved going beyond simply voting in periodical elections or occasionally on 
referenda. These councillors support citizen consultation and forms of  co-decision, 
wherein citizens can discuss and make binding decisions on certain local issues. Fur-
thermore, this group of  municipal as well as of  second-tier councillors favours the 
devolution of  responsibilities to neighbourhoods, which clearly goes beyond the realm 
of  representative and direct democracy. Finally, there is also clearly more support in 
this group for the transfer of  scrutiny power over municipal/county services to user 
boards and – in the case of  second-tier councillors (as only they were asked about it) – 
on participatory budgeting. The only differences between second-tier and municipal 
councillors with such a reform perspective are that the latter favour advisory referenda 
whereas the former support the idea of  binding referenda. However, the factor loads 
in both cases are so low that these differences are not considered further.
There are also municipal as well as second-tier councillors who are more in 
favour of  reforms focusing on electoral efficiency by direct elections of  mayors and 
county presidents, the reduction of  council members and – in the case second-tier 
councillors (as again only they were asked about it) – a recall of  the county presi-
dent by referendum.
Table 8.12  Correlations between the role behaviour of  councillors and the frequency of  their 
contacts to local actors
Frequent outward-
oriented contacts
Frequent inward-
oriented contacts
Outward-looking role behaviour Municipal councillors 0.408** −0.001
Second-tier councillors 0.106** 0.182**
Inward-looking role behaviour Municipal councillors 0.125** 0.416**
Second-tier councillors 0.255** 0.182**
Source: Second Tier Survey
** Pearson’s r; p < 0.01. N = 4,837 for municipal councillors and N = 1,156 for second-tier councillors
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In some respects Table 8.14 reveals correlations between these two different atti-
tudes of  councillors towards reforms at the local level and their notion of  democracy. 
However, in the case of  municipal as well as second-tier councillors, the correlation 
is clearly more significant between a broad participatory understanding of  democ-
racy and attitudes to reform that aim at a broader and more direct participation of  
citizens (r = 0.546 and r = 0.586). Nevertheless, municipal as well as second-tier 
councillors are also (though to a much lesser degree) in favour of  reducing the num-
ber of  council members, the direct election of  the political head of  the executive (i.e. 
the mayor or the county president) and – in the case of  second tier councillors (where 
this reform option has been mentioned) – of  initiating the recall of  county presidents 
by referendum. For municipal councillors, the correlation between a representative 
notion of  democracy and broader and more direct participation of  citizens is nega-
tive at a low level of  significance (r = −0.110) and positively significant at a quite low 
level regarding strengthening of  electoral efficiency (r = 0.090). Nevertheless, these 
results support the assumption that basic beliefs and subjective norms of  a person – as 
they underlay a particular understanding of  democracy – influence councillors’ atti-
tudes to different options for reform, which are either centred on an increase in 
electoral efficiency or a broader involvement of  citizens in policy making beyond 
casting a vote in periodical elections. However, in case of  second-tier councillors with 
an understanding of  democracy in line with the liberal model the data are a bid 
puzzling: the negative significance (r = −0.194) in respect to reforms aiming at broad-
ening citizen participation fit to this notion of  democracy.
Conclusion
The analysis has shown that not only municipal councillors (as have been shown 
on previous studies) but also councillors acting at the second tier of  local govern-
ment have different understandings of  what democracy means, and further that 
these differences can be related clearly on the one hand to a model of  representative 
democracy and on the other to a model of  participatory democracy in which the 
Table 8.14  Correlations between councillors’ attitudes towards reforms at the local level and 
their notion of  democracy
Reform attitudes 
aiming at a broader and 
more direct participation 
of  citizens
Reform attitudes 
aiming at a 
strengthening of  
electoral efficiency
Participatory democracy Municipal councillors 0.546** 0.198**
Second-tier councillors 0.586** 0.206**
Representative democracy Municipal councillors −0.110** 0.090**
Second-tier councillors −0.194** −0.093**
Source: Second Tier Survey
** Pearson’s r; p < 0.01. N = 10,283 for municipal councillors and N = 3,825 for second-tier councillors
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individual’s right to participate in general elections alone is perceived as insufficient 
for democratic self-determination. In this model, democracy beyond the core of  
the governmental structures at the local level is emphasised. Furthermore, it has 
been proven that the role perception and behaviour as well as the attitudes towards 
reforms at the local level of  municipal and second-tier councillors depend (although 
to different degrees) on the councillors’ notion of  democracy as an expression of  
their basic beliefs about appropriate behaviour and subjective norms.
It could be shown that the councillors’ notion of  democracy from both tiers is 
affected by personal characteristics – namely age, political orientation and gender. 
However, in contrast to municipal councillors, second-tier councillors’ notion of  
democracy shows relationships to the power relation between the council and other 
local key actors determined by local government systems. This may indicate that 
second-tier councillors with a broader participatory understanding of  democracy 
and a corresponding outward-looking role orientation find it more difficult than 
municipal councillors to actually give more emphasis to interactions with citizens 
or actors outside the county house, which can be seen as a result of  the larger 
distance of  the second tier of  local government to the ‘life world’ (Habermas 1987) 
of  laypeople. Such an interpretation is confirmed by the fact that there is a signifi-
cant correlation between a broad participatory notion of  democracy and interac-
tion with the local society (i.e. outward-looking role behaviour) in the case of  
second-tier councillors, but this correlation is much lower than for municipal coun-
cillors. In fact, although those second-tier councillors who have quite frequent 
contacts with the business community and other local associations, groups or move-
ments as well as to the Church and to religious groups have – in contrast to out-
ward-oriented municipal councillors – at the same time frequent contact with civil 
servants and the chief  executive officer of  the county administration as well as the 
county president and the president of  the councillor. This finding indicates that 
the group of  outward-oriented second-tier councillors try to bring in interests of  
societal actors and to mediate between them and the mentioned administrative 
and political key actors at the second tier of  local government. This points to their 
role as interest intermediators. Such a role could be more necessary for societal 
actors in respect to the upper level of  local government because it may be not so 
easy for them to get access to this level of  local government due to the larger spatial 
distance to this level than to the municipal level.
Notes
1 I am grateful for the support and comments of  Björn Egner.
2 See for instance Habermas (1992: 349–353); Habermas 1996b; Pierre and Peters (2000: 
137–141); or Cohen (2007) and for early debates Pateman (1970) and Pitkin (1967) (the 
latter especially for the mandate-independence controversy).
3 The question in the second-tier questionnaire was: ‘How much do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements?’ and the respondents could ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, nei-
ther agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’.
  Instead, the municipal councillors were asked the following question: ‘People have 
different ideas about how local democracy should function. Please indicate how impor-
tant for local democracy you feel the following requirements are.’
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4 The question in the second-tier questionnaire was again: ‘How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements?’ and the respondent could again ‘strongly agree’, 
‘agree’, neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’.
  In the questionnaire for municipal councillors, the first two statements were possible 
answers to the question: ‘People have different ideas about how local democracy should 
function. Please indicate how important for local democracy you feel the following 
requirements are.’ The next two statements in this questionnaire were possible answers 
to the question: ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’ The 
last two statements were not included in the questionnaire for municipal councillors.
5 For reason of  readability, factor loadings < 0.5 based on the results of  the Second Tier 
Survey are displayed in Table 8.1 only and not in the rest of  this article.
6 Even if  Norwegian councillors are not considered – which is reasonable as will be shown 
below – the factor load remains rather low (and under the threshold of  a factor load 
< 0.5 otherwise used in this paper; see Note 5).
  How to interpret the finding? It can be simply a result of  a misunderstanding insofar 
as local elections have been understood by the respondents only as municipal elections 
and not also as elections at the second tier of  local government (which was meant by 
those who constructed the questionnaire). Such an interpretation of  this statement and 
a respective response by those councillors at the second level of  local government 
emphasising representative democracy would simply mean that they do not feel bound 
to municipal but only to elections for the council at the second tier of  local government 
in which they are a member. This would be consistent with their understanding of  
democracy. However, we cannot be absolutely sure whether or not such a misunder-
standing lead to the presented finding.
7 Councillors were asked to respond to the following question: ‘There is often talk about 
a left-right dimension in politics. Where would you place yourself  on a left-right 
dimension?’
8 As in the case of  municipal councillors, a number of  other variables were also tested. 
However, neither the number of  years in office nor the membership in a party (or not) 
play a significant role with respect to the notion of  democracy of  councillors at the 
second tier of  local government (all absolute values of  r < 0.15). The same applies for 
whether or not the councillor had been elected as a candidate of  a list of  a national 
party, of  a local list or as an individual, or as independent candidate.
9 For other typologies of  local government systems and their conceptual weaknesses and 
strengths, see the overview in Heinelt and Hlepas (2006).
10 The quotations of  Mouritzen and Svara (2002) refer to the municipal level here as well 
as in the following.
11 Municipal councillors were asked the question: ‘In your experience as a councillor, how 
important are the following tasks for you as a councillor?’
12 Municipal councillors were asked the following question: ‘In your experience as a coun-
cillor, how would you define your contribution regarding the following tasks?’
13 The frequency of  contacts between second-tier councillors to journalist do not load on 
both components.
14 Instead, it is puzzling that a stated inward looking role behaviour is correlating more 
strongly with outward oriented frequent contacts (r=.255) than inward oriented frequent 
contacts (r=.182**).
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Introduction
Although the role and power of  national political parties in local government varies 
across Europe, the organisation and activities of  parties and the role they play in 
local government has an influence on the way councillors act as local representa-
tives, decision makers and governors of  their localities (see Ware 1996; Back 2003; 
Copus 2000, 2004; Leach 2006; Guerin and Kerrouche 2008). Indeed, national 
political parties interpose themselves between the councillor and the citizen and 
make demands on the loyalty and representative focus of  the councillor, drawing 
him or her away from a direct link with the citizen (Glassberg 1981; Cole 2002; 
Copus 2004 and Delwit et al. 2007). Moreover, national political parties impose 
disciplinary demands on their councillors to ensure they act in unified, coherent 
blocs speaking and voting together. In addition, feelings of  party loyalty and the 
strength of  attachment councillors have to their parties also ensures that they focus 
on it as a point of  political reference. Party discipline and party loyalty places the 
party at the forefront of  the councillor’s attention and generates a tension between 
the citizen and community and the councillor (see Eulau and Whalke 1959; Fallend 
et al. 2006 and Getimis and Hlepas 2013 and Aars et al., Chapter 6 in this book).
The presence of  national political parties in local government not only inter-
cedes between the councillor and the citizen in the representative–represented 
relationship (Pitkin 1972), but also ensures that the national party political battle 
lines and operating practices also find their way into council chambers (see Reiser 
and Holtmann 2008). As we shall see in this chapter, national political parties are 
the dominant players in some of  our sample country settings, while in others they 
are less dominant, but are certainly present. Despite their strength in those local 
government systems where they are dominant, national political parties have been 
experiencing a period of  ‘party decline’ and their legitimacy as the mainstay of  
democratic politics has been brought into question (Blondel 2002; Drummond 
2006). Party decline has been evidenced as the shift within parties from a large-
scale mass-membership base to a professionalised organisational arrangement 
where full-time politicians speak directly to the voter through the media, and party 
members are required to act more as foot soldiers than policy makers (see Seyd and 
Whiteley 2004; Ringkjob 2004; Blyth and Katz 2005).
The importance of political 
parties in county government
Colin Copus, David Sweeting and Thom Oliver
9
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The concept of  party decline reflects the marginalisation of  party members 
when compared to leading politicians, locally and nationally, and when compared 
to senior party managers who are not elected politicians. Indeed, party members 
become unnecessary as a channel to the electorate for views, currents of  opinions 
and shifting attitudes among electorate and are replaced by professional polling, 
focus groups or other market-driven attitudinal tests. Party members are required 
just to pay their subscriptions to fund the party and in some states even that role 
has been replaced by state funding or large donations (see Goul Andersen and Hoff  
2001; Heidar and Saglie 2003; Wheeler 2005; Bäck et al. 2005; Wilks-Heeg and 
Clayton 2006). Party decline is a local as well as a national phenomenon with local 
power becoming increasingly located within small units of  the local organisation 
of  national parties and particularly within the council party group and council 
leadership (Bäck 2000; Fredriksson 2003; Erlingsson 2008). Given the notion that 
party decline affects parties at all levels of  organisation and activity, we are left with 
this question: Can we reasonably expect to see councillors becoming increasingly 
distant from the local membership of  their national party and operating with scant 
attention or link to the local units of  national parties?
The question about the effect of  party decline at the local level becomes all 
the more pertinent when thinking about the upper tier of  local government – the 
county council – because of  the greater size of  county government, the scale of  
its activities, the nature of  the services and policy areas covered by counties, and 
the distance between the location of  party units and members of  the county 
council. We could again reasonably expect that county councillors will be among 
the more professionalised of  councillors (Reynaert 2012; Verhelst and Kerrouche 
2012; Verhelst et al. 2013) and as a consequence not be reliant on their party, be 
poorly connected to its local institutions, and be resistant to being influenced by 
local party institutions and party members. Indeed, we might also expect county 
councillors to act more as trustees or politicos than delegates of  the electorate or 
delegates of  the party and party loyalists (Eulau et al. 1959; Karlsson 2013a, 
2013b).
The chapter examines the organisation, activities and impact of  party politics 
on the role of  the county councillor as an elected representative. It will examine 
the way county councillors respond to party group demands for their loyalty and 
the way in which they act in a coherent and disciplined fashion in the conduct of  
local government business (Gyford, et al. 1989; Stoker 1991). The chapter will 
explore, using attitudinal data, how county councillors balance party pressures with 
the representation of  local communities. It will address this question: If  local 
democracy is party controlled and, as councillors (more often than not) belong to 
a national political party (see Bäck, 2003; Guerin and Kerrouche 2008), how do 
they balance the best interests of  their voters and the parties of  which they are a 
member (Copus 2004)?
The chapter will examine the relationship that county councillors have with 
their parties to comment on the applicability of  the concept of  party decline in 
local government. It will also explore how county councillors manage the tension 
generated by their membership in a national political party and the demands it 
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makes for their loyalty and disciplined action with the demands generated by, and 
the articulated opinions of, the communities that county councillors represent. It 
will do this by exploring the attitudes of  councillors towards the party of  which 
they are a member and the demands of  community representation and engage-
ment. In so doing the chapter will examine how county councillors as members of  
national political parties act as representatives, decision makers and governors at 
the county level, and the effects that party membership has on county-level local 
representation. The next section examines in more detail the notion of  party 
decline as it relates to an understanding of  the relationship between county coun-
cillors and the local units of  their national parties. The following section explores 
the findings of  the research data from our European sample. The chapter con-
cludes by setting out what the research findings mean for party decline and local 
representative democracy.
Party decline and county government
The involvement of  national political parties in local government is a European-
wide phenomenon (Nielsen 2001; Petersson 2005; Soininen and Etzler 2006; Woli-
netz 2007; Reiser and Holtmann 2008) and – much as at the national level – parties 
have a role in the recruitment and selection of  candidates, supporting and organis-
ing election campaigns, providing political space within which people of  the same 
views can explore political and policy issues and develop solutions, and then bring-
ing those solutions together with a range of  policy ideas to present to the local 
electorate. Indeed, political parties have long been seen as an essential element for 
the effective functioning of  modern representative democracy (Schattschneider 
1942; Montero and Gunther 2002).
The organisation and activities of  national political parties in local government 
also have their defenders for the way in which they provide a link between the 
council and citizen, provide a recognisable ruling administration and opposition 
bloc as an alternative for the voters to select, add consistency and certainly to policy 
development and provide accountability for the policies and decisions of  the 
council and provide councillors with private political space (Leach 2006; Leach 
and Copus 2004; Leach and Wilson 2008). Moreover, Hayden Phillips (2006: 3) 
in an interim report on party funding commented: ‘parties are essential to democ-
racy and there is no mature democracy anywhere in the world in which political 
parties do not play a vital role’. But a year later, in a final report (Phillips 2007: 1), 
it was noted that parties were in declining membership across Europe, concluding 
that parties were: ‘the least trusted of  our social institutions’. In the same year, 
however, the Councillors Commission (DCLG 2007: 46) commented: ‘Parties are 
essential to a functioning democracy: they provide clarity of  choice based on 
values, ensure a healthy degree of  electoral competition and play a crucial role in 
upholding ethical standards and providing clear lines of  collective accountability’. 
But healthy competition also relies on effective challenge to party domination 
from citizens and groups outside of  national political parties – and no more so 
than in local government.
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In England, some 90 per cent of  all council seats are held by members of  
the three British parties: Conservative, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
Keen (2014) has shown, however, that only 1 per cent of  the population are 
members of  those parties, a decline from almost 4 per cent in 1983. It would 
appear for all the discussion about the underrepresentation of  various groups 
on councils, the most underrepresented group in society, by far, are citizens who 
are not members of  one of  the three national parties – at least in the English 
context.
The figures for national party membership in England provide a necessary back-
drop to the debate about the impact of  party decline in local government and on 
the role of  the councillor sitting as a member of  the upper-tier of  local govern-
ment: county council. Party membership, and the relationship between members 
of  a party and the elected representatives (at any level of  government) are, of  
course, not measures of  party decline or of  assessing the power of  influence of  
parties within representative democracy. Party membership may fall, but it is 
always the smaller number of  active members that keep parties functioning locally 
and that provide a continuing supply of  councillors. Wilks-Heeg and Clayton 
(2006), in their study of  party membership in the English towns of  Burnley and 
Harrogate, showed that even with a perilously low level of  local party membership 
the national political parties – in their cases Labour and Conservative Parties 
respectively – were able to continue to control the councils and to do so with ease 
and large majorities. So, low levels of  membership (in these cases at least) did not 
indicate that the parties were moribund or in organisational decline, only that 
large-scale membership was not necessary or required by the existing local political 
elite. While the work of  Wilks-Heeg and Clayton (2006) provides only one case 
study of  falling membership, which is however recognised as a European-wide 
phenomenon (Saiz and Geser 1999; Seyd and Whiteley 2004; Lundell, 2008; 
Li and Marsh 2008). Nevertheless, councillors from the party group (or administra-
tion) in power but outside the leadership will within their private party group 
meetings be able to question, challenge, criticise, hold to account and then ulti-
mately support in public, the council leadership.
The party group meeting as a private space for debate thus provides a veneer of  
involvement and influence for the backbench councillor, further masking the pro-
fessionalisation of  county politics and the decline of  councillors and party mem-
bers to act as conduits for the citizens into county government decision making. 
Such disengagement and disenchantment with local government will display itself  
differently in different national settings, but the concentration of  power associated 
with party decline ironically is one of  the factors that have entrenched, rather than 
diluted, party control. Such entrenchment of  the party has been achieved because 
councillors outside of  the leadership are increasingly inclined to become more loyal 
to the party and more disciplined in public – seeing the party and not the voter as 
responsible for the councillor’s tenure in county government (Back 2000; Fredriks-
son 2003; Erlingsson 2008). It is the party that selects the councillor and campaigns 
for his or her election; once elected, it is the party group which expects the council-
lor’s loyalty.
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Party decline, and party group loyalty and discipline, go hand in hand as they 
serve to weaken the link between the councillor and the community and so become 
a cycle of  decline. Parties no longer find themselves embedded in local communi-
ties, rather sitting on top of  the community as a barrier between the citizen and 
the council. Such a position is exacerbated by the size of  county government and 
by the existence of  the councils at the first tier of  local government, which also 
attenuates the relationship between the party on the ground and the party in 
county office (see Biondi et al. 2000; Katz and Mair 2005; Wauters, 2010).
It is time then to turn to our data findings to explore in a European context 
whether declining party effectiveness and mass membership means (as we could 
logically expect) that county councillors care little about the views or activities of  
their party outside the council and concentrate on their party groups as a point of  
reference and a focus for their loyalty.
Counties and party across Europe
This section presents the results and analysis of  the responses to the questionnaire 
statements exploring the subject of  party influence. Some of  the results are simple 
frequencies, ordered by country or groups of  country. For some other responses, 
we constructed a party significance index (PSI) which takes into account several 
items related to various aspects of  the activities and influence of  parties on county 
politics. This involved transforming six of  the questionnaire items into an index 
score.1 The index was constructed on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 signifies no 
importance of  parties, while 100 signifies the highest importance of  parties on the 
political life of  county councillors. The six selected variables were:
• ‘How important do you believe the following tasks are for a councillor/county 
president/CEO to perform?’ ‘Taking part in implementing the program of  the 
political party/movement’;
• ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’ ‘Political 
parties are be the most suitable arena for citizen participation’;
• ‘How frequently do you have contact with the following individuals or groups?’ 
‘Members of  my party group’;
• ‘What is your opinion on the following statements?’
• ‘Leader(s) of  your national or regional party have a large influence over 
the decisions made by the party group in the county council’;
• ‘The national or regional party policies have a large influence over the 
decisions made by the party group in the county council’;
• ‘The leader of  the party group usually informs and seeks the support of  
the party group when decisions are taken.’
The first point to make from our analysis is that the vast majority of  our sample 
are party members, and the vast majority of  these are members of  national parties. 
In Table 9.1, eight of  the 14 countries listed have more than 90 per cent of  county 
councillors as national party members, and the mean across the sample is also more 
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than 90 per cent. In four countries, fewer than two out of  each 100 county council-
lors are not national party members. Only one country – Poland – has less than 
three-quarters of  its county councillors as national party members, and only in 
Germany does the proportion of  county councillors belonging to local parties 
exceed 10 per cent. In several countries (the Czech Republic, Greece, France and 
Poland) there are higher numbers of  councillors that are not party members, yet 
these numbers are still dwarfed by those that are members of  political parties. The 
responses from the sample show that there is clear evidence of  widespread penetra-
tion of  national parties at the county level of  government, across Europe.
According to the Hesse and Sharpe (1991) typology, modified to take into 
account Central and Eastern Europe,2 there is an association between party mem-
bership and country group. Table 9.2 shows that Southern and Central/Eastern 
European countries reported more non-party membership than Anglo and North-
Middle European countries.3 This finding plays in to the image of  the more profes-
sionalised bureaucracies of  Northern Europe (see e.g. John 2001). Yet there are 
important exceptions to this picture. For example, according to our sample Spain’s 
provinces have no non-party members at all, and the English counties have more 
non-party members than the counties of  Hungary, Belgium and Romania.
However, party membership does not automatically translate into party support. 
Table 9.3 shows what percentage of  party members had national and county level 
party support at the previous election. Two observations can be made about this 
table: First, while in many cases most councillors agree they had the support of  
their national parties, in some countries this is not the case for many councillors: 
for example, it is less than half  in Italy and Greece. Second, in all cases the levels 
of  support from national level parties and county level parties is virtually identical, 
Table 9.1  Councillors who are (local or national) political party members, 
by country, ordered by national party members (in per cent)
Not party 
member
National party 
members
Local party 
members
Sweden 0.5 99.5 0.0
Hungary 1.2 98.8 0.0
Norway 1.3 98.7 0.0
Belgium 1.9 98.1 0.0
Romania 1.7 97.7 0.6
Spain 0.0 96.7 3.3
Croatia 7.1 91.4 1.5
England 5.8 90.6 3.6
Italy 8.6 87.5 3.9
Czech Republic 10.6 85.9 3.5
Germany 4.4 85.5 10.2
Greece 16.7 81.9 1.4
France 21.6 76.3 2.1
Poland 45.9 52.3 1.8
Total 5.8 90.6 3.6
Source: Second Tier Survey
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giving further evidence of  the Europe-wide penetration of  national parties into 
county party politics.
In looking at these results, we are left wondering if  support transfers into influ-
ence for the county party over what county councillors do at the council and the 
policies they develop. Table 9.4 sets out the responses to statements designed to test 
councillors’ opinions about the level of  influence that the national and county party 
organisation had over the activities of  the county council party group.
It is worth noting that in countries where there appears to be a high level of  
support for the candidates from national parties (shown in Table 9.3), there is also 
considerable influence over the decisions made by party groups in the council 
(shown in Table 9.4). This is the case in Spain, Norway and Croatia. Table 9.4 also 
shows that there is reason to believe that party groups of  councillors at the county 
Table 9.2  County councillors who are party members or not party 
members, by countries with different local government 
systems (in per cent)
Local government systems Not party 
member
Party 
members
Southern (‘Franco’) type 10.2 89.8
Anglo type 5.8 94.2
North-Middle European type 2.4 97.6
Central-Eastern European type 11.5 88.5
Total 5.8 94.2
Source: Second Tier Survey
Table 9.3  Support at the last election (per cent agree) of  party members 
that had support at last election, ordered by support of  national 
party (in per cent)
National 
party support
County party 
support
Hungary 93.8 93.8
Norway 92.8 92.8
Spain 90.7 90.7
Croatia 89.4 89.3
Romania 89.0 89.0
Sweden 79.3 79.4
Czech Republic 76.3 76.3
France 69.5 69.8
Poland 69.0 69.0
Germany 67.3 67.3
Belgium 66.9 66.9
England 60.2 60.6
Italy 47.3 47.3
Greece 36.2 36.4
Source: Second Tier Survey
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level feel more connected to the broader party organisation at that level, rather 
than higher-level party organisations. In many cases, the score for influence of  the 
county party organisation (second column) is higher than the score for influence 
of  policies at national or regional levels (third column). Clearly there will be mutual 
influence occurring between each of  these organs, but this influence tends to flow 
downwards rather than upwards. In every case, the score for the influence of  the 
county organisation over the national organisation (fourth column) is lower than 
that for influence the other way (first column).
We now turn to our analysis, informed by the construction of  our index 
related to the influence of  party, outlined earlier. Table 9.5 presents, in order, 
the PSI scores for the county councillors in our sample. According to these 
results, there is considerable variance between countries according to this mea-
sure. In Spain, party influence appears strongest, compared to Poland, which is 
the weakest. These results, and others like it, are perhaps expected bearing in 
mind the party membership results reported in Table 9.1. High on the list come 
the Scandinavian countries of  Sweden and Norway, whereas a surprising result 
to these authors is how low the England comes in this list by comparison with 
other European countries, especially bearing in mind the significance of  parties 
in the functioning of  English local government articulated in the prior section 
of  this chapter.
Table 9.4  Intra-party influence, ordered by higher level policy influence over county party 
decisions (per cent agree)
‘The national or 
regional party policies 
have a large influence 
over the decisions made 
by the party group in 
the county council.’
‘The county’s party 
organisation has 
much influence over 
the decisions of  
the party’s council 
group.’
‘The leader of  the 
party group usually 
informs and seeks the 
support of  the party 
group when decisions 
are taken.’
‘The county’s 
party organisation 
has a large 
influence over 
decisions of  the 
national party.’
Spain 71.0 77.6 91.3 34.4
Croatia 59.1 81.4 76.5 28.3
Romania 57.9 77.8 72.5 35.7
Norway 57.7 74.8 81.1 35.6
Sweden 51.9 62.5 55.7 28.0
Greece 44.1 30.7 70.9 20.1
Belgium 40.6 57.1 76.5 20.0
Italy 37.6 43.6 35.0 11.1
France 34.2 40.4 79.8 11.4
England 27.5 29.0 72.5 8.4
Czech  
 Republic
25.0 52.6 82.9 14.5
Poland 23.7 40.7 59.3 3.4
Germany 15.9 36.0 81.5 1.8
Hungary Not asked 56.8 51.9 19.8
Source: Second Tier Survey
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There is limited purchase on this data according to country grouping. Table 9.6 
shows the Anglo-type group is different from other groups, but little can be read 
into that result as only England is included in that group.4 What is more notable is 
the lack of  variation between country groups, no clear pattern emerging from 
either Tables 9.3 or 9.4.
Next we move on to discuss the loyalty that councillors express towards their 
political parties and to do that the results of  the responses to the following state-
ment are presented: ‘the last time there were differences between your personal 
opinion and the opinion of  your party group in the council and the opinion of  
the voters, how did you vote?’ The statement tests what the councillor sees as 
his or her focus for loyalty when faced with a ‘crisis of  representation’ (Copus 
2004) – that is, when faced with competing calls for the councillor to act in 
certain ways and in accordance with the wishes and opinions of  three competing 
element: the party, the public and the councillor’s own opinions. Table 9.7 sets 
out the responses received (on this topic see also Aars et al., Chapter 6 in this 
book).
Table 9.5  Party significance index, by country, ordered by 
the PSI score (1–100)
Mean PSI score Standard deviation
Spain 80.8 11.74
Romania 73.3 11.55
Sweden 72.5 11.65
Norway 72.2 10.14
Croatia 68.2 13.33
Belgium 66.8 12.31
Greece 66.2 14.35
Italy 65.6 13.59
Germany 63.2 11.18
Czech Republic 62.4 10.96
England 61.4 14.51
France 58.6 14.25
Poland 55.3 14.40
Source: Second Tier Survey
Table 9.6  PSI by country grouping
Local government systems Mean 
PSI Score
Standard 
deviation
Southern (Franco) type 67.2 14.91
Anglo type 61.4 14.51
North-Middle European type 68.3 12.22
Central-Eastern European type 67.2 13.76
Source: Second Tier Survey.
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This table presents what proportion of  councillors when confronted with differ-
ences between personal opinion, party group opinion, and the opinion of  voters 
would vote 1) according to the opinion of  the party group (party soldiers), 2) Accord-
ing to his or her own conviction (trustees) or 3) According to the opinion of  voters 
(delegates). Countries are sorted by percentage of  party soldiers.
The sample may also highlight differences between the strength of  party support 
at different geographic levels. In particular, contrasting Sweden and Norway where 
party support is located at the local level whereas support for councillors in Eng-
land and Croatia tends to come from the national organs of  their parties. It is 
simplistic to suggest a ‘North – South/East’ distinction in the influence of  party 
groupings contrasting the partisan and organised party groupings in Scandinavian 
countries with post-communist and Mediterranean countries such as Poland, 
Romania and Greece where the role of  parties in local political careers is weaker. 
Despite this, clear exceptions exist, in particular the dominance of  parties in both 
Spain and Croatia.
Table 9.6 also demonstrates that despite ideas of  party decline explored earlier 
in the chapter parties remain an important element in the machinery and proce-
dure of  local politics. The question relating to the representational styles of  trustee, 
delegate and party soldier first developed in the United States (Eulau et al. 1959; 
Wahlke et al. 1962) has been used extensively in studies of  local government (New-
ton 1974; Kjǽr 2000; Copus 2004; Aars et al., Chapter 6 in this book).
The pervasive influence parties play in informing the choices of  councillors and 
loyalty party groups command is reflected across the data, and (beyond sample size 
limitations) highlights that in Spain and much of  Northern Europe the impact of  
party group control sustains the influence of  parties on county councillors, in clear 
contrast with alternative indicators which depict party decline. What we see here 
Table 9.7  Representative orientation, by country, ordered by party group score (per cent)
Countries n ‘I voted according 
to the opinion of  
the party group.’
‘I voted according 
to my own 
conviction.’
‘I voted according 
to the opinion of  
the voters.’
Spain 87 78.2 17.2 3.0
Belgium 275 68.4 26.9 4.7
Sweden 941 66.1 29.4 4.5
Norway 197 65.5 31.5 4.6
Croatia 294 45.6 47.6 6.8
Hungary 58 41.4 37.9 20.7
Italy 149 38.9 50.3 10.7
France 209 33.5 61.2 5.3
Greece 190 32.6 61.1 6.3
England 109 31.2 49.5 19.3
Romania 117 26.5 46.2 27.4
Germany 1,038 24.9 70.9 4.2
Poland 104 14.4 63.5 22.1
Source: Second Tier Survey.
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is that despite the notion of  party decline, parties are not losing their influence 
when it comes to the actions taken by councillors and therefore parties can survive 
falling membership and disconnection from the public, and that professionalisation 
of  parties re-enforces party control rather than diminishes it as councillors continue 
to grant loyalty to the group.
Conclusions
The chapter began by exploring the notion of  party decline and the effect that the 
professionalisation of  parties and marginalisation of  the ordinary party member 
had on political parties, generally. Party decline is not just a national phenomena 
but a process replicated locally where the local political elite become distant from 
the local party membership and therefore the influence that the membership has 
over the actions of  party leaders is diminished. As a consequence local power 
becomes ever more focused in a smaller and smaller group of  leading party 
members – and such leaders are to be found among councillors. Indeed, even 
among councillors and the council party group, power becomes centralised in the 
hands of  a few leading members, thus also potentially marginalising even council-
lors from the centre of  local political power (see Getimis and Hlepas, Chapter 11 
in this book). Given that county council and county party machinery operates at 
the top tier of  local government, the scale and population size of  county entities 
could also add to the distancing and marginalisation of  the party membership – 
larger units often require the concentration of  decision-making into fewer and 
fewer hands – both within parties and county councils. So we are left wondering: 
Does this matter for the continued dominance (where it exists) of  parties and their 
role within county government?
We saw in our survey that for all countries (with the exception of  Poland at just 
over 52 per cent), the overwhelming majority of  county councillors were members 
of  national political parties, ranging from France with 76 per cent to Sweden with 
just over 99 per cent being party members. Indeed, the total European score for 
party political county councillors is just over 90 per cent. Party dominance of  
county government is reflected across the Southern (‘Franco’), Anglo, North-Middle 
European and Central and Eastern European types of  local county systems. 
While party decline may reflect an internal process that involves a withering away 
of  the relationship between a mass membership and the party leadership – locally 
or nationally – decline is not an external process. That is, party decline does not 
affect the dominant position that parties hold on county councils across Europe. 
But, as we saw in Table 9.3 party membership does not automatically translate into 
party support for county councillors. Moreover, the support county councillors 
receive from their parties is very much a variable characteristic across Europe. We 
must take care here, however, as the figures for county councillors receiving support 
from either the national or county party may indicate that it is difficult for council-
lors to distinguish between the national party and the county party when it comes 
to electoral support. In many cases, for example, councillors may receive printed 
leaflets from their party as part of  a national, local election campaign, but those 
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leaflets would be delivered by local party members, including councillors them-
selves. It also depends on how councillors interpret the term support: are they refer-
ring to finances, material and physical resources? Or are they referring to leafleters, 
canvassers and election day helpers or party members who organise and conduct 
local election campaigns? There is sufficient ambiguity here for us to conclude that 
in county council elections party decline has not seriously affected county council-
lors in our survey countries from conducting electoral activity.
It is with the question of  which party organisation – the national or county level – 
has influence over what the county council party group does that we begin to see 
that party decline has not comprehensively across Europe had the result of  distanc-
ing the local party machinery and therefore local party members from the activity 
of  the party group and leadership of  that group at the county level of  government. 
The differences between the national results could reflect the rules and regulations 
of  party branches, as in the case of  England, where the rules of  the main national 
parties heavily regulate the relationship between the party groups and non-
councillor party members. The concept of  influence can also be a tricky one to 
define and understand: Does it reflect formal influence through official debates and 
votes of  party units? Or does it refer to a more informal process of  private discussion 
and interaction that provides ordinary party members with opportunities to con-
tribute to the development of  policy decisions through contact with county council-
lors. It is likely that councillors responded to the question with the formal role of  
the county party unit in mind – which will vary between countries – but we cannot 
exclude the possibility that individual members have more informal routes to influ-
ence. Equally, we must remember that county party units are likely to include large 
numbers of  county councillors, who themselves will be able to either influence the 
county party or indeed may control its activities, or prevent it from making formal 
decisions which the party group could not support.
When we considered the results for the statements which explored whether, 
when faced with a crisis of  representation (Copus, 2004) councillors would vote with 
the party group, their own conscience or the articulated views of  the voters, we saw 
that the party group loomed large in the councillors; assumptions of  loyalty and 
that the party soldier is found at the county level in all countries. It is possible to 
suggest that for all those councillors who said that they would pursue their own 
views as a trustee of  the general good we may also find that they support the party 
line as well. It is highly possible that given a county councillor’s membership in a 
party, the support he or she receives from it, the loyalty he or she grants to it gener-
ally and the ability that a councillor has to contribute to party group decisions, that 
they may rarely be faced with the need to rebel from the party line. Indeed, the 
councillors ‘own opinion’ may be exactly the same as the party group view on an 
issue, so we may see an inflation of  the support for the group line by considering 
that councillors’ own opinions coincide with that of  the group.
Party decline and the resultant loss of  influence the party membership may 
experience over the party leadership and particularly the county council group, is 
clearly a feature of  note. From our study, however, decline does not appear to 
extend to a reduction in the role that political parties play in county government. 
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That applies across Europe, or at least in those countries where parties are a strong 
element of  the local political scene. A gradual concentration of  power into the 
hands of  local political elite may indeed be simply a normal part of  political inter-
action as the more active members separate themselves from the less active mem-
bers by virtue of  being just more active. Parties tend to develop internal networks 
of  smaller and smaller numbers of  activists and councillors to organise and run 
the party, locally (Leach and Wilson 2000; Leach 2006). Such a process does not 
indicate decline, rather a political separation of  labour.
It is clear from our data, however, that even if  political parties are in decline, 
losing membership and seeing an increasing gulf  between the role played by local 
political elites – including councillors – and other party members, the ability of  
national parties to control local government is not impeded. Where we see cross-
national differences in the degree of  party penetration of  the local level and the 
nature of  the relationship between councillors in the group and the party, we are 
not seeing varying speeds of  party decline; rather we are witnessing the effects of  
local and national political culture, the different journeys that democracies have 
taken across Eastern and Western Europe, and changes in voter attitudes towards 
political parties and the role played by county government within each national 
setting. We can confidently conclude that party decline does not mean a decline in 
the domination of  county government by political parties. Most certainly there is 
no decline in the power of  the political party group at the county level. County 
government, in a European context, is by and large party government.
Notes
1 Further relevant variables pertaining to the comparative proportion of  weekly hours 
spent on party business were omitted due to gaps in the cross-national data.
2 The countries of  the South European (or ‘Franco’) type are (Belgium, France, Greece, 
Italy and Spain; those of  the Anglo type, England; the North-Middle European type, 
Germany, Norway and Sweden; and the Central/Eastern European type Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania.
3 There is a significant association between country grouping and party membership as 
 χ2 (3, N = 4,701) = 139.338, p < 0.0001.
4 One-way ANOVA (using Welch correction owing to unequal variances), revealed signifi-
cant differences in PSI scores in relation to country grouping according to the typology 
of  local government systems adopted from Hesse and Sharpe (1991): F (3,496) = 9.651, 
p < 0.0001, ηp 2= .0084. Post-hoc tests (Games-Howell) revealed significant differences 
between the Anglo type and all other types: at p < 0.001, effect size (d) = 0.39 for com-
parison with the Southern/‘Franco’ type, 0.51 for the North-Middle European type, and 
0.41 for the Central/Eastern European type.
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10 Parties and ideology
How parties shape their manifestos  
to obtain votes
Björn Egner
Introduction
From a rational choice perspective, politics is understood as a market (Downs 1957) 
where parties offer policy choices and voters buy those choices by giving their votes 
to the party they like best. This view has been harshly criticised and is still hotly 
debated (see Wood and Oliver 2012 for an overview). Especially, two central assump-
tions for the economic model of  democracy are challenged: The first assumption is 
that voters are well informed about the choices the parties have to offer. Additionally, 
voters are expected to be perfectly informed about the parties, their policies, their 
own current situation and the possible ramifications for their future well-being trig-
gered by potential political change. The second – and even more important – 
assumption is that the parties are not honest in proposing their policies. The model 
expects that a party seeks to maximize its vote share at election day, thus it is open 
for parties committing ‘fraud’ by either implementing policies it did not propose 
before the election or by not implementing policies it originally committed to. It 
seems reasonable for parties to act in this way, because policies with a negative 
impact on the public may hurt the party at the polls in the next election.
In order to be at least competitive with the other parties, a party must propose 
policies which enable it to collect enough votes – even if  it does not want the poli-
cies, or at least not in the proposed form. If  it wins the election in the end, the party 
may try to find some excuses for not implementing the policy or implement it in 
another way, whether the reason be a coalition partner (who can be blamed easily), 
altered circumstances or a process of  ‘learning’. It becomes clear that parties 
behave strategically in the shadow of  elections.
However, it may likewise seem reasonable that countries differ in this respect. 
Parties may be forced to pick different strategies in different institutional and politi-
cal environments. In this contribution, I try to uncover the difference between the 
parties’ ‘real’ ideology and the ones they propose for elections. For this purpose, I 
will use the ideology data collected within the frame of  the project to draw a picture 
of  the ideological positions of  the main parties in the 14 European countries 
covered.
To introduce the topic, I will briefly introduce how to measure ideology and why 
using data from the second tier of  local government is appropriate for this 
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challenge in the next section. I will also discuss whether the left-right divide is still 
a sensible distinction in the spatial measurement of  ideology. In the following sec-
tion, I will prepare the main analysis by looking into the ideological party landscape 
from three different perspectives. The first perspective will include the comparison 
between the individual ideology as stated by the councillors and their assessment 
of  their party’s ideology, which may yield interesting results concerning the internal 
cohesion of  the single parties. The second perspective will try to relate individual 
ideology of  a councillor to his or her personal attributes. The third perspective 
entails focusing on the ideology of  party families and their member parties. In the 
final section, I will compare the data for second-tier councillors’ assessments of  
their party’s ideology with data from the macro level using party manifestos in 
order to describe the interaction between ideological setup of  the parties and elec-
toral competition within the countries.
Measuring ideology
Measuring ideological party positions is one of  the central challenges in political 
science, especially in comparative politics. A large number of  empirical analyses 
use ideology scores for parties as independent variables, e.g. for policy choice, fiscal 
performance, electoral campaign strategies and for testing classical approaches like 
the economy of  democracy.
There are four traditional approaches for the assessment of  ideology scores. First, 
there is the programmatic approach, where a party’s position in the ideology space 
is measured by reading party manifestos and assigning values to statements of  the 
party concerning policies or societal issues (e.g. the Comparative Manifesto Project; 
cf. Klingemann et al. 2006). Second, the parties’ positions can be approximated by 
expert judgements, which can be based for instance explicitly on questionnaires 
(Huber and Inglehart 1995) or implicitly by rough comparison (cf. Carlsen 1997: 
147; Gross and Sigelman 1984). The third option is to use the self-assessments of  
voters of  the respective parties (cf. Laver and Schofield 1990: 245 ff.). Each of  these 
options raises its own sets of  questions about reliability and validity of  the data col-
lected. The fourth possibility is scarcely used by political scientists, although it sug-
gests enhanced validity and reliability: the measurement of  party positions according 
to the self-assessment of  party members (cf. Benoit and Laver 2006: 60 ff.). New 
developments of  measuring party ideology include e.g. observing campaign finance 
portfolios (Bonica 2014) or Twitter messages (Barbera 2015).
Measurement of ideology in the frame of the second tier project
The second tier project provides us data about the ideological self-assessment of  politi-
cians on this level of  local government. The survey respondents are thus in touch with 
the ‘real’, everyday tangible problems of  the local level, but are also potential career 
politicians for upper levels. Therefore, the assessment of  the people being active in 
politics on the second tier of  local government level may be representative for what 
the ‘party infantry’ (which may be potential future leaders of  the party) thinks where 
‘their’ party is located on the traditional left-right dimension.
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Within the second tier survey, there were two questions asked about ideology. 
The first asked respondents to assess their own ideological position on a scale 
between 0 (left) and 10 (right): ‘There is often talk about a left-right dimension 
in [. . .] politics.1 Where would you place yourself  on a left-right dimension?’
The second question reads ‘There is often talk about a left-right dimension in 
politics. Where would you place your party on a left-right dimension?’ Respondents 
were able to assess the ideology of  the county level, the regional/state level and the 
national level of  their respective party.2
In the following analysis, data from all 14 countries are used. In order to ensure 
maximum comparability, I use councillor data only for measurement, since it pro-
vides a more representative picture than data shaped by holders of  ‘unique’ offices 
such as county CEO or county president.
A descriptive overview
Looking at the county level, nearly 90 per cent of  all councillors assessed their 
individual ideology score on the scale mentioned. More than 80 per cent of  them 
also stated their view about their national party’s ideology. These high numbers 
show that the concept of  a left-right scale appears to be a suitable concept for the 
respondents. In some countries, the share of  respondents seems reasonably lower 
because of  the make-up of  the local party systems, e.g. in Germany or Poland, 
where ‘local parties’ or ‘independent councillors’ are common (see Heinelt and 
Egner 2011: 114; Swianiewicz 2011: 192). In those countries, local policy making 
is widely perceived as a ‘pragmatic’ realm, where there is no need or significantly 
less appropriateness for party politics. However, in the Nordic countries, in Spain 
and in England, party membership as a common feature of  national and local 
politics helped to generate considerably large shares of  responses.
Table 10.1  Response rate for ideology assessment questions
Country N all councillors Per cent assessed 
self-ideology
Per cent assessed 
national party ideology
Czech Rep. 85 100.0 100.0
Norway 226 100.0 100.0
Sweden 1,225 99.7 99.6
Italy 131 96.2 83.2
Spain 188 95.7 93.1
England 140 93.6 92.1
France 308 92.2 68.8
Belgium 336 91.7 89.0
Poland 120 91.7 55.8
Croatia 331 90.9 87.0
Greece 233 86.3 73.4
Romania 177 83.6 81.9
Germany 1,672 77.5 65.0
Hungary 113 70.8 64.6
Total 5,285 88.9 81.1
Source: Second Tier Survey
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The first question is whether the data is valid, i.e. if  it represents the dimension 
that was addressed by the question asked. Did councillors state their real ideologi-
cal self-assessment? Using the concept of  external validity (McDermott 2011: 34), 
I will in the following use correlation analysis to check if  the councillors’ self-
assessed ideology is connected to their self-perception about the representation of  
societal actors or groups.
The survey asked the councillors: ‘As a county councillor, do you speak on behalf  
of  the following groups or interests?’ The councillors could respond on a 5-point 
scale.
As Table 10.2 depicts, left-leaning councillors describe themselves as speakers 
for the poor, the unemployed, ethnic minorities, workers, public servants, the youth 
and the whole country. Right-leaning councillors to the contrary associate them-
selves with the industry, particular geographic parts of  the county, private-sector 
employees and the church. These patterns appear to match fairly the traditional 
left-right scheme.
We can further assume external validity by cross-checking support of  societal 
actors and groups for the electoral competition as perceived by the councillors. The 
survey asked: ‘As a candidate in the last election, to what extent did you have the 
support of  the following groups?’ where the councillors again responded on a 
5-point scale.
Councillors from the left consider themselves to be strongly supported by trade 
unions and to a smaller extent by local movements, whereas councillors from the 
right feel supported by business and the Church.
Table 10.2  Correlations of  self-assessed ideology and representation
Actor/group N Pearson’s r p
Less resourceful citizens 4,064 −0.196 0.000
Unemployed 3,966 −0.187 0.000
Ethnic minorities 3,880 −0.177 0.000
Workers 3,959 −0.149 0.000
Public servants 3,896 −0.088 0.000
The youth 4,135 −0.051 0.001
The whole county 4,411 −0.048 0.001
Elderly people/pensioners/retired people 4,076 −0.027 0.079
Particular public service(s) 3,847 −0.024 0.136
The middle class 3,936 0.010 0.538
Tourism sector 2,736 0.049 0.010
Secondary sector (industry) 2,677 0.064 0.001
Construction/real estate sector 2,634 0.077 0.000
Primary sector (farming, fishing etc.) 2,721 0.079 0.000
Trade sector 2,649 0.090 0.000
A particular geographic part of  the county 4,270 0.093 0.000
Private business employees 3,848 0.145 0.000
The Church/religious groups 3,743 0.148 0.000
Source: Second Tier Survey
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To sum up, both representation and perceived support are congruent with the 
traditional left-right cleavage. We can thus assume that the measurement of  the 
self-assessed ideology is valid.
Second-tier councillors and their ideology
Ideology of  parties and their second-tier councillors compared
Where does a party stand considering a one-dimensional ideology scale? To answer 
that question, we will first compare the councillors’ self-assessment of  their indi-
vidual ideology with the ideology position of  their respective party from their 
individual perspective. It is important to note the difference: the first variable dis-
plays how councillors rate their own personal ideology. The second variable mea-
sures how they view the ideological position of  their national party. Gaps between 
the own ideological commitment and the perceived ideological position of  the own 
party may be caused by the party’s ideological position moving due to electoral 
competition or simply time trends. Also, speaking in market terms, parties can be 
narrow ‘niche’ products which collect a small portion of  the electorate (and thus, 
also a small fraction of  potential party members), or can be ‘catch-all’ parties both 
in electoral and party membership terms.
In fact, a correlation between those two variables across the database shows a 
strong relationship (Pearson’s r = o.783 with p < 0.000 while N = 3,721), but there 
is still a significant gap.
For the purpose of  analysis, only parties will be considered with at 10 ten coun-
cillors responding to the ideology items in the questionnaire. To be consistent with 
the check against the manifesto project data carried out next, only parties will 
be included that are present in the manifesto database (Volkens et al. 2014). In some 
instances this leads to an incomplete display of  party systems: e.g. in France, where 
Table 10.3  Correlations of  self-assessed ideology and perceived support
actor/group N Pearson’s r p
Trade union(s) 4,465 −0.283 0.000
Other local associations/groups/social movements 4,473 −0.100 0.000
National organ(s) of  your party 4,348 0.022 0.139
Your party at the county level 4,433 0.036 0.004
National politician(s) 4,337 0.036 0.018
The media 4,450 0.053 0.000
Farmers, fishers et al. (primary sector) 3,187 0.088 0.000
Industrial enterprises (secondary sector) 3,175 0.096 0.000
Tourism sector 3,163 0.097 0.000
Construction/real estate 3,168 0.104 0.000
Trade-services (tertiary sector) enterprises 3,173 0.124 0.000
The Church/other religious groups 4,435 0.139 0.000
Source: Second Tier Survey
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Table 10.4  Self-assessed ideology and national party ideology compared
Country Party Self-assessment Party assessment Difference
N Mean N Mean
Belgium groen! Green! 11 1.73 11 1.55 0.18
sp.a Socialist Party 
Different
42 2.21 42 2.55 −0.33
ECOLO Ecologists 10 1.90 11 2.64 −0.74
PS Francophone 
Socialist Party
41 2.24 40 3.28 −1.03
CDH Christian Social 
Party
18 5.00 18 4.67 0.33
CD&V Christian 
Democratic and 
Flemish
68 4.99 66 4.88 0.11
openVLD Open 
Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats
43 6.23 41 5.95 0.28
MR Reform Movement 23 7.04 24 6.79 0.25
VB Flemish Interest 21 8.43 21 9.29 −0.86
Croatia SDP 42 2.26 40 2.53 −0.26
HSU 11 3.55 12 2.83 0.71
HNS 11 3.27 13 3.62 −0.34
HSS 33 5.97 33 6.42 −0.45
HDZ 66 7.42 68 7.09 0.34
Czech 
Republic
KSCM 17 1.66 17 1.66 0.00
CSSD 20 3.45 20 3.36 0.09
KDU-CSL 10 6.55 10 6.36 0.18
ODS 21 8.23 21 7.97 0.26
England Labour 15 3.40 16 4.38 −0.98
Liberal Democrats 28 4.22 29 5.33 −1.11
Conservative 73 6.74 72 6.54 0.20
the political right is in a constant reorganization process or in England, where the 
rise of  the UKIP has not been covered yet by the manifesto project. Ultimately, 60 
parties from 14 countries are included in the analysis. Altogether, 3,784 councillors 
are members of  these parties and answered the respective items in the question-
naire, which means that roughly three out of  four councillors included in the 
project database will be covered by the analysis within this chapter.
The first finding is that the data indeed paint a plausible picture of  the present 
party systems in the countries covered. We find communist, leftist, green, socialist 
and Social Democratic parties on the left, liberal and ‘centre’ parties in the centre 
and Christian, conservative and nationalist parties on the right. Despite the debates 
about the obsolescence of  the left-right scheme, second-tier councillors have no 
problem collectively reproducing the image of  ‘their’ party within the current 
national party system – within the left-right spectrum, no less.
Table 10.4 also shows that there are different types of  countries concerning the 
gaps between mean self-assessment and party assessment. In six of  the countries, 
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Country Party Self-assessment Party assessment Difference
N Mean N Mean
France PCF French 
Communist Party
13 0.92 13 1.08 −0.15
PS Socialist Party 108 3.18 103 3.38 −0.20
Germany Die Linke 62 1.74 62 1.29 0.45
Grüne 167 3.26 167 2.87 0.39
SPD 336 3.32 330 3.28 0.04
FDP 79 5.49 78 4.99 0.50
CDU 338 6.37 330 5.12 1.25
CSU 84 6.45 83 5.76 0.69
Greece PASOK 95 3.66 83 4.47 −0.81
ND 69 7.12 55 7.00 0.12
Hungary MSzP 13 3.15 12 2.58 0.57
FiDeSz 49 6.90 46 6.17 0.72
Italy PD 41 3.07 39 3.26 −0.18
PdL 32 6.38 32 6.19 0.19
Norway SV Socialist Left Party 10 3.00 10 2.73 0.27
AP Labour Party 91 3.53 91 3.92 −0.39
SP Centre Party 16 5.57 16 4.32 1.25
KrF Christian People’s 
Party
16 5.40 16 5.68 −0.28
V Liberal Party 16 6.19 16 6.25 −0.06
FrP Progress Party 21 8.14 21 7.58 0.56
H Conservative Party 49 7.46 49 7.29 0.17
Poland SLD 14 2.36 15 1.87 0.49
PSL 20 6.25 18 6.17 0.08
PO 14 6.57 13 6.46 0.11
Romania PSD 40 2.65 40 2.53 0.13
UDM/RMDSz 14 6.86 14 5.64 1.21
PD-L 28 8.36 28 7.68 0.68
PNL 37 8.51 37 7.78 0.73
Spain IU 13 1.15 13 − −0.15
PSOE (socialist) 70 2.53 68 3.26 −0.74
CiU 14 5.00 13 5.23 −0.23
PP (conservative) 65 6.52 62 6.56 −0.04
Sweden V Left Party 77 1.22 77 1.18 0.04
AP Social Democratic 
Labour Party
461 2.93 460 3.64 −0.71
MP Green Ecology 
Party
62 4.18 62 4.32 −0.15
CP Centre Party 97 5.70 97 6.19 −0.48
FP Liberal People’s 
Party
84 5.46 84 6.38 −0.92
Kd Christian 
Democrats
55 6.15 55 6.80 −0.65
MSP Moderate 
Coalition Party
290 7.52 290 7.38 0.14
Source: Second Tier Survey
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individual ideology self-assessment and perception of  the national party’s ideology 
do not differ much. This is the case in most Eastern European countries (Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), France and Italy. For the countries in East-
ern Europe, this finding is not surprising since the party systems and the parties 
within those systems are comparatively ‘young’. This means that the possible gap 
between individual and collective ideological identity has not had the chance to 
evolve. Concerning data for France, half  of  the political spectrum is missing. In 
Italy, only the major contenders (PD and PdL) are included in this analysis, which 
both seem to be coherent blocks.
In five countries, the relationship between individual ideology and party ideol-
ogy is lopsided. On one hand, in Spain, Sweden and England, average party mem-
bers in the majority of  parties considers themselves to be left of  their own party. In 
Romania and Germany, on the other hand, members tend to view themselves 
further to the right of  their own party. Especially in Germany, this can be explained 
by the nature of  the data: since the survey covers the Landkreise and thus no cities 
(which are mostly ‘county-exempt cities’, i.e. municipalities that are counties at the 
same time – see Heinelt and Egner 2011: 106) the councillors represent the rural 
parts of  the country, where people in general are more conservative than their 
colleagues from the cities. Three other countries seem to be special cases, where 
either two parties show significant gaps (the ecologist and the francophone socialist 
party in Belgium) or members of  a single party show a larger gap with their party’s 
ideology (PASOK in Greece and the Centre Party in Sweden) while the others are 
parties where the mean member are fairly in line with their party’s ideology.
Individual ideology and personal attributes
In the next step, I will give some insights to correlations between individual ideol-
ogy and individual attributes of  the councillors. For this purpose, I will use age (in 
years), gender (male = 1 and female = 2), education (1 = elementary, 2 = secondary, 
3 = university degree) and seniority (years of  party membership).
Having tested 60 parties and 14 countries with four pairs of  variables each, I 
show the results of  296 correlation tests in table 10.5. Since the analysis is based 
on micro-level data, most of  the significant correlations are weak, but some are 
considerably strong. There are no clear patterns of  correlations, which means that 
there is no individual attribute which is connected to the self-assessment of  per-
sonal ideology in the same direction over all countries with a significant effect, let 
alone all countries in the analysis. But nonetheless, there are some interesting 
results.
• Age seems to be related to leftism. Although only six significant correlations could 
be found, five of  them are pointing to this direction. One correlation is valid 
only for Greece itself, but nor within the Greek parties themselves. One case 
is the English Labour party, which shows a rather strong correlation (r = 
0.590), associating party members to the right with growing age. At the same 
time, the duration of  Labour party membership is strongly associated with 
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Table 10.5  Self-assessed ideology and individual attributes
Country/party Age Gender Education Seniority
Belgium 0.021 −0.094 −0.036 0.081
groen! Green! 0.153 0.232 0.425 0.220
sp.a Socialist Party Different −0.154 −0.284 *−0.371 0.137
ECOLO Ecologists −0.173 −0.147 −0.441 −0.270
PS Francophone Socialist Party −0.184 −0.296 0.240 0.190
CDH Christian Social Party −0.238 0.242 −0.142 −0.082
CD&V Christian Democratic 
and Flemish
−0.076 −0.108 0.072 0.059
openVLD Open Flemish 
Liberals and Democrat
0.074 0.270 0.054 −0.089
MR Reform Movement 0.023 −0.036 0.314 0.249
VB Flemish Interest −0.033 −0.147 −0.044 −0.165
Croatia −0.122 −0.059 −0.069 −0.052
SDP 0.075 −0.178 −0.146 *0.362
HSU −0.381 0.025 *0.682
HNS −0.062 −0.228 −0.341 −0.081
HSS 0.296 **0.548 −0.018 0.115
HDZ 0.083 0.148 −0.195 −0.145
Czech Republic 0.055 −0.130 −0.104 0.136
KSCM 0.002 0.085 −0.100 0.180
CSSD −0.005 −0.322 −0.210 −0.146
KDU-CSL −0.141 0.075 −0.075
ODS −0.003 0.191 −0.085 0.375
England 0.020 −0.100 −0.098 0.026
Labour *0.590 0.169 −0.060 *−0.675
Liberal Democrats −0.173 0.161 0.074 0.078
Conservative −0.172 −0.157 −0.034 0.055
France 0.053 0.089 0.087 **0.278
PCF French Communist Party 0.076 −0.124 0.257
PS Socialist Party 0.105 0.043 −0.033 0.170
Germany −0.102 −0.190 −0.065 −0.009
Die Linke 0.010 0.034 −0.040 −0.157
Grüne −0.152 −0.024 0.056 0.117
SPD *−0.109 −0.070 **−0.165 **0.173
FDP −0.020 −0.196 −0.072 −0.035
CDU −0.068 *−0. 109 0.007 *−0.119
CSU −0.162 0.090 0.008 0.121
Greece *−0.220 *0.164 0.010 *0.166
PASOK −0.070 0.091 0.040 −0.005
ND −0.191 0.209 0.011 0.074
(Continued )
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Country/party Age Gender Education Seniority
Hungary 0.066 0.187 −0.181 0.196
MSzP 0.535 −0.222 −0.324
FiDeSz 0.070 0.037 −0.079 0.003
Italy −0.067 **−0.316 −0.095 *−0.292
PD 0.123 −0.244 0.082 −0.099
PdL −0.195 0.021 0.049 0.158
Norway −0.023 −0.121 *−.0134 0.022
SV Socialist Left Party 0.282 −0.470 0.174
AP Labour Party 0.044 −0.036 0.170 *−0.219
SP Centre Party −0.024 −0.166 *−0.532 −0.028
KrF Christian People’s Party 0.114 0.040 −0.178 0.038
V Liberal Party −0.279 −0.197 0.163 0.282
FrP Progress Party 0.116 −0.197 −0.332 −0.329
H Conservative Party −0.016 −0.153 0.004 −0.041
Poland 0.177 0.024 −0.030 −0.099
SLD 0.230 −0.139 0.153 −217
PSL 0.133 −0.186 *−0.473 *−0.485
PO 0.329 0.108 −0.090
Romania −0.141 −0.145 0.161 0.116
PSD −0.120 *−0.343 0.145 −0.099
UDM/RMDSz 0.357 −0.228 0.007
PD-L −0.311 0.261 0.125
PNL 0.166 0.024 −0.285
Spain 0.072 −0.087 **−0.240 0.101
IU −0.460 0.062 0.262 0.161
PSOE 0.118 −0.197 −0.084 −0.110
CiU 0.080 −0.326 −0.270 0.098
PP −0.172 0.053 *−0.250 −0.110
Sweden −0.071 −0.014 **0.140 **0.091
V Left Party 0.202 −0.169 −0.009 −0.204
AP Social Democratic Labour 
Party
−0.012 −0.045 0.003 0.051
MP Green Ecology Party −0.173 0.058 0.104 0.157
CP Centre Party −0.127 *0.233 −0.170 0.134
FP Liberal People’s Party *−0.244 0.161 0.169 *0.265
Kd Christian Democrats *−0.271 −0.068 *0.330 *0.281
MSP Moderate Coalition Party *−0.163 0.044 *−0.151 −0.025
Source: Second Tier Survey. * indicates significant on .05 level, ** on .01 level.
Table 10.5  (Continued)
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describing the personal ideology as left (r = −.675). This separates the English 
Labour party from the German SPD, where older members are left and 
members with a brief  party membership are more on the right wing of  the 
party. The three remaining cases are all situated on the right side of  the 
spectrum in Sweden, where older members of  the Liberal People’s Party 
(FP) the Christian Democrats (KD) and the Moderate Coalition Party (M) 
significantly tend to the left.
• Gender and ideology are unsystematically linked together. In two countries, there is an 
overall correlation, but the findings are contradictory. In Italy, women tend to 
lean more to the left than men altogether, whereas in Greece, the connection 
is inverted. In both countries, the pattern cannot be reproduced within the 
parties, and thus are probably inter-party effects, e.g. because one party shows 
significantly more women in the sample than the other. In two countries, we 
see one party each where woman are leaning to the left (the German CDU 
and the left-leaning PSD in Romania). But in two countries, we also see women 
tending to the right (HSS in Croatia, and the Centre Party in Sweden).
• If  education and ideology are connected, it usually means that the higher educated are 
inclined to the left. This finding is based on two country patterns (Spain and 
Norway). Also, six parties show this correlation, among them the Dutch 
SP.A, German Social Democrats, the Centre Party in Norway, PSL from 
Poland, the Spanish conservatives (PP) and the Swedish Moderate Coalition 
Party. Two findings indicate the other direction; both are again located in 
Sweden, where the overall pattern shows that the higher educated lean to 
the right, as do the members of  the Christian Democrats.
• Self-assessed ideology and the individual duration of  party membership show the most significant 
correlations, but no clear pattern. Although the majority of  findings supports that 
party membership is connected to a tendency to the right, the direction of  the 
effect may in some cases be dependent on the general ideology position of  
the party. In three countries, the national pattern follows the idea of  long-time 
party members as leaning to the right, namely France, Greece and Sweden. 
The latter is the most interesting case, with two Swedish parties supporting the 
trend – again, it is the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party. Three 
left-leaning parties show the same behaviour, namely the two Croatian parties 
(SDP and HSU) and the German Social Democrats. Four parties show different 
patterns where long-time party members lean to the left. Those are the  German 
CDU, the Norwegian Labour Party, the Polish PSL and the English Labour 
party (where age also is a strong variable, as discussed earlier). The only country 
with an overall pattern of  party membership and left leaning is Italy; but again, 
the effect is not reproduced within the parties.
It seems that on the macro level, the findings are rather poor. This may be an 
effect of  the low numbers of  councillors representing some of  the parties, but it 
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may be also a result of  different ideological positions and historical development 
of  each party and its respective country. Therefore, I grouped the parties into party 
families according to Andersson et al. (2014).
As Table 10.6 shows, the correlations from the single parties (which had been some-
times ‘flip-flopping’) are now behaving consistently for most of  the combinations.
• Concerning age, becoming older seems to be associated with leaning to the 
left. This relationship is consistent over the whole population, but also in three 
party families (green and liberal as well as Christian Democratic parties).
• Additionally, women seem to assess their ideology as slightly more to the left 
than men. Although this relationship is quite small, it is consistent over the whole 
sample and two party groups (Social Democratic and Christian Democratic).
• Education has a different impact on ideology in party families. Higher edu-
cation is associated with leaning to the left in the agrarian and conservative 
group while being associated with leaning to the right in the liberal group.
• Party membership seniority is interrelated with leaning to the right in the 
whole population and consistently in the green and liberal party family, while 
the effect is reversed in the conservative group.
• Four party families (communist, electoral alliance, ethnic and right wing) show 
no correlation at all.
Party ideology and party families
The last step in the descriptive analysis about parties concerns whether the party 
families, as constructed by Andersson et al. (2014), are consistent from the perspec-
tive of  the second-tier data. Therefore, I will investigate if  the parties’ ideology 
scores from the councillors’ view match the values of  the parties’ families. Only 
families with more than two parties are included in the analysis.
Table 10.6  Self-assessed ideology and individual attributes by party family
Party family N Ideology Pearson’s r
Age Gender Education Seniority
Communist/socialist 192 1.50 .070 −.033 .034 .032
Social Democratic 1,345 3.10 −.001 **−.087 −.018 −.021
Green/ecologist 250 3.36 *−.155 .018 .053 *.134
Electoral alliance 85 4.25 .098 .008 −.174 .045
Agrarian 133 5.77 −.035 .098 **−.253 .030
Liberal 295 6.17 **−.299 −.056 **.198 **.316
Christian Democratic 648 6.25 **−.109 *-.088 −.006 .020
Ethnic 14 6.86 .357 −.228 .007
Conservative 628 7.18 −.061 .067 *−.081 *−.068
Right wing 21 8.43 −.033 −.147 −.044 −.165
Total 3,802 4.76 **−.071 **−.075 .023 *.040
Source: Second Tier Survey
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Table 10.7  Party ideology from councillor perspective by party family and party
Party family/party (country) N Mean Standard deviation
Communist/socialist 192 1.34 0.97
Parti communiste (France) 13 1.08 1.12
Vänsterpartiet (Sweden) 77 1.18 0.97
Die Linke (Germany) 62 1.29 0.69
IU (Spain) 13 1.31 1.03
KSČM (Czech Rep.) 17 1.66 1.12
SV (Norway) 10 2.73 0.86
Green/ecologist 251 3.16 1.26
Groen (Norway) 11 1.55 1.13
Ecolo (Belgium) 11 2.64 1.36
Grüne (Germany) 167 2.87 0.93
Miljöpartiet de gröna (Sweden) 62 4.32 1.25
Social Democratic 1,317 3.50 1.55
SLD (Poland) 15 1.87 1.96
PSD (Romania) 40 2.53 1.66
MSZP (Hungary) 12 2.58 1.16
PD (Italy) 39 3.26 1.35
PSOE (Spain) 68 3.26 1.31
PS (Belgium) 40 3.28 1.91
SPD (Germany) 330 3.28 1.17
ČSSD (Czech Rep.) 20 3.36 1.39
Parti socialiste (France) 103 3.38 1.87
Socialdemokraterna (Sweden) 460 3.64 1.55
AP (Norway) 91 3.92 1.54
Labour (UK) 16 4.38 1.25
PASOK (Greece) 83 4.47 1.70
Christian Democratic 623 5.52 1.36
CD&V (Belgium) 66 4.88 1.07
CDU (Germany) 330 5.12 1.19
KrF (Norway) 16 5.68 0.70
CSU (Germany) 83 5.76 1.05
KDU-ČSL (Czech Rep.) 10 6.36 0.74
Kristdemokraterna (Sweden) 55 6.80 1.11
ND (Greece) 55 7.00 1.53
Agrarian 131 5.95 1.56
SP (Norway) 16 4.32 1.31
Centerpartiet (Sweden) 97 6.19 1.39
PSL (Poland) 18 6.17 1.86
Liberal 296 6.24 1.66
FDP (Germany) 78 4.99 0.93
Lib Dem (UK) 29 5.33 1.47
V (Norway) 16 6.25 0.73
Folkpartiet Liberalerna (Sweden) 84 6.38 1.50
MR (Belgium) 24 6.79 1.18
(Continued)
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Party family/party (country) N Mean Standard deviation
PD-L (Romania) 28 7.68 1.36
PNL (Romania) 37 7.78 1.70
Conservative 619 7.00 1.65
CIU (Spain) 13 5.23 1.01
Conservative (UK) 72 6.54 1.89
FIDESZ (Hungary) 46 6.17 1.25
PDL (Italy) 32 6.19 1.28
PO (Poland) 13 6.46 2.37
PP (Spain) 62 6.56 1.26
H (Norway) 49 7.29 1.73
Moderata samlingspartiet 
(Sweden)
290 7.38 1.51
FrP (Norway) 21 7.58 2.23
ODS (Czech Rep.) 21 7.97 1.41
Source: Second Tier Survey
Table 10.7  (Continued)
The first result is striking: Most of  the parties rally around a relatively narrow 
area on the 11-point ideology scale. The mean standard deviation of  a party in the 
sample is only σ = 1.39, which seems small considering the catch-all function of  
some of  the parties. But if  we have a deeper look into the data, we find that some 
of  the party families and some of  the parties are more consistent in terms of  ideo-
logical span than others.
• The family of  the far-left parties is on the very left of  the spectrum (mean: 
1.34) and is narrowly shaped in a small span of  only 0.58 points, if  we 
exclude one exception in the group: the Norwegian Socialist Left, which is 
significantly more oriented to the right. From the judgement of  its own 
councillors, it would fit better into the green or the Social Democratic family. 
Apart from that, all parties show a narrow internal span, which means that 
councillors within those parties share equal judgement about their party’s 
position.
• The green party family is focused clearly more to the right with a mean of  
3.16 points. The group is more diverse than the family of  communists and 
socialist parties, and the parties themselves are somewhat more diverse. 
According to the ideology score, the green party from Norway would fit 
better into the ‘left’ family, while the Swedish green party resembles the 
ideology scores of  the Social Democratic family.
• The Social Democratic family is the biggest in size and is situated at a mean 
of  3.50, just slightly to the right of  the ecologists’ family. The span of  the 
family is wider than the two families discussed above as are the parties 
themselves. Three distinct subgroups of  Social Democratic parties emerge 
from the analysis. There are eight parties which are narrowly placed between 
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3.26 and 3.92 points and could be described as the ‘core’ of  European Social 
Democracy, namely the Social Democrats from Italy, Spain, Belgium, Ger-
many, the Czech Republic, France, Sweden and Norway. On the left, there 
are three parties from Eastern Europe (SLD in Poland, PSD in Romania 
and MSZP in Hungary) which are clearly more left-leaning than the rest of  
the family and would fit better either into the leftist family or the green 
family. On the right side of  the core, there are two parties beyond a similar 
gap, which are the English Labour party and the Greek PASOK, which are 
at the edge of  the Christian Democratic cluster.
• The Christian Democratic family is significantly to the right of  the Social 
Democratic cluster with a mean of  5.52. Its parties are less diverse than 
those in the Social Democratic family, but nevertheless the family covers a 
broad ideological range. Two parties are clearly leaning to a position even 
further to the right, those are the Swedish Christian Democrats and the 
Greek ND.
• Close to the Christian Democratic family and mostly overlapping ideologi-
cally is the agrarian party family, at a mean of  5.95. It is comprised of  
two Nordic parties and one Polish party, of  which one (the Norwegian SP) 
seems to be significantly different from the other two. It would fit better 
to the right wing of  the Social Democratic cluster or could be considered 
the left end of  the Christian Democratic family. Also, the Polish party 
shows a very broad internal deviation, but the low number of  cases makes 
it difficult to judge whether there are two party wings or if  it is just statisti-
cal noise.
• The liberal family is situated at 6.24, which is slightly on the right of  the 
overall spectrum. Together with the conservative family, it shows the broadest 
range of  all the families. The liberal ‘space’ is covered by consistent member 
parties, which vary significantly in their mean ideology score. For example, 
the German FDP seems to tend clearly to the left, whereas the two Romanian 
liberal parties tend strongly to the right – they would well fit into the ‘con-
servative’ group.
• The conservative family is clearly on the right with a mean of  exactly 7.00 
points. Its parties also cover a broad span of  the spectrum, but only one 
party (the small Spanish CiU) deviates significantly from the core – namely 
to the left. All other parties are fitting well into the conservative cluster.
The analysis so far shows that the councillors have familiarity with the concept 
of  the left-right cleavage and can base their ideological assessment on this notion. 
There is a high correlation between their self-assessed individual ideology and the 
ideological position of  their party as they describe it; but we must be aware that 
there are some parties in the 14 countries that show significant gaps between the 
mean ideological self-assessment of  individuals and the mean ideology score for 
the party. There are for most pairs consistent correlations between ideology and 
personal attributes, and party families deliver a consistent ideological picture of  
the parties included.
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Ideology data from the survey  
and manifestos compared
In this section, I will compare data for the second-tier councillors’ assessment of  
their party’s ideology with data for party ideology from the macro level using party 
manifestos in order to find differences between competing measures of  party ideol-
ogy, namely the ideology position of  a party from the perspective of  its own coun-
cillors and party ideology judged by comparative analysis of  party manifestos 
(Volkens et al. 2014). From the comparative manifesto project data, I will use the 
central ideology variable (right-left, ‘RILE’) for the party manifest ideology. In 
order to compare the data with the Second Tier Survey, the manifesto data (where 
−100 is the extreme left and +100 is the extreme right) were recalculated to an 
11-point scale to match the scale of  the second tier data.
On the electoral ‘market’, parties tend to maximize their electoral outcome by 
presenting voters a manifesto. Voters may compare the party’s manifesto to the 
programmatic statements of  other parties (and maybe government performance 
in the past) and try to predict what the future government will do. Before the back-
ground of  a standard normal distribution of  voters on the ideology scale, a party 
is likely to move towards the middle of  the scale: it can always win more voters 
there, even if  it loses voters who are on the edge of  the ideology room the party 
occupies (Downs 1957: 118).
Thus, we can expect parties to be more ‘centralist’ than the actual position their 
own party members are assigning to the party. We may also expect that the differ-
ence between party member assessment and the manifesto score to be larger if  the 
party is far away from the centre, because the electoral profit is much larger in the 
case of  big differences.
As Table 10.8 depicts, we see the same picture in all countries covered by the survey. 
Parties which are strongly left in the judgement of  the councillors show a manifesto 
which is much more to the right than we would normally expect – and vice versa, 
parties which are normally on the hard right show strong tendencies to the left. Inter-
estingly, the effects come with different magnitudes in different countries.
• Nine countries show the typical pattern of  parties on the brink of  the scale 
moving strongly towards the centre from both sides. This is the case in Belgium, 
where the green party and the SP.A (both left) as well as the Reform Move-
ment and the VB (both right) show big differences between ‘real’ and manifesto 
positions. It is also true for Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania, where we can see a significant divide between right parties tending 
to the left and left parties tending to the right. Italy is also a perfect example, 
where the two party blocks are separated by a significant gap in the survey 
assessment but are nearly equal regarding the manifesto scores. Spanish parties 
are similar in behaviour. The same tendency is demonstrated by Swedish 
parties, where particularly the three parties on the right try to appeal to the 
welfare-oriented voters, but where also the leftist party (V) shows a large gap 
of  more than three points between survey responses and manifesto scores.
8329-0042-PIII-010.indd   194 7/10/2015   1:24:04 PM
Table 10.8  Assessment of  party ideology and manifesto ideology
Country Party Party assessment Manifesto score Difference
N Mean Original Recalculated
Belgium groen! Green! 11 1.55 −0.85 4.96 3.41
sp.a Socialist Party Different 42 2.55 −12.61 4.37 1.82
ECOLO Ecologists 11 2.64 −31.28 3.44 0.80
PS Francophone Socialist 
Party
40 3.28 −26.61 3.67 0.39
CDH Christian Social Party 18 4.67 −24.61 3.77 −0.90
CD&V 66 4.88 7.25 5.36 0.48
openVLD. 41 5.95 12.73 5.64 −0.31
MR Reform Movement 24 6.79 −0.22 4.99 −1.80
VB Flemish Interest 21 9.29 39.44 6.97 −2.32
Croatia SDP 40 2.53 −9.26 4.54 2.01
HSU 12 2.83 −24.38 3.78 0.95
HNS 13 3.62 −5.16 4.74 1.12
HSS 33 6.42 −8.80 4.56 −1.86
HDZ 68 7.09 −6.37 4.68 −2.41
Czech 
Republic
KSCM 17 1.66 −28.36 3.58 1.92
CSSD 20 3.36 −10.66 4.47 1.11
KDU-CSL 10 6.36 1.54 5.08 −1.28
ODS 21 7.97 11.19 5.56 −2.41
England Labour 16 4.38 −1.50 4.93 0.55
Liberal Democrats 29 5.33 4.66 5.23 −0.10
Conservative 72 6.54 17.54 5.88 −0.66
France PCF French Communist Party 13 1.08 −48.00 2.60 1.52
PS Socialist Party 103 3.38 −21.26 3.94 0.56
Germany Die Linke 62 1.29 −34.57 3.27 1.98
Grüne 167 2.87 −19.59 4.02 1.15
SPD 330 3.28 −23.57 3.82 0.54
FDP 78 4.99 14.04 5.70 0.71
CDU 330 5.12 2.56 5.13 0.01
CSU 83 5.76 2.56 5.13 −0.63
Greece PASOK 83 4.47 −9.49 4.53 0.06
ND 55 7.00 −17.59 4.12 −2.88
Hungary MSzP 12 2.58 −15.20 4.24 1.66
FiDeSz 46 6.17 −4.46 4.78 −1.39
Italy PD 39 3.26 −6.86 4.66 1.40
PdL 32 6.19 3.81 5.19 −1.00
Norway SV Socialist Left Party 10 2.73 −40.11 2.99 0.26
AP Labour Party 91 3.92 −29.79 3.51 −0.41
SP Centre Party 16 4.32 −20.41 3.98 −0.34
KrF Christian People’s Party 16 5.68 −11.08 4.45 −1.23
V Liberal Party 16 6.25 −18.53 4.07 −2.18
FrP Progress Party 21 7.58 6.76 5.34 −2.24
H Conservative Party 49 7.29 −11.40 4.43 −2.86
(Continued )
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Country Party Party assessment Manifesto score Difference
N Mean Original Recalculated
Poland SLD 15 1.87 −0.90 4.96 3.09
PSL 18 6.17 18.30 5.92 −0.25
PO 13 6.46 −4.41 4.78 −1.68
Romania PSD 40 2.53 −12.91 4.35 1.82
UDM/RMDSz 14 5.64 −2.64 4.87 −0.77
PD-L 28 7.68 4.95 5.25 −2.43
PNL 37 7.78 12.89 5.64 −2.14
Spain IU 13 1.31 −36.86 3.16 1.85
PSOE (socialist) 68 3.26 −27.23 3.64 0.38
CiU 13 5.23 −10.86 4.46 −0.77
PP (conservative) 62 6.56 −3.45 4.83 −1.73
Sweden V Left Party 77 1.18 −12.20 4.39 3.21
AP Social Democratic Party 460 3.64 −32.27 3.39 −0.25
MP Green Ecology Party 62 4.32 −9.16 4.54 0.22
CP Centre Party 97 6.19 −2.24 4.89 −1.30
FP Liberal People’s Party 84 6.38 −4.80 4.76 −1.62
Kd Christian Democrats 55 6.80 8.14 5.41 −1.39
MSP Moderate Coalition 
Party
290 7.38 2.48 5.12 −2.26
Source: Second Tier Survey
Table 10.8  (Continued)
• Four countries show a lopsided picture, where only one side of  the system 
shows big differences. First, there is France, where only the left part of  the 
system could have been included in the analysis (see earlier). In Germany, 
the party Die Linke – and, to a lesser extent, the Green Party – show a gap 
to the right, whereas the other parties show quite consistent scores. Norway 
resembles the picture of  Sweden, where right-wing parties are strongly 
reaching out to centrist voters, but without the corresponding picture of  the 
left side of  the aisle.
• The sole exception is England, where the Conservatives and Labour show 
a minor difference as expected, but the magnitude is very low. This seems 
to be an effect of  the first-past-the-post electoral system, where the parties 
can be expected to be even closer to each other both concerning the personal 
ideology of  their members and their manifestos.
Conclusions
Looking at the Second Tier Survey responses of  elected councillors, we can learn 
a number of  things about individual and party ideology in the countries covered 
by the survey. First, it is notable that measuring ideology by asking for self-assess-
ment and party assessment on a one-dimensional scale makes sense for the 
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overwhelming majority of  the population in the sample: the left-right cleavage is 
still alive. Second, there is significant variation concerning within-party deviation 
from the mean, i.e. there are broad ‘catch-all’ parties and parties surviving in an 
electoral ‘niche’. Third, parties in Europe are very diverse concerning the linkages 
between ideology and personal attributes. Fourth, we can observe the effects of  
party competition in the various European countries, where – in line with the 
economic theory of  democracy – parties tend to polish their manifesto to less 
‘extreme’ policy statements in order to collect votes from the more centrist voters. 
Unfortunately, the survey only covers 14 countries; so much more research is 
needed covering a larger range of  countries and parties within those countries.
Notes
1 Some of  the teams used a scale with 10 points (either from 0 to 9 or from 1 to 10) instead 
of  the 11-point scale; this was compensated for by recalculating the values to the 11 point 
scale.
2 The regional/level was only included in the questionnaire if  applicable, i.e. if  the respec-
tive level exists in the country. The German Länder or Italy’s regions are typical examples 
of  this level.
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11 Actors’ influence and horizontal 
power relations at the second tier 
of local government
Panagiotis Getimis and Nikos Hlepas
Introduction
The consolidation and strengthening of  executive power at all levels of  local gov-
ernment tends to limit traditional collective decision making within the council 
( John 2001; Hambleton 2002; Getimis and Hlepas 2013).1 According to the leader-
ship and reform debate, this development is linked with various dynamics in the 
European countries: personalization of  politics and institutional trends or direct 
election of  mayors in the last decades (in Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere, see Hambleton 2011, 2015) changed the balances of  influence and 
power not only between the executive (mayors) and the council but also between 
elected politicians and professional administrators (Hambleton and Sweeting 
2014). In several countries, there were also tendencies towards privatization and 
outsourcing of  a part of  municipal services, actions that seem to weaken the tra-
ditional role of  municipal bureaucracies and even that of  elected assemblies. At 
the same time, political leadership was strengthened – including the role of  leading 
bureaucrats of  the local government administration, i.e. chief  executive officers 
(CEOs), who act as interlocutors and negotiators on the part of  local government 
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014).
Thus, executive leadership seems to gain power in local politics, while represen-
tative bodies and assemblies in which democratic decisions are traditionally 
debated and taken seem to lose ground.
In the present era of  ‘complexity and plurality’ (Jessop 1998) new governance 
forms emerge, in which public actors, like local government and administration, 
are not the only steering institutions. Furthermore, it is argued that private 
actors and semi-public agencies are becoming more influential in new gover-
nance arrangements (Denters and Rose 2005; Heinelt 2010: 53–54), while 
elected politicians and leading bureaucrats increasingly act within a web of  
multiple players (from the business community and the civil society), who exert 
influence on local government decisions. In the framework of  growing influence 
of  networks in public policy, the role of  leaders ‘is on steering, influencing, and 
co-ordinating the actions of  others’ (Hambleton 2007: 164). Following this 
approach, municipalities and counties would be expected to experience growing 
influence of  non- governmental local actors.
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At the same time, upper levels of  government (state level, European level) exert 
diverse influence on the local level. This occurs within multi-level governance 
arrangements, which differ among countries (e.g. varying dependence of  the local 
level from state funds, instructions and planning guidelines, varying configuration 
of  central/regional relations, varying openness and responsiveness of  local govern-
ment to European policies, etc.). The recent financial crisis particularly affected 
the European periphery, revitalizing, in most cases, institutional reflexes of  re-
centralization that disempowered local assemblies. Conversely, local executive lead-
ers could experience a strengthening of  their roles as advocates and interlocutors 
within the context of  the crisis. Therefore, different manifestations of  vertical inter-
governmental relations would emerge among the different European countries, as 
it has been systematically analysed by Sellers and Lidstrom (2007) who measured 
the strengths of  local capacities and degrees of  upper-level supervision.
In this chapter we first refer to the applied approach and the main research 
questions. The second part examines the horizontal power relations in different 
local governments types, while the third part focuses on the perceptions of  council-
lors, presidents and leading bureaucrats (CEOs) of  the second tier of  local govern-
ment, in the analysed countries, concerning the influence of  particular 
non-governmental actors and of  the upper level of  government over activities on 
the second tier. In the fourth part relations between actors will be highlighted 
against the background of  the frequency of  contacts among them and the electoral 
support provided to politicians by different categories of  actors. Finally, conclusions 
are drawn, answering the initial research questions.
Approach and main research hypotheses
We are following a twofold approach: On one hand we are referring to the hori-
zontal power relations’ typology of  Mouritzen and Svara (2002) as it has been 
adapted for the second level by Heinelt and Bertrana (2011) and, on the other 
hand, to perceptions about actors’ influence prevailing in three different groups of  
respondents to the empirical survey in 14 European countries: councillors, presi-
dents and CEOs of  the second tier of  local government.
The Mouritzen/Svara typology makes a major distinction between elected poli-
ticians (presidents and councillors) acting as laypeople on the one side and leading 
professional bureaucrats, on the other side. The latter engage their expert knowl-
edge and usually have a long term activity in a machinery of  administration 
marked by continuity, following service rules and duties (Mouritzen and Svara 
2002). Another distinction is made between presidents that overtake an executive 
leadership role and councillors being members of  an elected body, acting as rep-
resentatives of  the people (Getimis and Hlepas 2013: 146).
We expect that empirical findings about perceptions of  influence will reflect the 
patterns of  different horizontal power relations at the second tier of  local govern-
ment as categorized by strong leader form, committee-leader form, collective form, 
council-manager form.
Referring to the different horizontal power relations at the second tier of  local 
government in the examined countries and following the typology developed by 
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Mouritzen and Svara (2002: 55–66), Heinelt and Bertrana (2011) summarise the 
main patterns of  the relationships among the head of  the county, the county coun-
cil and the leading bureaucrats as following:
1. A strong leader form (similar to the ‘strong mayor’ form) exists where an elected 
leader ‘controls the majority [. . .] of  the council and is legally and in actual-
ity in full charge of  all executive functions’ (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 55). 
This form is found in Greece, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Croatia and most 
parts of  Germany. It also prevails in France, in Spain and in two additional 
federal states of  Germany (Baden-Württemberg, Schleswig-Holstein), where 
the head of  the county, although not directly elected, is legally and actually 
in full charge of  executive functions and controls the majority of  the council. 
In these countries, we expect that the empirical survey will show high scores 
of  perceived influence concerning county presidents.
2. A committee-leader form can be found where executive powers are shared among 
a political leader (who may or may not control the council) and standing com-
mittees composed of  elected politicians, while administrative actors also have 
important executive roles (Mouritzen and Svara 2002). This form is found in 
Sweden. We expect that influence of  committee presidents and CEOs will be 
relatively strong, compared to other forms of  horizontal power relations.
3. A collective form can be expected where an executive committee, a collegiate 
body, is fully in charge of  all executive functions. The ‘executive committee’ 
consists of  elected politicians and a leader, who presides (Mouritzen and 
Svara 2002). This form is found in Belgium and England in the form of  
the leader-cabinet model, after the Local Government Act 2000. Also Poland 
and the Czech Republic as well as the German federal state of  Hesse belong 
to this type, since the county council elects an executive board responsible 
for executive functions (Swianiewicz 2011: 191; Heinelt and Bertrana 2011: 
321). In this group, we expect strong scores of  perceived influence for the 
executive board and the county president.
4. A council-manager form exists in Norway where all the executive functions are 
in the hand of  a professional administrative officer who is appointed by the 
council. We expect the CEO and the executive board to reach high scores 
of  influence.
We will further investigate whether and how perceptions of  councillors, presi-
dents and CEOs differ concerning the influence of  different actors at the second 
tier of  local government. We will focus on non-governmental actors (outside the 
county hall) and more precisely on actors from specific economic sectors (e.g. pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary sector, tourism) as well as on civic actors (journalists,2 
NGOs, trade unions). Additionally, we will examine the vertical dimension con-
cerning the influence of  upper levels of  government on county activities.
We presume that executive leaders (administrative CEOs and the president) 
perform distinctive roles and have different perceptions about actors’ influence that 
will differ from ordinary councillors, since executives have to anticipate policy 
formulation and get things done, and often have to intensively interact with actors 
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involved in policy implementation. Conversely, ordinary councillors, as popular 
representatives participating in formal decision making of  elected bodies, need to 
maintain bonds to their followers and the wider public (Getimis and Hlepas 2013). 
Compared to executive office holders, their perceptions about influence are 
expected to focus less on specific actors. Ordinary councillors would rather refer 
to disperse and less intensive influence of  non-governmental actors. In addition, 
perceptions about influence of  particular actors (or actor categories) will be com-
pared with the frequency of  contacts the respondents declare to have with these 
actors and groups of  actors. Elected politicians with executive functions (presi-
dents) and CEOs are expected to have more frequent contacts to wider sets of  
actors than ordinary councillors. Finally, the variable of  electoral support can 
reveal bonds of  elected politicians to different actors. Moreover, we will test if  a 
significant correlation exists between electoral support to elected politicians, the 
frequency of  their contacts and their perceptions of  influence.
Horizontal power relations
In the Second Tier Survey, presidents, councillors and CEOs were asked to respond 
to the following prompt: ‘On the basis of  your experience [. . .] in this county, and 
independently of  the formal procedures, please indicate how much influence each 
Table 11.1  Perceived influence of  actors by responding actors acting under different forms 
of  horizontal power relations at the second tier of  local government
Actors whose influence 
were assessed
Role of  the assessing respondents
Strong leader Committee-
leader
Collective Council-
manager
Councillor president CEOs Councillors Councillor President CEOs Councillor
Political actors 3.52 3.62 3.67 3.42 3.59 3.64 4.09 3.67
County president 4.71 4.66 4.89 4.40 4.60 4.48 4.84 4.16
Executive board 3.89 4.15 4.08 4.34 4.30 4.40 4.57 4.28
President of  the 
council
3.34 3.27 3.70 2.78 3.32 3.50 3.95
Presidents 
of  council 
committees
3.13 3.08 3.09 3.36 3.04 3.15 3.83 3.70
Single councillors 
without official 
functions
2.47 2.80 2.68 2.21 2.64 2.62 3.21 2.57
Administrative/
professional actors
3.32 3.46 3.27 3.67 3.14 3.42 3.08 3.65
Chief  executive 
officer (CEO)
3.58 4.07 3.76 4.28 3.37 3.44 3.48 4.30
heads of  
departments
3.49 3.86 3.56 3.84 3.34 3.75 3.31 3.87
Source: Second Tier Survey
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of  the following actors have over county activities’. Respondents assessed influence 
on a scale from 1 (‘none’) to 5 (‘very high’). In the following tables we show the 
influence scores of  political and administrative actors as perceived by councillors, 
presidents and CEOs in the aforementioned four types of  horizontal power 
configurations.3
The empirical findings confirm the hypothesis that within the strong leader form, 
county presidents are assessed by all groups of  respondents to exercise much stron-
ger influence than any other political or administrative actor. Their position seems 
to be unchallenged by any other actor inside the county. However, this strong 
leadership position of  the president is not exclusive, since other actors exercising 
executive functions are reaching relatively high scores; indeed, the executive board 
(political actor) and the CEO (administrative/professional actors) reach scores 
which are much higher than the rest of  the actors. However, single ordinary coun-
cillors have the lowest scores of  influence, revealing their weak position in the 
strong leader form of  second-tier government.
In the committee-leader form (represented exclusively by Sweden in our sample), 
empirical findings about perceptions of  councillors (the only respondents to be 
taken into account) seem to confirm the assumptions about the relative strength of  
different actors sharing executive functions (county president, presidents of  council 
committees, executive board, CEOs). However, single councillors have particularly 
low scores of  influence. In Sweden, administrative/professional actors reach com-
paratively high scores of  influence, probably due to the fact that leadership and 
executive functions are shared.
In the collective form empirical findings show that both county presidents and 
executive boards, being in charge of  main executive functions, have the highest 
scores, while administrative actors (even the CEO) score obviously lower. Single 
councillors also have low scores in this form.
The initial assumption concerning the council-manager form was confirmed by the 
empirical findings in Norway (where this form is exclusively represented in our 
sample).4 This is the only form where the county president scores lower than the 
executive board and the CEO. Administrative/professional actors reach relatively 
strong scores, just as it has been found in the committee leader form.
All in all, the main features of  the horizontal power relations captured by 
Mouritzen/Svara typology and adapted by Bertrana and Heinelt for the sec-
ond tier of  local government have been confirmed by the empirical findings: 
in the committee leader and council-manager form, both represented by 
Nordic countries (Sweden and Norway respectively), political actors are not 
stronger than administrative/actors, while in the strong leader and collective 
form political actors are obviously stronger than administrative actors. Both 
political and administrative actors with executive functions reach higher scores 
in all forms of  second tier government. However, single ordinary councillors 
without official functions score lower in all aforementioned forms. These find-
ings seem to confirm the weak influence of  representative bodies (and their 
members) compared to the influence of  politicians and administrators holding 
executive offices.
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Perceptions of  actors’ influence
County presidents, CEOs and councillors participate in various decision-making 
procedures of  county policies, at different stages (problem identification, agenda 
setting, policy formulation, decision, implementation, evaluation). Elected county 
politicians and CEOs have important institutional, managerial and local knowl-
edge concerning networks of  influence affecting county activities. Therefore, it is 
obvious that their assessment concerning the relative influence of  different actors 
over county activities is significant.
Actors supposed to exercise influence have been categorized into three major 
categories that were further sub-divided into five groups: A first, major distinction 
has been made at county level between governmental and non-governmental 
actors. Governmental actors hold public offices in county institutions (councillors, 
heads of  departments etc.). Non-governmental actors are connected to business 
(e.g. tourism, trade) and/or civic (associations, unions etc.) roles and interests. 
A third, distinct category is formed by public actors at upper levels of  government 
(e.g. MPs, ministers), in order to illustrate vertical influence.
The category of  governmental actors is further subdivided into two groupings 
alongside the well-known distinction between laypeople and professionals (Mou-
ritzen and Svara, 2002: 51–52): On one hand, there is the group of  elected politi-
cians and bodies (country president, executive board, president of  the council, 
presidents of  council committees or even single ordinary councillors without 
official functions). On the other, there is a group of  professionals, CEOs which 
lead the county, or heads of  departments which lead units of  county administra-
tion. Elected politicians are accountable to the electorate and responsive to citi-
zen’s claims and demands. Political leaders promote value choices, mobilise 
capacities and feed energy into the policy system, giving direction to govern-
ment and exercising power. However, politicians remain government amateurs 
who lack expertise on the details of  the executive operation, while they often 
tend to follow short-term strategies focusing on their own re-election and some-
times lack the knowledge that is indispensable for proper administrative decision 
making. The complexity of  today’s problems and policy instruments as well as 
the rising importance of  technical aspects in policy making seem to increase the 
influence of  professionalism and expertise. Professional administrators account-
able to elected politicians are often able to address general, long-term problems 
that politicians tend to circumvent and citizens are mostly unwilling to recog-
nize. The influence of  professionals and experts is not the same in every institu-
tion; it differs depending on broader contexts, the tasks of  the relevant 
institutions and the level of  politicisation. On one hand, we expect the influence 
of  politicians in a highly politicised institution, such as the county, to be much 
stronger than the influence of  professionals and experts. On the other, we expect 
the influence of  politicians exercising executive functions and holding powerful 
posts to be stronger than the influence of  politicians with simple representative 
and deliberative tasks. Direct election is expected, of  course, to further 
strengthen the position of  politicians. Among professionals, we expect people 
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leading administrative units inside the county administration to be less influential 
than the CEOs.
Concerning vertical exercise of  influence, we expect upper levels of  government to 
obviously be less important than county politicians and administrators and prob-
ably even less important than non-governmental actors at county level. It is true 
that decision making on legal frameworks and allocation of  resources affecting 
county activities takes place at higher levels (parliament, government). County 
politicians and leading administrators (CEOs), however, would not stress the influ-
ence of  upper levels and put their own roles and discretion into question.
Finally, we anticipate deviation in perceptions of  influence among the three 
groups of  respondents (presidents, councillors, CEOs), since their point of  view is 
expected to be different according to their distinctive roles and tasks.
All three groups of  respondents perceive influence of  governmental actors to be 
much stronger than the influence of  non-governmental actors. Within the category 
of  non-governmental actors all sets of  respondents (county presidents, councillors, 
CEOs) consider the influence of  the subgroup of  political actors to be more 
Table 11.2  Perceptions of  councillors, presidents and CEOs about influence of  different 
actors and bodies over county activities (mean values)
Type of  actors Role of  respondent
Councillor President CEO
A. Local governmental actors 3.44 3.56 3.56
I. Elected/political actors 3.54 3.62 3.79
1. County president 4.66 4.63 4.87
2. Executive board 4.05 4.20 4.23
3. President of  the council 3.28 3.32 3.79
4. Presidents of  council committees 3.11 3.10 3.28
5. Single councillors without official functions 2.51 2.77 2.82
II. Administrative actors 3.30 3.45 3.22
1. CEO 3.58 3.94 3.69
2. Heads of  departments 3.48 3.84 3.50
B. Non-governmental actors 2.42 2.71 2.38
I. Representatives of  sectoral interests 2.40 2.71 2.34
1. Primary sector businesses 2.35 2.74 2.31
2. Secondary sector enterprises 2.44 2.80 2.37
3. Construction/real estate sector enterprises 2.41 2.55 2.25
4. Trade sector enterprises 2.38 2.60 2.24
5. Tourist sector enterprises 2.44 2.87 2.53
II. Civic actors 2.43 2.72 2.42
1. Local trade unions 2.32 2.73 2.46
2. Local associations 2.46 2.69 2.47
3. Journalists 2.71 2.81 2.59
4. The Church/religious groups 2.24 2.65 2.12
C. Actors from upper levels of  governance 
(MPs or ministers from the region)
2.98 2.64 2.92
Source: Second Tier Survey
8329-0042-PIII-011.indd   205 7/10/2015   2:38:07 PM
206 P. Getimis and N. Hlepas
important than the influence of  administrators. County presidents are considered 
to have the strongest influence, followed (where they exist) by executive boards. 
Politicians exercising executive functions are obviously considered to be more influ-
ential than politicians with representative and deliberative roles (members of  the 
assembly at county level). Presidents of  council committees and presidents of  coun-
cils have a key role in defining the agenda and coordinating decision-making pro-
cedures in collective bodies (council and committees) and their influence is therefore 
perceived to be stronger than the influence of  single ‘ordinary’ councillors but not 
stronger than the influence of  CEOs and the heads of  departments.
Among county politicians, single councillors are the only ones whose influence 
over county activities is considered to clearly be weaker than the influence of  
administrators (CEOs and heads of  departments). This is a finding that illustrates 
the comparatively small share of  power exercised by county assemblies – although 
in most countries, most important decisions are formally taken by the county coun-
cils. By means of  party and/or personal loyalties and other means of  persuasion, 
politicians with executive and directing posts (presidents, chairs of  collective bodies 
etc.) seem to be able to control a great deal of  decision-making procedures in col-
lective bodies and especially in assemblies/councils. Therefore, single ‘ordinary’ 
councillors consider themselves to be less influential even compared to non-elected 
top bureaucrats. The latter play key roles in defining problems and setting agendas 
as well as in implementing county policies, while they have easier access to informa-
tion and possess wider and deeper knowledge of  country organization and proce-
dures. They know their way through the secret corridors of  invisible bureaucratic 
power (Klausen and Magnier 1998). Among the professional administrators and 
experts, CEO influence is considered to be just a bit stronger than the influence of  
heads of  departments. Although hierarchically CEOs are placed over the heads of  
departments in most of  the countries under investigation, it seems that long-term 
embeddedness within county bureaucracy is strengthening the position of  heads 
of  departments, probably counterbalancing hierarchical supremacy of  CEOs.
Among the different non-governmental actors, journalists seem to stand out: 
their influence is perceived to be comparatively stronger, especially by presidents 
(which comes at no surprise since political leaders are more exposed to media and 
often become the target of  their criticisms). Other civic actors and representatives 
of  sectoral interests are considered to reach lower levels of  influence. Actors from 
different economic sectors have similar, non-deviating scores of  perceived influ-
ence.5 This is a finding that is similar to a previous one about European municipali-
ties and their councillors, where perceived (by municipal councillors) influence of  
business interests over municipal activities was found to be obviously weaker than 
the influence of  public actors (Plüss and Kübler 2013: 207).
Concerning upper levels of  government, perceived influence reaches scores 
slightly surpassing the middle of  the 1–5 scale, which is just a bit stronger than the 
influence of  non-governmental actors. This last finding, once more, matches find-
ings from the aforementioned survey about the influence of  upper levels of  govern-
ment over municipal activities (Plüss and Kübler 2013: 207). It seems that at both 
tiers of  local government in Europe the perceived influence of  elected politicians 
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and especially of  local leaders is obviously stronger than the influence of  non-
governmental, civic actors and representatives from the business community, which 
means that democratically legitimised decision making is still seen as dominant.
Perceptions about the influence of  political actors show that there are not very 
strong differences among the executives (presidents, CEOs) and the representatives 
(councillors). Presidents (who often have to deal with the socio-economic environ-
ment of  their county in order to get things done) would tend to give more emphasis 
on the influence of  non-governmental actors (representatives of  business commu-
nity and civic actors) than councillors and CEOs would. The same applies with 
regard to administrative/professional actors, whose influence is rated compara-
tively higher by presidents. Concerning upper levels of  governance, councillors and 
CEOs perceive a stronger vertical influence than the presidents do. This could 
mean that councillors and CEOs perceive stronger upper level influence over the 
top politician of  the county, the president, while he or she would not admit that 
this is a fact.
Influence of  different actors and bodies over county activities is expected to dif-
fer according to national contexts. Party systems and political cultures, institutional 
designs and fiscal systems, distinct welfare state traditions and democratic legacies 
certainly affect the positions and influence of  different actors in European counties. 
But do all these differences result into visible deviations of  perceived influence? Are 
the various models of  European local government systems (Hesse and Sharpe 
1991; Page and Goldsmith 1987; Wollmann 2000; Heinelt and Hlepas 2006, 
Sellers and Lidström 2007) reflected into deviations of  perceived influence?
Figure 11.1  CEOs’, presidents’ and councillors’ assessments on the influence of  different 
actor categories (mean values)
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Table 11.3 refers to the perceptions of  all three groups of  respondents (council-
lors, presidents and CEOs). Concerning perceived influence of  representatives of  
sectoral interests and civic actors over county activities, Romania obviously sur-
passes other countries, while Sweden has the lowest scores in this category. Roma-
nia reaches the highest score for civic actors, while Hungary has the lowest score. 
Political actors seem to be particularly influential in Spain, while Belgium shows 
the comparatively lowest score, but it is worth mentioning that deviations among 
countries are not big in this category. Professional administrators are most influen-
tial in Sweden and England (both countries have large county administrations, 
while in the English county managers are very important), while they are least 
influential in Poland, the Czech Republic and Croatia (countries where the second 
level of  local government falls short of  administrative infrastructure; see DEXIA 
2008). Finally, upper levels of  government are most important in Hungary and 
Romania (where counties are strongly dependent from upper levels), followed by 
Croatia, Spain and Greece, which are typical cases of  centralistic political systems, 
while on the other hand in Sweden, the Czech Republic and Norway, upper levels 
of  government have the lowest scores of  influence over county activities according 
to survey respondents.
With the exception of  findings concerning upper levels of  government, the 
aforementioned empirical results, however, cannot be connected to particular 
typologies of  local government systems (e.g. the Hesse/Sharpe typology). It seems 
that national contexts prescribe perceived influence of  political, administrative, 
business and societal actors, while local government typologies catch broader 
Table 11.3  Perceived influence of  actors and bodies over county activities in 14 European 
countries (mean values)
Country Representatives 
of  business 
community
Civic actors Political actors Administrators Upper levels  
of  government
Belgium 2.47 2.35 3.26 3.27 2.92
Croatia 2.47 2.44 3.42 3.01 3.20
Czech Rep. 2.39 2.35 3.44 2.99 2.69
England 2.41 2.33 3.32 3.70 2.84
France 2.50 2.29 3.53 3.26 3.04
Germany 2.34 3.48 3.32 3.02
Greece 2.65 2.73 3.56 3.02 3.13
Hungary 2.28 2.26 3.68 3.47 3.81
Italy 2.60 2.78 3.54 3.41 2.75
Norway 2.47 2.47 3.68 3.63 2.72
Poland 2.18 2.39 3.81 2.97 2.94
Romania 2.81 2.92 3.58 3.52 3.58
Spain 2.68 2.75 3.97 3.43 3.17
Sweden 1.90 2.29 3.42 3.67 2.26
Total Europe 14 2.48 2.52 3.65 3.32 2.84
Source: Second Tier Survey
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common characteristics in country groupings (e.g. vertical power relations and 
relations to upper levels of  governance in ‘Franco’ or ‘Northern’ types of  local 
government, or horizontal power relations in the Mouritzen/Svara typology). Nev-
ertheless, it is worth mentioning that deviations among single countries are the 
strongest when it comes to perceived influence of  upper levels of  government.
Frequency of  contacts and electoral support
While perceptions of  influence are subjective estimations, personal interactions 
with concrete actors are factual matters. Another variable used in the survey on 
the second tier of  local government refers to the communication behaviour of  
presidents, CEOs and councillors. Frequency of  contact in a given period of  time 
is often used in social network analysis as proxy indicator in order to estimate the 
strength of  interpersonal relationship. Furthermore, the frequency of  contact to 
specific actors can offer a picture how the respondent sees and fulfils his or her own 
role (Plüss and Kübler 2013: 212) and his or her own aspirations. Therefore, all 
three questionnaires (for councillors, presidents and CEOs) included the following 
question: ‘How frequently do you have contact with the following individuals or 
groups?’
Out of  a large number of  actors (22) originally included in the survey, we have 
chosen five business actors with different sectoral interests and four civic actors. We 
have put aside governmental actors inside the county house (committee leaders, 
civil servants etc.) because respondents are also acting in the county and it is obvi-
ous that contacts to actors inside the county would be very often. In addition to 
that, contacts with party members and the party organization have been also put 
Table 11.4  Frequency of  interaction with different actors in period of  observation (percent-
age of  reported contacts of  at least a few times a month)
Type of  actor Role of  respondents and the frequency of  
their contacts
Councillor President CEO
I. Representatives of  sectoral interests 26.5 48.7 5.8
1. Primary sector businesses 35.1 49.5 3.4
2. Secondary sector enterprises 24.8 54.3 4.1
3. Construction/real estate sector enterprises 23.5 43.3 8.2
4. Trade sector enterprises 23.3 43.2 7.5
5. Tourist sector enterprises 26.0 53.2 5.5
II. Civic actors 31.3 57.8 24.1
1. Local trade unions 22.2 39.1 23.3
2. Local associations 38.7 57.7 24.0
3. Journalists 41.8 88.1 40.0
4. The Church/religious groups 22.5 45.9 9.9
External/non-governmental actors in total 29.3 53.1 14.7
Source: Second Tier Survey
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aside, since elected politicians would obviously have frequent contact to party 
members and organizations.6
Respondents could answer on a four-point scale, starting with 1 (almost never 
having contact), 2 (a few times a year), 3 (a few times a month) and finally, 4 (a few 
times a week). Because the frequency of  contacts is measured on an ordinal and 
not on an interval scale, we used percentages of  respondents choosing answers 3 
and 4. According to the findings, presidents seem to reach a much higher frequency 
of  contacts (compared to councillors and CEOs) to all types of  the aforementioned 
actors. Councillors surpass the frequency of  contacts declared by respondent 
CEOs. These findings are not surprising: they seem to confirm the leadership roles 
of  county presidents, who participate in many kinds of  social networks in order to 
get things done and mobilize capacities and resources, but also in order to repro-
duce loyalties and mutual support. It also comes to no surprise that journalists are 
the actors that all three groups of  respondents most frequently contact. Least fre-
quent contact with to local trade unions reflect the declining roles of  unions, just 
as similar findings for the church and religious groups do. Contact with civil actors 
is more frequent than contact with business actors. Business actors of  the primary 
sector seem to surpass frequency of  contact with most of  the other business actors 
(under the exception of  tourism and second-sector businesses when it comes to 
county presidents).
Among the different countries, frequency of  contacts to business and civic actors 
seem to be obviously higher in some countries (Hungary, Italy, Greece). The con-
tact to business actors is more frequent only in Hungary (and just slightly more 
frequent in Croatia), while in all other countries contacts to civic actors are more 
frequent (and most frequent in Italy, Greece, Spain and England). Once more, 
relation of  these findings to local government types is not visible, while specific 
national contexts could probably offer some explanation.
Relations to different actors also include electoral support (probably also 
abstain from support or even opposition) to county politicians. Electoral support 
is probably the most important and the most desirable kind of  support that 
county politicians can obtain from different actors. Support is also a proxy vari-
able reflecting the relation between the different actors and elected county politi-
cians. Electoral support indicates trust in certain politicians. It is often connected 
to reciprocity and reciprocal support, or at least to possibilities of  easier access 
of  the electorate to politicians after the election. There is an inevitable tension 
in the relationship among elected politicians and followers. As Hambleton and 
Sweeting underline,
On the one hand, leaders who are forever looking over their shoulders, to see 
whether the followers are still there, are unlikely to provide the needed vision 
and inspiration. Equally, the leader who has a bold agenda, but neglects the 
important task of  winning and sustaining strong backing for the new vision, 
may soon come unstuck.
(2014: 3)
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The two categories of  elected county politicians (presidents and councillors) in 
the survey were asked about actors supported their electoral campaign. More pre-
cisely, the question was the following: ‘As a candidate in the last election, to what 
extent did you have the support of  the following groups?’
Respondents could answer in a five-point scale from 1 (‘not at all’) to 5 (‘very 
great’) to describe support from different actors during the last election. It is no 
surprise that, according to the findings, presidents had much stronger (compared 
to councillors) electoral support from all types of  private actors. Among these 
actors, local trade unions seem to offer the strongest support both to presidents and 
councillors, while no important differences were found when comparing support 
by the group of  business actors with the support by the group of  civic actors. Once 
more, business actors from the primary sector seem to be particularly important 
for gathering support, while the same applies (in relation to presidents) for journal-
ists. It is worth mentioning that presidents, who often exercise ceremonial func-
tions, have rated the support of  the Church to themselves much higher than the 
single councillors did.
From support to influence: a circle  
of  power (reproduction)?
As already mentioned, we would expect that a close relation characterised by trust 
and mutual support would include and combine findings of  relatively often con-
tacts to relatively strong electoral support.
According to empirical findings, Spearman non-parametric7 correlation between 
the frequency of  contacts and electoral support8 is significant in all countries (with 
Table 11.5  Electoral support (percentage of  reports of  at least some electoral support) from 
various types of  actors
Type of  actor Role of  respondents and their electoral 
support
Councillor President Both
I. Representatives of  sectoral interests 10.5 23.1 11.7
1. Primary sector businesses 19.6 32.8 20.9
2. Secondary sector enterprises 7.8 21.6 9.1
3. Construction/real estate sector enterprises 7.1 20.3 8.5
4. Trade sector enterprises 9.3 20.1 10.3
5. Tourist sector enterprises 8.5 20.2 9.7
II. Civic actors 11.2 21.5 11.9
1. Local trade unions 23.1 34.8 23.9
2. Local associations 7.1 15.0 7.6
3. Journalists 8.5 19.8 9.3
4. The Church/religious groups 6.0 16.5 6.8
non-governmental actors in total 10.9 22.3 11.8
Source: Second Tier Survey
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the exception of  Hungary, which is obviously an outlier) and most significant in 
Spain, while comparatively least significant in Germany. In other words, elected 
politicians tend to maintain bonds to their supporters, often contacting them after 
their election to office. This attitude could be related to the influence of  these sup-
porters in local affairs (see also Figures 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6) and to re-election 
strategies of  political personnel. However, relation to these supporters are not 
everywhere the same, obviously depending on national contexts.
In a next step we will try to find out whether the strength of  the relationship 
between electoral contacts and support is associated with the perception of  influ-
ence of  non-governmental actors by visually representing the relationship via scat-
ter diagrams. We hypothesise that elected politicians would receive stronger 
electoral support and have more frequent contacts to these actors, whose influence 
on second tier of  local government is perceived by the politicians to be stronger. 
Vice versa, the politicians would receive less electoral support and have fewer 
contacts whose influence on the second tier is perceived by them to be weaker. In 
the following three figures, the function on the upper right end of  the chart illus-
trates the geometry regression line (dashed).9
Concerning all non-governmental actors, the relationship between (a) perceived 
influence and (b) the non-parametric correlation between electoral support and 
frequency of  contacts has been positive. Among the different countries, Greece 
and Spain are cases where high influence is combined with a strong correlation 
between frequency of  contacts and electoral support (see Figure 11.4). High influ-
ence is also registered in Italy and Romania (but correlation is below average). In 
France, England, Poland, the Czech Republic and Sweden the influence of  non-
governmental actors appears to be comparatively weak, but the relationship 
between support and contacts is strong. Finally, in Germany and Belgium (Hun-
gary appears as an extreme case) both the influence and the relationship between 
support and contacts score below the average.
Concerning representatives of  sectoral interests (Figure 11.5), it is obvious that 
Hungary is an outlier in which the weak correlation between electoral support and 
frequency of  contacts is combined to a much weaker (compared to the average) 
perceived influence of  sectoral interests. Spain, Greece, France, Norway and Croa-
tia are cases where both influence of  sectoral interests and correlation of  support 
and contacts are above the average. In total, however, the slope of  the line is rather 
small concerning sectoral interests, which means that the perceived influence of  
sectoral interests does not increase when the correlation between support and con-
tact becomes more intense, as it does strongly as in the case of  civic actors (see 
Figure 11.6).
Concerning civic actors, it is obvious that the slope of  the line is steeper than in 
the previous graph concerning sectoral interests. That means that when the per-
ceived influence of  civic actors is higher, the correlation between support and 
contacts becomes stronger. Spain and Greece are the countries where high per-
ceived influence of  civic actors is combined with a strong relationship between 
electoral support and frequency of  contacts. In these countries, it seems that the 
analysis of  the empirical findings confirms a ‘circle of  power reproduction’, 
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starting with high electoral support that begets a relatively high frequency of  con-
tacts, which leads to a strong influence of  civic actors, as perceived by respondents. 
Both these countries belong to the strong leader form, while local governments are 
short of  resources and therefore local leaders have strong motives for cooperation 
with civic actors, especially concerning provision of  social services (Navarro 2015, 
Hlepas 2015).
Conclusions
Empirical findings about the perceptions of  influence have reflected the patterns of  
different horizontal power relations at the second tier of  local government as catego-
rised in the Mouritzen/Svara (2002) typology and adapted by Heinelt and Bertrana 
(2011) for the second tier of  local government. Distinct positions in horizontal power 
relations are reflected in perceptions of  ordinary councillors, county presidents and 
CEOs, concerning the influence of  different actors at the second tier of  local govern-
ment. Executive leaders (administrative CEOs and the county president) perform 
distinctive roles and do not share the same perceptions with ordinary councillors, 
who focus less on specific actors and rather refer to disperse and less-intensive influ-
ence of  non-governmental actors. Then again, primacy of  politics and governmental 
actors over county activities has been confirmed by all groups of  respondents in all 
European countries. On one hand, business interests seem to be less influential at the 
county level than governance theories would anticipate. On the other, we would not 
leave out the possibility of  reporting bias, since some respondents could probably 
overestimate the role of  politicians or consider that downgrading the actual influence 
of  business interests is more appropriate and ‘politically correct’. Finally, the range 
and the importance of  county competence affecting business and sectoral interests 
seem to be rather limited in most European countries (Heinelt and Bertrana 2011). 
Lobbying would therefore tend to unfold other levels of  government, where high-
stake decisions are made (Keating and Wilson 2014).
The analysis of  the frequency of  contacts that the respondents declare to have 
with different actors has clearly shown that elected politicians with executive func-
tions (presidents and CEOs) have more frequent contact with wider sets of  actors 
than ordinary councillors.
Our analysis has revealed bonds of  elected politicians to different actors. Empiri-
cal findings show a relationship between electoral support to politicians and fre-
quency of  their contacts in most cases. Finally, in some countries, a ‘circle of  power 
reproduction’ is confirmed, starting with a high electoral support that begets a rela-
tively high frequency of  contacts, which leads to a strong influence of  civic actors.
Notes
1 The authors would like to thank Thanos Chantzaras, a PhD student at the University of  
Athens, for his help concerning statistical analysis of  the empirical data.
2 Journalists can be subsumed to the second group because they are acting in the public 
sphere as carriers of  publicity in the domain of  public dialogue and deliberation. See 
Habermas (1991: 206–210).
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3 Statistical significance of  differences between the values of  these four types of  local gov-
ernment has been confirmed through the following methods. First, the ANOVA test was 
performed. If  this test showed statistical significance, post hoc tests followed for pairwise 
comparison and more specifically the Games-Howell test, since samples had uneven sizes 
and uneven variations.
4 Only responses of  the 94 Norwegian councillors were used because only four CEOs and 
three presidents participated in the survey.
5 However, there may be differences if  single countries would have been considered clearly 
dependent on concrete sectors (e.g. tourism).
6 Since frequency of  contacts will furthermore be combined to perceptions about influence 
and no variables about perceptions of  party influence over county activities existed in the 
questionnaires, there is one more reason for leaving out party actors.
7 We are applying the Spearman non-parametric correlation. The Spearman correlation 
evaluates the monotonic relationship between two continuous or ordinal variables. In a 
monotonic relationship the variables tend to change together but not necessarily at a 
constant rate.
8 This correlation expresses the intensity of  the monotonic relationship between the two 
variables ‘frequency of  contacts’ and ‘electoral support’. In case of  a positive relationship, 
when the value of  the one variable (e.g. support) increases, the value of  the other variable 
(e.g. contacts) also increases, and the opposite, while under a negative relationship an 
increase in one variable is accompanied by a decrease of  the value of  the other variable, 
and vice versa. In a monotonic relationship, however, the variables tend to change 
together, but not necessarily at a constant way. The value of  the correlation coefficient 
ranges between −1 and +1. As the value of  the coefficient tends to 1 in absolute terms, 
the relationship becomes stronger, while a near 0 value indicates the absence of  a (linear) 
relationship between the two variables.
9 E.g. in the case of  y = 0.234x + 2.399, R2 = 0.229: y = value of  influence, x = value of  
correlation of  electoral support/frequency of  contacts, 0.234 = b coefficient of  x, 2.399 = 
intercept of  the regression line
  When x (i.e. the correlation between electoral support and frequency of  contacts) is 
near 0, which means that no (linear) relationship exists between electoral support and the 
frequency of  contacts, the perceived influence will on average reach 2.399, i.e. the point 
where the line of  linear regression intersects the axis y.
  B coefficient represents the difference in the predicted value of  y (perceived influence) 
for each one-unit difference in x (value of  correlation between electoral support and 
frequency of  contacts (ceteris paribus), i.e. it is the slope of  the regression line. In other 
words, the bigger its value the stronger the change of  perceived influence will be by a 
shift in the strength of  the relationship (value of  correlation) between the electoral sup-
port and the frequency of  contacts.
  The more the set of  observations of  the scatter plot fall near the regression line, the 
stronger the (linear) relationship between perceived influence and the correlation of  elec-
toral support and frequency of  contacts will be, and the higher the value of  the correla-
tion coefficient.
  R2 is the coefficient of  determination. It is equal to the squared value of  the correlation 
coefficient and it expresses how accurate a linear relationship (the regression line) repre-
sents the data of  the graph (e.g. if  R2 = 0.229, the applied linear model explains 22.9 per 
cent of  the variability of  perceived influence).
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12 The political career of county 
councillors in Europe
Examining the internal logic of 
professionalization and comparative  
country patterns
Xavier Bertrana, Jaume Magre, Joan Manel Sánchez, 
Kristof Steyvers, Tony Valcke and Tom Verhelst
Introduction
How do county councillors in Europe move in, through and out of  their political 
office? Following Aars et al. (2012: 64), we define political careers as ‘the various 
roads leading from initial recruitment to eventual derecruitment’. As such the 
political career commences once elected citizens who have successfully completed 
their recruitment process develop patterns of  mobility within and between posi-
tions in the political realm (Marvick 1972).
Previous comparative research projects have already shed light on the political 
career development of  politicians at the first tier of  local government (see Kjaer 
2006 for mayors; Aars et al. 2012 and Verhelst et al. 2013 for municipal councillors). 
Yet the second local government tier (i.e. the counties or their equivalents) has only 
received scant attention in academic research hitherto – despite being at the centre 
of  many sub-national state reforms in Europe recently (Bertrana and Heinelt 
2011a). Scrutinizing the political career of  politicians in the core institution of  the 
second tier thus could provide valuable information about this government level. 
Besides, research on politicians from the first local government tier has also indi-
cated that the way in which (some aspects of) political careers evolve partly deter-
mines political orientations and policy preferences in office (Bäck 2006; Steyvers 
and Verhelst 2012). Hence, we might assume that the characteristics of  the political 
careers in the county councils under study (to some extent) matter for the counties’ 
policy choices in the end as well.
Throughout the chapter we will apply the theoretical concept of  profession-
alization to structure our analysis. In the context of  a political career, the concept 
of  professionalization refers to the gradual development of  a pattern of  conduct 
with area-specific standards and routines (Cotta and Best 2000). According to 
the classic notion, the councillor office is a layperson’s affair in which amateur 
office holders comprise the council on the basis of  equality (Mouritzen and Svara 
2002). Politics should not be a separate sphere of  society, as moving in and out 
of  the council is relatively easy from almost any subfield of  society. The principles 
of  representation, permeability, amateurism and rotation in office ensure the 
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necessary representative links between the political system and society at large. 
In practice, however, the changing and challenging modern governance context 
might call for a more professional career model in which expertise, exclusiveness 
and responsiveness come to outweigh equality and representation as prevailing 
principles and routines. Ultimately, the councillor office might then become ‘a 
“career” or even a “profession”, overturning the traditional image of  voluntary 
or amateur local government representatives devoting themselves to the service 
of  the public cause’ (Guérin and Kerrouche 2008: 180). Obviously, both models 
probably coexist in different degrees within and across county councils in Europe. 
Therefore we rather envisage the layperson and professional model as two ideal 
types situated on the end of  a continuum, with different degrees of  variance in 
between.
Furthermore and in spite of  the seemingly straightforward notion of  a ‘profes-
sional political career’, professionalization is still a multilayered concept which is 
to be operationalised through more specific dimensions and corresponding indica-
tors. We choose to deconstruct political careers in four dimensions which depict 
the career development from its beginning to the end: focus, scope, locus and 
sequence (Kjær 2006; Verhelst et al. 2013). The former two dimensions refer to 
the time, dedication, duration and outlook of  the current office in the county 
council. The latter two dimensions then expand our image by including preceding 
experience and subsequent ambitions in other political offices in and outside the 
second tier of  local government. As such, our analysis will not only assess the 
substance of  a political career in the county council as such, but it will also inter-
pret the role of  (a career in) the county council within the wider political constel-
lation of  modern multi-level governance, in which different government layers 
coexist and interact.
The chapter continues as follows. First, we set out the analytical framework 
that will structure the empirical scrutiny of  councillors’ careers. The frame-
work introduces our four analytical dimensions of  the councillor career and 
operationalises them applying specific items of  the questionnaire to substanti-
ate the ideal-typical features of  the layperson–professional continuum per 
dimension. Meanwhile, corresponding hypotheses are introduced to capture 
a potential internal path-dependent logic of  professionalization in the council-
lor career at the individual level. Additionally, we outline the comparative 
framework of  our career study at the cross-national level, following the posi-
tion of  the second tier in the vertical power relations of  each country (see 
Bertrana and Heinelt 2011b). Second, the empirical part of  the study analyses 
the political careers of  the county councillors across Europe along the lines 
of  the layperson–professional continuum per dimension. In addition to 
singling out general trends in the research population, testing our individual 
hypotheses will allow for more in-depth insights into the internal logic of  
professionalization. The subsequent comparative analysis will further substan-
tiate the key findings of  this analysis by searching for their structural/
contextual origins. The findings are summarised in the concluding section of  
the chapter.
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Analytical framework
Political careers are thus understood as patterns of  positional mobility within and 
between the various layers of  the political realm. Two important analytical implica-
tions follow from this conception. First, each tenure of  any given office (i.e. position) 
should be considered as a temporal phase in a potentially wider dynamic. Careers 
are created and reshaped through the various routes leading from initial recruit-
ment (as the foundational selection process for inclusion among elected office hold-
ers as political elites) up to eventual derecruitment (where individuals renounce 
candidacy or face deselection) out of  politics (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2007; 
Aars et al. 2012). Second, individuals may bring highly divergent experiences and 
outlooks into office, but the notion of  a career assumes that dominant tendencies 
in mobility (i.e. patterns) can indeed be discerned. Some will (want to) stay a short 
period in politics as a backbencher and/or focused on one specific office, whilst 
others will (aim to) develop a lifetime vocation in more pronounced executive and/
or higher office. Careers are comprised of  more or less typical sequences of  events 
and associated with area-specific standards and routines (Eulau et al. 1961; Cotta 
and Best 2000).
Following from these assumptions, we will analyse the current office of  county 
councillor as it unfolds from its beginning towards its termination including, con-
siderations on the possibility of  a preceding and consecutive political career. Based 
on the general literature and its specific application to the realm of  local govern-
ment, we scrutinize four dimensions with regard to political careers at the second 
tier of  local government: focus, scope, locus and sequence (Kjær 2006; Verhelst 
et al. 2013). Each dimension refers to a number of  specific characteristics included 
in the various items of  our questionnaire. As outlined earlier, to organise our find-
ings we will refer to the ideal-typical layperson–professional dichotomy to grasp 
recurrences in the nature and the form of  these respective characteristics (Steyvers 
and Verhelst 2012). Our analytical framework is summarised in Table 12.1 and 
further substantiated in this chapter.
We thus start from four allegedly important career dimensions. A first central 
tenet in our conceptualisation is that within and between each pair of  dimensions 
the indicators of  professionalization tend to reinforce one another at the individual 
level. Hence, a number of  individual hypotheses are forwarded to clarify our 
assumptions and structure the empirical part of  this chapter. A second main 
Table 12.1 Dimensions of  layperson and professional career development
Career dimension Layperson Professional
Focus part-time full-time
Scope novice, discrete seasoned, non-discrete (static 
or progressive)
Locus internal (alternative) external (integrated)
Sequence base (local) manifest (supra-local)
Source: own composition by the authors
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assumption is that systematic differences in vertical power relations of  counties in 
various country settings (captured in subsequent types of  county systems) affect the 
political career of  the county councillor and the degree of  professionalization. 
Therefore, comparative analyses will build further upon the main insights from the 
individual-level counterparts.
Career dimensions and comparing individual-level 
professionalization
The first two dimensions are predominantly centred on the current mandate as 
county councillor at the second tier of  local government.
Career focus refers to the extent to which the political mandate is exclusive in terms 
of  time and dedication. This dimension is clearly associated with the Weberian 
notion of  politics as a vocation in which individuals primarily live off instead of  for 
politics. The conception of  politics as a profession would be reflected by the time 
spent in the exercise of  office to the detriment of  alternative occupational activities. 
Evidently, the most clearly professional focus would occur where politics actually 
substitutes other gainful employment and office holding becomes a full-time activ-
ity. Alternatively, the amateur concept of  the layperson model sees occupying a 
political mandate as a part-time activity usually combined with another (non-polit-
ical) profession (Guérin and Kerrouche 2008). The data do not allow us to deter-
mine whether the mandate of  county councillor as such is exercised as full-time 
profession.1 However based on the question ‘Are you a full-time politician?’ we can 
more generally distinguish between full-time and part-time politicians. The profes-
sional category will thus most likely be comprised of  councillors who either hold 
an executive mandate at the second-tier level (as in systems with fused powers 
embedding the executive in the legislature) or accumulate their council mandate 
with another elected office (provided dual mandate–holding is legally allowed and/
or politically acceptable). Finally, we can assume that the degree to which office 
holding replaces alternative occupational activity will be reflected in the time spent 
on county-related activities (as measured on a weekly basis by the question ‘How 
many hours on average do you spend on county-related activities within a week?’). 
Therefore, we hypothesise that full-time politicians will spend significantly more hours per 
week on county-related activities (H1).
Career scope refers to the conception of  the current mandate in terms of  duration 
and outlook. The first aspect is indicated by the seniority in office (as measured by 
the question ‘For how many years have you been a county councillor?’). Standardis-
ing the number of  years as a county councillor by legally determined tenures with 
the time of  data collection as a benchmark, we may discern the novice from the 
more seasoned mandate holder. To this end we take the distinction between first-
term councillors and their more experienced counterparts as a rule of  thumb for 
categorisation. Assuming that generational circulation will be fairly constant across 
political systems and counties, those in their second or subsequent mandate could 
be considered as more professional councillors. The latter category will predomi-
nantly refer to incumbent-legislators having successfully sought re-election. It also 
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hints at the possibility to develop (within-mandate) an in-house apprenticeship of  
the standards and routines of  the councillor office exemplifying the importance of  
acquiring and confirming political status and achievement in the continuous cycle 
of  political recruitment. The possibility of  mandate-related training provides 
specialised first-hand knowledge of  and experiences in the political realities of  
the second tier of  local government reinforcing the political professionalization 
of  the county councillor office (Aars et al. 2012).
Future political ambitions are often considered to be the second aspect of  career 
scope (Black 1970). Following Schlesinger’s seminal ambition theory of  politics 
(1966) we may discern between the layperson-like discrete direction (where current 
individual office holders do not primarily and actively seek re-election and aggre-
gate turnover is expected to be relatively high) and their non-discrete more profes-
sionalised counterparts. With regard to the description of  the latter group, those 
with static ambitions (seeking re-election in their current mandate) should be dis-
tinguished from their progressive counterparts (who see the current mandate as a 
spring board for upward mobility to positions perceived as higher on the political 
career ladder). This classic trifold categorisation is captured in the question ‘For 
the time being, what are you planning to do at the end of  the present position?’
Following Eliassen and Pedersen (1978) we expect that those who seek a long-term 
career in politics (indicated by non-discrete ambitions) will dedicate significantly more time 
to county-related activities (H2a). In additional, we assume that focus and scope interact 
and mutually strengthen political professionalization. Therefore, we hypothesise 
that more seasoned mandate-holders will significantly more often be full-time politicians (H2b), 
spend significantly more hours per week on county-related activities (H2c) and will significantly 
more often hold non-discrete political ambitions (H2d). The last two dimensions of  our 
analytical framework allow us to position the mandate as a county councillor and 
the overall second tier of  local government within the wider and temporal unfold-
ing of  political careers in multi-level governance.
Career locus refers to the distinction (re-categorising the different mandates men-
tioned in the question ‘How did your political career evolve?’) between the so-
called internal and external political realm (Hibbing 1993; Kjær 2006).2 The 
internal career circuit exists within the orbit of  the second tier of  local government 
itself, either as a councillor and/or a member of  the executive. The external alter-
native consists of  mandates at the first tier of  local and/or upper tiers of  govern-
ment (e.g. regional, state, national, federal or European). Here also, a division can 
be made between legislative and executive mandates. We argue that the layperson 
model of  career development is associated with the more exclusively internal cir-
cuit. This type of  office holder will have experiences within the more confined 
space of  the second tier of  local government. For more professional politicians, the 
location of  their careers will be more diverse, including first-tier local and/or 
upper-tier government terms preceding the current mandate as a county council-
lor. The literature specifies that the difference between layperson and professional 
careers is also associated with the distinction between respectively alternative 
career paths (where a fairly strong divide exists between the second tier of  local 
government and alternative political realms characterised by the absence of  
8329-0042-PIV-012.indd   227 7/10/2015   1:23:42 PM
228 X. Bertrana, J. Magre, J. M. Sánchez, et al.
movements between the various arenas) and integrated career paths (where such 
movements are more commonplace; arguing that ambitious politicians will seize 
the different opportunities available to maximise the chance to live off  politics for 
a substantial part of  their career; see Stolz 2003). In our analysis we will, however, 
focus on the difference between an internal and external career locus, which is 
more straightforward. Thus we expect full-time politicians (H3a) and those with progres-
sive ambitions (H3b) to have significantly more often an external career locus.3
The last dimension probes into the career sequence of  county councillors. This can 
be captured by reconstructing the order of  elected positions to and/or through the 
current mandate establishing the shape of  political advancement from a horizontal 
(between the legislative and the executive) and/or a vertical (between the levels of  
government) perspective (re-categorising again the mandates mentioned in the 
question ‘How did your political career evolve?’). Here, we are mainly concerned 
with the latter without neglecting the former. We could argue that the layperson 
model of  career development would be characterised by councillors for whom the 
county council mandate has been the base office (i.e. their first entrance into an 
elected position). In addition, for these councillors, the county would be part of  a 
local career system in which the similarities of  the electoral base, the substance of  
office and/or the commonality of  the political arena stimulate movements between 
the first and second tier of  local government. Here also, differing patterns may be 
discerned between the classic (using the first-tier legislative mandate as a stepping 
stone for a second-tier counterpart) and inverse (using a second-tier legislative 
mandate as leverage for a first-tier executive counterpart) springboard. Alterna-
tively, in the professional model, the mandate of  county councillor will serve as a 
manifest office (i.e. which is not the first elected mandate but the one preceding a 
counterpart situated higher in the political hierarchy). For those councillors, the 
second tier of  local government is situated within a wider ranging supra-local 
career system where movement between the tiers of  local government and their 
upper level counterparts is more commonplace. These councillors will have had, 
are currently occupying or actively pursue mandates at the regional (or state), 
national (or federal) or European level. Here the logic of  the classic springboard 
(from local to regional, national or supranational and from legislative to executive) 
tends to prevail (Schlesinger 1966; Kjær 2006; Bochert and Stolz 2011). However, 
given the fact that only a few councillors have had supra-local mandates at the 
regional/national or European levels of  government (4.4 per cent), or aspire to 
such ambitions (5.5 per cent), we will not further develop this hypothesis in our 
analysis. We will expect only that full-time politicians will have significantly more often a 
career sequence in which the county council mandate is manifest (H4).
Career dimensions and comparing aggregate-level 
professionalization
In addition to scrutinising councillors’ careers at the individual level, we are also 
interested in finding comparative country patterns across our data set. Specific 
opportunity structures and country settings could turn second-tier politics into a 
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career of  its own right, particularly in connection with municipal politics. If  county 
councillors have distinct career interests and paths from other politicians, then what 
contextual factors can explain this?
It is clear that we expect professionalization to vary across the 14 European 
countries included in the data set, because factors that affect professionalization 
are unevenly distributed among them. At the heart of  our comparative analysis is 
the idea that if  the second tier of  local government is more influential in the multi-
level government system of  each country it will also be more attractive to persons 
who pursue a professionalized political career; in other words, these persons will 
be more inclined to live off  politics, triggered by the institutional circumstances. 
From this perspective, following Aars et al. (2012), we can assume that cross-country 
variation in the levels of  professionalization will tend to be stronger in systems 
where (the second tier of) local government is considered as an important provider 
of  public services. To evaluate this relevance in a comparative perspective, we need 
to assess the different country contexts. Bertrana and Heinelt (2011b: 318–319; 
2013) have developed a promising framework that we can use to that end. The 
framework integrates institutional factors from the different countries under study 
with general features of  the political system at the county level related to vertical 
power relations. The latter are assessed on the basis of  the differences in the ‘capac-
ity’ and ‘supervision’ of  the second tier of  local government in relation to upper 
levels of  government and the level below the second tier, i.e. the municipalities.4 
Despite marked differences in both dimensions, it is possible to distinguish four 
broadly defined country groups in terms of  vertical power relations.5
Strong local fiscal and politico-administrative ‘capacities’ combined with moderate 
levels of  supervision and control are the distinctive features of  the Swedish landsting. 
They operate exclusively as ‘pure’ territorial units of  local self-government in a highly 
decentralised unitary country – a characteristic that applies to Norway as well.
Table 12.2  Vertical power relations characterising the second level of  local 
government in European countries
Types Countries
High institutional capacity and moderate supervision
(Nordic countries)
Norway
Sweden
High or moderate capacity and strong supervision
(Middle-European countries)
Belgium
Germany
Moderate or weak capacity and moderate or weak 
supervision
(Southern and Eastern European countries)
France
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Spain
Poland
Strong dependency on and supervision by central government Romania
Source: Composition by the authors on the basis of  Bertrana and Heinelt (2011b).
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The second variant is associated with Belgium, Germany and the Nether-
lands, where the second tier of  local government has a dual role as a territorial 
unit of  local self-government and, at the same time, a (multipurpose) territorial 
(central) state administration, thus developing a distinctive role as institutional 
interface between multiple levels of  government. In our study, the Belgian 
provinces and the German Landkreise show different levels of  ‘capacity’, yet they 
are subject to stronger supervision and control from upper levels of  govern-
ment than the Nordic countries. Furthermore, although their ‘capacity’ in 
relation to municipalities differs, the ‘dual role’ of  the second tier in these 
countries leads towards higher levels of  supervision over the municipalities 
than in other countries. Exceptions in this respect are the Belgian provinces, 
which follow similar patterns as the second level of  local government in South-
ern European countries.
The third variant follows what may be called a municipalised second tier. The sec-
ond tier of  local government in France, Greece, Italy and Spain shares a common 
past and a common future with its moderate to weak ‘capacity’ in relation to 
upper levels of  government and municipalities, but high levels of  (formal and 
informal) discretion due to moderate supervision and control by upper levels of  
government in practice. The same applies to Hungary and Poland which resemble 
the Southern European countries in terms of  ‘capacities’ with higher levels of  
supervision from upper levels of  government, and could be expected from the 
Czech Republic and the Croatian cases. The most noteworthy difference between 
of  the Southern European countries and their Eastern European counterparts is 
the lower level of  financial autonomy and discretion found in these Eastern Euro-
pean countries.
Finally, there are the Romanian judete that cannot be placed in any of  these 
groups. Although the second level of  local government shows a relatively strong 
position in the vertical allocation of  resources, it is more dependent on, and strongly 
supervised and controlled by, central government than in any of  the other countries 
covered by this project, thus developing stronger supervisory powers over munici-
palities as well.
Empirical findings on the political career path  
of  county councillors
Following on from the theoretical overview, the aim of  this empirical section is 
twofold. First, it outlines the main features of  the political career development of  
county councillors at the individual level according to the logic of  professionaliza-
tion. Second, it reveals the similarities of  county councillors’ political careers across 
the European Union countries included in our study, as well as the differences 
according to the position of  the second tier of  local government within the 14 
multi-level environments of  this research project. To organise the analyses, both 
parts include testing the hypotheses about the four dimensions of  the career devel-
opment of  county councillors formulated in the second section.
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Career dimensions and individual-level professionalization
One of  the most striking features of  second-tier councillors is the low level of  political 
professionalization in terms of  career focus (see Table 12.3). In fact, nearly three out 
of  four county councillors consider themselves ‘part-time politicians’, spending 20 
hours per week on average in county-related activities. Hence only a minority of  the 
councillor population qualifies as a politician fulfilling his or her office as a true profes-
sion. Furthermore, we hypothesised that these full-time politicians will spend signifi-
cantly more hours per week on county-related activities, reinforcing their professional 
career focus (H1). If  we analyse the hours per week dedicated to county-related activi-
ties according to the full- or part-time occupation of  the political office (see Table 
12.4), we can observe a significant difference between full-time and part-time council-
lors – even if  the difference is probably lower than could be expected. On average 
county councillors who are full-time politicians spend 29.8 hours in their second-tier 
office, while their part-time counterparts spend 22.1 hours. A possible reason for this 
relatively limited difference could be the dedication of  full-time politicians to other 
elected offices, for instance at the municipal level, or to party politics.6
Other variables related to the scope of  county councillors’ political career show 
more evidence of  professionalization in general terms. County councillors have a 
seniority in office of  8.6 years on average. This figure represents approximately two 
mandates in most countries, if  we take into account that most countries have a local 
mandate of  four years (the exceptions are Belgium, France, Greece and Italy where 
local mandates have a duration of  5 or 6 years, and Germany where it depends on 
the Länder).7 As such, 58 per cent of  our councillors qualify as seasoned office hold-
ers. Furthermore, regarding future political ambitions, most councillors indicate 
that they seek re-election in their current mandate or, to a lesser degree, perceive 
this mandate as a springboard for mobility to positions considered as higher on 
their political career or, in other words, with a higher status in the political system. 
County councillors seeking for re-election at the second-tier authority, thus 
Table 12.3  Professionalization in the political career of  county 
councillors in Europe
Career focus
Occupation 26.6 per cent full-time politician
Time dedication 20 hours/week
Career scope
Seniority 58 per cent seasoned
Future ambition 83.5 per cent static or progressive
Career locus
Realm 68.5 per cent external
Career sequence
Position of  county office  
 in political career
58.2 per cent manifest
Source: Second Tier Survey
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Table 12.4  The logic of  professionalization in the political career of  county councillors in 
Europe
Hypothesis Independent level Dependent level Test value/significance
H1 full-time
part-time
29.8 hours/week
22.1 hours/week
t = 17.4708,  
df  = 938.628,  
p < 2.2e–16
H2a non-discrete 
ambition
discrete ambition
17 hours/week
16.1 hours/week
t = –1.4719,  
df  = 2,268.611,  
p = 0.1412
H2b seasoned
novice
29.6 per cent full-time
24.9 per cent full-time
Cramér’s V = 0.052, 
p = 0.022992
df = 1
X2 = 5.1691
H2c seasoned
novice
17 hours/week
15 hours/week
t = –4.8006,  
df  = 3,889.881,  
p = 1.641e–06
H2d seasoned
novice
71.7 per cent non-
discrete ambitions
76.9 per cent non-
discrete ambitions
Cramér’s V = 0.059, 
p = 0.00018758
df  = 1
X2 = 13.952
H3a full-time
part-time
86.1 per cent external 
career locus
73.2 per cent external 
career locus
Cramér’s V = 0.132, 
p = 4.2327e-09
df = 1
X2 = 34.514
H3b progressive 
ambition
non-progressive 
ambition
67.5 per cent external 
career locus
72.3 per cent external 
career locus
Cramér’s V = 0.038, 
p = 0.012191
df  = 1
X2 = 6.2829
H4 full-time
part-time
74.3 per cent manifest 
office
61.2 per cent manifest 
office
Cramér’s V = 0.122, 
p = 6.6759e-08
df  = 1
X2 = 29.157
Source: composition by the authors
showing static ambitions, represent 57 per cent of  the total population, while 
26.6 per cent show a progressive ambition not only to upper levels of  government 
(5.5 per cent), but also to the municipalities (7.2 per cent) or, more surprisingly, 
other political mandates (8.8 per cent) which were not further defined.
According to the logic of  internal professionalization in the political career, 
we were particularly interested in knowing whether focus and scope interact and 
mutually strengthen political professionalization or not. However, regarding this 
question, the evidence confirming our hypotheses is rather limited (even though 
most relations are significant – see Table 12.4). On one hand, those who seek a 
long-term career in politics (indicated by non-discrete ambitions) do not dedicate 
significantly more time to county-related activities (H2a). In fact, the difference is 
just 17 hours per week on average, against 16.1. On the other hand, the political 
experience of  county councillors at the second tier of  local government, analysed 
in terms of  seniority, has only limited impact in terms of  the full- or part-time 
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dedication to politics, the time dedication to the office, or discrete or non-discrete 
political ambitions of  the councillors (H2b, c and d). More precisely, regarding the 
hypotheses established in the previous section:
• H2b: 24.9 per cent of  the county councillors who are in their first mandate 
are full-timers, while this percentage only grows to a 29.6 per cent in sub-
sequent mandates.
• H2c: County councillors in their first mandate devote approximately 15 hours 
per week to their office on average, with more-seasoned county councillors 
devoting 17 hours per week.8
• H2d: 77 per cent of  county councillors in their first mandate show non-
discrete ambitions while this percentage decreases to 72 per cent in the case 
of  more-seasoned county councillors.
To analyse the career locus, which will allow us to explore the councillor mandate 
within the wider and temporal unfolding of  political careers in multi-level gover-
nance, we have re-categorised the different elected mandates assumed by county 
councillors before reaching the second tier of  local government. More than half  
of  the county councillors (58.5 per cent) have acceded to their office from a munici-
pal elected office, while a little bit more than one-third (31.5 per cent) have entered 
directly to the second tier of  local government and 9.6 per cent have assumed both 
elected mandates simultaneously. In this sense most county councillors have an 
external career locus, although it is clearly limited to the municipal level. By con-
trast, the number of  county councillors ‘landing’ at the second tier from upper 
levels of  government in the development of  their political career is simply 
negligible.9
Again, if  we subsequently observe whether these patterns relate to the other 
aspects of  the political career of  county councillors, constituting an internal logic 
of  professionalization, we find unexpected and rather weak (yet significant) pat-
terns. On one hand, full-time politicians show a clearer tendency to have an exter-
nal career locus (H3a) because 86.1 per cent of  full-time councillors share this 
feature, while this percentage decreases to 73.2 per cent in the case of  part-time 
county councillors. On the other, county councillors with static ambitions show a 
clearer trend to an external career locus than those with progressive political 
 ambitions – which could be surprising. However, the differences are not really 
strong (H3b): 67.5 per cent of  county councillors with progressive ambitions have 
an external career locus, while this percentage grows to 72.3 per cent in the case 
of  county councillors with ‘non-progressive’ or static ambitions.
Finally, the second tier of  local government above all seems to be a relevant 
political layer in the local government system of  each country. In particular, our 
analysis of  the county councillors’ political career shows a clear pattern pointing 
to a classic cursus honorum going predominantly from the first to the second tier of  
local government as the main feature of  the career sequence. Moreover, the idea of  
an autonomous local government system is further confirmed by the very limited 
amount of  councillors at the second tier who have experience in higher levels of  
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government, or want to continue their political career at upper levels of  govern-
ment.10 Besides, neither in this case the results of  our analyses allow us to show very 
convincing evidence about the interrelated impact of  the different indicators of  
county councillors’ career development in terms of  political professionalization. 
Most county councillors share a manifest office, in percentages that are relatively 
higher in the case of  full-time politicians (74.3 per cent) in comparison to their 
part-time counterparts (61.2 per cent) as we hypothesized in H4.
Aggregate levels of  professionalization according to the 
political career path of  county councillors across Europe
Moving from the individual to the aggregate level, to what extent can cross-country 
patterns, as defined by the vertical relations in the countries under study, account 
for our general findings? First, the autonomy of  the local government system in 
the career path of  county councillors is clearly reproduced in the different coun-
tries included in our analysis. The municipal level is the most relevant layer of  
recruitment of  county councillors in all the countries, with the exception of  Greece, 
Poland and Romania where most county councillors have had direct access to the 
second tier of  local government. However, besides this, common trend consider-
able variation between the countries can be observed in Table 12.5.
Almost all Spanish provincial councillors were previously elected at the municipal 
level because these elected mandates are indirectly elected by and among the munic-
ipal councillors according to electoral results after municipal elections have taken 
place (see Bertrana et al. 2011).11 In the Czech Republic and France the percentage 
of  county councillors ‘rooted’ at the municipal level lowers to 80 per cent but is still 
Table 12.5 Previous elected post (percentage)
Country Direct access to the 
second tier of  local 
government
Municipal level Simultaneous access 
to both levels of  local 
government
Other
Belgium 28.1 59.1 12.2 0.7
Croatia 40.6 53.9 4.2 1.3
Czech Rep. 15.5 79.8 4.8 0.0
England 38.3 56.3 5.5 0.0
France 11.5 81.5 6.6 0.3
Germany 24.9 61.2 13.3 0.6
Greece 52.6 45.5 0.5 1.4
Hungary 43.0 49.4 7.6 0.0
Italy 33.3 61.5 5.1 0.0
Norway 20.9 62.8 15.8 0.5
Poland 56.4 33.7 9.9 0.0
Romania 66.0 31.3 1.4 1.4
Spain 0.0 97.7 0.0 2.3
Sweden 28.0 58.9 12.8 0.3
Total 31.5 58.5 9.6 0.4
Source: Second Tier Survey
8329-0042-PIV-012.indd   234 7/10/2015   1:23:43 PM
Political career of  county councillors 235
very relevant, as happens in the cases of  Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Norway 
(70 to 80 per cent). Finally, in the rest of  countries approximately 60 to 65 per cent 
of  county councillors have acceded to their mandate from a previous one at the 
municipal level, or have been elected at both levels simultaneously – if  we leave aside 
the cases of  Greece, Poland and Romania, where direct access to the second tier of  
local government predominates as we have already mentioned.
Obviously, we can also distinguish the cases of  consecutive or simultaneous 
election to the municipalities and the second tier of  local government. As can be 
observed in Table 12.5, the cases of  simultaneous election never rise above 16 per 
cent. For that reason, the cursus honorum mentioned earlier can be further described 
by taking into account a common pattern which points to the relevance of  consec-
utive mandates at the municipal and second-tier levels of  local government in the 
countries included in our analysis. Even the cases of  Greece, Poland and Romania 
(where ‘direct access’ to the second tier is higher, as we have already explained), 
show the relevance of  the ‘municipal recruitment’ of  county councillors and, at 
the same time, the predominance of  consecutive mandates at both levels of  local 
government over a simultaneous election.
Another different question is what kind of  elected office at the municipalities 
is more relevant for gaining access to the second tier of  local government, either 
when county councillors have assumed a previous elected mandate at the munici-
pal level or when the access is simultaneous. If  we include only these categories 
in our analysis, we can observe that most county councillors are or have been 
members of  the municipal council (77.2 per cent), while the rest of  them are 
or have been members of  the political executive of  the municipalities (12.5 per 
cent) or mayors (10.3 per cent; see Table 12.6). In absolute terms this variation is 
logical because the contingent of  municipal councillors in each country is much 
Table 12.6  Previous elected post at the municipalities 
(percentage)
Country Mayor Executive Council
Belgium 4.2 17.1 78.7
Croatia 5.0 0.0 95.0
Czech Rep. 15.5 19.7 64.8
England 0.0 3.8 96.2
France 20.6 23.7 55.7
Germany 11.3 8.4 80.3
Greece 2.1 4.2 93.8
Hungary 15.6 0.0 84.4
Italy 2.6 7.7 89.7
Norway 0.0 23.7 76.3
Poland 9.1 18.2 72.7
Romania 4.2 4.2 91.7
Spain 20.7 17.2 62.1
Sweden 0.8 17.4 81.8
Total 10.3 12.5 77.2
Source: Second Tier Survey
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higher than the contingent of  members of  the executives or mayors, but in rela-
tive terms the internal political hierarchy at the municipal level seems to be clearly 
intertwined with the access to the second tier of  local government. Furthermore, 
if  we analyse this variable from a comparative perspective there are important 
variations across countries, as shown in Table 12.6.
In Croatia, Greece, Italy, Romania and England county councillors with some 
kind of  experience at the political executive of  the municipalities are around less 
than 10 per cent of  county councillors previously or simultaneously elected at the 
municipal level.12 In Hungary this percentage grows to 15.6 per cent (curiously, all 
of  them mayors). In Belgium and Germany, together with Norway and Sweden, 
it is generally around 20 per cent, while in Poland it is nearly 30 per cent. Finally, 
in the Czech Republic, France and Spain it exceeds 35 per cent.
In the countries where this percentage is higher, the access to relevant political 
posts at the municipality eases the access to the second tier of  local government, 
thus pointing simultaneously to the interrelationship between the internal cursus 
honorum at the municipal level and the cursus honorum at both levels of  local govern-
ment. However, what is probably more interesting is that countries where munici-
pal recruitment amongst the county councillors is higher also show a clearer 
tendency towards recruitment from the political executive of  the municipalities or 
even the mayoralty. By contrast, in those countries where the municipal recruit-
ment tends to be relatively lower, elected members of  the municipalities are 
increasingly recruited from the municipal councils.
In the cases of  the Czech Republic, France and Spain, where the percentage of  
county councillors recruited from the municipalities is higher than in the rest of  
the countries, those recruited from political executive posts follow the same trend. 
Then comes a group of  countries formed by Belgium, Germany, Norway and 
Sweden with lower values in both variables. Finally, there is a group formed by 
Greece, Italy, Croatia, Hungary and Romania where this trend is even clearer. We 
could also group the case of  England within these countries because it is also just 
below the average in relation to the percentage of  county councillors recruited 
from the municipalities and, at the same time, the country where less county coun-
cillors occupy or have occupied executive mandates at the district/municipal level. 
By contrast, the Polish case is difficult to classify into these groups of  countries 
because it follows an inverse pattern in both variables: it is the only country where 
the percentage of  county councillors recruited from the municipalities is one of  
the lowest amongst the countries included in our study and, at the same time, the 
percentage of  these political elites recruited from political executive mandates at 
the municipal level is relatively high (one out of  three approximately).
As could be expected, our data about the electoral mandate in which county 
councillors reach the second tier is quite consistent with this grouping of  countries 
(see Table 12.7). The Czech Republic, France and Spain are the only countries 
were most county councillors have acceded to their position at the second tier of  
local government as the second or even as the third elected mandate after hav-
ing some kind of  political experience at the municipal level according to the data 
explained earlier. The German case also reproduces this pattern, but to a lesser 
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degree. For that reason, it could be grouped with Belgium, where the percentage 
of  councillors reaching the second tier of  local government either as their first 
elected mandate or as the second are very similar, as happens with Norway and 
Sweden (although in the Swedish case ‘direct access’ to the counties as the first 
elected mandate is clearly higher). Croatia, Hungary and Italy intensify this trend 
and, standing out above these countries in relation to the percentage of  county 
councillors acceding at the second-tier authorities as their first elected mandate, 
together with the English county councillors (despite that the Italian and the Brit-
ish cases show a hybrid pattern in relation to this variable because provincial or 
county councillors show a clear trend towards longer political careers before being 
elected at the second tier). Finally, in the Greek, Polish and Romanian cases 60 to 
70 per cent of  county councillors have acceded to the second tier of  local govern-
ment as their first elected mandate.
This tentative grouping of  countries is relatively consistent with the typology of  
the second tier of  local government developed by Bertrana and Heinelt (2011b). 
These authors distinguished four broadly defined variations of  these local authori-
ties in the vertical power relations of  the different countries. As we have explained 
before, in their analysis, two of  these variations corresponded to the Nordic-Middle 
European countries (Denmark and Sweden, and Belgium and Germany respec-
tively) which shared a clearer pattern to a ‘nationalised’ local government structure, 
with the respective counties or provinces acting as a relevant agent in the provision 
of  public services or even assuming a dual role as a local self-government and a 
territorial state administration, as happens in the Belgian and German cases. The 
third variation corresponded to a so-called municipalised second tier, which 
Table 12.7  County councillors by numbers of  elected mandates 
(percentage)
Country Numbers of  elected mandates
First Second Third Fourth Fifth or more
Belgium 40.1 38.2 17.8 3.6 0.3
Croatia 46.0 39.0 13.3 1.3 0.3
Czech Rep. 20.2 38.1 31.0 10.7 0.0
England 44.1 24.4 23.6 6.3 1.6
France 18.8 28.6 27.9 17.0 7.6
Germany 38.5 43.1 14.1 3.6 0.8
Greece 58.7 21.7 13.2 6.4 0.0
Hungary 50.6 44.3 5.1 0.0 0.0
Italy 38.8 31.9 26.7 2.6 0.0
Norway 35.4 32.3 23.3 7.6 1.4
Poland 69.8 18.8 5.2 3.1 3.1
Romania 69.7 28.2 1.4 0.7 0.0
Spain 0.0 50.9 32.0 15.4 1.7
Sweden 42.0 32.5 21.0 3.9 0.5
Total 41.8 34.4 16.6 5.4 1.8
Source: Second Tier Survey
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included all Southern and Eastern European countries included in their book with 
the exception of  Romanian judete, which were grouped together with Turkey (a 
country excluded from this research project) in the fourth variation (distinguished 
by Bertrana and Heinelt 2011b: 318–319).
What is particularly surprising, according to our data, is that the countries 
belonging to the ‘municipalised second tier’ (including Croatia and the Czech 
Republic) show the most extreme differences according to the variables analysed 
here. The Czech Republic, France and Spain share the highest levels of  municipal 
recruitment and, at the same time, the highest levels of  recruitment amongst the 
members of  the political executives of  the municipalities or the mayors. By con-
trast, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy or Romania (plus England) share the lowest 
levels of  ‘municipal recruitment’ and the lowest levels of  recruitment amongst the 
political executives of  the municipalities. In fact, as we have already explained, 
Greece and Romania are the only countries where most county councillors gain 
access to their elected mandates without previous experience at the municipal level, 
together with Poland where the levels of  municipal recruitment are relatively low, 
but the percentage of  county councillors who are recruited from the first tier of  
local government political executives is amongst the highest.
It is difficult to explain these variations in the patterns of  recruitment and the 
political careers of  the county councillors by taking into account other institutional 
variables related to the horizontal power relations in the local government systems 
of  the countries analysed. There are some interesting common features in both 
groups that could help us to understand the relative autonomy of  the second tier 
of  local government in relation to the municipal level in the Southern and Eastern 
European countries analysed (for example, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy or 
Romania share the direct election of  the mayors and/or the county presidents, in 
contrast with Spain, France or the Czech Republic), but neither explain the varia-
tions across all the groups nor all the variations in each group.
We can only hypothesise that the ‘municipalised second tier’ – as an authority 
captured by municipal party political strongholds that we still observe in the Czech 
Republic, France or Spain – could have been transformed in a more autonomous 
second level of  local government from the perspective of  the local party political 
careers in Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Poland, where it is decoupled 
from municipal political power. On the other hand the degree of  ‘nationalisation’ to 
be found (in the sense of  Sellers and Lidström 2007: 611–612) in the local government 
structures of  Belgium and Germany as well as of  Norway and Sweden could 
explain the existence of  more nuanced local career paths in these countries which 
nevertheless form a relatively consistent group from a comparative perspective.
In this sense, we have taken a step forward in our knowledge about these political 
elites by showing the autonomy of  local levels of  government in the career evolu-
tion of  county councillors. This conclusion is based on the fact that (1) these politi-
cal elites have acceded this level of  local government either directly or from a 
previous municipal experience in almost all the cases and (2) their access is quite 
straightforward if  we take into account that more than 75 per cent of  these political 
elites of  all the countries included in our study have acceded to the second tier of  
local government as their first or their second elected mandate, with the only 
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exception of  the Czech Republic, French, Spanish and Italian cases where this 
percentage is just a little bit lower.
Cross-national analysis shows relevant variations in the levels of  municipal 
recruitment in the political careers of  county councillors and their interrelationship 
with the internal political career (or cursus honorum) at the municipal level in the 
countries included in our analysis. However these variations do not disprove this 
main feature of  county councillors’ career path. In fact, according to our data, 
this preliminary conclusion can only be reasserted if  we take into account that 
(1) membership in the county councils is not a relevant point of  arrival from upper 
levels of  government in the political careers of  our respondents (in fact, the percent-
age of  county councillors landing at the second tier from upper levels of  govern-
ment never exceeds a mere 2 per cent) and (2) the cases of  accumulation of  mandates 
or elected offices between the second tier of  local government and upper levels of  
government are too low even to be taken into account according to our data.
In fact, when it comes to their future ambitions, most county councillors want 
to continue in their position (a little bit less than 60 per cent). This is probably not 
surprising because these political elites are prone to develop what could be char-
acterised as an autonomous political career at the local level. What is more interesting 
is that county councillors from Belgium, Germany, Sweden, England and, above 
all, France and Poland have a higher propensity to expect some stability in their 
post,13 while those from the rest of  Eastern and Southern European countries 
have a higher propensity to prefer to continue their political career in other elected 
or political mandates. Both variables follow an inverse order relation, as can be 
seen in Table 12.8 (for that reason, the percentage of  county councillors who want 
Table 12.8 Future political ambition (percentage)
Continue 
as in my 
position
Continue my political career at . . . Quit  
politics
Not  
specified
The county 
level
The 
municipal 
level
Higher 
level
None of   
the above
Belgium 53.7 1.6 0.3 11.3 1.3 12.9 18.8
Croatia 46.7 2.2 0.6 3.5 7.4 22.0 17.6
Czech Rep. 42.4 2.4 2.4 14.1 3.5 15.3 20.0
England 52.6 35.3 – – – – 12.0
France 61.9 17.0 – – – – 21.1
Germany 65.0 0.0 0.6 7.4 2.3 6.9 17.9
Greece 40.7 3.4 0.5 7.2 10.1 19.1 19.1
Hungary 48.1 0.0 1.3 8.9 31.7 0.0 10.1
Italy 22.2 0.9 3.4 12.8 19.7 18.0 23.1
Norway – – 23.4 6.4 23.4 46.8 –
Poland 71.3 0.0 0.9 6.5 5.6 6.5 9.3
Romania 30.2 0.0 5.6 8.7 22.2 18.3 15.1
Spain 34.7 0.0 2.4 31.8 6.5 11.2 13.5
Sweden 52.1 0.0 3.2 2.8 7.4 18.4 16.1
Total 57.0 3.8 1.3 7.2 5.5 8.8 16.5
Source: Second Tier Survey
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to quit politics in the different countries is quite stable and shows minor variations, 
mainly ranging from 10 to 20 per cent).14
A different question is whether county councillors would like to continue their 
political career at the same county (for example, assuming political executive 
responsibilities), at the municipal level or at upper levels of  government. If  we take 
into account only those Eastern and Southern European countries where county 
councillors show a higher propensity to continue their political career, we can see 
that they can be grouped in two (see Table 12.8). The only country where most 
county councillors would like to continue their political career at the municipal 
level is Spain (probably as mayors or members of  the political executive because 
all of  them are municipal councillors). However the percentage of  county council-
lors with future expectations towards the municipal level is also relatively high in 
the Czech Republic. In contrast, the Italian, Hungarian or Romanian county 
councillors (and, to a lesser extent, the Croatian or the Greek ones) show a stronger 
future ambition to continue their political career at upper levels of  government: 
the locus of  their career seems to be at the regional and/or national level.
As our reader can see, both groups of  countries are more or less the same, as we 
defined when explaining the degree of  decoupling of  county councillors’ political 
careers in relation to the municipal level of  government. The only exceptions are 
France and Poland. However, the Polish case is already a singular case regarding 
the patterns of  its county councillors’ access to the second tier. The French case, 
which is characterised by its large share of  county councillors who would like to 
keep their mandate at the départements, seems to suggest that the second tier of  local 
government has a specific position in the multi-level government system of  France 
as a relevant point of  arrival of  municipal elites, in comparison with the Czech 
Republic and to a greater extent Spain where the second tier of  local government 
seems to be also a sound platform to access executive positions or mayoralties at 
the municipal level the other way round.
In these three cases county councillors’ political careers are coupled with careers 
at the municipal level. By contrast, the decoupling of  both levels of  government in 
relation to the political career of  these political elites seems to characterise the rest 
of  Southern and Eastern European countries – in particular, county councillors 
from Hungary, Romania and Italy, or Croatia and Greece, whose expectations of  
a future political career at upper levels of  government are higher.
Finally, county councillors from the remaining countries are those with a stron-
ger will to continue in their mandate. The Belgian and the German councillors are 
more focused to the municipal level when they want to continue their political 
career, the Swedish ones to the national level of  government. However county 
councillors from these countries share a relative position between the two extremes 
defined by Southern and Eastern European countries which is also consistent in 
relation to their future political ambition.
If  we order the countries according to (1) the percentage of  county councillors 
recruited from municipal elected mandates, (2) the percentage of  county council-
lors recruited from political executive posts at the municipal level and (3) the per-
centage of  county councillors who want to continue their political career depending 
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on their will to do it at municipal or higher levels of  government, three main groups 
emerge:
1. The first one would include the Czech Republic, France or Spain. It could 
be characterised by the strongest interrelationship between the political 
careers of  county councillors and municipal political careers.
2. This interrelationship becomes weaker in Belgium, Germany, Sweden or 
Norway. In these countries, the percentage of  county councillors recruited 
from the municipal level (and from political executive posts at the municipal 
level) is more or less on the average, but they show the strongest will to 
continue in their post despite the differences explained earlier.
3. Finally, in the rest of  Southern and Eastern European Countries, with the 
exception of  Poland, the decoupling between both levels of  local government 
in relation to the political career of  their political elites is the greatest. Access 
to the second tier tends to be direct to a large degree, is more independent 
of  the development of  an internal political career at the municipal level and 
county councillors show a clear propensity to seek a future career develop-
ment at upper levels of  government (especially in Hungary, Italy or Romania). 
As we have seen, the English case could be also grouped with these countries. 
By contrast, Poland is a unique case because (1) and (2) follow an inverse 
relationship.
These groupings of  countries make sense to explain the main variations showed 
by the cross-national analysis. However, we should not forget that the variables 
analysed in this section reconfirm the high degree of  autonomy of  the local levels 
of  government in the career evolution of  county councillors. In this section we have 
pointed out that this conclusion is based on the fact that (1) they have acceded this 
level of  local government either directly or from a previous municipal experience 
in almost all the cases and (2) their access is fast and straightforward in general 
terms. Now we could add a point (3) explaining that most of  them would like to 
continue in their post and a relevant percentage of  those who would like to con-
tinue their political career in most cases would like to do it at the municipal level.
Finally, we were also interested in knowing whether or not these career dimen-
sions regarding sequence and scope interact and mutually strengthen the focus, 
thus contributing to political professionalization. As we have explained before, 
only one out of  four county councillors consider themselves full-time politicians 
and, from this perspective, could be qualified as truly professional politicians (see 
Table 12.9). However cross-national examination of  the data shows again relevant 
variations in the countries included in our analysis.15
Spain is the only country where most provincial councillors are full-time politi-
cians (69.1 per cent) due to the fact that they always have a double representative 
mandate, but the Czech Republic and French county councillors also show a 
tendency towards political professionalization (a little bit less than 50 per cent) 
that is clearer than other countries. Then come the English (40.7 per cent), the 
Nordic (20 to 25 per cent) and the Belgian (18.3 per cent) county councillors. In 
8329-0042-PIV-012.indd   241 7/10/2015   1:23:43 PM
242 X. Bertrana, J. Magre, J. M. Sánchez, et al.
the rest of  the countries (mainly Southern and Eastern European countries like 
Croatia, Greece, Italy or Romania), part-time (or amateur) politicians are more 
than 90 per cent.
Again, there seems to be some kind of  relationship between the degree of  what 
we called ‘municipal recruitment’ (particularly amongst executive politicians) and 
the degree of  political professionalization of  county councillors, which probably 
points to multiple office holding at the local levels of  government of  these political 
elites as the main reason behind their full/part-time dedication.16 In those countries 
where the career path at both levels of  government seems to be more clearly inter-
twined, the levels of  political professionalization of  county councillors are higher. 
This factor seems to be more relevant than others related to the differences in the 
relative positioning of  the second tier of  local government in the vertical relations 
of  power.
Conclusion
In this contribution we have analysed the political career of  county councillors in 
Europe, including reflections on the possibility of  a preceding and consecutive 
political career in a multi-level context. Applying the findings from the general 
literature on professionalization, we scrutinized four dimensions with regard to 
political careers at the second tier: focus, scope, locus and sequence.
Our analysis referred to the ideal-typical layperson–professional dichotomy in 
an attempt to grasp the nature of  professionalization at the second-tier level. On 
a general level, we noticed clear signs of  a professional career scope regarding 
seniority and future ambitions – even though in terms of  focus (i.e. occupation 
and time dedication) the councillors’ career would still be classified as a layper-
son’s affair. Furthermore, while the combined results from career locus and 
sequence might hint at substantial degrees of  professionalization as well, a closer 
look revealed above all a largely separate local career system in which councillors 
Table 12.9 Full-time politicians (percentage)
Yes No
Belgium 18.3 81.7
Croatia 3.5 96.6
Czech Republic 48.2 51.8
England 40.7 59.3
France 46.2 53.9
Greece 7.2 92.8
Italy 2.3 97.7
Norway 25.3 74.7
Romania 5.4 94.6
Spain 69.1 30.9
Sweden 21.6 78.4
Total 26.6 73.4
Source: Second Tier Survey
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often gain external experience at the municipal level before entering the county 
council. Moreover, we expected that the different indicators of  professionalization 
within and between the four dimensions would reinforce one another at the indi-
vidual level. However, this expectation has been confirmed to a very limited extent 
only. Across the four analytical dimensions, the results of  our analysis offer only 
scarce evidence pointing towards a strong internal logic of  professionalization in 
the political career development of  second-tier councillors in Europe. It is for 
follow-up research to verify whether this internal logic is enhanced once the gen-
eral degree of  professionalization in the political career increases over time – or 
rather to adjust the model by incorporating different indicators and possible rela-
tions to gain more insights in the development of  the political career at the indi-
vidual level.
By contrast, systematic differences in vertical power relations of  counties in vari-
ous country settings seem to affect the degree of  county councillor professionaliza-
tion to a higher extent. Although the typology on the second-tier level developed 
by Bertrana and Heinelt (2011b) hardly proved to be useful for our analyses, a 
refined grouping of  countries defined on the basis of  their work shows that coun-
tries where the levels of  municipal recruitment amongst the county councillors are 
higher also show a clearer tendency towards recruitment from the political execu-
tive of  the municipalities or even the mayoralty, and hence to political profession-
alization. This pattern reinforces the idea of  the second-tier level offering fertile 
ground for a career path in its own right in the context of  an autonomous local 
political sphere where the different levels of  local government interact as a relevant 
feature of  political localism in some countries like France, Spain or the Czech 
Republic. In these cases county councillors’ political careers are coupled with 
careers at the municipal level. By contrast, the decoupling of  both levels of  govern-
ment in relation to the political career of  these political elites seems to characterise 
the rest of  Southern and Eastern European countries. Finally, the degree of  
‘nationalisation’ in the local government structures of  Belgium and Germany on 
the one hand, and Norway and Sweden on the other (in the sense of  Bertrana and 
Heinelt 2011b or Sellers and Lidström 2007: 611–612), could explain the existence 
of  more nuanced local career paths, which nevertheless are consistent with a rela-
tively autonomous local government system more integrated in the multi-level 
government system of  these countries.
Notes
 1 Given the position of  the second tier of  local government in general and the particular 
mandate of  councillor in particular, it is safe to assume however that this would refer 
only to a relatively small share of  our population, with the potential exception of  a 
number of  executive mandates.
 2 In this question, county councillors had to indicate the order of  elected or appointed 
positions held during their political career at municipal, county, regional/state, national 
or European level.
 3 Whereas the expectations for part-time politicians and those that have discrete future 
ambitions are likely the reverse, less straightforward hypotheses can be made for sea-
soned mandate holders or those with static ambitions. Depending on the type of  
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councillor we deem the assumption of  an internal career locus (those determined from 
the start to develop a career within the second tier of  local government) equally convinc-
ing as that of  an external counterpart (e.g. municipal councillors that may find the scope 
or style of  the second tier more satisfying).
 4 These authors also included 14 countries in their book. In comparison with this project, 
they included Denmark (where counties were abolished and replaced by regions in a 
reform that took effect on 1 January 2007; see Mouritzen 2011), the Netherlands and 
Turkey, but they excluded Croatia, Norway and the Czech Republic.
 5 These authors also took into account the horizontal power relations following Mouritzen 
and Svara (2002). The countries analysed in this chapter include the ‘strong political 
leader’ form in the countries characterised by a ‘municipalised second tier’ (and also in 
Germany), the ‘collective leadership’ form in Belgium, the ‘leadership by committee’ or 
‘committee leader form’ in Sweden and some of  the Eastern European countries 
included in the research project, and, finally, the Norwegian ‘council-manager’ system 
of  horizontal relations. For that reason, we have focused on vertical power relations. If  
we had included both dimensions, there would be seven groups. Following Aars et al. 
(2012), we can assume that professionalization tends to be stronger in systems where 
councils are relatively strong as compared to members of  the executive. Horizontal 
power relations could also trigger persons who want to pursue a professional political 
career, at least in some countries. However, for practical reasons our contribution will 
focus on vertical relations.
 6 For an extensive analysis of  this relation, see Ryšavý and Čermák, Chapter 13 in this 
book.
 7 With the exception of  the English ones that have remained in their posts three mandates 
(12.4 years) on average. We have to be cautious when interpreting these data because 
the standard deviation is quite high in most countries. Furthermore, in order to develop 
cross-national analysis we should take into account the existence of  different electoral 
cycles, minor variations in the years in which the surveys were carried out and other 
institutional factors (eg. the French départements renew half  of  the council every three 
years).
 8 It could be surprising that the average time spent on the councillor office is considerably 
higher for full-time and part-time councillors (30 and 22 hours per week) than for the 
research population in terms of  future ambition and experience (figures between 15 and 
17 hours per week). However, this is due to many missing cases for the ‘full-time vs part-
time councillor’ question. See Note 14.
 9 We have also analysed the external locus of  county councillors’ political career by not 
only taking into account their previous elected post, but also the cases of  accumulation 
of  mandates once they have been elected at the second tier of  local government. How-
ever, the differences are quite low (approximately 5 per cent).
10 On one hand, there are only 248 county councillors (without weighting in this case) who 
have occupied elected posts at upper levels of  government. On the other, 273 want to 
continue their political career at upper levels of  government.
11 More precisely: 97.7 per cent. The other 2.3 per cent are councillors that before being 
chosen at the provincial level were elected at upper levels of  government despite they 
were still occupying a municipal elected post (otherwise they could not have been chosen 
to be councillors at the second tier of  local government).
12 During the explanation, we have decided to group the previous political post at the 
municipal level in two main categories. On the one hand we have grouped former 
members of  the municipal council without taking into account if  they were the presi-
dents of  this political body or not. On the other we have grouped former members of  
the political executive, without distinguishing the mayors. The reason is that the insti-
tutional setting in the countries included in the book is very diverse and this makes it 
extremely difficult to draw comparative conclusions at such a concrete level of  analysis. 
For example, it is even difficult to refer to the mayoralty as a relevant political post in 
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some countries. Or the post of  the president of  the municipal council can be occupied 
by the mayor like in Spain or can be simply an honorary post.
13 As can be seen in Table 12.8, unfortunately the surveys from France and the England 
did not disaggregate this variable. In the case of  Norway just the contrary happened 
because the survey did not include the possibility of  ‘continue as in my position’ or ‘quit 
politics’. For both reasons, these countries are excluded in some parts of  the career scope 
analysis.
14 The most extreme position in relation to this variable is Italy (23.1 per cent). However, 
we must take into account the Italian case is exceptional because when the survey was 
conducted there was an on-going reform of  the Second Tier of  Local Government in 
order to establish an indirect system of  election (similar to that existing in Spain) which 
probably made the option of  “continuing in the same position” simply unfeasible for 
the Italian provincial councillors.
15 Data for this variable is missing for Germany, Poland and Hungary.
16 This matters more than other variables related to the scope, such as seniority. For exam-
ple, Spanish county councillors have some of  the lowest seniority in office, with 4.6 years 
on average (standard deviation = 5.2) like the Czech Republic councillors (6.9 with a 
standard deviation = 3.4), in contrast with the French conseillers généraux (12.6 with a 
standard deviation = 9).
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13 Political professionalization of 
county councillors in Europe
Dan Ryšavý and Daniel Čermák
Introduction
Modern democratic politics walks side by side with professionalization (i.e. a pro-
cess whereby politics is evolving into an occupation). On one hand, democracy 
requires time: when no income is derived from politics, it is in danger of  turning 
into an oligarchy. On the other hand, attempts to make a steady source of  income 
from politics (Weber 1919) can easily develop into social closure, hence threatening 
the democracy, as such (Borchert 2008).1
In line with studies that go as far back as the well-known lecture Politik als Beruf 
(Weber 1919), in this chapter we discuss those who live not only for but also off poli-
tics at the level of  kraje, powiaty, judete, županije and other second tiers of  local govern-
ment authorities. We are interested in how much time the representatives who work 
in politics full time dedicate to county affairs and what factors influence whether 
or not a layperson becomes a political professional. We are working from the 
assumption that the form and scope of  professionalization are important charac-
teristics of  the second tier of  local government, which is significantly and recipro-
cally interlinked with the stability or transformation of  this level of  multi-level 
government. We pay special attention to the cases of  countries where incongru-
ences between the time invested in county politics and a declared (non) full-time 
status can be found.
This book explores the many ways in which the councillors, political execu-
tives and leading bureaucrats of  provinces, counties, départements, Landkreise, 
etc. perceive their roles, how they behave and how they respond to the ongoing 
rescaling of  statehood that contests the upper tier of  local government. Look-
ing at the second tiers of  local government from the angle of  key players, we 
choose the perspective of  those who – through their action or lack thereof  – 
are able to either accelerate or more or less successfully navigate changes in 
this layer of  multi-level government. However, they would be some of  the first 
personally affected by these changes, should reforms result in alterations in 
the structure of  political opportunities for ambitious politicians (Schlesinger 
1966).2
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Theory and research of  political professionalization
Max Weber’s lecture Politik als Beruf (1919) is considered a classic text in the social 
sciences. What made it famous was primarily Weber’s distinction between an ‘ethic 
of  conviction’ and an ‘ethic of  responsibility’. The reception of  the text in the 
Anglo-Saxon world has been made easier by the 1946 translation provided by Hans 
H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. The more extensive and elaborated first part of  the 
lecture, where Weber expanded on his political professionalization theory, has 
received far less attention. According to Borchert (2007: 67), there are three 
hypotheses that stand in the centre here: (1) the modern professional politician is 
historically a new type of  politician, characterised by (a) being dedicated full time 
to politics and (b) living both for and off politics; (2) political professionalization is a 
product of  democratisation and bureaucratisation; (3) competing political parties 
are becoming the institutional epicentre of  a professional politics. Interpreting 
politics as a profession means uncovering latent conflict between professionalism 
that leads to the formation of  a political class and representative democracy.
In many ways, modern politics corresponds with the characteristics of  a profes-
sion as defined by the sociology of  professions (see e.g. Goode 1957; Abbott 1981), 
oftentimes to a larger extent compared to a number of  more classic professions. In 
the case of  politics, it is very difficult to estimate reward based on performance. 
Politicians also exercise a rather high level of  self-regulation. In line with such self-
regulation, elected politicians often designate the positions in politics that would be 
executed as full-fledged employment and the reward for which politicians in such 
positions would be eligible. Professionalised politics logically runs into conflict with 
the demands of  the theory of  democracy; it also alienates politics from citizens. This 
is one of  the reasons politicians do not make much show of  the fact they derive their 
living through politics. It can briefly be stated that politics is a ‘precarious’ profession 
(Borchert 2003).3 The process of  democratisation created time demands on politi-
cians, and thereby, the need for an income derived from politics (Borchert 2008: 
272). It is apparent, especially on the parliamentary level, that without the introduc-
tion of  salaries for politicians, the social opening of  the political sphere could not 
be possible and democracy based on the participation of  a wide range of  social 
groups would starve out. As for local governments, there are tendencies toward the 
professionalisation of  local executives (Aderholt et al. 2009; Guérin and Kerrouche 
2008; Reiser 2006; Ryšavý 2013b; Steyvers and Verhelst 2012). The ongoing profes-
sionalisation at the state level in federations and regions in regionalised states has 
been reflected in the growing number of  studies on the political careers of  regional 
elites (e.g. Borchert and Stolz 2011 and the 2011 special issue of  Regional and Federal 
Studies, 2, Vanlangenaeker et al. 2013; Dodeigne 2014). Establishment or empower-
ment at the regional level of  governance in a number of  countries considerably 
changed the scope and form of  the structure of  political opportunities (Schlesinger 
1966). However, studies of  multi-level political careers do not cover the second tier 
of  local government in federal or regionalised states and are also underrepresented 
in the case of  countries with only one level of  government between municipalities 
and national parliaments (Ryšavý, forthcoming).
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In Heinelt and Bertrana (2011), the topic of  professionalisation has been men-
tioned rather marginally in relation to the county presidents (Landrat) in Germany 
and the members of  the county executives in Belgium, Italy and the United King-
dom. In Germany, the Landrat gained the status of  full-time civil servants (Heinelt 
and Egner 2011: 111). Martin (2011: 95) has stated that ‘the role of  leader and 
other cabinet members in a county council in the UK is now usually seen as a full-
time one and allowances increasingly reflect this’. Similarly, most of  the Italian 
presidents and the assessori are professional politicians (Baccetti 2011: 170) and 
professionalisation also pertains to the members of  the provincial executive in 
Belgium (Valcke et al. 2011: 37). These cases are most likely not exceptions, as 
elected positions in the second tier of  local government are seen as career oppor-
tunities in other countries, as well. Borchert (2008) understands diffusion within 
political systems to be one of  the main tendencies of  political professionalization. 
Despite particular differences, it can be concluded that professionalization is associ-
ated mainly with members of  county executive organs, much as at the municipal 
level.
Hypotheses and data
The international survey on county councillors is a unique source of  information 
that can serve for testing the two general hypotheses resulting from the previous 
summary. The first hypothesis expects path dependency of  professionalization at 
the second tier of  local government resulting out of  different institutional and 
historical factors. The second hypothesis envisages that the incongruence between 
professionalization at the individual level and professionalization of  an office or 
institution is a sign of  some kind of  transitory state.
There may be political amateurs taking over a professionalised office, or there 
may be political professionals coming into an office that has not yet been 
professionalised. While these instances are rather rare, they do occur, and most 
often signal a transitory state that usually is resolved by way of  professionaliza-
tion of  the as yet amateur side. [. . .] The reverse situation of  politicians who 
pursue politics full-time while the position they hold is not yet adequately 
reimbursed is usually part of  a historical (rather than an individual) process of  
transition.
(Borchert 2008: 271)
As noted in the introductory section, this chapter primarily seeks to analyse the 
professionalization of  the second tier of  local government institutions. By political 
professionalization, we basically mean the process that has turned politics into an 
occupation. Increasing time demands produce the need for an income being 
derived from politics (Borchert 2008). However, neither the survey of  county coun-
cillors nor other sources provide complete, as well as comparable, data indicating 
which offices of  the second tier of  local governments are connected with financial 
sources that would justify labelling those positions as professionalised. Nevertheless, 
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it is possible to draw conclusions indirectly from the statements of  individual 
county councillors.
We focus on two indicators of  political professionalization, which could be said 
to be classic and connected: first, the time spent in the exercise of  office, showing 
how the role in local government replaces the normal professional activity; and 
second, the level of  financial remuneration of  politicians (see e.g. Guérin and Ker-
rouche 2008; Reiser 2006; Stolz 2009; Holtkamp 2011). In the case of  the county 
councillors’ survey, two variables could do well at playing the role of  the mentioned 
indicators: first, the question ‘Are you a full-time politician?’, which was placed at 
the end of  the questionnaire, and, among other things, differentiated those people 
who answered the question on present occupation (‘No’) and who were not asked 
about occupational status (‘Yes’). A positive answer to the question indicates that 
there is a ‘professionalised’ office being occupied by a county councillor. However, 
he or she may not be a ’county professional’. The second variable is the answer to 
the question: ‘How many hours on average do you spend on county-related activi-
ties within a week?’ The time devoted to county affairs is understood here as a 
direct indicator of  living for county politics, but also as an indirect indicator of  
living off county politics.4 It represents an indirect measure of  professionalization 
on the individual level. It is presumed that those who dedicate a lot of  time to 
county politics most likely do not spend that much time in paid employment. They 
are either reimbursed for their commitment or receive resources otherwise. Those 
without financial remuneration can include either retired people and people on 
parental leave, as examples, or those who find themselves in a state of  ‘hidden 
professionalization’ (Borchert 2008: 271; see also Reiser 2006). If  this is the case, 
we are probably dealing with the previously mentioned transitional situation, 
which is characterised by an institutional level of  professionalization, rather than 
individual. We suppose that the proposed or realised reforms of  the second tier of  
local government influencing the scope and shape of  opportunity structure for 
ambitious politicians represents a source or expression of  these transitional states; 
councillors more or less consciously reflect them.
In the case of  the first hypothesis, the combination of  both indicators in the form 
of  a typology will be used for estimating the form and scope of  the professionaliza-
tion of  councillors at the second tier of  local government. Other features (mainly 
institutional) are tested as factors resulting in the differences in the scope of  profes-
sionalization among the individual councillors from the countries included in the 
study. As a next step, the discrepancy between the two chosen indicators will be 
analysed in relation to the second hypothesis. The presence of  those who invest 
their time without proper remuneration or those who are full-time politicians 
mostly oriented outside county affairs will be analysed and contextualised.
Last, but not least, the limitations of  the survey data being used should be noted. 
First, the primary focus will be on county councillors, regardless of  their other func-
tions, because the survey data does not indicate precisely which functions the par-
ticular representative performed at the time of  the survey. Second, in addition to 
problems related to the low response rate, not all councillors answered the question 
regarding time. The abstention rate varied widely among the different countries, 
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with a minimum level in Norway and the Czech Republic (all answered), a median 
level in Croatia and Poland (11 per cent abstained) and the extreme case of  Greece 
(63 per cent).5 As for the second key question indicating whether the respondent is 
a full-time politician or not, there is, unfortunately, data missing for three countries 
(Germany, Hungary, and Poland). Nevertheless, based on the literature and our own 
analysis, it can be expected that the range of  full-time positions in county councils 
is limited, at least in the cases of  Germany and Poland, while professionalization is 
much more likely a matter of  the upper level of  government, such as the Länder in 
Germany (see Borchert and Stolz 2011) or the województwa in Poland. The other 
countries do not manifest such high abstention regarding the question on time spent 
on county-related activities. In most cases, the missing answers did not exceed a ratio 
of  5 per cent, while the highest was in Romania (17 per cent).
How much time do county representatives  
spend doing county politics?
In the first step, we analyse the total time the representatives in the individual 
countries spend on county-related activities. We study the distribution of  frequen-
cies and the inclination or irregularities (more peaks in the histogram). The cate-
gorisation of  countries represents a secondary step.
After the answers to the question on time spent on county affairs were inte-
grated into categories (modal interval) of  five hours each (1–5 hours, 5.1–10 hours 
and so on, up to 60.1 or more),6 it was revealed that in most countries (specifically, 
nine out of  14) county councillors spent between 5.1 and 10 hours a week on this 
task (see Table 13.1). The second most frequent category is usually not all that 
Table 13.1 Time invested in county affairs by county councillors by different time intervals
Country Number of  
respondents
Modal interval 2nd most 
common 
interval
How many hours a week? (per cent)
Hours Per cent 1–10 hours 10.1–30 hours > 30 hours
Spain 163 5 to 10 15 35 to 40 18 33 49
England 132 25 to 30 18 10 to 15 8 53 39
France 263 15 to 20 16 5 to 10 16 48 37
Greece 86 15 to 20 20 5 to 10 29 44 27
Romania 168 5 to 10 23 10 to 15 26 51 23
Italy 123 10 to 15 18 5 to 10 20 57 23
Norway 217 5 to 10 20 10 to 15 28 52 20
Sweden 1,136 5 to 10 30 1 to 5 54 31 16
Hungary 87 5 to 10 26 1 to 5 47 38 15
Czech Rep. 85 5 to 10 29 1 to 5 57 29 14
Belgium 276 5 to 10 33 1 to 5 55 36 10
Poland 106 5 to 10 38 1 to 5 59 34 7
Croatia 293 1 to 5 35 5 to 10 66 28 6
Germany 1,305 5 to 10 36 1 to 5 64 34 3
Source: Second Tier Survey
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far from the most-mentioned category. Only a minority of  councillors reported 
spending more than 30 hours per week on county affairs, with the exception of  
Spain, where many county councillors dedicate between 35.1 and 40 hours to 
their function as a political representative at this level of  government. The sec-
ond step of  the analysis concentrated on those councillors who had declared that 
the time they spend on county affairs is either (a) less than 10 hours a week, 
(b) between 10.1 to 30 hours a week or (c) more than 30 hours a week.7 In Table 13.1, 
the countries are divided into four groups according to the proportion of  respon-
dents who declared they invested more than 30 hours a week in county affairs. 
The first group includes countries where this applied for more than 30 per cent 
of  the councillors (Spain, England, France); in the second group of  countries, this 
applies for around 25 per cent (Greece, Romania, Italy); in the third group, for 
between 10 to 20 per cent (Norway, Sweden, Hungary and the Czech Republic); 
the fourth group, for less than 10 per cent (Belgium, Poland, Croatia and Ger-
many).8 As the rate of  representatives who claim to spend more than 30 hours a 
week on county affairs increases, the percentage of  those councillors who spend 
between 5.1 and 10 hours in exercising their mandate decreases.9
The distribution of  the countries into four groups appears to be non-random. 
The first two groups include England and the countries in Southern Europe. Less 
time investment was declared by councillors from federal or quasi-federal politi-
cal systems such as Germany and Belgium (i.e. countries with more than one 
government level between the national and municipal) and the New Democracies 
of  Eastern-Central Europe where decentralisation quite recently took place 
(Croatia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) and often with a delay and an 
emphasis on the reestablishment of  self-government at the municipal level as one 
of  the first institutional changes after the year 1989 (see e.g. Illner 1997; 2002). 
Nordic countries are placed between these groups of  European countries. This 
pattern resembles the distinction between countries made by Loughlin et al. 
(2011). It seems that countries with similar state traditions also approximate the 
studied indicator, i.e. the ratio of  representatives devoting more than 30 hours 
per week to county activities. There are a number of  partial factors that play a 
role here, such as different job descriptions, the form of  remuneration (lump sum 
versus reimbursement of  time spent on council and committee meetings, etc.), 
the way they divide their time between their own employment and in the elected 
position, etc.
When we measure the level of  professionalization at the second tier of  local 
government by the proportion of  councillors who are spending nearly a full-time 
work week on county affairs (specifically, more than 30 hours per week), we are 
able to identify differences between countries and must reflect on the reasons for 
these differences. One reason for a high percentage of  county councillors with 
such a workload could be the way of  becoming a political representative at this 
level of  local government. This particularly applies to Spain, where ‘the seats of  
the provincial councils are distributed between the political parties in accordance 
with the results of  the elections to the municipal councils within the boundaries 
of  the province’ (Bertrana et al. 2011: 229). The reason for a much lower 
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percentage of  such councillors could be a political system in which a meso-level 
determines the size of  county councils, form of  their organs, etc. (Belgium, 
 Germany). Finally, the historical development of  the institutional setup seems to 
matter, as shown by the young institutions of  local and regional governments in 
the new democracies of  Eastern Europe.
Four types of  county councillors
The next part of  the chapter will first focus on the differences in the proportions 
of  county councillors in the individual countries who declared they carry out their 
function as a full-time job. Subsequently, we will outline a typology of  county 
councillors’ professionalization by using both responses to time invested into county 
affairs and full-time status.
As for the full-time question, the highest proportion of  this type of  politician 
was reported for Spain (68 per cent), median (22 per cent) for Sweden, and the 
smallest for Italy and Croatia (2–3 per cent; see Table 13.2, Column B). When 
comparing these data with those on the time invested in county affairs (Table 13.2, 
Column A), it is apparent that the first group of  countries shows a high proportion 
of  those with 30 or more hours of  county work, as well as a high proportion of  
full-time politicians. The second group unambiguously shows a discrepancy in the 
relatively frequent incidence of  busy representatives on the one hand, and the low 
percentage of  declared full-time politicians on the other. An opposite example of  
a discrepancy is illustrated by the cases of  the Czech Republic and Spain, where 
the proportion of  those representatives who claimed to be full-time politicians 
Table 13.2  Measuring the professionalization of  county councillors by 
(A) declared time invested in county affairs and (B) declared 
status as a full-time politician
Country (A) > 30 hours (B) full-time 
per cent
Difference between 
B and A
Spain 49 68 19
England 39 41 1
France 37 46 10
Greece 27 7 −20
Romania 23 5 −18
Italy 23 2 −21
Norway 20 25 6
Sweden 16 22 6
Hungary 15 Missing data  
Czech Rep. 14 48 34
Belgium 10 18 9
Poland 7 Missing data  
Croatia 6 3 −3
Germany 3 Missing data  
Source: Second Tier Survey
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significantly exceeded the number of  those who stated they put in more than 
30 hours a week for the county. In other countries, the difference between the 
values of  these two indicators did not exceed 10 percentage points.
The calculation of  the differences in Table 13.2 is merely indicative, as it is based 
on two different variables, two percentages with different roots. On one hand, full-
time politicians do not have to invest their time primarily in county affairs, and, on 
the other, there are a number of  those who declare they spend a lot of  time working 
for the county, but are not reimbursed for this. However, by combining these two 
indicators, we get a typology of  county councillors, as shown in Figure 13.1. There 
are full-time councillors who are mainly focused on county affairs, i.e. those who 
reported a full-time position and high time investment, hereinafter referred to as 
full-time county councillors. On the opposite extreme are laypeople, i.e. those who devote 
up to 30 hours a week to county affairs and simultaneously declare they are not 
full-time politicians. The incongruence of  a high amount of  time spent without 
full-time status is characteristic of  time-investors. And finally, there is another form 
of  full-time county councillor: specifically, those who declare they are full-time 
county councillors, but nevertheless do not focus on county affairs (i.e. they reported 
that they devote 30 hours a week or less to county affairs). This type of  county 
councillor, hereinafter referred to as outward oriented full-time councillors, probably 
spends more time on politics outside the county.
In this study, we analyse professionalization at the individual level, as well as at 
the institutional. The typology described earlier includes two congruent types that 
represent opposite poles: laypersons and full-time county politicians. We will look into 
the factors that increase or decrease the chances of  the representatives falling under 
one of  these types in the following part of  this section. Attention will later centre 
on the two incongruent types: the time investors and outward oriented full-time councillors. 
Based on our theory, the presence of  time investors represents evidence of  the 
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transitory state of  the institution rather than the individual’s decision. The repre-
sentation of  outward oriented full-time politicians should indicate the existence of  
personal interconnectedness to various levels of  government. Nevertheless, there 
could be many other explanations for the occurrence of  both incongruent types.
Before we take a closer look at the profile of  county councillors in the indi-
vidual countries, we will highlight the general differences in attitudes toward 
the selected questions regarding professional careers on the individual and 
institutional level (see Table 13.3). On the individual level, this is a matter of  
future career prospects and the self-evaluation of  one’s own influence over 
county affairs. In the first case, we have concentrated on the ratio of  those who 
are determined to leave politics once their current mandate ends.10 In other 
words, we are interested in those representatives who declare discrete ambitions 
according to the typology of  Schlesinger (1966). Although the individual types 
are not very different, we can see that both types of  full-time politicians less 
often consider ending their political careers. Contrarily, it was time investors who 
most often mentioned leaving.
The state of  professionalization, both explicit as well as hidden, can also be 
indicated by the self-perception of  the representatives in regard to the influence 
they have over county activities.11 Is the influence a result of  efforts the representa-
tives devote to activities in their counties, or is inherent in gaining or maintaining 
a full-time post? It is apparent that the representatives who declared themselves 
more influential dedicated more time to activities in their post as county councillor. 
In the case of  our typology, this means full-time county councillors and time investors 
claimed to have high influence over county affairs more often than laypersons and 
outward oriented full-time politicians.
In the survey, county councillors also expressed their view on possible reforms 
to the second tier of  local government (see Heinelt, Chapter 8 in this book).12 From 
the perspective of  professionalization, the most interesting proved to be seeing how 
Table 13.3  Different types of  county councillors by their attitudes towards their future career, 
self-perception of  influence and institutional settings (column percentages)
 Percentage Total 
weighted
Laypersons Time 
Investors
Outward 
Oriented 
Full-Time 
Councillors
Full-Time 
County 
Councillors
I would like to quit politics (a) 19 23 15 15 310
High influence (b) 26 39 25 49 539
Agree
County Merging (c) 36 26 23 23 560
Reduction of  the 
representatives (d)
32 21 23 23 503
Fraud and corruption (e) 47 43 25 30 747
Source: Second Tier Survey
Notes: Data are weighted across the country shares. Agree = sum of  percentages for the options 
‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on a five-point scale.
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the different types of  representatives expressed their views on the two possibilities 
most closely tied to the availability of  full-time positions in the second tier of  local 
government – how they supported or rejected the merging of  counties and reduc-
tions in the numbers of  representatives. On one hand, as the representatives not 
engaged in politics full-time nor paying that much attention to county affairs, lay-
persons were bigger fans of  these straightforward solutions. Proponents of  county 
merges or cuts involving the numbers of  representatives can more frequently be 
found among them. On the other hand, full-time politicians and those who invest 
tens of  hours to county affairs (time investors) are usually opponents of  such 
measures.
Finally, Table 13.3 presents the attitudes of  county councillors connected with 
the evaluation of  institutional performance: namely, how effective the second tier 
of  local government is and whom it primarily serves. This can be shown by the 
different responses to the statement ‘Fraud and corruption are increasingly threat-
ening the efficacy of  local government,’ as depicted in the table.13 A relatively 
low proportion of  full-time politicians identify with this statement. To the con-
trary, those representatives for whom political activity does not represent full-time 
employment are far more critical.
Profiles of  county councillors in European countries 
and what they reveal
In the analyses that follow, we work with the typology of  county councillors intro-
duced in Figure 13.1. We will first show the distribution of  the individual types in 
the studied countries and identify possible differences among them. Subsequently, 
we will focus on two opposite types: laypersons and county full-time politicians, where 
(with the use of  multivariate statistical models) we will focus on the institutional, 
and to some extent, also on the individual, characteristics that are connected with 
the level of  representation of  the mentioned types in the individual countries.
Directing our attention to Table 13.4, we can see that in the majority of  coun-
tries the county councils represent a political organ of  laypersons.14 Only in Spain, 
France and England do laypersons represent a minority of  county councillors. To 
the contrary, nine out of  10 county councillors in Croatia fall under the category 
of  laypersons. Individual countries also differ considerably in terms of  the represen-
tation of  the type labelled full-time county councillor, i.e. the type that best matches a 
professionalised form of  local government at the second tier. The highest propor-
tion of  full-time county politicians can be found in Spain, followed at some distance 
by England, with approximately one-fourth of  these councillors. In the cases of  
the Czech Republic, France, Norway and Sweden, the abovementioned category 
represents approximately one-eighth of  all county councillors; the proportion is 
even lower in the remaining countries. The representation of  time investors is often 
indirectly dependent on the proportion of  full-time county councillors. This is well 
illustrated in the examples of  Greece, Romania and Italy. However it can be said 
that the percentage of  time investors is not connected with the distribution of  layper-
sons in the individual countries. Outward oriented full-time councillors show the highest 
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representation in countries that are characterised by high fragmentation of  munici-
palities, meaning each county has a large number of  municipalities. Specifically, 
this is the case in the Czech Republic and France.15
The differences in the types of  county councillors, as shown in Table 13.4, 
could be the result of  a variety of  factors that can be differentiated as either indi-
vidual or institutional. We will now analyse how these factors impact on the com-
position of  county councillors in the individual countries. This can be done by 
creating two multivariate analytical models, where the dependent variables will be 
those that define the type of  county councillor(s). These are two binary variables; 
the first is being a layperson or not, while the second is being a full-time county politi-
cian or not. As these represent binary dependent variables, the most appropriate 
method to use appears to be binary logistic regression. The following list indicates 
the institutional variables included in the calculation of  the two binary logistic 
regression models as independent variables.
1. Diffusion: One of  the tendencies of  professionalization is its diffusion within 
political systems, i.e. to other territorial levels of  government (Borchert 2008: 
274). A smaller diffusion can be expected in countries with a short history 
of  democratisation and local government. It is primarily a matter of  dif-
ferentiating post-communist countries from established democracies. The 
analysis worked with Loughlin’s typology (Loughlin et al. 2011): the New 
Democracies (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Romania), the Southern Euro-
pean States (France, Greece, Italy, Spain), the Nordic States (Norway, Swe-
den), the Rhineland States (Belgium). We have the necessary data for only 
Table 13.4  Four types of  county councillors by country (row percentage)
 Per cent of total number 
of  councillors 
included Laypersons Time 
investors
Outward 
orientedfull-time 
councillors
Full-time county 
councillors
Spain 26 7 25 42 163
France 28 25 36 12 253
England 46 14 15 25 128
Czech Rep. 51 1 35 13 85
Greece 67 27 6 0 83
Norway 70 6 11 13 216
Romania 74 21 1 4 145
Sweden 75 3 10 13 1,117
Italy 76 22 2 1 123
Belgium 76 5 15 4 257
Croatia 92 5 3 0 285
Source: Second Tier Survey
Note: The most frequent category among non-laypersons categories (time investors, outward oriented 
full-time, and full-time county) are marked in bold.
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these countries; therefore, it was possible to include only them in the models 
(see page XXX).
2. Pool eligible: We suppose that the full-time positions at the second level of  
local government are often filled by politicians with previous experience in 
a professionalised political office at the municipal level. Since professionalisa-
tion at the municipal level is usually limited to local executives, we measure 
the availability of  these pre-county experiences as the number of  mayors in 
every county. More precisely, the indicator is represented by a logarithm of  
the number of  municipalities falling under one county (for more information, 
see Lidström and Roos, Chapter 2 in this book).
3. Number of  inhabitants: The model uses a natural logarithm of  the number of  
inhabitants in the individual county. We presuppose that there will be a 
higher proportion of  professionals among the representatives of  the more 
populated counties. As the size of  a county increases, so too does the amount 
of  sources, as well as an increased amount and complexity of  matters that 
counties govern and on which the representatives must make decisions.
4. Vertical position: This variable differentiates countries based on whether there 
is another level of  government (a regional or state level) between the two 
levels of  local government and national level. The number of  levels affects 
the number of  available full-time offices in a country (more levels, more 
electable positions). Nonetheless, the attractiveness of  full-time positions can 
increase in proximity to the national level.
Apart from the institutional variables which show characteristics associated with 
specificities of  the individual countries or individual counties, the multidimensional 
models included the following two independent individual variables as well:
1. Position: This variable shows the degree of  experience of  councillors based 
on the number of  electable positions they have held during their career.16
2. Elected as a candidate of: This variable shows if  the councillor was nominated as 
a candidate of  a national party or whether they have run individually, or as a 
candidate for a county-specific party. In the case of  being nominated as a can-
didate of  a national party, a bigger coalition potential can be expected and, 
therefore, easier access to full-time positions in executive organs of  local govern-
ment.17 This might not be universally valid, as there are countries (such as 
Germany) where the influence of  national politics is enforced on the level of  
federal states, while strong ‘independent’ political groups exist at both levels of  
local government (Reiser and Holtmann 2008).
Table 13.5 presents the outcomes of  the two multivariate models that show 
which factors are connected with the fact that the county councillor either is or is 
not a full-time county politician or whether they are or are not laypersons. Some of  the 
variables (vertical position and elected as candidate) have proved to be significant in only 
one of  the models, while not being useful in the other, nor did they contribute to 
the explanatory power of  the entire model.
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Table 13.5  How to explain difference in the composition of  county councillors between 
countries? Outputs of  binary logistic regression models
Name of  
variable
Value Model 1 – layperson Model 2 – full-time 
county politician
Sig. Exp. (B) Sig. Exp. (B)
Number of  
inhabitants
ln of  value 0.015 0.85 0.019 1.29
Pool eligible ln of  value 0.000 0.11 0.000 4.08
Positions number of  positions 0.034 0.91 0.001 1.26
Vertical 
position
•  only two tiers of  local 
government
0.020 0.38 X X
•  existence of  regional/
state level (ref.)
. . X X
Loughlin 
typology
•  New Democracies 0.022 3.59 0.969 0.97
•  Southern European states 0.256 0.71 0.533 1.49
•  Nordic states 0.207 0.53 0.001 8.58
•  Rhineland states (ref.) . . . . 
Elected as a 
candidate
•  individual or independent X X 0.27 1.744
•  national party X X 0.04 2.146
•  county-specific party (ref.) X X . . 
Nagelkerke R2  0.248 0.101
Source: Second Tier Survey
Note: The dependent variable in Model 1 is layperson or not (ref.). The dependent variable in Model 
2 is full-time county politician or not (ref.). X means that variable was not included in the model. 
Data are weighted across the country shares. Reference categories are marked with dots.
The first of  the introduced models (Model 1 – layperson) reveals which factors 
affect the chances of  the individual county councillors to become (or remain) lay-
persons. Regarding the individual characteristics, the experience gained by working 
in politics proved to be important (measured by the number of  electable positions 
previously held by the councillor). The more experienced the councillor, the smaller 
their chance of  becoming a layperson. On the county level, the ‘pool eligible’ factor 
proved to be very impactful. The same applies to a lesser extent, but still quite 
significantly, to the number of  inhabitants of  the county. It turns out that the fewer 
municipalities under the jurisdiction of  a county and the fewer inhabitants the 
county has, the better the chance of  a councillor to become a layperson. The chance 
of  belonging to the laypersons category is predetermined by the existence of  a 
regional or state level in the respective country. If  this is the case, the chance that 
a county councillor falls under the category of  laypersons increases almost threefold. 
In regard to the national context, it is also true that the chance of  becoming a 
layperson for county councillors from post-communist countries (the New Democra-
cies) is almost four times higher compared to county councillors from Belgium (the 
only representative of  the Rhineland states). Moreover, this chance is five times 
higher compared to the Southern European states and nearly seven times higher 
in comparison with the Nordic states.
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The other calculated model (Model 2 – full-time county politician) tells us which fac-
tors influence the chances of  individual county councillors becoming (or remaining) 
a full-time county politician. When looking at the individual characteristics, the number 
of  electable positions the representative had held in the past also played an important 
role here as well. In this case, however, as the number of  positions increases, so too 
does the chance of  being a full-time county politician. In contrast to the previous model, 
the variable indicating if  and for which political party the county councillor was 
running also proved to have an impact. If  councillors were nominated by a national 
party, they had twice the chance of  being full-time county councillors, compared with a 
candidate of  a county-specific party. The structural characteristics of  the county also 
play a role: as the number of  inhabitants and municipalities in an individual county 
increases, the chance of  becoming a full-time county politician also considerably 
increases. On the national level, it turned out to be important whether or not the 
county councillor is in the Nordic states. In comparison with county councillors of  
other countries, the candidates from Nordic states have a significantly higher chance 
of  becoming a full-time county politician. The chance is nine times higher in comparison 
with Belgium (the Rhineland state) and the New Democracies, while almost six times 
higher when compared with the group of  Southern European states.
Generally, after calculating the influence of  the analysed variables, the models 
indicate that it is crucial whether the councillor is from a county with a large num-
ber of  municipalities. The bigger the county, the higher their chances of  being a 
full-time county politician, and the opposite: the lower the chance of  being a layperson. 
The number of  municipalities in a county is connected with the number of  inhab-
itants in the county, which is a variable that performs similarly in the models, but 
does not have such a big impact on the dependable variables. The assumption 
about the impact of  previous experience on the municipal level on political profes-
sionalisation was confirmed. Equally so, the experience of  politicians measured by 
the number of  electable positions they had held also influenced their professionali-
sation. The more positions they had held in the past, the bigger their chances were 
of  being full-time county politicians. Conversely, the smaller their number of  previous 
positions, the bigger their chance of  becoming laypersons.
After factoring in the influence of  the remaining variables, not only did the 
individual experience of  politicians or physical parameters of  the counties prove 
to be significant in terms of  the professionalization of  councillors at the second 
level of  local government, but also the institutional context of  the individual coun-
tries. The fact of  whether a county councillor is or is not a layperson is influenced 
by the multi-level government arrangement of  the individual countries. In the 
countries with a regional or a state level, there is a bigger chance for a county 
councillor to become a layperson in comparison with countries where this level is 
non-existent. The institutional context is also determined by the type of  political 
system; in our case, we have used the Loughlin typology (Loughlin et al. 2011). It 
is evident from the models that the chance of  being a layperson is especially higher 
in the case of  county councillors from the New Democracies of  Eastern Europe 
and, conversely, the chance of  being a full-time county politician is highest for county 
councillors of  the Nordic states.
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All of  these factors are relevant for the country with the highest proportion of  
laypersons, which is Croatia. Not only does Croatia belong to the New Democracies, 
but it also has few municipalities per county, has the lowest number of  inhabitants 
per county on average, lacks a regional/state level and has poorly experienced 
county councillors in terms of  the number of  electable positions held in the past. 
In contrast, the country with the highest proportion of  full-time county politicians is 
Spain, with very strong counties in terms of  population and a relatively high num-
ber of  municipalities and county councillors with outstanding experience in terms 
of  the number of  previously held electable positions; in the majority of  cases, these 
councillors were elected for national parties.
To summarise the findings of  the previous analyses, it can be said that the stud-
ied countries differ by the level and form of  political professionalization. We find 
countries with a very high proportion of  laypersons among county councillors 
(e.g. Croatia), but also countries in which the proportion of  full-time county politicians 
is not so insignificant (e.g. Spain), or transitory types located somewhere between the 
two mentioned types (e.g. the Czech Republic, France, Greece). Using multivariate 
models helped to show that these differences are influenced by both the individual 
political experience of  county councillors, the size of  the counties (in respect to 
population as well as the number of  municipalities) and the institutional setting in 
the individual countries.
County councillors in the space of   
political professionalization
In the previous section we analysed the factors that help in clarifying why one 
person does not engage very much in county affairs (laypersons), while another dedi-
cates a lot of  time to it and makes a living by doing so ( full-time county councillors). 
We will now compare the levels and forms of  professionalization in the different 
countries. For these purposes, a two-dimensional space based on two key variables 
was created, in which the individual countries are located based on the distribu-
tions of  the individual types of  councillors. This space was created to reflect the 
level of  congruence of  the two variables that identify the level of  professionaliza-
tion (see Figure 13.2). The horizontal axis shows whether those who dedicate more 
than 30 hours a week to work for the county in the particular country comprise a 
larger degree of  full-time politicians (positive values) or not (negative values). The 
vertical axis indicates whether those who declared themselves full-time politicians 
devote more than 30 hours a week (positive values) to county politics, or not (nega-
tive values). The secondary diagonal goes from the area of  low incidence of  full-time 
county politicians (Full-Time County – in Figure 13.2) to the area of  high incidence 
of  this type (Full-Time County +++). The main diagonal starts at the upper left 
corner, i.e. the area with relatively high representation of  time investors, and ends in 
the lower right corner, in the area characterised by the presence of  outward oriented 
full-time councillors.
The size of  the circles associated with the individual countries in Figure 13.2 
corresponds to the proportion of  respondents that either devote more than 30 hours 
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of  their time to the county or have declared themselves to be professionals. In other 
words: this figure indicates all county councillors after deducting laypersons.
That there are considerable differences between countries in terms of  the 
involvement of  councillors in county affairs is apparent. For example, on one hand, 
Croatian county councils consist of  about 40–50 representatives, but only one of  
every 20 of  these councillors spends more than 30 hours a week on county affairs, 
and every 30th claimed to be a full-time professional. On the other hand, only 
about one-fourth of  their colleagues in Spain would qualify as laypersons.
The location of  most of  the countries in Figure 13.2 approximates a line that 
represents a positive correlation between both axes. Closest to the line are those 
countries where the difference between the two main indicators of  professional-
ization does not exceed 10 per cent (see Table 13.2). Closest to the ‘Full-Time 
County +++’ pole is Spain; farthest is France. In both countries, only a minority 
of  respondents corresponded with the laypersons type, even though the results of  
the binary regression analysis (Table 13.4) suggest something else, i.e. that county 
councillors from countries with two levels of  local government as well as function-
ing regional governments have a better chance of  fitting into the laypersons type. 
However, the odds of  being a layperson are influenced by a number of  other fac-
tors. In particular, both France and Spain find themselves among the countries 
with a relatively high number of  municipalities in the individual counties (i.e. a 
positive occurrence of  the ‘pool eligible’ factor) and relatively experienced politi-
cians (measured by average number of  positions held), which lower the chances 
of  becoming or remaining laypersons. This effect seems to be strongly manifested 
in the generally low proportion of  laypersons in France and Spain. The location 
in Figure 13.2 is determined by the fact that, in France – unlike in Spain – we are 
more likely to encounter time investors or outward oriented full-time politicians, rather 
than the full-time county councillor type.
The noticeable outliers mentioned are located outside the area adjacent to the 
secondary diagonal: these were represented by a group of  three countries, where it 
again and again appears that time spent on county affairs is not a subject of  remu-
neration (Greece, Italy, Romania). Particularly these three countries can support or 
falsify the second hypothesis stipulated in the introduction to this chapter. This 
hypothesis concerns the correlation between the incongruence between profession-
alization at the individual level and professionalization of  an office or institution. In 
other words, they can prove the validity of  Borchert’s thesis that the ‘situation of  
politicians who pursue politics full-time while the position they hold is not yet ade-
quately reimbursed is usually part of  a historical (rather than an individual) process 
of  transition’ (2008: 271). A different case is the Czech Republic, where the time 
investor type is nearly non-existent and the outward oriented full-time councillor type is 
more widespread than full-time county councillors. With this type of  incongruence one 
can more easily envisage a long-continuing trend. Moreover, the Czech Republic is 
one of  the countries where local government was only re-established after 1989 and 
the constitution of  the second tier of  local government was delayed until the end of  
the millennium (Illner 2002; Ryšavý 2013a). These outliers will be discussed in more 
detail in the rest of  the chapter.
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What does the existence of  time investors signal?
In four of  the 11 countries – Greece, France, Italy and Romania – the proportion 
of  representatives labelled time investors exceeded one-fifth (see Table 13.3). With 
the exception of  France, this was the most frequent of  the three non-laypersons 
categories. Does this prove the existence of  a transitory state, as suggested by 
Borchert (2008) and our second hypothesis? Could this type of  incongruence rep-
resent a by-product or a consequence of  the changes that the second tier of  local 
government in the mentioned countries has been undergoing, or is it explainable 
in a different way?
According to the comparative study of  Bertrana and Heinelt (2013), the men-
tioned countries are not any of  those in which the second tier of  local government 
has shown a high capacity to resist structural reforms. Whilst ‘the current economic 
and fiscal crisis has opened a “window of  opportunity” to realise reforms which 
would have been difficult to implement under normal circumstances’ (Bertrana and 
Heinelt 2013: 83–4), Greece and Italy have been among the first to move away 
from the traditional strategy of  territorial reforms in Southern European countries. 
Among other things, this strategy was concerned with helping small municipalities 
handle their tasks, specifically through the second tier of  local government.
Moreover, in respect to the professionalization of  county politicians, it is impor-
tant that the launched reforms had, in a considerable way, influenced the possibili-
ties of  making a living by doing politics. The recent Kallikrates reform (2010–11) 
in Greece led to the merger of  municipalities and a ‘moving up’ of  the second tier 
of  local government to the former regional level (see Hlepas 2012) – and thereby 
to a considerable reduction of  full-time posts. After delays caused by quickly chang-
ing governments, a reform strategy is also starting to gain ground in Italy that 
weakens or even abolishes provinces (Bolgherini 2014). However, France has not 
been experiencing such strong deflection from the ‘Southern European Strategy’ 
after the change in the presidential office.18
Bertrana and Heinelt (2013) exclude Romania from the group of  other East-
ern European countries represented by Poland and Hungary, due to a different 
form of  the second tier of  local government, as well as ongoing reforms that have 
not in any way weakened the high degree of  the country’s centralisation. The 
mentioned study does not include Croatia. Although the time investor type was only 
marginally represented among the Croatian councillors, it was, nevertheless, more 
frequent than both types of  full-time politicians together (see Table 13.3). There 
has been an ongoing debate in academia for years regarding appropriate reforms 
that would, among other things, include the process of  merging into larger enti-
ties (e.g. Dulabic 2011; Kopric 2010). The contemporary county representations 
do not seem to stand against such intentions. However, the current government is 
carrying out the reforms with apparent reluctance.
To summarise, it appears that in the range of  countries characterised by a rela-
tively large proportion of  councillors of  the time investor type, the second tier of  local 
government currently finds itself  in a transitory state due to ongoing reforms and, 
also, diverting from models that were common in these countries over a long period 
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of  time. However, these statements would not reveal much about a possible causal 
relation or the general nature of  the relationship between a certain county council-
lor’s profile and the transformation of  the institution in which they are acting. It is 
for this reason why we will try to explicate the high representation of  the time investor 
type based on our own survey among representatives.
We will first concentrate on any possible biases caused by the tool used; namely, 
who answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘Are you a full-time politician?’ and why. For 
example, we know that most of  the Italian county presidents and the assessories are 
professional politicians (Bacceti 2011: 170), however, only one of  eight interviewed 
county presidents declared that they were a full-time politician, and it was a very 
rare answer among assessories (two out of  59).19 One possible reason for this in the 
case of  Italy and also France is the stipulation that financial resources provided for 
financial compensation for the exercise of  an office or mandate are not a salary or 
wage (Guérin and Kerrouche 2008: 189 and 190). The answers from the French 
county presidents were, indeed, similar to those of  the Italians; there was only one 
positive answer from the seven interviewed. However, contrary to the Italians, 
almost half  of  the French provincial councillors declared full-time engagement in 
politics. It appears as if  the same question may have been answered by a number 
of  the respondents according to the formal definition, while for others, the question 
represented an assessment of  their de facto economic and professional positions.
It is not possible from the survey of  councillors to find out precisely how long 
the representatives have manifested the features of  time investors. This could mean 
a transitory phase in a political career enabling an ambitious local politician to 
more easily reach their desired position, i.e. a stepping stone towards the national 
parliament. Such an interpretation is offered by Stănuş et al. (2009) in the case of  
Romania. Approximately one-third of  the county councillors elected in 2004 
renounced their position in the following 12 months, either because they were 
elected as an MP or because they were appointed to an executive position at the 
national or local level. In such cases, the time dedicated to county affairs becomes 
an investment incorporated into one’s political career plans.
The relatively high representation of  time investors could also be interpreted as a 
consequence of  a situation in which the salary of  persons dedicating a lot of  time 
to county affairs comes from other sources that do not require paid work outside 
of  politics. First, these persons could be economically inactive individuals – and, 
indeed, a majority of  French councillors belonging to the time investor type (80 per 
cent) come from a group of  students and retired or unemployed people. Second, 
these persons could be financially independent, self-employed or actual employers 
(entrepreneurs, owners). The latter often applies to Romanian councillors. How-
ever, neither the categories alone nor the sum of  both categories – economically 
inactive and (self) employers – together make up more than half  of  the Romanian, 
Greek or Italian time investors, as is the case of  France.20 The suggested explanation 
is most likely only in the case of  France.
Based on the survey, it is far more difficult to prove an expansion of  the so-called 
hidden professionalization among the time investors (Reiser 2006). This would mean 
politicians gain support from political parties, interest groups, public institutions, 
8329-0042-PIV-013.indd   265 7/10/2015   1:23:33 PM
266 D. Ryšavý and D. Čermák
etc. At least an approximate indication can be extracted from the selected ques-
tions on attitudes mentioned earlier in connection with the four types of  
representatives.
The first of  these questions is represented by the evaluation of  one’s own influ-
ence over county activities. We assume hidden professionalization applies only to 
those representatives who have something to offer. Influence over the decision-
making process in counties can represent such leverage. In only one of  the 
14 countries covered by the survey did more than half  of  the time investors indicate 
their influence to be ‘very high’ or ‘high’: this was Italy.21 In France and Romania, 
one-third of  the representatives of  the same type evaluated themselves this way, 
while in Greece, it was even less. We should pay special attention to the difference 
between Italy and Greece. In Greece, the survey of  county councillors took place 
after the implementation of  reforms; these were so abrupt that they most likely 
significantly reduced the extent of  hidden professionalization, or at least temporar-
ily reduced it, while the networks that were built over a long time were either dis-
turbed or disrupted altogether. The Italian councillors, unlike others, mostly 
appreciated changes such as the merging of  provinces, i.e. the strategy that was 
elected and enforced in Greece. Half  of  the representatives agreed with this, while 
the possible reduction in members of  assemblies was well regarded by a smaller 
number.
The existence of  informal rewards of  different kinds can also be inferred from 
the evaluation of  the situation in which the local government finds itself. More 
precisely, more than three-quarters of  the councillors in the three mentioned coun-
tries agreed with the statement ‘Fraud and corruption are increasingly threatening 
the efficacy of  local government.’ In other countries, the proportion of  those who 
agreed with this did not exceed 55 per cent. Reputation cannot be built in one day. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising there was no difference between Italy and Greece in 
this case.
Nevertheless, if  county politicians represent the select elite, their perception of  
corruption was in agreement with public opinion, as at other political levels. This 
is supported by a strong correlation between an agreement with the mentioned 
statement and the Corruption Perception Index of  Transparency International (see 
Figure 13.3).
A consensus between councillors and the public is not enough for an enforce-
ment of  changes that would turn things to the better. This can be successfully 
avoided by those who – either allegedly or in reality – are affected by it. Even if  
there is nothing much to lose, taking into account the measured availability of  fully 
paid positions, planned and discussed changes can be postponed if  willingness on 
the part of  the key actors (the national governments especially) is lacking (Croatia). 
Nonetheless, neither did any quick shift in the assessment of  local government 
occur in such countries where specific circumstances (‘windows of  opportunity’) 
led to swift radical chances (Greece).
To summarise, the described explanations call for caution when interpreting the 
incongruence of  the individual and institutional levels of  professionalisation indi-
cated here by the presence of  the time investor type representing the direct proof  of  
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the transitory state. Although reforms could change the structure of  opportunities 
for ambitious politicians, alternative explanations for the presence of  time investors 
should also be taken into account.
In some cases, it is possible to explain the incongruence through the socio-
demographic profile of  representatives (e.g. the high rate of  economically inactive 
in France); in other cases, it could be the effect of  a different understanding (or 
simply a misunderstanding) of  the key question in the questionnaire (e.g. Italy). 
Incongruence of  individual and professional status can become a permanent fea-
ture if  it is accompanied by so-called hidden professionalization. Its existence is 
proven indirectly, for example, by a widely shared perception of  the local govern-
ment being threatened by fraud and corruption. Despite the mentioned doubts and 
alternative explanations (see e.g. Bertrana and Heinelt 2013), the study of  the 
extent and nature of  professionalization at the second tier of  local government 
partially supports the second hypothesis.
Conclusion
National studies describing the character and changes of  the second tier of  local 
government in Europe (Heinelt and Bertrana 2011) often point out that this level 
of  government is one of  the weakest, and furthermore, often exposed to the pres-
sures of  ongoing debates and reform plans on the rescaling of  statehood. Despite 
this, for many politicians, it is worth spending their time there. For some, it repre-
sents a fruitful source of  regular income, while others occupy professionalised posi-
tions in other levels of  government, which makes the work in county bodies a 
secondary or complementary activity for them.
In this chapter, we have pointed out that it is primarily individuals with previous 
experience in politics who are fully dedicated to county affairs. The chance of  
becoming a full-time county politician grows not only with the increasing number of  
inhabitants, but also with the increasing number of  municipalities in the counties. 
Conversely, the presence of  a regional or state level of  government increases the 
chances of  county councillors remaining laypersons, i.e. those who make their living 
by doing something else and dedicating less time to county politics compared to 
their ‘professional’ colleagues. Whilst the poll of  eligible candidates for profession-
alised positions in county organs is saturated primarily by municipal politicians, a 
recruitment system is approved by politicians from the national or state level; they 
may try to constrain access to county organs. This has been indirectly supported 
by one of  the findings that suggest the chance of  becoming a full-time county politi-
cian increases with candidacy for one of  the national political parties. The continu-
ous diffusion of  professionalization within the political system has been proven by 
the smaller occurrence of  this phenomenon in the second tier of  local government 
in the New Democracies.
Apart from laypersons, we have identified a considerable number of  councillors 
at the second tier of  local government who do not comply with the original idea 
of  purposive rationality of  professional exercise of  the office. We have labelled time 
investors those who spend a lot of  time on county affairs without full-time status. On 
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one hand, in France, these people are mostly pensioners who are committed in this 
way to départmental politics. On the other hand, the relatively high representation 
of  time investors in Greece and Italy was most likely connected with the transitory 
state the second tier of  local government in these countries was going through at 
the time of  the survey.
How the ongoing reforms will change the profile of  county councillors remains 
a question for other research. A more permanent presence of  not-so-insignificant 
numbers of  time investors may be possible with further expansion of  a so-called hid-
den professionalization, which can include different informal rewards. However, 
this would require special research methods. We assume that hidden professional-
ization can threaten the efficacy of  local government. The fact is that in countries 
with a high representation of  time investors, both councillors and the public perceive 
local government as increasingly threatened by fraud and corruption.
Finally, we repeat that the process of  professionalization is connected with 
democratisation, and, over the course of  time, its diffusion within political systems 
comes about (Borchert 2008). The extent and form of  professionalization at the 
second tier of  local government in New Democracies of  Central and Eastern 
Europe are, therefore, more affected by changes on the national political scene 
rather than by reforms that directly involve the second tier of  local government. 
The first example would be Croatia, where the reforms discussed by experts are 
not supported by the contemporary government. Electing Klaus Iohannis, a suc-
cessful mayor of  Sibia, into the Romanian president’s office in autumn 2014, might 
constitute an opportunity to shuffle the country politics of  county councillors who 
were most likely to agree with the statement ‘Fraud and corruption are increasingly 
threatening the efficacy of  local government.’ As for the Czech Republic, at the 
time that the survey of  councillors was being conducted, there was a series of  
scandals symbolised by one of  the county presidents being arrested and taken into 
custody under bribery charges. A few months later, after the county elections in 
autumn 2012, almost a quarter century after the Velvet Revolution, the Commu-
nist party established itself  as the main partner of  the Social Democrats in county 
governments (Ryšavý 2013a). A year later, in the pre-term parliamentary elections, 
the new political grouping of  the large-scale businessman and also recent press 
magnate, Andrej Babiš, had success by addressing its voters with the slogan ‘We 
are not politicians. We work hard.’ If  politics is a profession, it is a precarious one 
indeed (Borchert 2003).
Notes
1 This chapter was a result of  the research project Regional councils in a European perspective 
funded by the Czech Science Foundation (P404/12/0714).
2 The most noticeable example from recent times would be the abolition of  14 counties 
in Denmark in 2007 (Mouritzen 2011), or the case of  Greece, where the second tier has 
been ‘moved’ up to the regional level (Hlepas 2012). To the contrary, the quite recently 
established institutions of  the second tier of  local government in countries such as 
Poland or the Czech Republic exhibit a relatively high level of  stability (Bertrana and 
Heinelt 2013; Ryšavý 2013a).
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3 Political professionalisation was the subject of  the research project Politik als Beruf. Die politische 
Klasse und die Modernisierung demokratischer Institutionen funded by the Volkswagenstiftung. The out-
comes of  this study comprise elaborated and actualised concepts of  profession, political class 
and models of  multi-level political careers, as well as analyses of  political professionalisation 
on both the central and sub-national level (see e.g. Borchert 2003; Edinger and Patzelt 2010; 
Reiser 2006; Stolz 2009). Therefore, a whole new area which enriched the historical research 
of  the professionalisation of  parliamentary politics was uncovered, first investigating Western 
democracies (Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007), while later including the parlia-
ments of  the New Democracies as well (Best and Edinger 2003; Semenova et al. 2013).
4  Alongside the total amount of  time declared by councillors, the councillors were to state 
how many hours they spend on seven different tasks, such as council meetings, party 
meetings, public debates, their own preparation, etc.
5 The respondents from Greece more frequently answered the question about the time 
invested in particular matters. In other cases, it was the other way around.
6 The overall number of  cases with zero answer was 15. These cases were omitted from 
the analysis.
7 For German municipal councillors, Holtkamp (2011: 109) concentrated on those who 
spend more than 15 and more than 30 hours a week. Guérin and Kerrouche (2008: 193) 
used three categories for Wallonian municipal councillors, mayors and their deputies: 
less than 16 hours, 17–32 hours and more than 32 hours a week.
8 If  the total amount of  time as stated by the respondents was not taken into account, but 
instead, the results from the sum of  the seven partial data linked to various activities was 
calculated, the overall range between the two extreme cases – Spain and Germany – would 
not change much. The ranking of  countries would significantly differ for the first two groups. 
One can distinguish a group of  countries in which the proportion of  representatives spend-
ing more than 30 hours a week in total on the seven activities exceeded 40 per cent. This 
group includes Spain, Italy and Greece. A second group of  countries consists of  England, 
France and Sweden, where between 25 per cent and 40 per cent of  second-tier councillors 
dedicate more than 30 hours a week to the seven activities. As for the New Democracies, the 
proportions of  such committed politicians range from 9 per cent in Croatia to 21 per cent 
in Romania. Norway is located in the middle, while the lowest proportions of  very busy 
representatives can be identified for Belgium (7 per cent) and Germany (5 per cent).
9 The Pearson correlation coefficient between these two variables for the 14 countries 
reached the value of-0.9.
10 Councillors were asked the following question: ‘For the time being, what are you plan-
ning to do at the end of  the present position?’ The percentages of  politicians who 
claimed ‘I would like to quit politics’ can be found in Table 13.3.
11 Councillors were asked ‘On the basis of  your experience as a councillor in this county, 
and independently of  the formal procedures, how much influence do you have over 
county activities?’ Answers were given on a scale from ‘very high’ to ‘none’.
12 Councillors were asked the following question: ‘How desirable or undesirable do you 
consider the following reforms, irrespective of  whether such reforms have been intro-
duced in your county?’ Among others, the proposed reforms were: ‘Merging counties.’ 
(c); ‘Reducing the number of  council members’ (d). Answers were given on a scale from 
‘highly desirable’ to ‘highly undesirable’. The percentages in Table 13.3 represent the 
sum of  ‘highly desirable’ and ‘desirable’.
13 The question was: ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?- 
Fraud and corruption are increasingly threatening the efficacy of  local government.’ 
Answers were given on a scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. The percent-
ages in Table 13.3 represent the sum of  ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’.
14 The data in the table could be biased by self-selection. However, we do not have detailed 
evidence of  how the different types of  representatives in individual countries differed in 
their willingness to answer our questions.
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15 Countries such as Spain or Italy also have a rather fragmented territorial structure. 
However, many municipal politicians in Spain are also engaged full-time in provinces. 
Every Italian province comprises dozens of  municipalities, but, in the case of  the Czech 
Republic and France, they are hundreds.
16 The variable was created by the transformation of  the variables indicating positions that 
the respondent has held during his or her political career.
17 Councillors were asked the following question: ‘In the last election, were you elected as 
a candidate . . .’. The offered answers were as follows: ‘for a national party’, ‘for a 
county-specific group or party’ and ‘as an individual or independent’.
18 In Spain, the contemporary reform efforts could, to the contrary, lead to an empower-
ment of  the second tier of  local government, although up till now the role of  the prov-
inces has been weakened by the growing power of  municipalities and regions (Bertrana 
et al. 2011, Bolgherini 2014). Altogether separate attention should be given to the role 
that county councillors play in this development, as they do, in fact, receive reimburse-
ment for their work in provincial councils.
19 In the case of  the Romanian county president, the ratio was three of  five; in Greece, 
five of  eight. It represents a majority, but from a small number of  cases.
20 Let us leave aside the question of  what it means that many members of  county councils 
are retired people or entrepreneurs.
21 For comparison, it should be noted that the same influence was claimed by two-thirds 
of  the assessori who make up the Giunta Provinciale, the executive organ outside of  council 
selected by the provincial president.
References
Abbott, A. (1981) ‘Status and status strain in the professions’, American Journal of  Sociology, 
86, 4: 819–835.
Aderhold, J., Harm, K. and Jaeck, T. (2009) ‘Professionalisierungsprozesses lokaler Selbst-
verwaltungseliten und ihre Bedeutung für Integration und Legitimation’, in K. König 
and S. Kropp (eds.) Theoretische Aspekte Einer Zivilgesellschaftlichen Verwaltungskultur. Speyer: 
Deutsche Forschungsinstitut für Öffentliche Verwaltung, 161–200.
Bacetti, C. (2011) ‘Italy’, in H. Heinelt and X. Bertrana (eds.) The second tier of  local government 
in Europe. New York: Routledge, 164–184.
Bertrana, X. and Heinelt, H. (2013) ‘The second tier of  local government in the context of  
European multi-level government systems: institutional setting and prospects for reform’, 
Revista catalana de dret públic, 46: 74–89.
Bertrana, X., Espinosa, M. and Magre, J. (2011) ‘Spain’, in H. Heinelt and X. Bertrana. 
(eds.) The second tier of  local government in Europe. New York: Routledge, 224–242.
Best, H. and Cotta, M. (2000) Parliamentary representatives in Europe 1848–2000. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Best, H. and Edinger M. (eds.) (2003) Representative elites in post-communist settings. SFB 580 
Mitteilungen Gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen nach dem Systemumbruch Heft 8, Jena: 
Druckerei der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität.
Bolgherini, S. (2014, September) ‘Local government reforms in Italy and Spain: toward 
institutional sustainability or weaker local authorities?’ Paper presented at the ECPR 
General Conference, Glasgow.
Borchert, J. (2003) Die Professionalisierung der Politik. Frankfurt, Main: Campus.
Borchert, J. (2007) ‘From politik als beruf  to politics as a vocation: the translation, transfor-
mation, and reception of  Max Weber’s lecture’, Contributions to the History of  Concepts, 3, 1: 
42–70.
8329-0042-PIV-013.indd   271 7/10/2015   1:23:34 PM
272 D. Ryšavý and D. Čermák
Borchert, J. (2008) ‘Political professionalism and representative democracy: common his-
tory, irresolvable linkage and inherent tensions’, in K. Palonen, T. Pulkkinen and J. María 
Rosales (eds.) The Ashgate research companion to the politics of  democratization in Europe. Farn-
hame: Ashgate, 267–283.
Borchert, J. and Stolz, K. (2011) ‘German political careers: the state level as an arena in its 
own right?’ Regional and Federal Studies, 21, 2: 205–222.
Cotta, M. and Best, H. (2007) Democratic representation in Europe: diversity, change and convergence. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dodeigne, J. (2014) ‘(Re-)assessing career patterns in multi-level systems: insights from Wal-
lonia in Belgium’, Regional and Federal Studies, 24, 2: 151–171.
Dulabic, V. (2011) ‘Razvoj i modernizacija regionalne samouprave u Hrvatskoj’, in 
J. Kregar, V. Dulabić, D. Gardašević, A. Musa, S. Ravlić and T. Rogić Lugarić (eds.) 
Decentralizacija. Zagreb: Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo, 35–61.
Edinger, M. and Patzelt W. J. (eds.) (2010) Politik als Beruf. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften.
Goode, W. J. (1957) ‘Community within a community: the professions’, American Sociological 
Review, 22, 2: 194–200.
Guérin, E. and Kerrouche, E. (2008) ‘From amateurs to professionals: the changing face of  
local elected representatives in Europe’, Local Government Studies, 34, 2: 179–201.
Heinelt, H. and Bertrana, X. (eds.) (2011) The second tier of  local government in Europe. New 
York: Routledge.
Heinelt, H. and Egner, B. (2011) ‘Germany’, in H. Heinelt and X. Bertrana (eds.) The second 
tier of  local government in Europe. Oxon, New York: Routledge: 106–125.
Hlepas, N. K. (2012) ‘Local government in Greece’, in Á. M. Moreno (ed.) Local government 
in the member states of  the European Union: a comparative legal perspective. Madrid: INAP: 
257–281.
Holtkamp, L. (2011) ‘Professionalisierung der Kommunalpolitik? Empirische und norma-
tive Befunde’, in M. Edinger and W.J. Patzelt (eds.) Politik als Beruf. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, 103–120.
Illner, M. (1997) ‘Territorial decentralisation – a stumbling block of  democratic reforms in 
East-Central Europe?’ Polish Sociological Review, 117: 23–45.
Illner, M. (2002) ‘Multilevel government in three East Central European candidate coun-
tries and its reforms after 1989’, EUI Working Paper, RSC No. 2002, 7. Badia Fiesolana: 
European University Institute Florence, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies.
Kopric, I. (2010) ‘Prijedlozi za reformu lokalne i regionalne samouprave u Hrvatskoj’, 
Hrvatska Javna Uprava, 10, 4: 941–959.
Loughlin, J., Hendriks, F. and Lidström, A. (eds.) (2011) The Oxford handbook of  local and 
regional democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martin, S. (2011) ‘The United Kingdom’, in H. Heinelt and X. Bertrana (eds.) The second 
tier of  local government in Europe. New York: Routledge, 90–105.
Mouritzen, E. (2011) ‘Denmark’, in H. Heinelt and X. Bertrana (eds.) The second tier of  local 
government in Europe. New York: Routledge. 56–72.
Reiser, M. (2006) Zwischen Ehrenamt und Berufspolitik. Professionalisierung der Kommunalpolitik in 
deutschen Großstädten. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Reiser, M. and Holtmann, E. (eds.) (2008) Farewell to the party model? Independent Local Lists in 
East and West European countries. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Ryšavý, D. (2013a) ‘Czech counties after a dozen years of  regionalization: continuity and 
novelties after county elections 2012’, Regional & Federal Studies, 23, 5: 631–642.
8329-0042-PIV-013.indd   272 7/15/2015   5:47:05 PM
Professionalization of  councillors 273
Ryšavý, D., (2013b) ‘European mayors and councillors: similarities and differences’, in 
B. Egner, D. Sweeting and P.-J. Klok (eds.) Local councillors in Europe. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 
161–180.
Ryšavý, D. (forthcoming) ‘Career politicians a dozen years after regionalization of  the 
Czech Republic (2000–2013)’, The Journal of  Legislative Studies.
Schlesinger, J. (1966) Ambition and politics. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Semenova, E., Edinger, M. and Best, H. (2013) Parliamentary elites in Central and Eastern Europe. 
New York: Routledge.
Stănuş, C., Pop, D. and Suciu, A.M. (2009) Studiu de politici privind informarea cetăţenilor despre 
activitatea aleşilor locali. Cluj-Napoca: Centrul pentru Politici Publice.
Steyvers, K. and Verhelst, T. (2012) ‘Between layperson and professional? Political recruit-
ment and career development of  local councillors in a comparative perspective’, Lex 
Localis, 10, 1: 1–17.
Stolz, K. (2009) Towards a regional political class? Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press.
Valcke, T., Reynaert, H. and Steyvers, K. (2011) ‘Belgium’, in H. Heinelt and X. Bertrana 
(eds.) The second tier of  local government in Europe. New York: Routledge, 27–55.
Vanlangenaeker, I., Maddens, B. and Put, G.-J. (2013) ‘Career patterns in multilevel states: 
an analysis of  the Belgian regions’, Regional Studies, 47, 3: 356–367.
Weber, M. (1919) Politik als Beruf. München und Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot.
8329-0042-PIV-013.indd   273 7/15/2015   5:47:49 PM
14 Family, ambition, local 
rootedness and party
A study of the activation and  
apprenticeships of the county  
councillor in Europe
Eric Kerrouche and Corentin Poyet
Introduction: studying activation and apprenticeships 
within political recruitment
Although politics becomes increasingly a ‘career’ or even a ‘profession’, most citi-
zens are not predestined for political office. The political recruitment process does 
not operate in any random way: in their passage to power, elected representatives 
have often benefited from various circumstances (e.g. the upbringing in a political 
family, a recognized reputation in the locality), personal predispositions (like ambi-
tion) or specific legal provisions (such as towards specific group, women etc.; Prewitt 
1970; Budge and Farlie 1975; Norris 1997). All these elements are intertwined 
aspects of  political recruitment, ‘the process by which citizens are mobilized into 
politics’ (Brady et al. 1999: 153). This chapter, which is directly inspired by a previ-
ous publication on the same subject, but for municipal councillors (Verhelst and 
Kerrouche 2012), focuses on two phases of  this process at the local level: the activa-
tion and apprenticeships of  councillors-to-be, turning ‘eligible’ citizens (Abéles 
1989) into aspirants willing and ready to run for office. In our perspective, activa-
tion on one hand refers to the incitement towards, and awakening interest in poli-
tics through the primary socialization in the family/local environment and the 
combination of  different motivations. Apprenticeships, on the other hand, refer to 
the acquisition of  specific political skills in networks from associational and political 
life. Activation and apprenticeships may determine candidates’ passages to power 
by adding up to, or compensating for the basic and most documented resource of  
eligible citizens, i.e. a favourable and distinctive social background (Levine and 
Hyde 1977; Steyvers and Reynaert 2006).
As in the other chapters of  this book, our perspective is comparative – which is 
the best way to enrich the already existing literature on political recruitment ( Jacob 
1962; Levine and Hyde 1977) in avoiding a fragmented view of  this topic in Europe 
(Patzelt 1999). In this respect, we fall in line with efforts in recent years to build a 
better comprehensive knowledge base in comparative research on political recruit-
ment. The study of  Cotta and Best (2000) focussing on the recruitment of  national 
MPs in several European countries, the work on ‘The European Mayor’ (2006) in 
which Bäck and his colleagues (Bäck, Heinelt, and Magnier 2006) comparatively 
8329-0042-PIV-014.indd   274 7/18/2015   2:03:56 PM
Family, ambition, rootedness and party 275
scrutinised the recruitment of  mayors in Europe or the survey on municipal coun-
cillors in Europe in which Egner et al. (2013) did the same for this specific popula-
tion have been many milestones to a better and systematic understanding of  
political recruitment. This chapter adds a new layer dedicated to county council-
lors in Europe.1 However, we find the exact same limitations than for our previous 
study on municipal councillors due to our specific research interest. Indeed, once 
again, the survey exclusively addressed elected councillors. Thus candidates failing 
to take the ultimate step in the recruitment process are not included. Similarly, 
focussing solely on the supply side of  recruitment excludes the opinions and 
motives of  the established actors at the demand side of  recruitment, even if  we can 
imagine that the elected candidates are a fair reflection of  what is expected by those 
‘selectorates’ (Norris 1997). Further, the cross-sectional nature of  the data set 
enables us to discuss and classify the activation and apprenticeships of  our respon-
dents but does not allow addressing recruitment from a longitudinal perspective. 
Finally, the data represent auto-evaluations from councillors, as such some subjec-
tivity (distortions due to time passing by, social desirability) might have occurred 
during response.
Bearing in mind these qualifications, the chapter takes a descriptive and an 
explanatory approach by empirically outlining the activation and apprenticeships 
of  county councillors in Europe. First, it presents a general assessment of  the mat-
ter in a comparative perspective, overcoming the ‘patchwork approach’ that has 
marked so much of  European recruitment research (Patzelt 1999: 265). Second, it 
assesses activation and apprenticeship as particular stages of  the broader process 
of  political recruitment. Accordingly, this explanatory section scrutinises the 
impact of  councillors’ social base and the opportunity structure of  local govern-
ment in Europe upon activation and apprenticeships. Whereas the former acts as 
the basic and preceding resource for citizens in recruitment, the latter determines 
the general context in which political recruitment unfolds (Norris 1997).
‘Professionalization’ is the guiding concept to organize our data and findings. 
Professionalization is claimed to have transformed the legislative elite in most West-
ern societies across all political levels (including local), this shift towards profes-
sionalization being, to differing degrees, reinforced by the changing legal framework 
(Guérin and Kerrouche 2006). As such it appears to be an effective concept to study 
political elites from a comparative perspective (Eliassen and Pedersen 1978; Fox 
and Lawless 2005). For centuries the layperson councillor served as benchmark for 
representative (local) democracies. Elected citizens, empowered to act on behalf  
of  the locality, formed the base of  democratic government (Mouritzen and Svara 
2002). Yet the traditional image of  voluntary or amateur local government repre-
sentatives devoting themselves to the service of  the public cause has been gradually 
given up, to the detriment of  professionalised representatives due to evolutions in 
the context of  local politics (e.g. local governance with its increasing complexity of  
decision making; Guérin and Kerrouche 2008). Professionalization incorporates 
several distinctive dimensions. A common dimension denotes the political career 
or occupation of  elected councillors in office (Eliassen and Pedersen 1978; Cotta 
and Best 2000; Guérin and Kerrouche 2008). This chapter, however, is concerned 
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with early stages of  professionalization, i.e. professionalization in the preceding 
process of  political recruitment. It refers to the ‘change in recruitment patterns of  
the legislative elite’ (Eliassen and Pedersen 1978: 291). According to Cotta and Best 
(2000), professionalised political recruitment contains both a social and a political 
dimension. Whereas the former might imply typical social characteristics such as 
coming from a political family, the latter represents the growing importance of  
political status in recruitment – usually embedded in the sphere of  party politics 
(see also Eliassen and Pedersen 1978). In addition, we argue that professionaliza-
tion implies a personal aspect that relates to the adaptation of  an individual to his 
or her potential functions as a local elected representative. It is embodied by coun-
cillors’ ambition or motivational system.
Layperson or professional? A descriptive analysis  
of  activation and apprenticeships
Blood ties – political families as the social component  
of  professionalization
Families are not only the place of  primary socialisation; they are also the con-
tainer where political experience is shaped (Percheron 1987). As such, the family 
unit is a medium to understand political participation. As pointed out by Fox and 
Lawless (2005), ‘inherited’ interest in political affairs oftentimes accounts for the 
decision to enter politics, regardless of  socio-demographic background or per-
sonality. The most ancient effect of  the upbringing in a political family consists 
of  the so-called political dynasty effect where mandates are (indirectly) passed on 
from one family member to another (Prewitt 1970; Patriat and Parodi 1992). This 
situation has been studied in many contexts when the mandate itself  became an 
inheritance at the municipal (Le Bart 1994), regional (Darviche et al. 1995) or 
county level (Criqui 1992). Although political dynasties in this strict and narrow 
sense still occur, they are gradually declining over time whilst their absolute 
impact is diminishing as well (Van Liefferinge and Steyvers 2008). The modern 
interpretation of  political families stresses their impact as an activating factor in 
recruitment. In this sense families activate people’s political capital by exposing 
them to political information and stimuli, inciting an interest in or passion for 
politics (Prewitt 1970). Moreover, the feeling of  citizenship grows particularly 
well in the environment of  a highly politicised family as well (Fox and Lawless 
2005). According to Fox and Lawless (2005: 653), ‘early political exposure gener-
ates lasting effects that are independent and cannot be entirely compensated for 
by being politically active as an adult.’ As such, family life acts as the primary 
agent of  political socialisation (Eulau 1962; Braud 1996; Muxel 2001). Addition-
ally, political families affect the outcome of  political recruitment later on as well 
by facilitating and advancing the career of  candidates from a politicised family 
(Van Liefferinge and Steyvers 2008).
In the research design of  the questionnaire, coming from a ‘political family’ 
represents one social component of  professionalised recruitment opposing 
8329-0042-PIV-014.indd   276 7/18/2015   2:03:56 PM
Family, ambition, rootedness and party 277
candidates with this particular background to others who cannot benefit from the 
same advantage. The variable ‘political family’ was operationalized through the 
question: ‘In the two last generations, were any of  your close relatives elected for 
a political function?’
As Table 14.1 shows, almost one-third (32 per cent) of  the European second-
tier councillor population in general has been socialised in a political family. This 
figure, which is higher than the percentage which was found in the survey on 
municipal councillors (28 per cent), falls in line with the general proportion of  
dynastic following across contemporary political systems (Van Liefferinge and 
Steyvers 2008). Thus, coming from a political family remains a non-negligible 
modality in the recruitment process of  second-tier councillors in Europe. Three 
countries are situated well above this average. In France about two-thirds of  
the councillors come from a political family. The percentage is lower but still 
substantial in Scandinavian countries, with Sweden at 40 per cent and Norway at 
56.3 per cent. In these three countries political recruitment seems much more 
determined and restricted by the empowering and activating influence of  the 
upbringing in a political family. For the Scandinavian countries, the results are a 
confirmation of  the findings on municipal councillors (the percentages were 
43.5 for Sweden and 55.1 for Norway). The French percentage for its part cor-
roborates the specificity of  the county councillor population in France (Roy 2008). 
Nonetheless, when those three countries are excluded, the overall majority of  
county councillors in Europe has been activated towards politics elsewhere. The 
proportion of  dynastic following is weak in Southern European countries (Greece, 
22.2 per cent; Croatia, 25 per cent; and Spain, 26.9 per cent), as well as in  England 
(26.6 per cent). Poland is a particular outlier, with no convincing explanation for 
its low score (16 per cent).
Table 14.1  Second-tier councillors in 
Europe belonging to political 
families (in per cent)2
Countries Yes
Belgium 33.0
Croatia 25.0
Czech Rep. 33.0
England 26.6
France 64.9
Germany 30.7
Greece 22.2
Norway 56.3
Poland 16.0
Romania 27.4
Spain 26.1
Sweden 40.0
total (N = 4,305) 32.0
Source: Second Tier Survey
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Family and ambition: the personal component of  
professionalization
Coming from a political family is not the only way eligible citizens are activated 
towards politics: studies of  political recruitment should consider the attitudes, 
expectations and plans of  councillors to be as intrinsic personal elements of  profes-
sionalization. In this respect it is important to pay attention to the circumstances 
surrounding the candidate at the time of  his or her decision (Schlesinger 1966).
Motivation and ambition underlie the initial decision to run for office (Norris 
1997; Schlesinger 1966: 1). Fox and Lawless (2005: 643) define this type of  political 
motivation as the ‘nascent ambition, the embryonic or potential interest in office seeking 
that precedes the actual decision to enter a specific political contest.’ In other words, 
although eligible citizens might profit from specific resources (such as social base and 
networks, family, education and local resources) they still have to be willing to engage 
in politics as well. In a previous article on municipal councillors (Verhelst and Ker-
rouche 2012), three traditional ways to study political ambition or motivation dis-
cerned by Meadowcroft were put forward (2001). The first is to follow into the 
footsteps of  Schlesinger, the founding father of  ambition theory (Blac 1972; Levine 
and Hyde 1977; Aars and Offerdal 1998). He claimed that potential candidates 
are rational ‘office seekers’ who adjust their actions to the changing circumstances of  
the recruitment pattern in order to seek personal benefits. Consequently, they gradu-
ally develop the ambition that matches the demands of  the pursued political office 
and/or higher office (Black 1972). The second way is to apply the social psychology 
model developed by Laswell (1948), which depicts the politician as a special kind of  
personality driven by the quest for power and status. Both approaches, however, have 
been criticised for their lack of  empirical support, paving the way for a third avenue 
to study the initial ambition. The inductive or empirical school simply asks candidates 
in person to assess their nascent ambition. As such ‘political motivation’ is conceptu-
alised in an empirically measurable way. On the downside, because of  its subjectivity, 
the approach seems particularly prone to the distortions mentioned in our introduc-
tion. Still, Schlozman, Verba and Brady (1995) state that this is the most appropriate 
method if  it is used carefully and is accompanied by methodological elucidation.
Political motivation has a strong relation with the process of  professionalisation 
(Black 1970). Still, in research of  efficiency for the survey, some questions available 
for the study on municipal councillors were been dropped from the questionnaire 
on county councillors. We had to adapt our approach and indirectly operationalise 
political motivation through three items using some theoretical insights coming 
from the body of  research from the empirical school.
First, we distinguish between self-centred and altruistic motives (Eulau et al. 
1961). Schlozman, Verba and Brady (1995: 7) stated that: ‘There is a significant 
difference between citizens whose activity is motivated by a desire to further their 
careers [ . . . ] and those whose gratification emanates from the feeling of  having 
helped others or having made the community a better place to live.’ It is thus pos-
sible to oppose the ‘citizen duty’ motive and the ‘political career’ motive. The 
former refers to the ideal-typical councillors ‘devoting themselves to the service of  
the public cause’ (Guérin and Kerrouche 2008: 180). The latter motive represents 
the professional councillor who consciously strives for a career in politics.
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Other motives need to be taken into account. Specific issue motivations may 
increase candidate’s likelihood to participate politically. Issue passion spurs political 
activism (Fox and Lawless 2005). Strong policy goals have been shown to serve as 
substantial motivating factors for candidates with no previous political experience 
(Canon 1990). Candidates may pursue an elective office in order to influence and 
implement specific policy issues, and local politics might be the pre-eminent politi-
cal level due to the high direct visibility of  policy output.
The final motive is the particular motivation to represent the political party. 
Since parties have become important selection agents in recruitment (Eliassen and 
Pedersen 1978; Norris 1997; Kenig 2009), some candidates will acknowledge their 
influence on their behaviour.
Our questionnaire indirectly captured this theoretical continuum of  profession-
alization with three items related to the question ‘How important do you believe 
the following tasks are for a councillor to perform?’ Respondents were asked to rate 
the importance of  the motives on a five-point scale (1 = not important at all; 5 = 
very important). It is thus possible to have a schematic continuum ranging from 
layperson side to professional side, the score and the polarity being different for 
each item, as shown in Figure 14.1.
Even if  the picture is less precise than for the study on municipal councillors,3 
Table 14.2 illustrates that the average county councillor in Europe is rather inspired 
by motives on the layperson side. The most important motive relates to the ideo-
logical drive behind the pursuit of  office. More than 92 per cent of  our research 
population aspired to public office in order to influence the main goals of  county 
activity, and 86.4 per cent of  them wanted to represent requests and issues emerg-
ing from local society. Motives on the ‘professional side’ of  the continuum generate 
less support, without being negligible: about two-thirds of  the councillor popula-
tion (64.8 per cent) acknowledged party duty as an important element of  their 
motivation. With those limited indicators, we can support the idea that county 
councillors mainly correspond to the layperson ideal-type, being more inspired 
community workers with the will to influence the county activity specific policy 
issues and a general political interest in mind. Still, it is not possible to ignore par-
ties’ influence for more than 60 per cent of  the councillor population.
This global picture conceals strong discrepancies between the countries under 
scrutiny. First, the layperson motive ‘Representing the requests and issues emerging 
Figure 14.1 Schematic continuum from layperson side to professional side
Source: Second Tier Survey
question maximum and minimum 
score in favour of  a
layman professional 
Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society 5 1
Taking part in defining the main goals of  county activity 5 1
Taking part in implementing the program of  the political 
party/movement
1 5
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Table 14.2 Political motivations of  county councillors in Europe
Country ‘Taking part in defining  
the main goals of  county 
activity’
‘Taking part in 
implementing the program 
of  the political party/
movement’
‘Representing the requests 
and issues emerging from 
local society’
Mean Per cent of  
councillors 
with a score 
of  4 or 5
Mean Per cent of  
councillors 
with a score 
of  4 or 5
Mean Per cent of  
councillors 
with a score 
of  4 or 5
Belgium 4.0 (1) 75.5 4.0 (0.9) 77.5 4.0 (1) 73.5
Croatia 4.2 (0.9) 82.3 3.7 (1) 58.0 4.3 (0.8) 86.0
Czech Rep. 4.1 (0.7) 84.6 3.9 (0.7) 70.0 3.9 (0.8) 70.0
England 4.5 (0.8) 87.8 4.0 (1) 70.7 4.7 (0.5) 97.0
France 4.7 (0.5) 98.8 2.8 (1.1) 26.8 4.3 (0.8) 88.0
Germany 4.7 (0.5) 97.8 3.9 (0.9) 72.2 4.1 (0.8) 79.8
Greece 4.2 (1) 80.0 3.7(1.2) 60.0 4.3 (0.9) 80.6
Hungary 4.9 (0.5) 100.0 3.9 (1) 68.0 4.7 (0.6) 98.1
Italy 4.8 (0.6) 95.7 4.0 (0.9) 71.3 4.7 (0.6) 94.6
Norway 4.6 (0.6) 94.8 4.4 (0.7) 94.8 4.1 (0.8) 82.4
Poland 4.2 (1) 75.4 3.4 (1) 37.6 4.7 (0.6) 92.8
Romania 4.6 (0.7) 95.0 4.3 (0.8) 88.1 4.6 (0.6) 93.8
Spain 4.8 (0.6) 96.9 4.4 (0.7) 89.2 4.7 (0.7) 92.2
Sweden 4.8 (0.4) 98.6 4.7 (0.5) 97.8 4.5 (0.6) 94.5
Total 4.6 (0.7) 92.4 3.8 (1) 64.8 4.4 (0.8) 86.4
Source: Second Tier Survey.
from local society’ is less important in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany and 
Norway but appears especially high in countries such as Hungary, England, Swe-
den, Italy, Romania, and Poland. This preoccupation seems to be disconnected 
from the type of  local government system. Second, issue politics was particularly 
present in the minds of  county councillors in Hungary, France, Sweden, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and Romania. In Poland (75.4 per cent) and Belgium (75.5 per cent), 
this motive, if  still important, is low compared to other countries (Greece, Croatia 
and the Czech Republic being in between the two former groups). Party politics is 
particular important for councillors in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden and 
Norway), Spain and Romania. For county councillors in France and Poland, imple-
menting the program of  the political party is less important.
Local community, political party and local supports:  
the political component of  professionalization
Besides the socialization in a political family and/or a motivation to run for office, 
the acquisition of  political capital through (political) apprenticeships is an equally 
important advantage in recruitment (Prewitt 1970). In our perspective, apprentice-
ships refer to the membership in certain associations, which act as secondary 
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socialisation agents and can be considered as potential bridges toward a political 
career. At the same time they may complement and/or compensate for the political 
capital acquired in the family environment and steer the candidate to office. Such 
associations may even represent a pool of  likely candidates for ‘selectorates’ eager 
to find new profiles. In other words, candidates can ‘convert’ the social capital 
acquired in those associations into the political arena. Being a member may help 
them to climb the political ladder.
Since there are no formal schools in which to learn politics, if  we except some 
specific bodies within political parties (Petaux 1994), certain organisations of  the 
(local) community assume the role of  informal training school (Kjaer 2006). The 
learning mechanism of  organizations or associations works in a twofold way (Moy-
ser and Parry 1986). On one hand, citizens gain organisational and communicative 
skills (e.g. debating, speaking in public and negotiating) during their activity in and 
work for the associations. These skills are both an indirect preparation and indispens-
able assets in the race for office and the political career later on. On the other hand, 
associations create the perfect environment to build or expand personal (and political) 
networks (Becquart-Leclercq 1979). These networks are an obvious head start for 
candidates when it comes to recruitment and elections as well. Hence, whereas social 
background, family and motivations pave the way to office, associations are claimed 
to be the high roads (Balme 1989). Furthermore, associations play an important role 
in the political life of  elected councillors in office as well. Not only do they serve as 
an input channel for information from local society, they also provide a firm and 
continuous electoral base for subsequent elections (Moss and Parker 1967).
For laypersons, apprenticeships will be situated in the non-political sphere, rep-
resented by associations and organisations in the local community. In order to 
capture these apprenticeships, we used the answer to the question ‘Have you previ-
ously been a member or held a position in the following types of  organisations?’ 
Three types of  organisations were available in the questionnaire: trade union, 
business/professional association and others. We combined these three items in a 
variable called ‘local community apprenticeships’.4
Table 14.3 shows that county councillors in Europe are strongly integrated in the 
associational life of  their local community. Only 15.1 per cent have never been a 
member of  a particular association at all (the percentage was 3.6 per cent for the 
municipal councillors). The majority of  the county councillors in Europe (44.8 per 
cent, as opposed to 65.7 per cent for the municipal councillors) held an elected or 
appointed position in at least one association, pointing to a real degree of  integration 
and local commitment (the percentage of  former member being 40.1 per cent). This 
leads us to conclude that layperson apprenticeships in non-political organisations still 
play an obvious role in the recruitment process of  local elected representatives.
Here again differences between European countries are noticeable. In coun-
tries such as England, Sweden, Norway and Italy, less than 10 per cent of  the 
councillors were never members of  at least one association in the local commu-
nity. The percentage exceeds 20 per cent for Poland, Romania and Belgium – 
mostly because in these cases fewer councillors with former elected or appointed 
positions are to be found. Belgium, Germany, Croatia, Italy, Spain and the Czech 
8329-0042-PIV-014.indd   281 7/18/2015   2:03:56 PM
282 E. Kerrouche and C. Poyet
Republic single out with a proportion of  former member, which exceeds elected 
or appointed position. There is an opposite picture in England, Romania, Greece 
and France. Still in no single country of  our study is less than 75 per cent of  the 
councillor population connected to the community through apprenticeships in 
associational life.
Local supports are another essential component of  local ‘eligibility’ because 
social networking is one of  the conditions for a political career (Abéles 1989). These 
local supports may be connected to the involvement of  the candidate in the com-
munity, be it in voluntary associations, religious or professional circles. The more 
those supports, acquired over time, are important, the more they provide strong 
foundations for a potential political career (Fenno 1978). The amount of  support 
is also an indirect measure of  local rootedness of  the candidate, the underlying 
hypotheses being that the more support a candidate gets, the more ‘eligible’ by 
different segments of  the population that person is recognised. The questionnaire 
allowed us to build a scale of  local support prior to the last election,5 using the 
question ‘As a candidate in the last election, to what extent did you have the support 
of  the following groups?’ All the items available – namely the party at the county 
level, national politician(s) and representatives of  trade union(s), farmers, fishers, 
industrial enterprises, the construction/real estate sector, trade-services enterprises, 
the tourism sector; the media; the church and other religious groups as well as other 
local associations, groups and social movements – were included in the scale (with 
the exception of  ‘national organ(s) of  your party’ because above all local rootedness 
should be measured). For each kind of  support, a score of  1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
great) was possible. Since 11 items were available, the maximum possible score was 
Table 14.3  Local community apprenticeships of  county councillors in 
Europe: membership in a local association (in per cent)
Countries Never Former member Former elected or 
appointed position
Belgium 23.3 44.4 32.2
Croatia 15.5 46.4 38.2
Czech Rep. 14.5 56.6 28.9
England - 23.7 76.3
France 14.0 29.0 57.1
Germany 18.8 44.9 36.3
Greece 17.6 25.3 57.1
Hungary 19.5 34.1 46.3
Italy 8.5 46.6 44.9
Norway 5.0 29.7 65.3
Poland 20.3 38.2 41.6
Romania 22.6 32.9 44.5
Spain 19.7 46.7 33.6
Sweden 1.4 33.0 65.6
Total (N = 4,859) 15.1 40.1 44.8
Source: Second Tier Survey
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55. Using the data, we ended up with an additive scale going from 0 to 44, which 
was afterwards recoded in a four-point scale. According to these measurements 
(N = 2,856):
• 26.2 per cent of  the county councillors had low local support
• 26.5 per cent had high local support
• 18.6 per cent scored with a value of  2
• 25.7 per cent had a value of  3
There are again strong discrepancies between European countries, as illus-
trated in Table 14.4.
Local support is especially low in England, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France 
and Sweden. Conversely, it is important in Norway, Hungary and Romania. Since 
the average mean of  local support is 2.5, it leads us to conclude that if  this aspect 
is non-negligible, it is less essential than others.
Political party is another distinctive channel of  the associational life. Member-
ship in a political party is often considered to be the irreplaceable stepping stone 
towards a political mandate (Prewitt 1970; Moyser and Parry 1986; Lazarus 2008). 
Local elective representatives are often recruited amongst the party ranks, because 
the partisan organisation (a) continues to be the essential pool of  candidates and 
(b) has an essential role in the selection process and select candidates that have the 
(alleged) qualities to be elected (Eliassen and Pedersen 1978; Norris and Loven-
duski 1993; Meadowcroft 2001). In this respect, ‘political party apprenticeship’ is 
the prominent conceptualization of  the political component of  professionalization 
in recruitment. The variable indicates the percentage of  councillors that were a 
party member before their first elective local mandate. As such it represents council-
lors who have been recruited in the professional environment of  the party ranks.6
Table 14.4 Local support of  county councillors in Europe
Countries Mean Standard deviation
Belgium 2.0 1
Croatia 3.0 1
Czech Rep. 2.2 1
England 1.6 0.8
France 2.2 1
Greece 2.7 1.1
Hungary 3.2 0.9
Italy 2.7 1.2
Norway 3.1 0.9
Poland 2.4 1.2
Romania 3.3 0.9
Spain 3.0 1
Sweden 2.3 1
Total (N = 2,856) 2.5 1.2
Source: Second Tier Survey.
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Given the huge proportion of  county councillors socialised in parties’ ranks 
before their election, Table 14.5 illustrates, if  such were necessary: (a) the strength 
of  party influence, (b) their anchorage at the local level and (b) their strong impact 
upon recruitment. Generally 93.8 per cent of  the European county councillor 
population was a party member before his or her first election (compared to 
77.4 per cent for the municipal councillors). In the Southern countries such as 
Spain, Greece and Italy party membership takes almost absolutist proportions. 
This is also the case for Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Poland and Sweden 
(with percentages ranging from 90 to 94). However, Norway (especially), the Czech 
Republic and Hungary are characterised by a fairly low rate of  party membership. 
Still we can argue that party politics is a fundamental apprenticeship for at least a 
substantial part of  the councillor population in each country of  the study.
To sum up, if  local involvement in associational life remains an important aspect 
of  apprenticeships (but to a lesser extent than for municipal councillors), the impli-
cation in the political arena has a higher impact, which tends to marginalising also 
the local rootedness measured by the level of  support.
Activation and apprenticeships in European local 
governance: A multivariate analysis
Defining variables and hypothesis
The first sections of  this chapter dealt with the questions of  activation and appren-
ticeship in European local government. As argued in the introduction, both activa-
tion and apprenticeship are phases of  a wider process of  political recruitment 
Table 14.5  Political party apprenticeships of  local councillors in Europe: 
party members before their first elective local mandate (in per cent)
Countries Non party members Party members
Belgium 5.9 94.1
Croatia 14.6 85.4
Czech Rep. 37.3 62.7
England 6.3 93.8
France 8.1 91.9
Germany 18.8 81.2
Greece 2.8 97.2
Hungary 27.7 72.3
Italy 5.4 94.6
Norway 62.0 38.0
Poland 9.4 90.6
Romania 11.3 88.7
Spain 1.4 98.6
Sweden 9.9 90.1
total (N=4,499) 6.3 93.8
Source: Second Tier Survey.
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which is composed of  several interconnected phases (Norris 1997). Hence, our 
purpose is now to investigate the importance of  activation and apprenticeship 
regarding several factors influencing political recruitment processes. We will show 
how particular characteristics might influence the shape of  activation and appren-
ticeship; the process to be ‘recruitable’ may result from different patterns. Political 
recruitment is strongly related to the institutional framework in which potential 
candidates operate (Aars and Offerdal 1998; Nay 2001; Siavelis and Morgenstern 
2012). In this chapter we thus select two characteristics of  the second-tier local 
government system which would affect both activation and apprenticeship: local 
government system at the county level and size of  the county (H1, H2 and H3). 
Beyond these structural features, we also investigate the effect of  three individual 
factors, namely ideology of  county councillors, their function and their social base. 
Finally, we also assess the impact of  social characteristics – namely age, gender and 
profession (H4, H5 and H6).
Despite general trends in the descriptive analyses, both activation and appren-
ticeship of  county councillors follow various patterns. Similarities may occur within 
groups of  countries sharing similar features. Hence it is interesting to systematically 
investigate the effect of  institutional factors on activation and apprenticeship. The 
literature highlights various typologies of  local government systems (Lidström 
1998) based on different aspects. According to Stoker (2010: 208), two kinds of  
typologies focusing on historical or present day criteria are dominant. As argued 
by Lidström (1998: 103), the most cited typology is proposed by Hesse and Sharpe 
(1991). In addition, other scholars provide similar classifications with a more Euro-
pean perspective (Batley and Stoker 1991; John 2001; Page 1991; Page and Gold-
smith 1987). These typologies distinguish three groups based upon the vertical 
relations between local and central governments: Anglo (high autonomy without 
constitutional status), North and Middle European (high autonomy with a consti-
tutional status) and Franco groups (limited autonomy with a constitutional status). 
As a development of  the first typology, Denters and Rose (2005) added a distinction 
between federal and unitary systems. Similarly, Heinelt and Hlepas (2006) added 
a group, Central and East European countries, due to their similar backgrounds 
and recent process of  decentralization. A second typology is based on the horizontal 
relations at the local level of  governance referring to the institutionally determined day-
to-day practice of  local politics (Mouritzen and Svara 2002). Four types of  local 
government may be distinguished: the strong political leader, the committee-leader, the 
collective and the council-manager form. In this chapter, the second typology (i.e. the 
one developed by Mouritzen and Svara 2002) is assessed upon activation and 
apprenticeship. According to this typology, we may state the first two hypotheses:
1. If  the institutional set-up of  a county is characterised by the committee-
leader form (or the council-manager form), then it will lead to a recruitment 
toward professional path.
2. If  county works with the collective-leader or the strong president form, then 
political recruitment will rather be characterised by the prevalence of  lay-
person rule.
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Hypothesis 3 concerns the size of  the county. Unfortunately, we do not have precise 
data about the electoral districts, although this is generally the key factor explaining 
legislators and representatives’ behaviours and attitudes (Carey and Shugart 1995; 
Dudzinska et al. 2014; Poyet 2014; Studlar and Welch 1991; Tremblay 2007). In 
order to tackle this problem, we decided to define to what extent a county is more 
or less urbanized through its number of  inhabitants. As argued by Eliassen and 
Pedersen (1978, 291), urbanisation leads to a growing professionalization of  local 
mandates because of  the complexity of  politics linked to this evolution (Denters 
and Rose 2005). Thus our expectation is:
3. The more urbanized the county is, the more the professional path of  recruit-
ment will be fostered.
Candidate recruitment does not follow the same rules in left- and right-wing 
parties. As shown by Lundell (2004) as well as by Rahat and Hazan (2001), different 
practices coexist in the same country and depend mainly on the party itself  rather 
than on cultural or institutionalized practices. In other words: party politics matter. 
Previous analyses of  municipal councillors or MPs showed a dichotomy between 
left and right parties. The former tend to apply the American model of  primaries, 
letting members of  the party decide who will run for particular elections (Costa and 
 Kerrouche 2007; Garraud 1989). On one hand, this very inclusive method of  
recruitment would encourage potential candidate to be involved in the party poli-
tics. On the other, candidates of  right-wing parties rely more on their own social 
background and tend to be more independent (Garraud 1989). Thus we can expect 
Hypothesis 4:
4. If  a candidate situates him- or herself  on the left of  the ideological continuum, 
then he or she would have favoured a recruitment through the profes-
sional path.
As argued by Black (1972) and Schlesinger (1994), the main goal of  an individual 
involved in politics is to attain a political office. Strøm (1997) goes further by show-
ing that individuals pursue goals one by one. Only the completion of  one goal will 
generate and launch the pursuit of  the following one. In his theory an executive 
position is hierarchically higher than a councillor position. Being elected at such a 
position requires specific skills which differ from the previous stage. According to 
Strøm (1997), candidates who have experienced socialization through their politi-
cal party and through local organization will be favoured. Hypothesis 5 may be 
stated as follows:
5. If  potential candidate tend to reach an executive office, then he or she will 
be inspired by professional motives and mainly party duty.
Favourable social bases operate as resources for potential candidates (Meadow-
croft 2001). In other words, in context of  growing professionalisation of  local 
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politics (Brugué and Vallès 2005), academic degrees or highly skilled professions 
become central elements of  political recruitment (Cotta and Best 2000). Hence, 
potential candidates without advantageous social base may have to compensate 
this disadvantage. Activation and apprenticeship will then work as tool to build 
eligibility. Our final hypothesis is:
6. The less favourable the social base is, the more important activation and 
apprenticeship will be.
Results
In order to examine the effect of  the previous factors we ran multiple binary logistic 
regressions upon activation and apprenticeship. Results are displayed in the follow-
ing tables.
First of  all, the high number of  significant results indicates that both institutional 
and individual factors matter in defining differences in activation and apprentice-
ship. In addition, some models have rather high Nagelkerke R2, meaning that the 
models are robust.
The hypotheses about the type of  government system cannot be completely 
corroborated. County councillors from the council-manager group frequently 
come from a political family. Socialisation in a political environment is thus more 
important for this group than the others, including the committee-leader group. 
In terms of  motivation, the pattern is unclear. According to our hypotheses, mem-
bers of  the committee-leaders and the council-managers group tend to give 
importance to the implementation of  the programme of  their political party 
(party duty). This is the only item that provides a significant difference between 
the groups. It has to be noticed that, according to our expectations, the general 
interest is not a motivation for councillors elected in a council-manager system 
but this is the case for those elected in a committee leader system. Thus, the 
importance of  being socialised in a political family is significant and corroborates 
the hypotheses but the question of  motivations remains rather uncertain. The 
pattern is clearer when we investigate apprenticeship: a very large part of  mem-
bers of  the committee-leader and the council-managers group were members of  
their political party before their mandate at the county council. In addition, the 
same groups are much more involved in local community than are councillors 
from the collective leaders and strong leader groups. The sense of  party duty of  
the former tends to be confirmed by the item measuring the political support, 
which is higher for them than for the latter group. These results confirm the first 
and second hypotheses: the council-manager and the committee-leader system 
tend to favour a recruitment of  professionals, potential candidates who are 
involved in the political scene of  their county. If  the results are clear for appren-
ticeship variables, they are not for activation variables. Therefore, hypotheses 1 
and 2 cannot be totally confirmed.
The size of  county matters. Hypothesis 3 is corroborated by almost all vari-
ables. Again, our hypothesis is confirmed for variables measuring apprenticeship. 
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In addition, here the pattern is also clearer for those measuring activation. Coun-
cillors elected in highly populated counties benefit more often of  being socialised 
in a political family and through a political commitment. Because potential can-
didates are more numerous in these counties, these skills may act as resources in 
order to go out of  the crowd. Hence, we argue that more than a question of  
professionalization due to a growing complexity, being involved in politics and 
in local organization at an early stage is a strategic resource that facilitates the 
changeover from a potential to an eligible candidate. However, the coefficients 
for models measuring the support of  local economic organizations are negative, 
thus rejecting the hypothesis. This means that in large counties, local involvement 
is mainly connected to the political arena. Councillors coming from large coun-
ties also have more professionalised motivations oriented towards party duty 
instead of  individual issues and general interest. The former confirm our hypoth-
esis but not the latter.
Ideology does not matter as much as the previous factors. We therefore cannot 
corroborate hypothesis 4. However, some factors lead to interesting results. Con-
trary to our expectations, county councillors placing themselves on the left side of  
the ideological spectrum tend to have motivations oriented toward the general 
interest and individual issues, meaning that recruitment through the layperson path 
is privilege in their case. On the contrary, party duty is more frequent among 
members of  county council from the right flank of  the continuum. However, politi-
cal socialisation, both familial and partisan, is more important for leftist councillors. 
In addition, analyses of  local ties show that they are more involved in political 
activation (2)
defining the main goals 
of  county activity
implementing the 
program of  the political 
party/movement
Representing the requests 
and issues emerging from 
local society
committee-leader form 0.973 (0.238)*** 1.854 (0.203)*** −0.389 (0.180)**
collective leaders −0.769 (0.132)*** −0.425 (0.142)*** −0.060 (0.132)
council-manager form −0.237 (0.270) 0.633 (0.264)** −1.656 (0.284)***
size of  county 0.126 (0.071)* 0.133 (0.074)* −0.234 (0.069)***
left-right scale −0.016 (0.017) 0.077 (0.018)*** 0.043 (0.017)**
president/executive 5.367 (1.206)*** −0.771 (0.179)*** −0.044 (0.148)
woman 0.331 (0.133)** 0.379 (0.126)*** 0.045 (0.123)
employee 0.332 (0.101)*** 0.221 (0.103)** −0.206 (0.095)**
age 0.004 (0.004) −0.015 (0.004)*** −0.020 (0.004)***
Nagelkerke R2 0.218 0.144 0.063
N 2,435 2,435 2,434
Source: Second Tier Survey
***. p ≤ 0.01; **. p ≤ 0.05; *. ≤ 0.1. All coefficients are beta (standard errors in parentheses).
Table 14.6b  The impact of  the opportunity structure and social base on activation and 
apprenticeships, a multivariate regression analysis
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organisations, namely parties and trade unions. On the contrary, apprenticeship 
in the economic sector plays a greater role for rightist councillor.
Contrarily to our expectations (hypothesis 5), presidents or members of  the 
executive board of  the county are highly motivated by the general interest instead 
of  party duty. Nevertheless, as hypothesised, they are not driven by representing 
the requests emerging from the local society. Surprisingly, they do not appear to 
rely more on the socialisation in the family environment. In line with our expecta-
tions, executives seem to benefit from a specific pattern of  political recruitment 
thanks to their very high degree of  involvement in civil society and in the political 
arena. According hypothesis 5, they are, thus, highly professionalised: because their 
recruitment is more selective, they are encouraged to develop high level of  profes-
sionalization through involvement in the local and/or political organizations.
Finally, social-base variables – hypothesis 6 - are not highly significant and a 
global pattern cannot be drawn. Women appear to be firstly socialised in their 
family. They, thus, profit more often from their familial ties than do men. In 
addition, they tend to be more interested by general interest and party duty 
motives. In terms of  apprenticeship, women are mainly recruited through their 
political party. They are, thus, encouraged to enrol in a political organisation 
(party or union trade). Age is an important predictor. The younger cohorts seem 
to be above all recruited through the civil society and local organizations (regard-
less the type). In other words, creating local ties is strongly encouraged for 
younger cohorts. Their motivations are more oriented towards individual issues 
and party duty. The analyses of  the effect of  employment are biased because of  
the operationalisation of  the variable7 (In terms of  apprenticeship, only recruit-
ment through a political party is significant for employers. As far as activation 
variables are concerned, employees are motivated by the general interest and 
party duty. Moreover, being an employer results in a high score on the citizen/
civil society motives.
Conclusion
The purpose of  this chapter was to contribute to the European comparative litera-
ture on political recruitment at the local level. More precisely we were interested 
in two phases of  this process, namely activation towards politics and apprenticeship 
in politics. Both activation and apprenticeship were analysed through the three 
components of  professionalization: the social (political socialization inside the 
familial environment), personal (motivation) and political (party and civil society). 
The findings can be summed up as follows.
First, before recruitment itself  some requirements appear to be indispensable 
for a potential eligible candidate. The key factor here is the involvement in a politi-
cal party. Our results show that almost 80 per cent of  county councillors were 
members of  their party before running to the county election. In addition, mem-
bership or responsibilities in local organisation(s) seem to be a must, even if  the 
support of  these organizations appears to not be important when election time 
comes. These two factors are strongly interrelated and clearly show that social 
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network as a whole is important. This means that a successful political career is 
determined by factors related to social life.
Second, socialisation in political life through familial ties is important but not a 
requirement. It can act as a resource (mainly for women) but, for the achievement 
of  recruitment, the crucial point remains involvement in the local social life. In 
terms of  motivation, few differences between countries appear. Representing gen-
eral interest is a motivation for almost all councillors. Party duty follows the same 
pattern expect for French and Polish councillors. Electoral rules might matter in 
these cases.
Third, size matters. The size of  the county constitutes a good predictor to 
explain differences in activation and apprenticeship. In rural counties, the support 
of  local economic sector is a must; social recognition seems, thus, more important 
than in urban counties. On the contrary, in urban counties, being actively involved 
in a political organisation is necessary. The local government system also matters. 
The professional path is favoured for recruitment in committee-leader and council-
manager systems.
Fourth, individual factors also matter. Leftist councillors benefit more from their 
engagement in politics and trade unions. On the contrary, the socialisation of  right-
wing councillor appears to take place independently of  the political scene, mainly 
in the economic sector.
Notes
1 Although the project aimed to include an equal share of  cases for each country, the 
response rate variegated quite strongly between the countries under study. Therefore all 
analyses in this paper were run on the base of  a weighted data set, ensuring that each 
country is represented by an equal share of  cases.
2  Hungary has been excluded from the table because of  the weak number of  cases. In 
addition, data for Italy are missing. 
3 In the questionnaire on municipal councillors, the main question on that topic was for-
mulated as follows ‘When you first accepted to become a candidate, how important were 
the following reasons?’
4 The original questions did not allow us to exactly differentiate between membership of  
an association prior to the first mandate as a councillor and membership afterwards. 
Nevertheless we considered that the response ‘not now, but before’ referred to the time 
before the election and chose to exclude ‘at present’.
5 The last election does not mean of  course the first election. Nevertheless, according to 
our calculations, seniority of  county councillors does not have an influence on the level 
of  local supports.
6 This variable was calculated by the authors on the base of  the councillors’ years in office 
and their first affiliation to the political party.
7  The variable measures if  a county councilor is an employee or an employer regardless 
the economic sector, the size of  the firm, etc. A more precise variable would have been 
desirable. 
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